How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[OBJ]

10 hours ago, JonS said:

It's a different time period, but top-down was definitely a thing at Ortona.

With all respect to those with direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building, not quite sure why clearing a building top down is controversial, peace time thinking or practically infeasible. From recent 2003-2011-2016 direct US combined arms experience, it seems to be the preferred method, and the proven preferred method over the last ~70 years. Indications are this is the first option any CQB leader should consider with a mission involving clearing buildings.

@JonS example, Canadians fighting Fallschirmjäger in WWII, emphasis added
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-5-battle-of-ortona/

"Finally, the use of the mouse-holing method was another tactic that heavily influenced the battle’s outcome. It enabled the Canadians to avoid having soldiers cut down on the open streets by remaining and moving inside buildings and allowed them to fight from the top down instead of from the bottom up. Although it was not invented by the Canadians—the method was actually already formalized in British doctrine and called “the vertical technique”—mouse-holing was a common-sense tactic to apply to avoid casualties, advance under protective cover, and surprise the Germans by attacking from above.

More on Urban warfare in general, a number of case studies and essays on present and near future urban warfare, US perspective, including observations on urban combat experience in Ukraine
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/

 

[The_Capt]

32 minutes ago, OBJ said:

With all respect to those with direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building, not quite sure why clearing a building top down is controversial, peace time thinking or practically infeasible. From recent 2003-2011-2016 direct US combined arms experience, it seems to be the preferred method, and the proven preferred method over the last ~70 years. Indications are this is the first option any CQB leader should consider with a mission involving clearing buildings.

@JonS example, Canadians fighting Fallschirmjäger in WWII, emphasis added
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-5-battle-of-ortona/

"Finally, the use of the mouse-holing method was another tactic that heavily influenced the battle’s outcome. It enabled the Canadians to avoid having soldiers cut down on the open streets by remaining and moving inside buildings and allowed them to fight from the top down instead of from the bottom up. Although it was not invented by the Canadians—the method was actually already formalized in British doctrine and called “the vertical technique”—mouse-holing was a common-sense tactic to apply to avoid casualties, advance under protective cover, and surprise the Germans by attacking from above.

More on Urban warfare in general, a number of case studies and essays on present and near future urban warfare, US perspective, including observations on urban combat experience in Ukraine
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/

 

I honestly think it is a hold over from WW2, where we know it did happen.  Why it is impractical or unfeasible in the modern era is a combination of factors:

- Firepower - both sides in a modern conflict have access to orders of magnitude greater firepower than WW2.  The Canadians did not have cannons, GLs or PGM - let alone unmanned systems.  The entire reason to go top-down is to be in a better position to apply firepower, but I do not think modern firepower requires taking the risks.  As we have seen in this war, the enemy has access to increased firepower as well.  They are not going to stupidly sit back and let one crawl up a building exposed.  They are going to have next-gen MANPADs to deny tac aviation support.  They are going to be mutually supporting.  So this makes Ortona-esque approaches far more risky because an opponents ability to counter has gone up dramatically.

- ISR - Key element of any top-down attack is going to be isolation.  That means not only from enemy fires but ISR - that is nearly impossible in modern warfare. Enemy ISR is going to pick up anything as high profile and exposed as climbing up a building and counter it.  Surprise and total isolation is nearly impossible so elegant roof-top solutions are going to be suicidal most of the time.

In Iraq and Afghanistan I am sure someone did a top down attack.  From personal experience I can only say I never saw or heard of it - the "first option" in CQB was to fix the opponent in the building with fires and observation...and then shred the building.  They only exception was if there were non-combatants known to be in the building - at that point one is doing a detailed clearance which borders on an HRO and special operation.

What is interesting is looking ahead.  This is just another small but potent example of just how much our frame is shifting.  Doing a building assault in the future will be to lead with unmanned systems.  Flying FPVs top down, bottom up or basically into any entry.  This is a form of distributed, precision fires.  No one is going to climb up on top of buildings because in that sort of environment enemy drones will simply pick you off from a grid square away.  Urban operations are going to become condensed versions of what we are seeing in the open - unmanned elements leading.  Troops will need to stay under as much cover as possible because being in the open is near suicidal.

Finally, I know all discussions of Gaza have pretty much devolved - but has anyone seen or heard of the IDF doing rooftop assaults in that war?  I haven't, it has been almost entirely firepower led.

I completely disagree that a rooftop attack should be the "first option", quite the opposite in fact - it should be near the bottom of the list.  First option is fix, and then let firepower do the work, mass, PGM or unmanned, with noted non-combatant exceptions etc.

 

Edited January 29 by The_Capt

[Pete Wenman]

Just to jump in here in as a Cold War infantryman - we did extensive FIBUA training at various specialised training ranges over the years.

We trained to go in through the roof, the doors, windows, mouseholes, not to go in at all but to bypass, to call in air support, to call in armour support, to blow the place up and if I've missed any options we also trained for them. 

P

[OBJ]

29 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I completely disagree that a rooftop attack should be the "first option", quite the opposite in fact - it should be near the bottom of the list.  First option is fix, and then let firepower do the work, mass, PGM or unmanned, with noted non-combatant exceptions etc.

 

Again, with all respect to those having direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building(s), we may have to disagree and leave it there.

From the references I have cited it appears over the past 70 years to the present day, when infantry in a combined arms setting is given the mission to clear a building(s), top down is preferred for a number of reasons perhaps most importantly to minimize the attacker's casualties. Top down in no way assumes the necessity of heli-lift to drop the attackers or that all other pre-assault measures needed to support top entry will not first be in place.

edit:
1. Top down does not assume starting on the roof, most particularly when assaulting adjacent buildings
2. Agree in near future humans preceded by drones or drones alone might be the assaulters 
3. I see I am at risk for falling out of sync with responses

 

Edited January 29 by OBJ

[The_Capt]

13 minutes ago, OBJ said:

Again, with all respect to those having direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building(s), we may have to disagree and leave it there.

From the references I have cited it appears over the past 70 years to the present day, when infantry in a combined arms setting is given the mission to clear a building(s), top down is preferred for a number of reasons perhaps most importantly to minimize the attacker's casualties. Top down in no way assumes the necessity of heli-lift to drop the attackers or that all other pre-assault measures needed to support top entry will not first be in place.

Well next time you find yourself in urban combat, try out what those references say and let us know how it went.  Lord knows the pubs are never wrong or scramble to catch up to reality (heh, I have been on those writing boards and the stories I could tell...)

[OBJ]

@The_Capt I think there is little doubt of your courage, combat experience, and intellect.

Assuming the doctrine is based on actual experience, and as far as I can tell it is, not just some between the wars staff officer theorizing, I will retain my position and leave you to yours. 

[Kinophile]

Your solution is pretty much Russia's current MO.

[The_Capt]

7 minutes ago, OBJ said:

Assuming the doctrine is based on actual experience, and as far as I can tell it is, not just some between the wars staff officer theorizing, I will retain my position and leave you to yours. 

Cool.  Just make sure you make note of all the doctrine in that position.

13 hours ago, OBJ said:

7-149. The disadvantages of upper entry are that the means to enter a building at an upper level may not be present and, even if present, often takes additional time to reach; and the method of entry often increases the exposure risk of the assault force. These disadvantages, combined with the fact that the ground floor is by far the most accessible, mean that the most common method of gaining entry to a building remains by way of the ground floor. As such the dangers of ground floor entry can be successfully mitigated by support, suppression, security and obscuration.

 

[OBJ]

39 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Cool.  Just make sure you make note of all the doctrine in that position.

14 hours ago, OBJ said:
7-149. The disadvantages of upper entry are that the means to enter a building at an upper level may not be present and, even if present, often takes additional time to reach; and the method of entry often increases the exposure risk of the assault force. These disadvantages, combined with the fact that the ground floor is by far the most accessible, mean that the most common method of gaining entry to a building remains by way of the ground floor. As such the dangers of ground floor entry can be successfully mitigated by support, suppression, security and obscuration.

Yes, I know, you have repeated my quote of the last section of this part of the US Army ATTP. I deliberately highlighted the latter half of this section as you show above to recognize your position. 

However, for those just joining us, the section you have quoted is preceded by, emphasis added by me

7-146. The goal is to gain a foothold. While a direct frontal assault can accomplish this, it also can be quite costly. As such, always look for an alternate entry points. If the building is enemy occupied, try to avoid the obvious entry as the enemy will be expecting it and, to various degrees, be ready for it.  

7-147. In many instances, it is better to clear a well-defended building, especially a well-defended ground floor, from the top down as this avoids a frontal assault and bypasses the expected ground floor entry points that are often well defended and booby trapped. 

As I said above, @The_Capt I think there is little doubt of your courage, combat experience, and intellect. Assuming the US Army doctrine is based on actual experience, and as far as I can tell it is, not just some between the wars staff officer theorizing, I will retain my position and leave you to yours. 

For those interested in doing their own research, I am referencing US Army:
ATP 3-21.8 INFANTRY PLATOON AND SQUAD April 2016, which references:
ATTP 3-06.11 (FM 3-06.11) Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain Jun 2011

The ATTP reference starts page 7-36  "METHOD FOR ENTERING AND CLEARING BUILDINGS"

Edited January 29 by OBJ

[The_Capt]

21 minutes ago, OBJ said:

14 hours ago, OBJ said:
7-149. The disadvantages of upper entry are that the means to enter a building at an upper level may not be present and, even if present, often takes additional time to reach; and the method of entry often increases the exposure risk of the assault force. These disadvantages, combined with the fact that the ground floor is by far the most accessible, mean that the most common method of gaining entry to a building remains by way of the ground floor. As such the dangers of ground floor entry can be successfully mitigated by support, suppression, security and obscuration.

Yes, I know, you have repeated my quote of the last section of this part of the US Army ATTP. I deliberately highlighted the latter half of this section as you show above to recognize your position. 

However, for those just joining us, the section you have quoted is preceded by, emphasis added by me

7-146. The goal is to gain a foothold. While a direct frontal assault can accomplish this, it also can be quite costly. As such, always look for an alternate entry points. If the building is enemy occupied, try to avoid the obvious entry as the enemy will be expecting it and, to various degrees, be ready for it.  

7-147. In many instances, it is better to clear a well-defended building, especially a well-defended ground floor, from the top down as this avoids a frontal assault and bypasses the expected ground floor entry points that are often well defended and booby trapped. 

As I said above, @The_Capt I think there is little doubt of your courage, combat experience, and intellect. Assuming the US Army doctrine is based on actual experience, and as far as I can tell it is, not just some between the wars staff officer theorizing, I will retain my position and leave you to yours. 

For those interested in doing their own research, I am referencing US Army:
ATP 3-21.8 INFANTRY PLATOON AND SQUAD April 2016, which references:
ATTP 3-06.11 (FM 3-06.11) Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain Jun 2011

The ATTP reference starts page 7-36  "METHOD FOR ENTERING AND CLEARING BUILDINGS"

Hey, this is not about me.  And one thing we can agree on is mouse holing.  If one has to enter a building the last thing you are going to do is go through the front door.  Blow a hole in the side and then keep blowing holes, even between buildings.  In the future, as we have seen repeatedly in this war, cover is king: dig, disperse or die.

As to this debate - well you are standing on doctrine, I am standing on old experiences and observations of this war; I guess we will just have to see how things turn out.  Things to watch for will be after action reports from Mariupol and Gaza - some more details on Mosul would be good too. 

Doctrine is based on experience, from the last wars.  It tries to inform the next one.  No one is really good at writing doctrine ahead of conflict, we always write it after - trust me, been there and done it.

While watching this war, it is dawning on me that we are going to be in for some major doctrine re-writes (or not, as we tend to ignore other nation's experiences) - urban warfare is just one small part of this.

 

[The_Capt]

Just as a follow up, for those that are interested:

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-eight-rules-of-urban-warfare-and-why-we-must-work-to-change-them/

https://academic.oup.com/book/45784/chapter/400599318

https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/konaev_urban_warfare_megacities_2019.pdf

[OBJ]

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Just as a follow up, for those that are interested:

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-eight-rules-of-urban-warfare-and-why-we-must-work-to-change-them/

https://academic.oup.com/book/45784/chapter/400599318

https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/konaev_urban_warfare_megacities_2019.pdf

An excellent list by @The_Capt. I can only offer a small addition:
The first on the Capt's list is part of a large project on past, present and near future urban warfare.
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/

within that, for those interested, a pretty interesting collection of case studies
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/urban-warfare-project-case-studies/

[dan/california]

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Hey, this is not about me.  And one thing we can agree on is mouse holing.  If one has to enter a building the last thing you are going to do is go through the front door.  Blow a hole in the side and then keep blowing holes, even between buildings.  In the future, as we have seen repeatedly in this war, cover is king: dig, disperse or die.

As to this debate - well you are standing on doctrine, I am standing on old experiences and observations of this war; I guess we will just have to see how things turn out.  Things to watch for will be after action reports from Mariupol and Gaza - some more details on Mosul would be good too. 

Doctrine is based on experience, from the last wars.  It tries to inform the next one.  No one is really good at writing doctrine ahead of conflict, we always write it after - trust me, been there and done it.

While watching this war, it is dawning on me that we are going to be in for some major doctrine re-writes (or not, as we tend to ignore other nation's experiences) - urban warfare is just one small part of this.

 

We have entered a period of almost complete battlefield illumination, and denial. ALL of the field manuals are going to have to be rewritten to take this into account. Throw in the fact the leading edge, and 90% of the CSIR is going to consists of unmanned platforms, and we are just at the point of starting over on doctrine. That doctrine rewrite will extend from blue water naval operations down to how to secure a sewer system. Then we start on the hard part, getting procurement to actually change to reflect that new doctrine. It sounds like The_Capt is fairly close to retirement, the next person in his job is going to be rather busy. 

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

We have entered a period of almost complete battlefield illumination, and denial. ALL of the field manuals are going to have to be rewritten to take this into account. Throw in the fact the leading edge, and 90% of the CSIR is going to consists of unmanned platforms, and we are just at the point of starting over on doctrine. That doctrine rewrite will extend from blue water naval operations down to how to secure a sewer system. Then we start on the hard part, getting procurement to actually change to reflect that new doctrine. It sounds like The_Capt is fairly close to retirement, the next person in his job is going to be rather busy. 

So long as they don't call me...all will be well.  

[OBJ]

Ahhh, Capt we count on you. We here will always call on you. 'They' might not for reasons unknown.

Someone in this discussion on the future of urban warfare, made reference to Mosul lessons learned, including use of UAV, both for ISR and attack. Whoever that was might be interested in this-

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-2-battle-of-mosul/

[Carolus]

It is claimed by telegram channel "Crimean Wind" that a SU-24 did not return from a mission near Snake Island.

We might have to see if "Fighterbomber" eventually confirms.

[Ultradave]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So long as they don't call me...all will be well.  

This made me think that if they get so far down the list that they come to my name, well, building entry doctrine is not going to be the issue we're concerned about. We'll be in "The Road" territory by then.

[OBJ]

Hey Dave, got a chuckle, not sure about you but for me road was, 'Retired On Active Duty.'

[Ultradave]

1 hour ago, OBJ said:

Hey Dave, got a chuckle, not sure about you but for me road was, 'Retired On Active Duty.'

Ha! Never heard that before. No, I meant the book/movie "The Road"  - post apocalyptic wasteland wandering.

[OBJ]

Don't think I've seen it but now I will

[Joe982]

6 hours ago, Carolus said:

It is claimed by telegram channel "Crimean Wind" that a SU-24 did not return from a mission near Snake Island.

We might have to see if "Fighterbomber" eventually confirms.

But is it Russian or Ukranian???

[dan/california]

10 hours ago, OBJ said:

With all respect to those with direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building, not quite sure why clearing a building top down is controversial, peace time thinking or practically infeasible. From recent 2003-2011-2016 direct US combined arms experience, it seems to be the preferred method, and the proven preferred method over the last ~70 years. Indications are this is the first option any CQB leader should consider with a mission involving clearing buildings.

@JonS example, Canadians fighting Fallschirmjäger in WWII, emphasis added
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-5-battle-of-ortona/

"Finally, the use of the mouse-holing method was another tactic that heavily influenced the battle’s outcome. It enabled the Canadians to avoid having soldiers cut down on the open streets by remaining and moving inside buildings and allowed them to fight from the top down instead of from the bottom up. Although it was not invented by the Canadians—the method was actually already formalized in British doctrine and called “the vertical technique”—mouse-holing was a common-sense tactic to apply to avoid casualties, advance under protective cover, and surprise the Germans by attacking from above.

More on Urban warfare in general, a number of case studies and essays on present and near future urban warfare, US perspective, including observations on urban combat experience in Ukraine
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/

 

So i read the Ortona case study, in addition to being interesting in itself it is useful to contrast it with some vaguely similar engagements in Ukraine. I picked Vuhledar because it is the closet in population size. Avdiika is three times the size. Scaled for population size they are held by units at similar strength. Very approximately 1000 men per ten thousand in prewar population. All three are a style of construction that effectively makes every building a a prebuilt strong point. I think we can agree that a German parachute battalion consisted of reasonably competent soldiers, and they had artillery support.

So the point I am trying to make is that with admittedly very heavy casualties, the Canadians were able to TAKE Ortona in a month of hard fighting. The Russians have taken between five and ten times the number of casualties the Canadians took at Ortona in their assaults on Vuhledar, and Adviika. The Russians have spent ammo in both places like it was free. Both towns are still firmly in Ukrainian hands. That is how much the relative advantage of being on the defense has increased since 1943. 

Discuss. 

 

[dan/california]

A hard watch, but informative.

 

[dan/california]

The development cycle is not slowing down.

[dan/california]