Joe982 Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 UK doesn't need boots on the ground. These speculations will make Russia think the UK has boots on the ground. We know that Russia does not evidence to make decisions. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
holoween Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 3 minutes ago, Grigb said: So, for Germany US is not truly ally. Good that we are all on the same page. NATO is a defensive alliance. Which is why when the US triggered Article 5 after 911 all of NATO joined while it didnt participate in the 2003 Iraq invasion. 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Zeleban Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 (edited) 57 minutes ago, Butschi said: In addition, even if article 5 is invoked it doesn't oblige anyone to anything beyond sending a letter of condolences. It says every nation supports the nation under attack in a way it deems appropriate. This is why I don’t understand why Ukrainians dream so much of joining NATO. We have already received this even without participation in NATO. The countries have gathered, consulted and are helping to the extent they deem necessary. What will change if Ukraine joins NATO? Edited February 27 by Zeleban 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Rokko Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 16 minutes ago, holoween said: NATO is a defensive alliance. Which is why when the US triggered Article 5 after 911 all of NATO joined while it didnt participate in the 2003 Iraq invasion. On the other hand, to my knowledge nobody tried to "weasel out" in 2001 on technicalities, like "oh but the US did this and that first" either. Granted, the stakes of going to war were much much lower in that case, so unity came cheap. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Butschi Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 14 minutes ago, Zeleban said: This is why I don’t understand why Ukrainians dream so much of joining NATO. We have already received this even without participation in NATO. The countries have gathered, consulted and are helping to the extent they deem necessary. What will change if Ukraine joins NATO? Can't argue with that... From nato.int: Quote At the drafting of Article 5 in the late 1940s, there was consensus on the principle of mutual assistance, but fundamental disagreement on the modalities of implementing this commitment. The European participants wanted to ensure that the United States would automatically come to their assistance should one of the signatories come under attack; the United States did not want to make such a pledge and obtained that this be reflected in the wording of Article 5. ... So it was the US who made sure it is possible to "weasel out" of this. Hadn't seen that coming... 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Butschi Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 7 minutes ago, Rokko said: On the other hand, to my knowledge nobody tried to "weasel out" in 2001 on technicalities, like "oh but the US did this and that first" either. Granted, the stakes of going to war were much much lower in that case, so unity came cheap. To be fair, so far, no one has tried to weasel out of anything. I was just asking/wondering if article 5 triggers in stock a circumstance. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Butschi Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 (edited) 32 minutes ago, Joe982 said: UK doesn't need boots on the ground. These speculations will make Russia think the UK has boots on the ground. We know that Russia does not evidence to make decisions. You mean to tell us, UK can do it remotely? I see, I guess, it was too complicated for us to set up such a process using fax machines, so we would actually need boots on the ground. #digitalfailedstate Edited February 27 by Butschi 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
holoween Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 27 minutes ago, Zeleban said: What will change if Ukraine joins NATO? How about actual troops. There has never been a question on weather NATO territory would be defended or not. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Carolus Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 46 minutes ago, Grigb said: So, for Germany US is not truly ally. Good that we are all on the same page. ...you have heard of a small event called "Iraq War" during which Germany, France etc. did not participate? Your input for this thread is truly invaluable, but I am afraid when it comes to this sub-conversation on international law, there must have been some misunderstanding between what you read how it works and how it actually works. Because I simply don't recognize what you say in the treaties nor in how it was applied in the past. 4 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Carolus Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 1 hour ago, Grigb said: It seems you are not. Well, would you say how you interpret it? Quote So, the ultimate decision rests with the heads of state. We have Orban, we have Scholtz and possibly few others (Austrian). Can NATO overcome their opinion? Austria is not a NATO member. But yes. Ultimately it comes down to the heads of state of the member states at a given time. Member states are also free to support each other without NATO article 5. But I am also sure that these heads of state would realise what the consequences would be if they individually decided to not follow a NATO call. It's the risk we have discussed regarding the US elections and Trump. Even if a country does follow an article 5 invocation, it may still just "sit it out" if the government takes no steps. But it would be a huge, global diplomatic shake-up. 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
squatter Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said: 1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs. Thanks for engaging with my post. I have no privileged information about what's going on around Krynki and the Dniepr front (I get most my info from here and various of the better-known podcasts) but I question several of your assertions, such as the two points in bold above. "non-stop attacks" and "giving better than they get"? Maybe this is true, but I question the data on this, given the first-hand accounts we've seen from the battered UKR marines. 20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said: 2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one. 20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said: 3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here. I think the first point to make is that if the Dniepr marsh/delta/peninsula area is so disadvantageous to Russian operations, and advantageous to UKR operations as you say, why are we not already seeing the UKR exploit this? I think that's probably because having some of UKR's best SOFs wading around in the marsh with nothing to shoot while RUS sit in their fortifications the dry land the other side of it doesn't really achieve much. 20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said: 4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake.... I may be ignorant, but looking at the map I don't see how aviation attacking lobbing glide bombs at this zone of the front is any more difficult than any other zone? And I don't see how the BSF being in port changes that equation either? RUS aircraft will be lobbing bombs from somewhere over Crimea, presumably? Also see reports elsewhere on this thread of the horrendous bombing the current bridgehead is experiencing. 20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said: 5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have! Given how vulnerable Sebastopol has proven to deep strike missiles/drones, I really don't see the RUS wanting to build any major naval facilities much closer to UKR as would just be a sitting duck, no? I would have thought the whole Kinburn spit/Marshland area is a strategic backwater. You can't build on marshland - you can hardly dig a trench or a dugout - you can't deploy armour there, and you can't (especially if you're UKR) supply it easily. If there's a ceasfire and further conflict in years to come, it will be naval drones (launched from anywhere on the Crimea) that the RUS will use to shut down UKR shipping out of Odessa. Yes, I could see special forces wading around conducting nuisance strikes and skirmishing, but much more than that I fail to see a) how it could be achieved, and b) what good it would achieve. Your position seems to be 1: The marshes west of Oleshky to the K spit are of the highest strategic value. 2 That the terrain favours the UKR over the RUS forces. 3 Therefore UKR should engage in large scale light INF operations in this area. I disagree with all three points, but I guess the next 12 months or whatever will prove the point either way. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
The_Capt Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 1 hour ago, squatter said: Thanks for engaging with my post. I have no privileged information about what's going on around Krynki and the Dniepr front (I get most my info from here and various of the better-known podcasts) but I question several of your assertions, such as the two points in bold above. "non-stop attacks" and "giving better than they get"? Maybe this is true, but I question the data on this, given the first-hand accounts we've seen from the battered UKR marines. I think the first point to make is that if the Dniepr marsh/delta/peninsula area is so disadvantageous to Russian operations, and advantageous to UKR operations as you say, why are we not already seeing the UKR exploit this? I think that's probably because having some of UKR's best SOFs wading around in the marsh with nothing to shoot while RUS sit in their fortifications the dry land the other side of it doesn't really achieve much. I may be ignorant, but looking at the map I don't see how aviation attacking lobbing glide bombs at this zone of the front is any more difficult than any other zone? And I don't see how the BSF being in port changes that equation either? RUS aircraft will be lobbing bombs from somewhere over Crimea, presumably? Also see reports elsewhere on this thread of the horrendous bombing the current bridgehead is experiencing. Given how vulnerable Sebastopol has proven to deep strike missiles/drones, I really don't see the RUS wanting to build any major naval facilities much closer to UKR as would just be a sitting duck, no? I would have thought the whole Kinburn spit/Marshland area is a strategic backwater. You can't build on marshland - you can hardly dig a trench or a dugout - you can't deploy armour there, and you can't (especially if you're UKR) supply it easily. If there's a ceasfire and further conflict in years to come, it will be naval drones (launched from anywhere on the Crimea) that the RUS will use to shut down UKR shipping out of Odessa. Yes, I could see special forces wading around conducting nuisance strikes and skirmishing, but much more than that I fail to see a) how it could be achieved, and b) what good it would achieve. Your position seems to be 1: The marshes west of Oleshky to the K spit are of the highest strategic value. 2 That the terrain favours the UKR over the RUS forces. 3 Therefore UKR should engage in large scale light INF operations in this area. I disagree with all three points, but I guess the next 12 months or whatever will prove the point either way. You guys are dancing around the central reason of why a UA action in this area would matter - it is where the RA is weakest and least prepared. The Krynki bridgehead has really been a proof of concept, not easy but the UA can sustain a light force against opposition on the other side of a river. Now, can they do that in multiple locations? The aim here is not to become Lords of Marshlands, it is to threaten Russian LOCs in the entire sector. This will force an RA response and reallocation of forces (in the biz we call this “seizing the initiative”) or risk having to pull out. That is the value of this operation, not water buzzard nesting grounds. The next question is “can they do it, light?” Can they upscale Krynki but not run afoul of the dangers of mass in this war? This we do not know. Light has done some pretty amazing stuff in this war, but mostly on the defence. We saw hints at Kharkiv as Light forces broke out, not heavy. But I am still not sure if light infantry, precision fires and unmanned can actually pull off a series of sustained raids that create (as opposed to enable) operational effects leading to decisions. All I can say is that if I wanted to try out that theory, I would pick the Kherson sector. My three points are 1) the value of the terrain is that it would put operational (and possibly) strategic pressure on Russia in an area of vulnerability. 2) The terrain favours a light force approach due to logistical and ISR realities, and 3) It expands Ukrainian strategic options, as opposed to locking them into a grinding war of attrition. But as you say, we will have to wait and see. 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 2 more Su34 plinked? 4 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 (edited) Lol check out the decals on the side of his plane... Edited February 27 by Kinophile 5 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1762218401122976092?t=ldDz4GL2md9ZbXGgDwDFWw&s=19 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 "In Ukraine, Russia Is Inching Forward Death by Death" - One line description of Russian "strategy" in a nutshell. NY Article 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
kimbosbread Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 To elaborate on why Kryki is a great spot for another Russian phyrric victory: Obviously it’s a pain for Russian logistics, but it’s hard to get their artillery in range without getting hit with all of Magyar’s pain/HIMARS. Because of this, glide bombs. But apparently roaming Patriot/whatever batteries are a thing in this area, hence all the losses we see. So they have to use meat, which unsupported, in a nasty slushy marsh isn’t going to do so well. So, ending the glide bomb threat: Russia started the war with ~150 SU-34 and has lost close to a quarter. If they are losing another 3-4 per week, that’s going to get real interesting. I don’t know how many were serviceable to start with, but what happens when there aren’t enough to go around and they’ve lost most of the pilots too? 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Battlefront.com Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 When I logged in this morning I saw 40+ new posts since I went to bed. I thought either Ukraine sank another ship, blew up something special to Russia, or there was a tit-for-tat argument about something we've already argued about before. It was the latter, though I will admit the recent addition of possibly 2 more planes knocked out of the sky made me smile About NATO. The question Zeleban asked about what is the benefit of being a NATO member is a good one. He asked this in the context of the lack of specificity in the NATO charter and the practical inability to enforce participation. Here's what I didn't see mentioned in the debate: Being a NATO member means approved, official NATO presence in Ukraine. This is CRITICALLY important for a deterrent against Russian aggression. Why? Because the chances of NATO countries going to war against Russia goes up exponentially if their forces are attacked as part of the defense of a member nation. Denying this or being pessimistic about it is equivalent to admitting living in a world extremely different than the one the rest of us live in. Because there is absolutely NO evidence, historical or the study of nation states, that supports a counter argument to what I just stated. Some NATO members may quibble over what they do or don't do to support an Article 4 or 5 declaration. But if there is a clear attack on a member who calls for that, the pressure to approve Article 4/5 will be massive. To the point of a nation saying "no" being kicked out of NATO. There might come a time when a nation would be fine with this, but that time hasn't arrived yet and it doesn't seem to be a near future possibility. More realistic is the country would vote "yes" and then do very little to support the war. NATO countries are free to act on their own, just as many did for Gulf War 1 and Gulf War 2. So let's say that a country like Hungary or Turkey refused to sign off on Article 4 or 5... so what? If the other members want to go to war they go to war. An individual country within NATO does *NOT* dictate what the other nations do on their own. It can only affect what official NATO policy is. The primary problem with Ukraine's acceptance into NATO has always been, and always will be, Russia's reaction to NATO forces being permanently stationed on Ukrainian soil under the NATO flag. Russia knows damned well that once that happens, Ukraine is effectively untouchable as long as NATO remains active. Steve 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Harmon Rabb Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 (edited) 2 hours ago, Kinophile said: Lol check out the decals on the side of his plane... Petr Pavel is one of the coolest world leaders serving in office right now. He reminds me of those Presidents you would see in 90s movies like Independence Day and Air Force One. But as much as I like Harrison Ford he is just an actor, Petr Pavel is a real hero. Edited February 27 by Harmon Rabb 9 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
squatter Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 2 hours ago, The_Capt said: You guys are dancing around the central reason of why a UA action in this area would matter - it is where the RA is weakest and least prepared. The Krynki bridgehead has really been a proof of concept, not easy but the UA can sustain a light force against opposition on the other side of a river. Yes, well I was just addressing some specific points made by the other poster. My main point is/was that I disagree with yourself/Steve/others who believe an operationally/strategically significant cross-river operation could be possible this year, as I can't see that as leading to anything other than heavy Ukrainian losses and retreat (RUS Kherson situation in reverse). Yes, I could see some small scale harrass/distract operations that may require some RUS force allocation (current bridgehead example of this), but any significant attempt to put large forces across is surely madness. I feel like without a near total breakdown in one side or other's will/ability to continue the fight (caused by grinding attrition) that this war is going to end along pretty much along the line of contact as it stands. The only question is how many more dead, maimed, traumatised people will be added to the butcher's bill, and how much more economic, environmental and social damage will be done between now and then. I pray for less rather than more. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 (edited) 48 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said: When I logged in this morning I saw 40+ new posts since I went to bed. I thought either Ukraine sank another ship, blew up something special to Russia, or there was a tit-for-tat argument about something we've already argued about before. It was the latter, though I will admit the recent addition of possibly 2 more planes knocked out of the sky made me smile About NATO. The question Zeleban asked about what is the benefit of being a NATO member is a good one. He asked this in the context of the lack of specificity in the NATO charter and the practical inability to enforce participation. Here's what I didn't see mentioned in the debate: Being a NATO member means approved, official NATO presence in Ukraine. This is CRITICALLY important for a deterrent against Russian aggression. Why? Because the chances of NATO countries going to war against Russia goes up exponentially if their forces are attacked as part of the defense of a member nation. Denying this or being pessimistic about it is equivalent to admitting living in a world extremely different than the one the rest of us live in. Because there is absolutely NO evidence, historical or the study of nation states, that supports a counter argument to what I just stated. Some NATO members may quibble over what they do or don't do to support an Article 4 or 5 declaration. But if there is a clear attack on a member who calls for that, the pressure to approve Article 4/5 will be massive. To the point of a nation saying "no" being kicked out of NATO. There might come a time when a nation would be fine with this, but that time hasn't arrived yet and it doesn't seem to be a near future possibility. More realistic is the country would vote "yes" and then do very little to support the war. NATO countries are free to act on their own, just as many did for Gulf War 1 and Gulf War 2. So let's say that a country like Hungary or Turkey refused to sign off on Article 4 or 5... so what? If the other members want to go to war they go to war. An individual country within NATO does *NOT* dictate what the other nations do on their own. It can only affect what official NATO policy is. The primary problem with Ukraine's acceptance into NATO has always been, and always will be, Russia's reaction to NATO forces being permanently stationed on Ukrainian soil under the NATO flag. Russia knows damned well that once that happens, Ukraine is effectively untouchable as long as NATO remains active. Steve Didn't someone make a game about that exact scenario? Dammit, what was it called again...tip of my tongue...gimme a sec... Edited February 27 by Kinophile 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
squatter Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 1 hour ago, kimbosbread said: To elaborate on why Kryki is a great spot for another Russian phyrric victory: Obviously it’s a pain for Russian logistics, but it’s hard to get their artillery in range without getting hit with all of Magyar’s pain/HIMARS. Because of this, glide bombs. But apparently roaming Patriot/whatever batteries are a thing in this area, hence all the losses we see. So they have to use meat, which unsupported, in a nasty slushy marsh isn’t going to do so well. Genuine question: why is RUS artillery more vulnerable supporting Kryki than any other sector of the front? If a SPG is firing 40km from the front, what makes one 40kms more dangerous than the next? 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Butschi Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 1 hour ago, Kinophile said: "In Ukraine, Russia Is Inching Forward Death by Death" - One line description of Russian "strategy" in a nutshell. NY Article Isn't that a general description of war? The question is just how many inches you get per death, right? 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Battlefront.com Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 8 minutes ago, squatter said: Genuine question: why is RUS artillery more vulnerable supporting Kryki than any other sector of the front? If a SPG is firing 40km from the front, what makes one 40kms more dangerous than the next? Further from Russian resources, closer to Ukrainian. That's a big one. The other is Ukraine has decided to commit a large amount of their artillery and drone forces in this area, Russia has not. This is partly because Russia has prioritized things like Avdiivka and Ukraine did not. This was Grigb's point earlier in the discussion. Specifically that Russia went "all in" to take Avdiivka, Ukraine did not have to to achieve what it achieved. The other thing is Russia is trying to stay on the offense and this is not the place to do it. Therefore, this sector (and others) are getting shorted on resources. We saw this happen several times before, most notably Kharkiv. Russia requires massive quantities of everything to get anything done, which means the rest is stripped of extras. Steve 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
A Canadian Cat Posted February 27 Share Posted February 27 18 hours ago, Fernando said: Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity. I do love that saying - it is always a good avenue of thought when trying to figure out if some conspiracy theory is true or not. I fear in this case there is some malice too - those agents are likely fully aware of the **** they are sending people too. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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