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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


Probus

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47 minutes ago, Carolus said:

Is it a basic rule to not attack enemy military infrastructure on his territory?

Is it?

I am not sure if I would call it "basic". It's certainly a rule of some sort.

Absolutely not.  Any military infrastructure or even civilian infrastructure that supports military enterprises are legitimate targets under the laws of armed conflict.  Civilian casualties are also accepted so long as they are tied directly to military objectives.  So one could hit a civilian power plant but not the neighborhoods next to it.  It isn’t the LOAC that is preventing Ukraine from conducting deep strategic strike campaigns , it is escalation.

You guys should check out the Israel thread where we are having the exact opposite conversation.  People are trying to make cases that everything is legitimate, which is also a problem.

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16 hours ago, Haiduk said:

It's impossible to win, when you have a deal with cruel orcs, which spit on all conventions, but "deeply concerned" international community to force you adhere to these conventions for orcs. "If you take no prisoners, if you hit their cities, power plants, if you allow losses among their "innocent" civilians, you will turn to orcs themeselves! This will be not correspond with democracy values, human rights etc!" People lost feeling of reality and live in own ivory towers with rose unicorns...

That argument is akin to what we heard here in the US when some people, both within government and without, defended the use of torture (kindly described as "enhanced interrogation techniques").

The "feeling of reality" is that should Ukraine decide to not adhere to conventions on warfare, despite Russia spitting on them, you'd see public support for Ukraine evaporate. And quickly. Also evaporating would be any hope of Ukraine being admitted to the EU and NATO in the future. 

We had lots of debate about things like this during Iraq and Afghanistan. We are (or at least try hard to be) the "good guys." You *cannot* lower yourselves into the gutter of the opposition. Is it going to cost you to do that? Yes, it most certainly is, in money, time and lives. And I fully acknowledge that in Iraq and Afghanistan we were not fighting for the survival of our country, and I sympathize and support the fact that you are. A better example might be WW2. We (the Allies) for the most part, behaved, knowing full well the Germans and Japanese did not (I'm excepting Russian behavior as part of the Allies here, because after all, that's who we are talking about and some things don't change much).

You'll no doubt be aware that soldiers accused of war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan were highly publicized, and many put on trial. And the reason we know about it is that it was by FAR, the exception, and the fact that mostly we police our own. We're not perfect - far from it. But we do try. And it starts at the top with the communicated expectation of what won't be tolerated.

Dave

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2 hours ago, Sgt Joch said:

Remember there are two objectives as far as the West is concerned: 1) helping Ukraine to defend itself; and 2) preventing this regional conflict from spinning into WW3. I would argue goal 2 is more important than goal 1 to the West.

I would not dispute that, but that is beside the original point. The original point was whether Ukraine deserves support solely because 1) the attack on it is a Russian land grab in Europe and that kind of political move should be resisted in principle; and 2) the attack on it is indirectly aimed at and would have the effect of undermining NATO, and NATO should indirectly defend against it; or , as a conditio sine qua non, in addition to the preceding points 3) Ukraine also has to display moral superiority over Russia in some ways (democracy, human rights, corruption, adherence to LOAC, whatever else).

In my view 1) and 2) are entirely sufficient reasons.

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42 minutes ago, Ultradave said:

The "feeling of reality" is that should Ukraine decide to not adhere to conventions on warfare, despite Russia spitting on them, you'd see public support for Ukraine evaporate. And quickly. Also evaporating would be any hope of Ukraine being admitted to the EU and NATO in the future. 

I think we are going to see a practical test of this, quite soon.I think that sometime this year public support for Ukraine in countries other than Ukraine will cool down to the point where it will be as good as evaporated. Yet I am moderately optimistic and think that the Ukraine will still be supported by the Western governments - because of the underlying political interests. Public opinion support is not everything and not every war is 100% a moral crusade. 

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6 hours ago, Carolus said:

If Ukraine was allowed to do all the things any nation at war would be allowed to do

This sounds a lot like the Russian narrative, that Ukraine is just a US/NATO puppet. But we know this is a lie, Ukrainians can do whatever they wish, it is not like we can forbid them.

The real point is that the same is true for us. We support Ukraine entirely by choice, not because we have to. What's more, unlike Russia or China, we don't have dictators who can just spend money any way they see fit. Our governments have to justify giving money to Ukraine instead of spending it in their respective country (Germany is currently deep in a budget crisis and aid for Ukraine was among the very few points that were not under scrutiny). That works because it is not orcs fighting orcs but good guys defending against bad guys.

I totally get the frustration but on the other side I think all the negativity about Western support is unwarranted. In less than 2 years the West pledged well beyond 100 billion € for supporting a country that we are not allied with. And that number does not include costs for harbouring refugees or costs related to sanctions. All while still having to manage the aftermath of the pandemic and fighting climate change. Yes, we could have done better but we could also have done a lot worse.

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3 hours ago, Sgt Joch said:

Remember there are two objectives as far as the West is concerned: 1) helping Ukraine to defend itself; and 2) preventing this regional conflict from spinning into WW3. I would argue goal 2 is more important than goal 1 to the West.

You are missing 3) Send a message to Taiwan that we will protect them.

Because if we don’t do (3), then (2) becomes much more likely as everybody worth note is rexamining the need for a “strategic weapons program”, as Pax America is dead and done.

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56 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I would not dispute that, but that is beside the original point. The original point was whether Ukraine deserves support solely because 1) the attack on it is a Russian land grab in Europe and that kind of political move should be resisted in principle; and 2) the attack on it is indirectly aimed at and would have the effect of undermining NATO, and NATO should indirectly defend against it; or , as a conditio sine qua non, in addition to the preceding points 3) Ukraine also has to display moral superiority over Russia in some ways (democracy, human rights, corruption, adherence to LOAC, whatever else).

In my view 1) and 2) are entirely sufficient reasons.


Deserving support and thinking out the consequences of that support are two very different things. Unfortunately, all forms of public policy are captured by the needs to propagandistically capture the emotions of the citizenry who don't know any better. The Ukrainians had a Georgia-esque deal on the table in Ankara. They went with the West instead. Now this talk of Taiwan and China? Absolutely daft. No perspective at all on the bigger picture.

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4 hours ago, Carolus said:

These are some graphd based on the numbers of the Ukrianian MoD.

If we consider them inflated, but inflated in a way that is proportional to the real numbers (e.g. they add 33% to everything), there is a little bit of a trend visible.

The losses of Russian heavy equipment  (artillery, tanks, APC) is declining, the losses of Russian manpower are increasing, whereas before they have always been sort of proportionate to each other (the first jump of manpower losses are from the Bakhmut area).

 

 

 

 

Thanks for posting this.

I think we should have some faith that Ukraine's numbers are reasonably useful when viewed "relatively", but not "absolutely".  I also think they give a good view of "scale" because even if you 1/2 them the numbers still are massive.

These numbers reflect my sense of the war as we have followed it here.  The overview chart pretty accurately reflects the various phases:

  • Initial invasion was equipment heavy, infantry light.  They suffered massive casualties relative to their starting strength, but much of the equipment lost was abandoned and the soldiers with them walked back to Russia.  Which explains the huge equipment spike way above manpower.
  • Spring 2022 saw casualties decline while Russia paused to scrape together everything it could to keep the war going.
  • Early summer 2022 casualties spiked again as it launched a large and costly campaign in the Donbas which did, in fact, yield significant territorial gains.  More infantry this time, but still emphasizing massed armor attacks, which gave Ukraine a lot of opportunities to rack up equipment kills.
  • Mid summer 2022 casualties again quieted down as Russia was spent offensively.  Manpower and equipment stabilized to even rates.
  • Late summer 2022 Ukraine launched its Kherson offensive so once again casualties started going up.  Again, lots of emphasis on armor and so it climbed along with manpower losses.
  • Fall 2022 the Kherson and Kharkiv counter offensives punched up Russia's losses proportionally probably because it was mostly fighting defensively.

From the Fall on things changed.  Russia not only switched from massed armor to massed infantry, but they increased the scale and pointlessness of those attacks.  Bakhmut being, of course, the biggest part of this new strategy.  The results seem pretty clear in this chart... equipment down, infantry WAY up.

Spring 2023 saw Russia launching a lot of failed attacks which wiped out a lot of vehicles in the process, but not as much manpower.

Then things seemed to have shifted again in Fall 2023.  Russia's infantry casualties went down and equipment went way up.  This seems to reflect Russia's attempts to create massed attacks involving both infantry and armor.  This peaked early last month with the slaughter at Avdiivka, likely wiping out much of Russia's rebuilt armored units, and so now equipment losses are on the decline again.

The most interesting thing to see is that Russia's switching back to massed infantry is creating casualty levels roughly 40% higher just prior to Bakhmut and 20% higher than during the height of Bakhmut.

This all jibes with what we've been seeing here, I think.  Which is Russia is currently conducting Bakhmut style "meat assaults" on a much grander scale.  Equipment is playing a decreasing role in these attacks (likely due to shortages), therefore the delta between the two loss rates continues to spread apart.

Steve

 

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2 hours ago, Butschi said:

This sounds a lot like the Russian narrative, that Ukraine is just a US/NATO puppet. But we know this is a lie, Ukrainians can do whatever they wish, it is not like we can forbid them.

Okay, I am not sure if you aim to be splitting hairs, but it appears to be like that to me. "Don't use western weapons on Russian territory or we will potentially cut off the support you depend on" is not really a "choice" in the colloquial meaning of the word when facing the situation Ukraine is in, or is it?

Ukraine does not have the same fear of escalation as their allies do, despite (or maybe because) having less skin in the game. And that is to a good degree understandable. To which degree is the Western fear understandable? Did a Chinese ship cut some underwater cables south of Sweden as revenge for 20 ATACMS or was that something they would have done anyway just because they wanted and know they get away with it?

Sure, so Ukraine still has that conditional choice, but that brings me back to my point: Is it normal that a nation has to face such a conditional choice when fighting a conventional war? 

And regarding the "actually we do not have to help Ukraine", this is also not completely accurate or at least misleading.

Even if we ignore the moral angle of preventing the Russian goal of erasing another ethnicity in Eastern Europe as mere bleeding-heart idealism (something for which we fought a war in former Yugoslavia), Western nations have clear interests regarding deterrence of Russia, the principle of territorial integrity, and international influence by increasing their alliance bloc by another member.

So I don't buy the "our support for Ukraine is an act of generosity we can stop anytime, so better play nice Ukis" when it is clearly also simply good policy. 

 

Edited by Carolus
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4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Absolutely not.  Any military infrastructure or even civilian infrastructure that supports military enterprises are legitimate targets under the laws of armed conflict.  Civilian casualties are also accepted so long as they are tied directly to military objectives.  So one could hit a civilian power plant but not the neighborhoods next to it.  It isn’t the LOAC that is preventing Ukraine from conducting deep strategic strike campaigns , it is escalation.

You guys should check out the Israel thread where we are having the exact opposite conversation.  People are trying to make cases that everything is legitimate, which is also a problem.

I was referring to the rumored "rule" that Western nations have banned the usage of Western long-range weapons on Russian territory as well as having called back GRU operations from becoming too uncomfortable for Russia.

I mean, the whole discussion about limiting GPS coordinates for missiles, changing HIMARS software etc. have basically confirmed that rumor and it was plausible before that.

Because that is what I think Hajduk's complaint was mainly about. I could be wrong about that.

Edited by Carolus
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4 minutes ago, Carolus said:

I was referring to the rumored "rule" that Western nations have banned the usage of Western long-range weapons on Russian territory as well as having called back GRU operations from becoming too uncomfortable for Russia.

I mean, the whole discussion about GPS locking missiles, changing HIMARS software etc. have basically confirmed that rumor and it was plausible before that.

Because that is what I think Hajduk's complaint was mainly about. I could be wrong about that.

Ah, sorry been all up in LOAC last few days over on other thread.  Not sure what the ROE limitations are really.  All the US can do is heavily “suggest” with an unstated threat to pull support if things get too far out of hand.  Ukraine did all those long range drone strikes into Moscow even, but they were largely symbolic.

The restraint is to avoid escalation and driving support into Putin’s hands.  Escalation because Russia seems pretty boxed up but major strikes directly into Russia could change that.  Essentially it would give Putin an excuse to go to places we do not need.  And support.  Putin can dress it up all he wants, support for this war is going to be a slippery slope inside Russia.  By Afghanistan-izing the war (ie keeping it an “over there” war) then the question of the wars point remains uncertain.  If Russians start seeing direct sustained strikes that cause casualties they may very well run into Putin’s arms.

So “war in a box” (copyright) is where we are at. Unfortunately, all of Ukraine is inside that box.  The big and highly cynical lesson for a lot of smaller nations after this war is “don’t be Ukraine”.  How they go about doing that will vary.

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https://twitter.com/andikynast/status/1735351787589099631

The EU will begin membership negotiations with Ukraine and Moldawia. Hungary has withdrawn its veto during today's EUCO.

(the twitter account belongs to a reputable German journalist)

About five hours ago Orban still said to the press that his veto is as solid as a rock.

 

Edited by Carolus
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14 minutes ago, Carolus said:

https://twitter.com/andikynast/status/1735351787589099631

The EU will begin membership negotiations with Ukraine and Moldawia. Hungary has withdrawn its veto during today's EUCO.

(the twitter account belongs to a reputable German journalist)

About five hours ago Orban still said to the press that his veto is as solid as a rock.

 

Both could be true.  Orban might have rescinded his threat to veto the beginning process, yet hasn't committed to allowing a finalized plan to go forward.  If that's the case, I don't see it as problematic because I'm sure there are many EU nations that have significant reservations about rushing the process.

Steve

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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Both could be true.  Orban might have rescinded his threat to veto the beginning process, yet hasn't committed to allowing a finalized plan to go forward.  If that's the case, I don't see it as problematic because I'm sure there are many EU nations that have significant reservations about rushing the process.

Steve

Oh, indeed. This phase of membership accession can take many many years, and I fully expect it will.

But the decision today is like a bottleneck being overcome. It allows so much new necessary paperwork to be worked on by both sides which would otherwise be blocked.

Edited by Carolus
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14 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

 

 

This is good news.  It doesn't resolve the supplemental request to fund Ukraine, but it's critically important in other ways.

Even better news, part of the package included a fairly low profile provision that prevents a President from unilaterally withdrawing from NATO:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/lawmakers-stuffed-a-provision-into-the-pentagon-funding-bill-that-makes-it-all-but-impossible-for-trump-to-leave-nato/ar-AA1lvB2I
 

Our NATO allies can all sleep sounder knowing this is now law.  I know I will!

Steve

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8 minutes ago, Carolus said:

Oh, indeed. This phase of membership accession can take many many years, and I fully expect it will.

But the decision today is like a bottleneck being overcome. It allows so much new necessary paperwork to be worked on by both sides which would otherwise be blocked.

For sure it is good news.  Orban was smart to do this.  There's 1000 different ways this can play out over many years, but stopping the process from starting is binary (either it starts or it doesn't).  Holding up talks would put the spotlight and pressure on Orban RIGHT NOW, which is something politicians tend to avoid if there's something they can do later on to achieve the same goal.

Since Orban is mortal and (still) an elected head of state, he might not even be around when the final decisions need to be made.

Steve

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Nieuwsuur (NL), Monitor(DE) and RUSI traced a German company WWsemicon that sends chips despite the sanctions to RU. -German customs took action. Good start you'd say, however: one of the main sources was RU customs(!). They were so nice to write down what is imported.

If billions of cocaïne etc. is imported to the EU, we cannot expect the sanctions to be watertight. But if this is the game, I dont see much reason to expect that the flow of western parts will ever cease or even diminish. 

Edited by Yet
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46 minutes ago, Yet said:

I dont see much reason to expect that the flow of western parts will ever cease or even diminish. 

The state of Russian civil aviation suggests that sanctions are being rather effective.

Edited by JonS
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

So “war in a box” (copyright) is where we are at. Unfortunately, all of Ukraine is inside that box.  The big and highly cynical lesson for a lot of smaller nations after this war is “don’t be Ukraine”.  How they go about doing that will vary.

An awful lot of them are going to decide to go nuclear. If we let Ukraine go under that will include places like South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. At least two of those three could probably do it in six months from a standing start. That is on the very optimistic assumption is they haven't ALREADY started. Australia too, come to think of it. And, and, and.........

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11 minutes ago, dan/california said:

An awful lot of them are going to decide to go nuclear. If we let Ukraine go under that will include places like South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. At least two of those three could probably do it in six months from a standing start. That is on the very optimistic assumption is they haven't ALREADY started. Australia too, come to think of it. And, and, and.........

A dozen nuclear armed small states..what would possibly go wrong?

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