How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Letter from Prague]

25 minutes ago, JonS said:

Would the average Ivan-Sixpack soldier have a sufficient presence online to reliably identify a photo of a corpse from years-old high school photos and drunken 2am photos? I mean ... maybe? Some of them?

Probably, but you need to look on vkontakte rather than instagram.

However, I would not expect the average Ivan-soldier to have a face once Ukrainian drones and artillery and ATGMs and later weeks of rotting and local dogs are done with them.

[Haiduk]

The US has postponed the supply of the first large batch of long-range GPS-guided air bombs able to fly an almost 160-km distance to Ukraine until 2024.

Source: Reuters with reference to informed sources from the US Department of Defence as reported by European Pravda

Details: According to an unnamed representative of the Pentagon, the supply of this armament is expected at the beginning of 2024 after its successful inspection.

According to sources, the supply of GLSDB by the Boeing company will be conducted at the end of December, and then testing will be conducted for a few more months before it is sent to Ukraine.

Since the contract for the beginning of production of GLSDB was signed in March 2023, the supply was postponed until the end of the year. The production required the materials provided by the government, so its start had to be postponed.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/30/7431127/

[NamEndedAllen]

21 hours ago, billbindc said:

The DC trial happens in March. 

Yes, but at their Super Tuesday. In fact, see below. And IF that trial starts on time, it will not conclude before he has the nomination sewn up. Barring sudden shocks, voting may well be just a formality.  In the unlikely event a verdict is reached before November, any conviction will be appealed Take odds on who his VP will be?

It’s now official: The day after former President Donald Trump’s federal election-interference trial begins in DC on March 4 — so after Super Tuesday — Republicans will have allocated nearly half of their delegates (47%) from the contests in the 2024 GOP presidential race. 

A week later, by March 12, that percentage will grow to 54%. After the primaries on March 19, it will be 69%. And after Louisiana’s primary on March 23, 71% of all delegates in the Republican race will have been allocated.  

https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/first-read/gop-will-allocate-clear-majority-delegates-trumps-dc-trial-ends-rcna127344

Edited November 30, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[kimbosbread]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

As for the Transnistria situation, I understand the limiting factors that both Moldova and Ukraine have to take into consideration.  However, I still think that on balance causing trouble for Russia there is better than leaving them alone.

In prior conversations about the artillery shell depots, my assumption is they are wired to blowup on a moment's notice.  I doubt Ukraine will get their hands on them.

Then Ukraine should go blow them up on the sly as soon as possible.

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

There is no direct way for anybody to make this happen.  Sanctions help.  Blowing up expensive infrastructure helps.  Causing Russia to divert major spending into replacing things like tanks and AD systems helps.  But ultimately it is Moscow that determines spending priorities and if they can rob one part of the economy to pay for volunteers, there's nothing anybody can do to change that.  Hopefully over time people will notice a decline in public services, in particular health, that even by Russian standards is unacceptable.  That will take a LONG time.

Meh, I think going after Russian power plants, data centers, fiber junctions, chemical factories, any sort of warehouse, any and all rail and shipping infrastructure, trucks, that would do it pretty fast. 

4 hours ago, Astrophel said:

The ideological battle needs to be fought actively.  Hearts and minds!  The future looks a lot brighter when russians have the same impulse as happened in USA after Vietnam.

Disagree. I don’t think the West is in general aware of the amount of control Russia has over the minds of its citizens. My Russian coworkers always mocked our Chinese coworkers for thinking their authoritarian state was so all-powerful.

Maybe once their will and spirits are sufficiently demolished we can rebuild them in America’s image as a monument to how awesome we are.

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

An interesting form of warfare would be to identify Russian private enterprises that are struggling financially due to sanctions and hit them with cyber or physical attacks. 

That is a very clever idea. I would go for all sorts of enterprises though, the more digital the better, and make their lives hell. Make Russia depend on paper. Corrode the way they operate.

[panzermartin]

First Leo1 loss? Is this krasnopol artillery 

And why tanks in this war just wander alone until they get killed 

Edited December 1, 2023 by panzermartin

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, panzermartin said:

And why tanks in this war just wander alone until they get killed

Because if you bunch them up together they get killed faster.  RA got tired of losing entire companies and started using them in 1s and 2s a while back.  The UA appears to be going the same way.  Now in UA case it may be force preservation but it also may be that RA C4ISR has finally started to catch up.

Edit:  just rewatched that video.  So that tank was spotted by the UAS probably 1-2 kms away.  It looks like it took maybe 3-4 rounds to knock it out? That is crazy precision.  When did the RA start hitting like that?

If they had sent 4 tanks into that field there would probably be 4 KO’d tanks.

Edited December 1, 2023 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

46 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Because if you bunch them up together they get killed faster.  RA got tired of losing entire companies and started using them in 1s and 2s a while back.  The UA appears to be going the same way.  Now in UA case it may be force preservation but it also may be that RA C4ISR has finally started to catch up.

Edit:  just rewatched that video.  So that tank was spotted by the UAS probably 1-2 kms away.  It looks like it took maybe 3-4 rounds to knock it out? That is crazy precision.  When did the RA start hitting like that?

If they had sent 4 tanks into that field there would probably be 4 KO’d tanks.

With the aforementioned Russian improvement there just seems to be a multi-kilometer band on both sides of the line where vehicle movement is suicidal. My assumption, and it is an assumption, is that this band is defined by the sensor reach of medium altitude drones flying circuits far enough onto their own side to be mostly safe from SAM systems. Absent a better way to knock these drones down, or a truly massive superiority in the weight if effective fires, I just don't see how either side is doing much of anything in way of advancing.

[The_Capt]

13 minutes ago, dan/california said:

With the aforementioned Russian improvement there just seems to be a multi-kilometer band on both sides of the line where vehicle movement is suicidal. My assumption, and it is an assumption, is that this band is defined by the sensor reach of medium altitude drones flying circuits far enough onto their own side to be mostly safe from SAM systems. Absent a better way to knock these drones down, or a truly massive superiority in the weight if effective fires, I just don't see how either side is doing much of anything in way of advancing.

It depends on how the ISR is fused.  The UA is rumoured to have a JADC2 structure up.  So this means that any sensor: Strat, Op or Tac is integrated into a network.  So a satellite can pick up something, hand off to a med alt ISR drone, who then can hand off to a tac UAS system at Bn or below.  Given that everything has a GPS and LRF pinning a target can happen pretty quick.  One that is done it gets fed back to the fires complex where the best capability is cued and given the data.  Shots fired, requesting sensor can send corrections, or even hand the target off for the finish.

What is surprising is to see possible evidence the RA has managed to pull this together.  They had pieces of it back in ‘14 but have been woefully poor in linking sensor to shooters, particularly artillery.  This is the working theory as to why they have relied so much on mass fires.  This action possibly demonstrates that the RA ISR-targeting architectures are catching up.  This definitely means there is a death-band along the frontline, likely wider than tank direct fire ranges.  Add to this ATGMs etc and the situation gets worse.

The mainstream theory was/is that the RA and UA were pushing out tanks in penny packets due to training/experience failures.  However, this phenomenon is simply too wide spread.  I cannot believe that every armoured unit in both militaries are in able of armor platoon or higher operations.  We have not seen a full tank platoon in action for months - always 1 or 2 sniping or swooping in to provide direct fires.  This trend, along with the reports of the RA using tanks primarily as “indirect fire” platforms 10+kms speak to something else going on.  Same complaints have been aimed at the UA, and we trained them.  

Most often we hear “why aren’t the infantry clearing for the tanks?”  The amount of infantry needed to clear or screen at these ranges is prohibitive.  And how do infantry screen layered ISR and artillery?  They would need to screen out past artillery ranges.  

My sense is that these tactics are happening for a reason.  It could be to try and lure out RA artillery so they can CB it.  Could be to go out and snipe but know they are likely going to lose the vehicles, so small packages.  Either way it matches the trend towards “displace, disperse, dig, or die” which has been seen repeatedly in this war.

What is most disconcerting is that Ukraine had a significant C4ISR advantage.  It is what made the difference in the first year.  But now the RA is beginning to demonstrate similar capability - at least in this one isolated case.  They do not need to match UA C4ISR.  They just need enough to sustain denial.

[Fenris]

3 hours ago, panzermartin said:

First Leo1 loss? Is this krasnopol artillery 

And why tanks in this war just wander alone until they get killed 

Too bad the hatches are still open.  Perfectly understandable but still, increases the chance of going from immobilised to destroyed quite a bit these days.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

It depends on how the ISR is fused.  The UA is rumoured to have a JADC2 structure up.  So this means that any sensor: Strat, Op or Tac is integrated into a network.  So a satellite can pick up something, hand off to a med alt ISR drone, who then can hand off to a tac UAS system at Bn or below.  Given that everything has a GPS and LRF pinning a target can happen pretty quick.  One that is done it gets fed back to the fires complex where the best capability is cued and given the data.  Shots fired, requesting sensor can send corrections, or even hand the target off for the finish.

What is surprising is to see possible evidence the RA has managed to pull this together.  They had pieces of it back in ‘14 but have been woefully poor in linking sensor to shooters, particularly artillery.  This is the working theory as to why they have relied so much on mass fires.  This action possibly demonstrates that the RA ISR-targeting architectures are catching up.  This definitely means there is a death-band along the frontline, likely wider than tank direct fire ranges.  Add to this ATGMs etc and the situation gets worse.

The mainstream theory was/is that the RA and UA were pushing out tanks in penny packets due to training/experience failures.  However, this phenomenon is simply too wide spread.  I cannot believe that every armoured unit in both militaries are in able of armor platoon or higher operations.  We have not seen a full tank platoon in action for months - always 1 or 2 sniping or swooping in to provide direct fires.  This trend, along with the reports of the RA using tanks primarily as “indirect fire” platforms 10+kms speak to something else going on.  Same complaints have been aimed at the UA, and we trained them.  

Most often we hear “why aren’t the infantry clearing for the tanks?”  The amount of infantry needed to clear or screen at these ranges is prohibitive.  And how do infantry screen layered ISR and artillery?  They would need to screen out past artillery ranges.  

My sense is that these tactics are happening for a reason.  It could be to try and lure out RA artillery so they can CB it.  Could be to go out and snipe but know they are likely going to lose the vehicles, so small packages.  Either way it matches the trend towards “displace, disperse, dig, or die” which has been seen repeatedly in this war.

What is most disconcerting is that Ukraine had a significant C4ISR advantage.  It is what made the difference in the first year.  But now the RA is beginning to demonstrate similar capability - at least in this one isolated case.  They do not need to match UA C4ISR.  They just need enough to sustain denial.

Russian artillery is probably no better than it was earlier in the war with one exception... Krasnopol rounds.  They seem to have been in very short supply, or were perhaps not used due to preoccupation with massed fire.  More recent reports are that they've been using them much more than they were in the past.  Again, it could just be it's more noticeable because they aren't firing 100 rounds blindly into open fields because they don't have the ability to do that any more

As for massed armor, let's not forget that Russia just tried it *again* at the beginning of October around Avdiivka.  And they got slaughtered.  So it seems Russia had to re-learn the lesson that massed armor is just not viable any more.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

It depends on how the ISR is fused.  The UA is rumoured to have a JADC2 structure up.  So this means that any sensor: Strat, Op or Tac is integrated into a network.  So a satellite can pick up something, hand off to a med alt ISR drone, who then can hand off to a tac UAS system at Bn or below.  Given that everything has a GPS and LRF pinning a target can happen pretty quick.  One that is done it gets fed back to the fires complex where the best capability is cued and given the data.  Shots fired, requesting sensor can send corrections, or even hand the target off for the finish.

What is surprising is to see possible evidence the RA has managed to pull this together.  They had pieces of it back in ‘14 but have been woefully poor in linking sensor to shooters, particularly artillery.  This is the working theory as to why they have relied so much on mass fires.  This action possibly demonstrates that the RA ISR-targeting architectures are catching up.  This definitely means there is a death-band along the frontline, likely wider than tank direct fire ranges.  Add to this ATGMs etc and the situation gets worse.

The mainstream theory was/is that the RA and UA were pushing out tanks in penny packets due to training/experience failures.  However, this phenomenon is simply too wide spread.  I cannot believe that every armoured unit in both militaries are in able of armor platoon or higher operations.  We have not seen a full tank platoon in action for months - always 1 or 2 sniping or swooping in to provide direct fires.  This trend, along with the reports of the RA using tanks primarily as “indirect fire” platforms 10+kms speak to something else going on.  Same complaints have been aimed at the UA, and we trained them.  

Most often we hear “why aren’t the infantry clearing for the tanks?”  The amount of infantry needed to clear or screen at these ranges is prohibitive.  And how do infantry screen layered ISR and artillery?  They would need to screen out past artillery ranges.  

My sense is that these tactics are happening for a reason.  It could be to try and lure out RA artillery so they can CB it.  Could be to go out and snipe but know they are likely going to lose the vehicles, so small packages.  Either way it matches the trend towards “displace, disperse, dig, or die” which has been seen repeatedly in this war.

What is most disconcerting is that Ukraine had a significant C4ISR advantage.  It is what made the difference in the first year.  But now the RA is beginning to demonstrate similar capability - at least in this one isolated case.  They do not need to match UA C4ISR.  They just need enough to sustain denial.

So Ukraine needs SOMETHING to break, or at least degrade, the Russian C4ISR system to unstick this thing.  There need to to be smart people in quantity, with money in even greater supply, throwing rocks, laser beams, and autonomous drones at this problem until they figure it out. And when they do figure it out, it needs to be built and shipped in a truly crash program. 

Edited December 1, 2023 by dan/california

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/11/30/putin-seems-to-be-winning-the-war-in-ukraine-for-now

Putin seems to be winning the war in Ukraine—for now

His biggest asset is Europe’s lack of strategic vision

 

Not a cheery read, I would argue the greatest flaw in the strategic vision though, was in the Whitehouse at about the three month point of the war. They just vastly overestimated their ability to fine tune how this thing was going to end. Now they are vey close to allowing the bad guys to make a late game comeback. 

Edited December 1, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

ISW included a report that another poll of Russians is indicating that support for the war is slipping:

Quote

A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not. Independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles stated that data from its October 17-22, 2023, telephone survey indicates that respondents who are “consistent” supporters of the war - those who expressed support for the war, do not support a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and think that Russia should prioritize military spending - decreased from 22 percent to 12 percent between February 2023 and October 2023.[1] Chronicles stated that 40 percent of respondents supported a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and that this number has remained consistent at about 39 to 40 percent throughout 2023. Chronicles stated that 33 percent of respondents did not support a Russian withdrawal and favored a continuation of the war and noted that this number has been consistently decreasing from 47 percent in February 2023 and 39 percent in July 2023. Recent polling by the independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published on October 31 indicated that 55 percent of respondents believed that Russia should begin peace negotiations whereas 38 percent favored continuing the war.[2]

Yes, polls are unreliable generally speaking... but if done right they can indicate trends over time.  It is not impossible to believe that people are slowly understanding that "victory" is not possible.  I mean, they should have figured this out over a year ago, but a variety of conditions within Russia don't promote this sort of thing  Regardless, once someone concludes that victory is not possible, it becomes harder to advocate for continued fighting.

What does this mean for this war?  Nothing for the near term.  However, if the trend is at least somewhat accurate it does reinforce the notion that a) the Russians aren't indefinitely patient with a badly fought war and b) Russia doesn't have time on its side.

Steve

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

So Ukraine needs SOMETHING to break, or at least degrade, the Russian C4ISR system to unstick this thing.  There need to to be smart people in quantity, with money in even greater supply, throwing rocks, laser beams, and autonomous drones at this problem until they figure it out. And when they do figure it out, it needs to be built and shipped in a truly crash program. 

Given the density of listening antennas flying around over and and adjacent to Ukraine (and presumably all over the ground, too), I'd be surprised if the higher levels of the UA don't have a very good idea of how any new Russian ISR system works.  Simply blowing a few drones out of the sky is  a short term solution to it - they'll just tweak something and start the cycle over again.  As @The_Capt alludes - the UA may be baiting the RA with stuff in front of those eyes so that the RA either exposes high value forces that the new ISR capability is supporting, or exposes the brains so they can be destroyed.  It's probably better to leave the capability in place for a while and feed it disinformation (one way or another), rendering it useless, while the RA thinks it's still providing value, so that the RA will use the bad information to get itself killed.  

[Tux]

On 11/29/2023 at 7:37 PM, The_Capt said:

Oh my God.  Is it terrible that I want this to happen?  I mean worst/best sit-com idea ever.

I honestly think a significant portion of people, especially young people, would be driven to vote for Trump specifically to make this happen.  What’s more fun than bending a rule and watching it break?  Think of the memes!

I hope our American friends manage to tidy things up before they get that chance. 
 

On 11/29/2023 at 8:54 PM, Haiduk said:

Pal, sometime when I read your last posts I recall Denetor, who looked at palantir during a siege of Minas-Tirith %) Of course, we had very hard year and broken hopes, but I not shure that all go to complete bad scenario. What I fully agree - when Russia asks "Iran, give me 1000 Shakeds!", Iran answers "here you are!", when Russian asks N.Korea "Kim, give me 10000000 shells", N.Korea (China) answers "Here you are". But when Ukraine asks "Allies! Give me... Patriots, Leos, Abrams, shells" aliies answer "well, we will support you till the end! But... we need to gather Ramstein through two months, conduct discussions, discuss all pro- and contra... And memento escalation of course" 

And only small Denmark silently says "Psss... I heard you need arty? We have some cool stuff. Take all wahat we have. We anyway will not make war with Norway or Germany"

Come on, now.  There are plenty of legitimate criticisms to make of the rate at which support has been sent to Ukraine; there’s no need to pretend Russia are somehow getting a better deal from NK and Iran.  Russia pay for what they get, for a start.

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russian artillery is probably no better than it was earlier in the war with one exception... Krasnopol rounds.  They seem to have been in very short supply, or were perhaps not used due to preoccupation with massed fire.  More recent reports are that they've been using them much more than they were in the past.  Again, it could just be it's more noticeable because they aren't firing 100 rounds blindly into open fields because they don't have the ability to do that any more

As for massed armor, let's not forget that Russia just tried it *again* at the beginning of October around Avdiivka.  And they got slaughtered.  So it seems Russia had to re-learn the lesson that massed armor is just not viable any more.

Steve

Well it is impossible to tell how long they were tracking that Leo but the sensor to shooter linking was fast enough to ping a lone tank.  This is beyond what the RA has been demonstrating in this war.  Much more like what we have been seeing from the Ukrainians.  We will have to see if more examples show up.  It does speak to why the UA has been having a harder time of it.

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

Not a cheery read, I would argue the greatest flaw in the strategic vision though, was in the Whitehouse at about the three month point of the war. They just vastly overestimated their ability to fine tune how this thing was going to end. Now they are vey close to allowing the bad guys to make a late game comeback. 

We seriously need to define “Russian victory”.  Unless Russia can either renew operational level warfare and break the UA, it is not going to happen militarily.  Unless Russia can convince enough Ukrainians that it is a good idea to throw in with them (and after the warcrimes we have seen…) then it won’t happen politically.  Economically is a complete write off at this point and so is Diplomatic.

The problem is that we convinced ourselves that the only Ukrainian victory was a total push out of Russia.  Anything else was defeat/Russian victory.  This was dangerous thinking in a war.  Wars tend to take on a life of their own and victory or defeat is rarely total.  If one looks at the history of warfare the outcomes were more often ambiguous.  Outcomes of military conflict were often milestones on larger trajectories.  We have seen plenty example in modern history.  Gulf War - total defeat of Iraq in Kuwait but not of the Iraq nation.  Serbia ‘99 - same.  Iraq 03 (yeesh), defeat of Iraq as a nation but definitely not a clear victory.  Afghanistan…let’s not even start.

In fact the only total defeats/victories in the last century+ that spring to mind are WW2, Vietnam and maybe the Falklands.  Arab-Israeli wars maybe?  The rest were all some sort of mosh-mash of accomplishing some objectives while accepting that other things will just have to be lived with.  Putin keeping his freakin corridor is not a Russian “victory” in the war overall.  It means he got something at great, possibly crippling cost.

[cesmonkey]

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

29 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 Putin keeping his freakin corridor is not a Russian “victory” in the war overall.  It means he got something at great, possibly crippling cost.

Out of all real estate contested in this war, the corridor is big freaking deal. It messes up the Ukraine's sea lanes of transportation really bad and includes two of the Ukraine's biggest cities. Also, morale effects are going to be huge. Good luck telling Ukrainians they have won the war if they get to lose Melitopol and Mariupol.

[The_Capt]

21 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Good luck telling Ukrainians they have won the war if they get to lose Melitopol and Mariupol.

"You are still Ukraine...you won."   It is that simple. 

And then they can read this: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-russias-unconventional-operations-during-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2022

That is a systematic campaign to erase a nation.  Of everything I have read about this war, that document is the most brutal.  So ya, they won because that is what losing would have looked like.

[Zeleban]

Снова неутешительные новости из Машовца со стороны Лимана:

1. На лиманском направлении противник продолжает развивать наступление в направлении села Ямполевка, села Терный и в районе Серебрянского лесничества, в частности:

В результате наступательных действий подразделениям 254-го мотострелкового полка 144-й мотострелковой дивизии 20-й общевойсковой армии противника удалось вытеснить украинские войска восточнее села Терный с шести позиций и одного наблюдательного пункта.

В свою очередь, южнее и юго-западнее села Диброва, видимо, части 31-го и 37-го мотострелковых полков 67-й мотострелковой дивизии 25-й армии при поддержке частей 228-го мотострелкового полка 90-й танковой дивизии. дивизии удалось выбить передовые украинские части с пяти позиций и одного пункта.

Вероятно, в ближайшее время противник продолжит наступательно-штурмовые действия в направлении села Терный, по крайней мере, в этом направлении (западнее села Житловка) движется командование 144-й мотострелковой дивизии противника. штурмовые части (роты) типа «Шторм-В» из состава своих 488-го и 283-го мотострелковых полков.

Стоит отметить, что при этом противник продолжает постепенно пополнять части и соединения 25-й армии на Лиманском направлении вооружением и военной техникой для повышения их боевых возможностей. Вчера я доложил о намерении противника пополнить части 19-го танкового полка 67-й мотострелковой дивизии партией танков Т-90М (до шести единиц); Судя по всему, точно такой же процесс продолжается и в 11-й отдельной танковой бригаде этой армии. В штат подразделений этой бригады также была передана партия танков – до 7 единиц типа Т-90М и не менее 4 единиц типа Т-80БВ (возможно, Т-80БВМ).

2. В районе Бахмута продолжаются ожесточённые рукопашные бои северо-западнее и южнее города. Обе стороны настойчиво атакуют/контратакуют, поочередно занимая ту или иную позицию друг у друга:

Противнику удалось вытеснить подразделения ВСУ с двух позиций севернее села. Богдановка (331-й парашютный полк 98-й вдд), с трех позиций северо-восточнее деревни Хромово (217-й полк 98-й вдд) и с одной позиции севернее деревни Курдюмовка (83 отдельная десантно-штурмовая бригада).

В свою очередь, подразделения ВСУ выбили противника (тот же 331-й полк) с трех позиций севернее села Хромово, а также восточнее села Клещевка вытеснили передовые части 88-й отдельной мотострелковой бригады (ОМСБР). ) противника отступить еще с трех позиций

На мой взгляд, все эти действия на ближних подступах к городу Бахмут лишены какого-либо внятного и ясного оперативного смысла. По крайней мере для ВСУ. В конечном итоге от этого выигрывает только противник, который сумел, по сути, остановить наступательные действия украинской группы армий южнее города и теперь настойчиво атакует ее фланг и тыл с севера. И я бы сказал, что ему это удалось

Объемы и размеры потерь сторон в этой бойне вполне сопоставимы, но противник явно имеет большие возможности их компенсировать. Тем более, когда преобладающим форматом боевых столкновений является небольшая группа пехоты против малой группы пехоты без массированного применения бронетехники.

Edited December 1, 2023 by Zeleban

[Anthony P.]

22 hours ago, billbindc said:

Don't regret Kissinger's passing. He was of the realist school and did not hesitate to endorse a breakup of Ukraine and it's consignment into a Russian sphere of influence. He only changed his tune when it became untenable in the face of the unified disgust of the foreign policy establishment in DC.

I mean... the man was over 90 years old when Crimea happened. I suspect that most politicians who've consulted him for the last >30 years more or less just wanted a picture of them posing with a political A+++ celebrity rather than actual, relevant advice.

A lot of people seem to credit him with superhuman intelligence when basic medical science ought to caution us about the cognitive abilities of people >80 years old (at best). When a man reaches the age where odds are that he struggles with how the remote works, his abilities to keep abreast of and judge current political affairs are likely somewhat restricted to put it mildly.

[Zeleban]

3. That is, it is mainly infantry who fight, mostly with “legs”, the bulk of the equipment is in the tactical rear. The fact that from time to time a couple of tanks and an armored fighting vehicle goes to the front line to “carefully work” will not pass the point. The bloody carousel continues - infantry + mortars and artillery. This is a format that plays into the hands of our enemy, who significantly surpasses us in human resources, which he, moreover, treats precisely as a resource, and not as valuable to his own citizens.

Obviously, figuratively speaking. “stop a little” and think about what to do about it. It is clear that the enemy will not stop “voluntarily”; he must be forced to do so. This can only be done in one way - if the volume and number of losses in the same human resource on which he is now relying increases multiple times. That is, the enemy’s rate of “consumption” must exceed the rate of its recovery.

Technologically, we cannot do this yet (because there is no advantage in the entire range of weapons so significant that it would lead to real “devastation” in the ranks of the enemy, neither quantitative nor qualitative). Moreover, our ammunition capabilities, let’s say, are also quite limited.

And General Zaluzhny, despite all the hate that stupid “strategists” gave him, in his assessments and conclusions regarding the current development of the situation, he was not only 100% right, but I would even say 150%. Either technology or a positional dead end.

However, the reality is that we are not yet able to independently increase our own technological “capabilities” on the battlefield - neither resource-wise, nor financially, nor even through organizational and administrative means. Relying solely on the help of the allies in this matter is, of course, possible, but this is a rather unreliable matter.

Therefore, it remains to look for a way, directly, figuratively speaking, “on the battlefield itself.” In my opinion, from the entire price list of possible solutions and taking into account the currently superior format of organizing and conducting combat operations, we can only provide our own infantry with a “new quality” so that it is certainly superior to the enemy infantry in this format of combat clashes (for now, unfortunately, we have to think exactly about such a “consumable” method).

Or, it is very important to work quantitatively and qualitatively on the artillery component of our army. There are certain problems with the latter. We are very dependent in this matter on our allies, who, in turn, do not have bottomless supplies of art and ammunition for it for us.

Therefore, at this stage, we should thoughtfully and seriously engage, first of all, with the infantry, with constant and persistent attention to our artillery.

Its “new quality” should consist of significant improvements in three main areas - training (I mean the whole complex, from moral and psychological training to special tactical and fire), weapons + equipment (they should be in the infantry in SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES, and not only to dominate the enemy’s analogues in terms of their “performance characteristics”, and this should apply to the entire complex, from tactical drones, mortars, communications equipment, heavy machine guns and grenade launchers, ending with “spores”, protective equipment, thermal imaging and all-weather sights and the standard weapons of the shooter), and the tactical level command link: from the squad commander (assault group), to the brigade commander and regiment commander must not only be READY to organize and control infantry combat in a variety of conditions, but also BE ABLE to do so do.

We must finally understand that the enemy will strive every now and then to repeat the “fortresses” of Bakhmut, Avdievka, etc., in which our infantry will come into contact at a high rate (even with a comparable, or even slightly lower, rate of infantry grinding down ) the enemy himself). This plays into his hands; in the mobilization tension he outplays us, because he has a much greater mobilization resource.

The fact that to this day the Kremlin regime, due to the internal political peculiarities of the “current moment,” has so far reduced the pace of mobilization, do not mislead you. As soon as it discharges (and this, obviously, will happen one way or another), these rates will begin to increase significantly. Moreover, during this time the enemy can significantly improve and increase the capabilities of its system of mobilization deployment of troops.

Stopping this, or better said, radically changing it, is only possible when, figuratively speaking, the enemy begins to realize the fact that in order to kill one Ukrainian infantryman at the front, he must spend his 15-20 "TulovyCh" in any situation and under any circumstances. It is then that the mobilization race, which the Kremlin has obviously chosen as one of the main elements of its war strategy, will lose its meaning for it.

In the meantime, in the current conditions, it is quite profitable for him to organize some next “meat grinder” over and over again - today it is Bakhmut and Avdeevka, tomorrow it could be Seversk, Ugledar or Kupyansk with Liman. At the same time, the result is not so important to him as the process itself.

 

 

Edited December 1, 2023 by Zeleban

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

3. That is, it is mainly infantry who fight, mostly with “legs”, the bulk of the equipment is in the tactical rear. The fact that from time to time a couple of tanks and an armored fighting vehicle goes to the front line to “carefully work” will not pass the point. The bloody carousel continues - infantry + mortars and artillery. This is a format that plays into the hands of our enemy, who significantly surpasses us in human resources, which he, moreover, treats precisely as a resource, and not as valuable to his own citizens.

Obviously, figuratively speaking. “stop a little” and think about what to do about it. It is clear that the enemy will not stop “voluntarily”; he must be forced to do so. This can only be done in one way - if the volume and number of losses in the same human resource on which he is now relying increases multiple times. That is, the enemy’s rate of “consumption” must exceed the rate of its recovery.

Technologically, we cannot do this yet (because there is no advantage in the entire range of weapons so significant that it would lead to real “devastation” in the ranks of the enemy, neither quantitative nor qualitative). Moreover, our ammunition capabilities, let’s say, are also quite limited.

And General Zaluzhny, despite all the hate that stupid “strategists” gave him, in his assessments and conclusions regarding the current development of the situation, he was not only 100% right, but I would even say 150%. Either technology or a positional dead end.

However, the reality is that we are not yet able to independently increase our own technological “capabilities” on the battlefield - neither resource-wise, nor financially, nor even through organizational and administrative means. Relying solely on the help of the allies in this matter is, of course, possible, but this is a rather unreliable matter.

Therefore, it remains to look for a way, directly, figuratively speaking, “on the battlefield itself.” In my opinion, from the entire price list of possible solutions and taking into account the currently superior format of organizing and conducting combat operations, we can only provide our own infantry with a “new quality” so that it is certainly superior to the enemy infantry in this format of combat clashes (for now, unfortunately, we have to think exactly about such a “consumable” method).

Or, it is very important to work quantitatively and qualitatively on the artillery component of our army. There are certain problems with the latter. We are very dependent in this matter on our allies, who, in turn, do not have bottomless supplies of art and ammunition for it for us.

Therefore, at this stage, we should thoughtfully and seriously engage, first of all, with the infantry, with constant and persistent attention to our artillery.

Its “new quality” should consist of significant improvements in three main areas - training (I mean the whole complex, from moral and psychological training to special tactical and fire), weapons + equipment (they should be in the infantry in SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES, and not only to dominate the enemy’s analogues in terms of their “performance characteristics”, and this should apply to the entire complex, from tactical drones, mortars, communications equipment, heavy machine guns and grenade launchers, ending with “spores”, protective equipment, thermal imaging and all-weather sights and the standard weapons of the shooter), and the tactical level command link: from the squad commander (assault group), to the brigade commander and regiment commander must not only be READY to organize and control infantry combat in a variety of conditions, but also BE ABLE to do so do.

We must finally understand that the enemy will strive every now and then to repeat the “fortresses” of Bakhmut, Avdievka, etc., in which our infantry will come into contact at a high rate (even with a comparable, or even slightly lower, rate of infantry grinding down ) the enemy himself). This plays into his hands; in the mobilization tension he outplays us, because he has a much greater mobilization resource.

The fact that to this day the Kremlin regime, due to the internal political peculiarities of the “current moment,” has so far reduced the pace of mobilization, do not mislead you. As soon as it discharges (and this, obviously, will happen one way or another), these rates will begin to increase significantly. Moreover, during this time the enemy can significantly improve and increase the capabilities of its system of mobilization deployment of troops.

Stopping this, or better said, radically changing it, is only possible when, figuratively speaking, the enemy begins to realize the fact that in order to kill one Ukrainian infantryman at the front, he must spend his 15-20 "TulovyCh" in any situation and under any circumstances. It is then that the mobilization race, which the Kremlin has obviously chosen as one of the main elements of its war strategy, will lose its meaning for it.

In the meantime, in the current conditions, it is quite profitable for him to organize some next “meat grinder” over and over again - today it is Bakhmut and Avdeevka, tomorrow it could be Seversk, Ugledar or Kupyansk with Liman. At the same time, the result is not so important to him as the process itself.

 

 

Yup, that tracks.  Most disconcerting is that no one knows how much overmatch is required to break this deadlock.  The next question is "can we actually build that and sustain it?"  Doubling down on the three main components of this war - C4ISR, Infantry and Fires and ensuring Ukraine has them will at least ensure that the costs go up for the RA dramatically.  Further, it is possible that the RA will break itself overtime, particularly if the UA can continue deep strikes.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Out of all real estate contested in this war, the corridor is big freaking deal. It messes up the Ukraine's sea lanes of transportation really bad and includes two of the Ukraine's biggest cities. Also, morale effects are going to be huge. Good luck telling Ukrainians they have won the war if they get to lose Melitopol and Mariupol.

Is the land corridor important?  Yes.  Does it constitute a victory by Russia's own definition?  Absolutely not.  This is not what they started the war to achieve.  They started this war to wipe Ukraine from the map and to reassert Russian dominance over its neighbors as well as increase its influence abroad.  It was also a war designed to cement regime control over the Russian people by having them voluntarily give up their remaining freedoms.  Fail, fail, fail, and fail.

An analogy is that I managed to steal your TV from your house.  Victory?  Well, let's consider that I drove my own truck to your house with the intention of looting everything.  On the way I lost control of the truck and it crashed, destroying it.  I then had to walk (well, limp, because I injured my leg) to your house.  I broke in the back door and cut my hand pretty badly smashing the glass.  I went in and the only thing I could carry was the TV, so that's what I took.  I smashed up a bunch of stuff out of spite and anger, as well as bleeding all over the place.  You got this all on security cameras, including me pooping in my pants when I saw your dog, which tore at my other leg as I left. 

After getting out of your house it started to rain and it is below freezing, now I have to walk all the way back home with your TV, which it turns out no longer works because I dropped it after the dog attacked me.  We don't know how this story ends because I'm still dragging the broken TV behind me as I limp my way in miserable conditions back home.

Even if I make it home, and there's no sense that I will, did I really "score" something valuable?  Maybe, but I'll have to put a bunch of my own money into fixing the TV before I can actually use it.  Was the "score" worth it?  I might tell my 4 buddies (that's all the friends I have and they actually don't really like me) and anybody that might listen that I am a master thief, but I know the truth.  Which is I made a terrible mistake.

As for you, there is damage and the outrage of violation that you have to contend with.  You don't have a TV any more, well downstairs that is.  You still have two upstairs that I didn't get to because the dog and my lack of ability to transport them.  What's more, the TV that was stolen wasn't even your best TV.  But the police know that I did it and everybody around you is on your side.

Sooooo.... did I "win" and you "lose"?

Steve