How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Bearstronaut]

4 hours ago, paxromana said:

As I understand it this has always been the case since at least WW2 and probably even WW1 and under the Tsars

Same as it ever was. I read a book about Soviet soldiers in WW2 over the summer and officers coercing female soldiers into becoming "field wives" was a big issue. 

[Battlefront.com]

An OpEd piece that pretty succinctly sums up where Russia is now and where it is headed.  The piece ends with the line "burn baby burn":

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3921962-russia-is-burning-out-of-control-on-putins-watch/

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Ithikial_AU said:

Side note: Who is Taiwan's biggest trading partner? China. China also exports a lot to Taiwan. Is this going to stop them possibly going to war if China decides it's in their interest to bring the wayward province 'back into line'? Wouldn't think so. One thing about markets is they tend to spring back after any market driven or political action downturn. Again... post pandemic. Money will find it's way into every crevice of an economy hunting value - even after wars.

Agreed, but the important assumption here is that Taiwan is conquers fairly easily and is capable of returning to prewar trade levels.  If China ruins Taiwan's infrastructure in the process, kills its business class, destroys its entrepreneurial infrastructure, etc. then the prewar quantity and quality of trade will suffer proportional to the damage.  Over time it might recover, but time is money so there is a cost no matter how optimistic the scenario is.

Additionally, there is the impact on China's other trade relationships if it should invade Taiwan, successfully or otherwise.  China might be Taiwan's largest trading partner, but it certainly isn't China's

As China has been taking notes on what went wrong for Russia in this war the economic impact should make them very wary of trying to take China by force.  Not only did Russia *not* successfully take over Ukraine, it has suffered massive direct and indirect costs with no end in sight. 

China should note that some of this damage is permanent (e.g. all the military hardware and lives lost), some might well turn out to be permanent (e.g. losing its top energy customers), and still other things will take so long to recover that they might as well be considered permanent since the effects will outlast the lives of the current leadership (e.g. loss of international prestige). 

These costs are massive and I doubt any sensible Chinese assessment will deem them acceptable.  Moreover, the war isn't over yet and so the true costs of the war are still accumulating with no known end.  It could be that Putin's government falls and Putin himself dies as a result.  Xi should be aware of this (I think the recent meeting indicates he is) and at the very least make him doubtful that invading Taiwan would work.

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

Four bankers who helped ‘Putin’s wallet’ set up Swiss accounts convicted (The Guardian)

[Battlefront.com]

Very good article in RFE/RL fleshing out the previous report from ISW I posted here about Russia's obligating males to come to recruitment centers to "clarify" their data:

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-summons-military-mobilization/32334087.html

From this report it is clear that Russia is preparing for the possibility of another mass mobilization and using the summons to either trick people into going into service or get them to sign up willingly.  Two birds with one stone.

Interesting to note about the efforts to get college students ready to be mobilized.  To me this indicates that Russian planners have decided they've hit the other demographics hard enough that they have to start looking towards schools for further mobilization.

Steve

[billbindc]

29 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Agreed, but the important assumption here is that Taiwan is conquers fairly easily and is capable of returning to prewar trade levels.  If China ruins Taiwan's infrastructure in the process, kills its business class, destroys its entrepreneurial infrastructure, etc. then the prewar quantity and quality of trade will suffer proportional to the damage.  Over time it might recover, but time is money so there is a cost no matter how optimistic the scenario is.

Additionally, there is the impact on China's other trade relationships if it should invade Taiwan, successfully or otherwise.  China might be Taiwan's largest trading partner, but it certainly isn't China's

As China has been taking notes on what went wrong for Russia in this war the economic impact should make them very wary of trying to take China by force.  Not only did Russia *not* successfully take over Ukraine, it has suffered massive direct and indirect costs with no end in sight. 

China should note that some of this damage is permanent (e.g. all the military hardware and lives lost), some might well turn out to be permanent (e.g. losing its top energy customers), and still other things will take so long to recover that they might as well be considered permanent since the effects will outlast the lives of the current leadership (e.g. loss of international prestige). 

These costs are massive and I doubt any sensible Chinese assessment will deem them acceptable.  Moreover, the war isn't over yet and so the true costs of the war are still accumulating with no known end.  It could be that Putin's government falls and Putin himself dies as a result.  Xi should be aware of this (I think the recent meeting indicates he is) and at the very least make him doubtful that invading Taiwan would work.

Steve

And looming over all of this are the semiconductor factories. They are jewel in the crown of global tech and they simply cannot function without the cooperation of a whole slew of democracies that won't go along with a hostile takeover by Beijing. In fact, in a shooting war that Taiwan looked like losing, it's fairly certain we would reduce them to rubble forthwith. 

[Kinophile]

Zelensky's read of Putin is exactly what was missing from that intel officers article. A mafioso mind, and about as trustworthy. 

[womble]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

An OpEd piece that pretty succinctly sums up where Russia is now and where it is headed.  The piece ends with the line "burn baby burn":

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3921962-russia-is-burning-out-of-control-on-putins-watch/

Steve

This bit had passed me by:

Quote

during the summit should have been humiliating to Putin, who agreed to replace the Russian ruble with the Chinese yuan in trading with the Global South.

So the Chinese are going to let Russia buy Yuan with their worthless Ruble? Two artificially-maintained (in the absolute worst sense) currencies trading is going to be a really fun game of "let's pretend" to build an economic system on, isn't it?

 

[Kinophile]

https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-kyivs-spring-counteroffensive-planned-in-several-areas-says-reznikov/

[cesmonkey]

12 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Zelensky's read of Putin is exactly what was missing from that intel officers article. A mafioso mind, and about as trustworthy. 

Is it better for Putin to think he's being successful at Bakhmut, or failing?

If he thinks the's being successful, maybe he will take more risks offensively that will end up backfiring spectacularly?

[kevinkin]

Would it be possible to draw off RA forces to the north?

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/30/the_wests_arctic_forge_23_drills_unsettle_russian_military_890306.html

If Russian is so tapped out, even a minor repositioning might be helpful a) draw off combat units b) just see how they respond logistically. Use Russia's paranoia against them, not by crossing the northern border but by poking at it. 

Another long one:

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-russias-unconventional-operations-during-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2022

Interesting passage:

Overall, it may be said that the Russians do not have much trouble obtaining information
about targets or locations. Their capacity to collect is significant. Assembling, analysing
and disseminating this information, however, is a different matter. It is understood within
the Ukrainian intelligence community that the GRU has established a targeting centre for
coordinating its reconnaissance across Ukraine. Reports from human agents are routed to this
centre for analysis. Here analysts produce a daily overview of detections, cross referenced with
GRU geospatial intelligence and other collection methods.

BUT

The target packs then provided to the relevant echelon would be sent with limited contextual information to determine prioritisation – and targets were often struck in the order in which target packs were received rather than in an order reflecting the characteristics or value of the target. Often the distribution of these instructions and the target’s place in the series of tasks of the unit
assigned to conduct the strike would take at least 24 hours. Sometimes this was much longer,
especially where it required Russian naval assets to move to a position and launch Kalibr missiles. 

Edited March 30, 2023 by kevinkin

[RandomCommenter]

51 minutes ago, billbindc said:

And looming over all of this are the semiconductor factories. They are jewel in the crown of global tech and they simply cannot function without the cooperation of a whole slew of democracies that won't go along with a hostile takeover by Beijing. In fact, in a shooting war that Taiwan looked like losing, it's fairly certain we would reduce them to rubble forthwith. 

I know that this is a little off topic of Ukraine (although with Xi and Putin getting in to bed together both questions end up being a little interrelated), but one thing that Taiwan has done is to place the semiconductor factories directly behind the most likely invasion beaches. So that China cannot do a contested landing on those beaches without destroying the factories.

 

For example:

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-chips/

[kevinkin]

Article highlights moral vs. physical and yet again how those inside the beltway got it wrong. They would call it miracle vs physical. The higher ups just didn't realize the multiplying effect of the will of the UA and western training had when put up against the blind lumbering RA. You have to be in theater to understand this, not behind a desk towing the line until retirement. 

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/30/the-war-of-surprises-in-ukraine/

Dang!

https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/03/new-artillery-round-shoots-farther-some-missiles-can-hit-moving-targets/384601/

A shell with electronic counter measures has 70 mile range. I wonder how they would affect a warship? 

Edited March 30, 2023 by kevinkin

[billbindc]

 

What Rob Lee wonders about often turns out to be a fairly important theme of the war later on. In this case, he seems to be thinking that GLSDB's will be available for the upcoming Ukrainian offensive. If so, Russia is going to be dealing with the equivalent of the HIMAR's campaign and the Kherson/Kharkiv offensive all at once. 

I suspect we are going to find out how brittle Russian formations may have become. 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

And looming over all of this are the semiconductor factories. They are jewel in the crown of global tech and they simply cannot function without the cooperation of a whole slew of democracies that won't go along with a hostile takeover by Beijing. In fact, in a shooting war that Taiwan looked like losing, it's fairly certain we would reduce them to rubble forthwith. 

We need to put a Marine division on Taiwan, ambiguity has exhausted it usefulness.

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Very good article in RFE/RL fleshing out the previous report from ISW I posted here about Russia's obligating males to come to recruitment centers to "clarify" their data:

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-summons-military-mobilization/32334087.html

From this report it is clear that Russia is preparing for the possibility of another mass mobilization and using the summons to either trick people into going into service or get them to sign up willingly.  Two birds with one stone.

Interesting to note about the efforts to get college students ready to be mobilized.  To me this indicates that Russian planners have decided they've hit the other demographics hard enough that they have to start looking towards schools for further mobilization.

Steve

It will be interesting to see if this prompts another round of brain drain.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Zelensky's read of Putin is exactly what was missing from that intel officers article.

Yes.  We've discussed it here, but maybe even we haven't put it in those stark terms.  I will attempt

Militarily Bakhmut is not important to either side, especially not for the price that is being paid.  It is also clear that Russia is expending far more resources into taking Bakhmut than Ukraine is defending it.  Militarily this is not sustainable and will have consequences for Russia sooner probably more than later.  And yet Putin continues to attack.  Why?  Because Putin has decided that politically it is important to take.  Perhaps the most important political objective at present.  Because war is politics through other means, and Putin has decided this is politically important to take, then by extension it is politically important for Ukraine to defend.

We do not need to fully comprehend why Putin feels taking Bakhmut is so politically necessary for his regime.  The simple fact that Putin believes that it is makes it so.  Defeating Putin at Bakhmut, therefore, denies his regime something that he feels it needs.  Something pretty damned important.  The harder Putin fights for Bakhmut, the more important it seems to be and the more dangerous it is for him to fail to take it.

When viewed this way, it makes perfect sense for Ukraine to hold onto Bakhmut for as long as possible.  The only way to end this war is to defeat Putin.  As with Combat Mission's asymmetrical Victory Conditions, you don't have to agree with the enemy's objectives, you just have to prevent him from securing them successfully.

Steve

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I suspect we are going to find out how brittle Russian formations may have become. 

Yeah, this is what I keep thinking about also.  Yes, some RU sectors will be strong, w good troops, gear, supply & leadership.  Other sectors..... exhausted older, unfit mobiks w bad leaders, insufficient gear, poor supply and inadequate defenses.  Just gotta find the right places to exploit.

[JonS]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

If China ruins Taiwan's ..., kills its business class, destroys its entrepreneurial infrastructure, etc. then the prewar quantity and quality of trade will suffer proportional to the damage. 

/glances toward Hong Kong

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, JonS said:

/glances toward Hong Kong

Heh... yeah, I was thinking exactly that.  Bloodless takeover of Hong Kong, yet Human and monetary capital fled big time.  It is doubtful that it will regain its previous status without some huge change on China's part.

Steve

[dan/california]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Heh... yeah, I was thinking exactly that.  Bloodless takeover of Hong Kong, yet Human and monetary capital fled big time.  It is doubtful that it will regain its previous status without some huge change on China's part.

Steve

But regardless of the damage to Hong Kong, which was severe, the damage to China's overall economy proved tolerable. Xi isn't going to be deterred by economic damage, regardless. He is simply to insulated from the well being of the Chinese people as a whole. What WILL deter his is enough military power on Taiwan to make it clear he will wind up like Putin has in Bakmuht, incomprehensibly large losses with absolutely nothing to show for it, not even a flag planted on smoking wreckage. Xi could lose 80% of the Chinese navy and it would be a symbolic/propaganda victory if he got too parade through Taipei. Losing 80% of the Chines navy and getting nothing for it except an economy 25% smaller than it was the month before is an entirely different thing.

[Battlefront.com]

Article just came out in The Washington Post detailing a 5000 page trove of top secret documents coming out of Russia's cyberwarfare structure.  Specifically a private company, Vulcan, that contracts with GRU and SVR.  The documents detail a ToDo list of things that could be attacked, catalog of known vulnerabilities, and evidence of past attacks and disinformation campaigns.

Quote

“These documents suggest that Russia sees attacks on civilian critical infrastructure and social media manipulation as one and the same mission, which is essentially an attack on the enemy’s will to fight,” said John Hultquist, the vice president for intelligence analysis at the cybersecurity firm Mandiant, which reviewed selections of the document at the request of The Post and its partners.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/03/30/russian-cyberwarfare-documents-vulkan-files/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F39908ff%2F6425b1aff19a510b042c55c3%2F5b6a1f5bade4e277958a3cb5%2F8%2F72%2F6425b1aff19a510b042c55c3&wp_cu=e17d566bfc90044414eb36edd5675ce3|72E0F70E3B4B42CEE0530100007F2E01

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, dan/california said:

But regardless of the damage to Hong Kong, which was severe, the damage to China's overall economy proved tolerable.

Correct.  As I said above, this is the sort of thing Putin was expecting when he invaded Ukraine.  It is probably the same thing Xi was hoping for if China invades Taiwan.  But now Xi has to contemplate the costs of failure instead of just the benefits of success.

15 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Xi isn't going to be deterred by economic damage, regardless.

I do not agree.  Xi knows regime stability is dependent upon economic stability.  The more unstable the economy, the more unstable his regime.  Xi should now understand better that the West is willing to engage in economic warfare to a far greater extent than he probably did prior to the Ukraine war.  I do not understand how it is possible for Xi to examine the West's reaction and think "yup, that wouldn't hurt us one bit".  What I would better understand is thinking "yup, that would hurt us a lot, however we're more clever and capable than the Russians so it won't happen to us".  That is the sort of thing the West should be putting a thumb to the scale to tip the balance.  If Xi becomes convinced that the West is willing to engage in a Russian level trade war with China over Taiwan, I don't see an invasion happening no matter what the military calculation is.

Steve

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Correct.  As I said above, this is the sort of thing Putin was expecting when he invaded Ukraine.  It is probably the same thing Xi was hoping for if China invades Taiwan.  But now Xi has to contemplate the costs of failure instead of just the benefits of success.

I do not agree.  Xi knows regime stability is dependent upon economic stability.  The more unstable the economy, the more unstable his regime.  Xi should now understand better that the West is willing to engage in economic warfare to a far greater extent than he probably did prior to the Ukraine war.  I do not understand how it is possible for Xi to examine the West's reaction and think "yup, that wouldn't hurt us one bit".  What I would better understand is thinking "yup, that would hurt us a lot, however we're more clever and capable than the Russians so it won't happen to us".  That is the sort of thing the West should be putting a thumb to the scale to tip the balance.  If Xi becomes convinced that the West is willing to engage in a Russian level trade war with China over Taiwan, I don't see an invasion happening.

Steve

Concur. 

Also, recent events have shown that the PRC gov't is a lot more susceptible and sensitive to public outcry than Putin's Russia. Chinese civil society has a lot mor energy than Russian civil society does...even if it's too nationalistic and anti-American for our taste. The leadership in Beijing can't just ignore it...their overt messaging notwithstanding.

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/how-chinas-new-no2-hastened-end-xis-zero-covid-policy-2023-03-03/

[Kinophile]

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3689119-ukraines-counteroffensive-to-be-launched-without-new-warplanes-reznikov.html

Considering the ZSU is mumbling quietly about "_multiple"  offensives (I assume starting consecutively,  not concurrently),  we could veiw the first assault(s) to be the one that tests a lot of personnel, tactics, concepts etc, but mainly with familiar SOV gear. Don't waste NATO stuff too early. 

The follow-on Ops could implement more and more NATO weapons,  steadily building to a Fall operation with a large, tightly integrated NATO component that sets the conditions for Winter.

This allows the ZSU to "use up" SOV gear in initial bloody assaults,  then crack open the weakened Russian theatre posture with much stronger NATO gear, when the AFRF is at its weakest. 

Thoughts? 

Edited March 30, 2023 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes.  We've discussed it here, but maybe even we haven't put it in those stark terms.  I will attempt

Militarily Bakhmut is not important to either side, especially not for the price that is being paid.  It is also clear that Russia is expending far more resources into taking Bakhmut than Ukraine is defending it.  Militarily this is not sustainable and will have consequences for Russia sooner probably more than later.  And yet Putin continues to attack.  Why?  Because Putin has decided that politically it is important to take.  Perhaps the most important political objective at present.  Because war is politics through other means, and Putin has decided this is politically important to take, then by extension it is politically important for Ukraine to defend.

We do not need to fully comprehend why Putin feels taking Bakhmut is so politically necessary for his regime.  The simple fact that Putin believes that it is makes it so.  Defeating Putin at Bakhmut, therefore, denies his regime something that he feels it needs.  Something pretty damned important.  The harder Putin fights for Bakhmut, the more important it seems to be and the more dangerous it is for him to fail to take it.

When viewed this way, it makes perfect sense for Ukraine to hold onto Bakhmut for as long as possible.  The only way to end this war is to defeat Putin.  As with Combat Mission's asymmetrical Victory Conditions, you don't have to agree with the enemy's objectives, you just have to prevent him from securing them successfully.

Steve

Nicely put.