How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Zeleban]

It looks like Vugledar is becoming a second Belogorovka for Russians

[Haiduk]

12 hours ago, Rokko said:

 

Potentially noteworthy, 30th Mech apparently in action north of Bakhmut. Maybe it's old news but I've personally not seen this brigade mentioned in recent weeks, so it was possibly sent to reinforce this sector.

30th brigade (or some of it part) fights around Bakhmut already long time. Initially they fought on southern part of front. They just not so media-strong like 93rd, or Madyar, though they have own social media accounts too. 

On Russian LostArmor forum noted this T-80UK was captured in the spring near Sumy from 4th GTD

Edited February 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

41 minutes ago, dan/california said:

This little master class in scenario design needs to be in the game manual, in full.

Outstanding information as always. Two observations related to the current war. The Russians, with few exceptions seem put a unit forward, and leave there until it is just shattered. This must greatly limit the accumulation corporate knowledge The_Capt is referring to. The Ukrainians on the other hand seem very aware that units needs to rotated before combat exhaustion set in, even if their casualties have only been moderate. The minus side of the Ukrainian approach is that I can site at least two significant instances where a less experienced unit that was just put in to relive another unit had a very bad day that led to a lot of OTHER units having a very bad day. So as the The_Capt says, no approach is perfect. Higher level staff should remain conscious of the down sides of whatever approach the are using.

FWIW I think the Russians are making a big mistake pushing there few remaining pre war elite formations to total failure, instead of pulling virtually all of them back to use as trainers and cadre for new units.

The other thing within this area is the issue of troop positioning.  The UA looks like it has been pretty consistent with its formation placements and rotations (correct me if I am wrong), while the RA has been noted as pushing troops up and down the line, particularly last summer, as they either feed these grinding attacks or try and fill gaps.

Beyond the obvious strain-costs of doing this wrt logistics etc.  There is again a hidden human cost in tacit collective knowledge.  

In CMCW we got comments on how much harder the Soviet Campaign was than the US one…”BFC is all ‘USA,USA!’”  Well first off, no. We got zero pressure or direction from BFC corporate (also known as ‘Steve’) on content beyond “gimme 3 campaigns and 15-20 scenarios and for the love of gawd don’t screw this up” - seriously I think I still have the email.  No what we had were US troops who had owned the sectors they were in and defending as collective organizations for decades.  So what? (Beyond an obvious plug for CMCW?)  

Well formations and units get to know their locales.  They learn the weird quirks - “Ya, ignore the maps this is really over there”.  They get to know their opponents - “The Russian commander has a hard-on for morning bombardments and they always fall short here”.  They know the troops to their left and right - “I did OCS with that guy, do not trust him”.  We call this integration. Which is a fancy term for, you guessed it, corporate knowledge.

It comes with a lot of other things like coordination and ISR sharing but the implication is that the Russian units getting bounced around are not getting a chance to gain Situational Awareness (SA) of their slice of the line when they are continually getting moved around.  There are ways to mitigate this, like really good communications, but all these solutions fall into areas of identified RA weaknesses.  This is a form of induced corrosion  as the RA units and formations have to continually reorient themselves, while suffering internal attrition.  This leads to mistakes and information/learning gaps that lead to more attrition.

Then throw onto this a bunch of replacements who have zero experience and we see the ongoing erosion of the RA at a foundational level.  This is why another 150k rapidly mobilized troops can be more of a problem than solution - you need to have the C4ISR architecture to integrate them into the fight and offset both individual and collective inexperience.

The RA is failing at a genetic level when it comes to operations and we have been seeing the steady decline for months.  Gotta be honest I am not sure what is holding them together at this point.

Edited February 8, 2023 by The_Capt

[Haiduk]

4 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

It looks like Vugledar is becoming a second Belogorovka for Russians

This is first half of yesterday issued episode, where drone drops grenades on the enemies, covering behind BMP. 

Here likely a role of drone-bomblets, which @Beleg85 has asked. Vehicles stop with arty fire and minefield, then dismounted infantry, which takes cover or try to move attack drones with VOGs. Their explosions maybe not so fatal, but multiple light wounds of personnel forced them to break attack and regroup.

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The RA is failing at a genetic level when it comes to operations and we have been seeing the steady decline for months.  Gotta be honest I am not sure what is holding them together at this point.

That is THE question of this war. Why don't they look around declare it a disaster/I mean total victory, and go the bleep home?

[akd]

14 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

It looks like Vugledar is becoming a second Belogorovka for Russians

Looks like the tank's engine caught on fire just from mishandling.

[Lethaface]

40 minutes ago, dan/california said:

This little master class in scenario design needs to be in the game manual, in full.

It is sort of, as the .pdf version is included in every install since it came out AFAIK.
I do agree it is good, as a matter of fact some of it came in handy as at the time I read it as I was hammering people about why it's important to develop a conceptual vision before committing deep on a project/program/product. Thanks, @JonS 
Although till this day I haven't created any CM scenario's/maps. 

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Outstanding information as always. Two observations related to the current war. The Russians, with few exceptions seem put a unit forward, and leave there until it is just shattered. This must greatly limit the accumulation corporate knowledge The_Capt is referring to. The Ukrainians on the other hand seem very aware that units needs to rotated before combat exhaustion set in, even if their casualties have only been moderate. The minus side of the Ukrainian approach is that I can site at least two significant instances where a less experienced unit that was just put in to relive another unit had a very bad day that led to a lot of OTHER units having a very bad day. So as the The_Capt says, no approach is perfect. Higher level staff should remain conscious of the down sides of whatever approach the are using.

FWIW I think the Russians are making a big mistake pushing there few remaining pre war elite formations to total failure, instead of pulling virtually all of them back to use as trainers and cadre for new units.

'Funny' thing is that many tactical battles I have seen footage of from this war (which is not a complete picture obviously) often sort of resemble a CM H2H battle between an experienced player and a (much)less experienced player. Usually Russian forces star in the latter. The most obvious one is advancing AFVs in complex terrain where the enemy has infantry with decent AT. Another one is (panic) area firing all around the place or mortars/artillery FFE being ordered against 'scout teams'.

The Russian player has now 'descent' into sending disposable units (drivers/etc) as 'recon by death' units, followed up by (in)direct fires. While potentially effective, usually not a sign of a battle going their way. 

Edited February 8, 2023 by Lethaface

[Kinophile]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think we have enough evidence, direct and implied, to conclude that Russia's goals for sometime now have been fairly consistent:

1. generally cause Ukraine as much pain and suffering as possible to soften them up for negotiations
2. take all the terrain of Luhansk and Donetsk as designated by prewar maps
3. declare victory
4. dig in and freeze the conflict
5. rebuild the military for future operations (not just in Ukraine)

Not surprisingly, it seems you have come to similar conclusions.

This is a logical way for Putin to end the war with something resembling a win.  Obviously it isn't a win, but being able to say that is what controlling the media and people's ability to express themselves is for

Yeah, that's the sort of stuff I'm asking about.  If the above is Russia's only play, and they're too weak to pull it off, then what will the consequences be?  Because there are always consequences.

Since the beginning of the war I've only put out very loose and vague concepts of what failure will mean to the Putin regime.  Now that it appears we're finally getting to the endgame, I'm wondering if we're any closer to figuring out what the most likely outcome of failure is.

Based on what we're seeing I think the most plausible chain of events for 2023:

1. this winter offensive fails to achieve anything even close to what Russia feels it needs
2. Russia will not surrender, but instead continue to fight defensively
3. Ukraine will have some successes in the coming months, perhaps not spectacular like the Kharkiv or Kherson operations, but still obvious and damaging (see separate point below)
4. whatever negative things are going on within Russia that Putin is worried about will get worse.  Especially if losses are so bad that a large desperation mobilization is once again required to keep the front from collapsing
5. someone will make a move to take power away from Putin.  This need not be an outright coup.  It could be something negotiated, as I've just speculated about Gazprom's entrance into the PMC arena
6. Russia's maximalist demands for a peace deal will soften, at first only superficially, but as things get worse there will be meaningful concessions
7. Ukraine may reject negotiations, but it might also decide a pause has more advantages than disadvantages
8. whether the war ends this year or extends into next year depends on Putin's continued ability to wage war, both politically and militarily

This is broadly how I see things going this year.  However, there is one MASSIVE wild card in the deck... Russian military collapse.  We've discussed this hundreds of times and it is still an extremely real possibility that Putin has managed to (barely) avoid at least 3 or 4 times so far.  There's only so many times one can dodge a bullet.

One scenario is that the costly failure we expect this winter offensive to be will sap so much strength away from Russia's ability to defend itself that when Ukraine goes on the offensive some sector of front, large or small, will be torn open.  Unlike Russia, Ukraine has shown an ability to exploit such a situation to a meaningful extent.

What happens then?  When a similar situation happened in 2022 Putin had to not only do a hasty partial mobilization, throwing tens of thousands of lives away, but he also had to withdraw forces from Kherson.  And all that did was stabilize the situation.  Is it viable for Putin to do this again?  I'm not so sure that it is for a host of practical and political reasons.

So if throwing bodies at the problem was the only solution he came up with in 2022 when Ukraine tore into his frontlines, and bodies aren't available in the quantity he needs to stop another offensive in 2023, then what?  Collapse seems quite plausible.

Steve

You're playing fast and loose with the word "Collapse" , my friend!  

You've identified Russian Army collapse as a precursor to internal domestic chaos,  and I agree.  

But at no point in 2022 was the Russian Army tm,  as a theatre fighting force,  in danger of operatipnal-level collapse. 

It suffered defeats because of local collapses but none of those threatened the overall operational force in themselves. Kyiv was a bad tactical,  operational and strategic defeat -  but the Donbass forces were not threatened and became the core of the next stage. The Sumy defeat was a domino from Kyiv,  becoming pointless after the northern retreat. Kharkiv was very damaging to the northern flank of the Donbass attack but even then we suspected (and its patently clear now) UKR was never going to exploit past local theatre success. Taking Luhansk was simply out of reach of the ZSU's then-capabilities. The Kherson defeat was managed relatively well and while a bad PR moment served to stabilize the whole front, and again,  the rest of the line was not in threat. 

Each time there has been a local defeat the rest of the operation has been fairly untouched and could hold its part while adjustments were made. None of the defeats compounded their effects across the force in general. 

There doesn't seem to be anything in 2023 that will break that process, except for UKR launching a massive, multi axis assault with compounding effects throughout the entire expeditionary force. 

Otherwise the Ivan will just suffer local defeats,  absorb the damage,  adjust and reconstitute and still be there next spring,  ready to go once more. 

Your required collapse requires more than the ZSU can do this year. 

Can you be more descriptive of what you think the ZSU can do? 

Edited February 8, 2023 by Kinophile

[billbindc]

3 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Russian news sites are enjoying talking about this:

https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream
How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline
The New York Times called it a “mystery,” but the United States executed a covert sea operation that was kept secret—until now
Seymour Hersh

 

The tell on these "exposes" by Hersh is that he always has just one source who covers about 6 sentences in the article propped up by pages of background, supposition and endless adjectives like 'vast', 'elites', 'deep' etc. Fanboi fic for the Taibbi crowd.

[Lethaface]

38 minutes ago, dan/california said:

That is THE question of this war. Why don't they look around declare it a disaster/I mean total victory, and go the bleep home?

Because it's in their genetics ;-). Although perhaps @The_Capt had a Freudian typo (?) and meant generic? Anyway I think genetic might be a good term for the answer to your 'why'. And no I don't mean literally DNA but in the 'corporate genes' of the Russian army.

[Haiduk]

Several days ago one soldier has written in twitter that soldiers have to demand from own battalion HQ to supply companies with 60 mm mortars. Because in dense infantry fights its turned out very useful and damgerous weapon. This post summoned many feedback from other soldiers, which were either agree with that or told that 60 mm is a good thing, but it's few skilled crews to use its properly - ther were many accidents of friendly fire with these mortars. 

Here is one of such posts from soldier of 93rd brigade:

Translation:

So it happened that only on last period of our previous rotation in Bakmut 60 mm mortar was appeared and used in our unit. In particular, our aerial-recon unit tried to ajust it fire, when it was needed. Based on results, I also consider that such stuff should be in big numbers on frontline. Heavy infantry clashes are exhausting our potential in part of infantry. And there is no any secret here. Clashes are losses always. Moskovites actively use mortar crews and SPG-9 and this cause problems for our defense. While we expect tanks, IFVs and howitzers, we need to resque those, who hold frontline with own bossoms. And mortars with AGSs can do that. Mimimum one hit with 60 mm mortar helped to stop one of numerous assults of position of our infantry to the south from Bakhmut.  

I can repeat, that AFU has a lack not only howitzers, but also mortars of all calibers. In the autumn Taras Chmut, head of Back-and-Alive charity foundation told that we have defficite in about 300-400 mortars only 120 mm caliber and this is not counting 82 and 60 mm. You can see on numerous videos huge zoo of mortars in our service, sometime from very exotic countries and even from our formal foes, like Iran (probably 82 mm Iranian mortars for Houthi, captured in some way). 60 mm mortars inintially was defined for SOF and TDF units, but soon many other light and not only light infantry evaluated opportunities of these small toys. Alas, load of work for arty and mortars so big, that they are taking out of service not only because enemy fire, but because of huge rate of barrel exhausting. 

Edited February 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[Lethaface]

12 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

There doesn't seem to be anything in 2023 that will break that process, except for UKR launching a massive, multi axis assault with compounding effects throughout the entire expeditionary force. 

Otherwise the Ivan will just suffer local defeats,  absorb the damage,  adjust and reconstitute and still be there next spring,  ready to go once more. 

Your required collapse requires more than the ZSU can do this year. 

The 'only' thing UKR needs to do is convince the average soldier that 'further resistance is futile'. While some/a bunch  local tactical victories are indeed probably not enough, another wave of the Russian rear HQs/ammo dumps blowing up followed by another large strategic setback is a different casus. Everyone has his limits. 
A massive multi axis assault is not necessarily a requirement for braking the will of average RA soldier.
Anyway time will tell and there's no guarantees. 

Edited February 8, 2023 by Lethaface

[Kinophile]

7 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

The 'only' thing UKR needs to do is convince the average soldier that 'further resistance is futile'. While some/a bunch  local tactical victories are indeed probably not enough, another wave of the Russian rear HQs/ammo dumps blowing up followed by another large strategic setback is a different casus. Everyone has his limits. 
A massive multi axis assault is not necessarily a requirement for braking the will of average RA soldier.
Anyway time will tell and there's no guarantees. 

You have greater faith than I in the effects of HIMARS on the average Ivan. They seem to have adjusted so far.

And a large operational defeat with bad strategic implications is exactly what I'm describing as needed for RA collapse. 

[Haiduk]

I can't find this screen from Russian/DPR TG channel, but in this post DPR milblogger issued "hate speech" about nature of Wagner successes. In angry manner he blamed Russia that they throw DPR units in continous senseless attacks around Donetsk airport, Avdiivka, Maryinka, Horlivka only with one goal - to keep tense situation and prevent UKR  command from moving of additional units to Bakhmut. But this already causing so terrible situation, DPR troops are suffering huge, enormous losses - many companies already almost completely changed four compositions sinde 24th Feb, so that to the summer DPR troops can be totally decimated and then...

On this VERY GRAPHIC video represented result of one of such pointless DPR attack in area of Opytne village near Donetsk airport.

On other hand Khodakovskiy, former commander of DPR Vostok battalion (now reginemt) complained, that despite on heavy push in first day of Vuhladar assault and Russian advantage in personnel and vehicles, UKR command disn't fall into temptation to move here numerous reserves from other sectors, except some minor units. 

Edited February 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[NamEndedAllen]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Based on what we're seeing I think the most plausible chain of events for 2023:

1. this winter offensive fails to achieve anything even close to what Russia feels it needs
2. Russia will not surrender, but instead continue to fight defensively
3. Ukraine will have some successes in the coming months, perhaps not spectacular like the Kharkiv or Kherson operations, but still obvious and damaging (see separate point below)
4. whatever negative things are going on within Russia that Putin is worried about will get worse.  Especially if losses are so bad that a large desperation mobilization is once again required to keep the front from collapsing
5. someone will make a move to take power away from Putin.  This need not be an outright coup.  It could be something negotiated, as I've just speculated about Gazprom's entrance into the PMC arena
6. Russia's maximalist demands for a peace deal will soften, at first only superficially, but as things get worse there will be meaningful concessions
7. Ukraine may reject negotiations, but it might also decide a pause has more advantages than disadvantages
8. whether the war ends this year or extends into next year depends on Putin's continued ability to wage war, both politically and militarily

Steve, can you pin something to just a thread? This should be memorialized for easy reference. Your specific takes for what may develop in what time frame have a good track record. Lots here to use as a scorecard in the unfolding real life drama caused by Russia.

[Lethaface]

5 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

You have greater faith than I in the effects of HIMARS on the average Ivan. They seem to have adjusted so far.

And a large operational defeat with bad strategic implications is exactly what I'm describing as needed for RA collapse. 

What would a 'large operational defeat with bad strategic implications' look like in your opinion?

Besides not necessarily HIMARS but I do think that the disappearance of 'HQ' and 'ammo' is not doing morale among soldiers a favor. Especially if combined with Ukraine rolling up important parts of the front/rear.

Edited February 8, 2023 by Lethaface

[Haiduk]

On the video of Madyar BTR-4 was seen. Here is other video also with BTR-4 fire in Bakhmut. But, no, this is not 92nd mech.brigade, though units also from Kahrkiv. This is 3rd National Guard operative brigade, wich now is transforming into assault brigade "Spartan" of "Offensive Guard"

 

[Harmon Rabb]

Vindman leads new push to send military contractors to Ukraine (Politico)

Alexander Vindman supports the idea of sending contractors to help the AFU with repairs.

Think I remember this idea brought up on this forum a while ago.

Ben Hodges seems to like this idea.

 

[Haiduk]

Second visually confirmed loss of Su-35S, newest Russian fighter jet. Unverified yet, but allegedly this is Berislav area, Kherson oblast. There was a report of General Staff in May as if UKR MiG-29s shot down Su-35 in Kherson oblast, but this also can't be confirmed now.

  

 

[cesmonkey]

9 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Second visually confirmed loss of Su-35S, newest Russian fighter jet.

While it's nice to see this wreckage, isn't the Su-57 Russia's newest fighter jet?

[The_Capt]

32 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

You're playing fast and loose with the word "Collapse" , my friend!  

You've identified Russian Army collapse as a precursor to internal domestic chaos,  and I agree.  

But at no point in 2022 was the Russian Army tm,  as a theatre fighting force,  in danger of operatipnal-level collapse. 

It suffered defeats because of local collapses but none of those threatened the overall operational force in themselves. Kyiv was a bad tactical,  operational and strategic defeat -  but the Donbass forces were not threatened and became the core of the next stage. The Sumy defeat was a domino from Kyiv,  becoming pointless after the northern retreat. Kharkiv was very damaging to the northern flank of the Donbass attack but even then we suspected (and its patently clear now) UKR was never going to exploit past local theatre success. Taking Luhansk was simply out of reach of the ZSU's then-capabilities. The Kherson defeat was managed relatively well and while a bad PR moment served to stabilize the whole front, and again,  the rest of the line was not in threat. 

Each time there has been a local defeat the rest of the operation has been fairly untouched and could hold its part while adjustments were made. None of the defeats compounded their effects across the force in general. 

There doesn't seem to be anything in 2023 that will break that process, except for UKR launching a massive, multi axis assault with compounding effects throughout the entire expeditionary force. 

Otherwise the Ivan will just suffer local defeats,  absorb the damage,  adjust and reconstitute and still be there next spring,  ready to go once more. 

Your required collapse requires more than the ZSU can do this year. 

Can you be more descriptive of what you think the ZSU can do? 

Collapse - not quite.  I think you may be outlining Strategic collapse, which has not happened.  I argue that the RA has suffered at least two operational collapses.

In a warfare context a “collapse” had at least three critical components - it is under pressure, it systemic, and it is uncontrolled.  If a military collapses outside of warfare it is an institutional collapse, which is a whole other thing.  A collapse has to affect multiple military systems, often in a chain - looking at operational functions things like Act, Sense and Command often all fail at the same time or quickly in sequence because they are interlinked.  And loss of control - it is debatable if Kherson was a collapse because it was controlled and somewhat orderly, this is what differentiates a collapse from a withdrawal operation.

So Collapse #1 - Northern Front Phase I.  We are going to need a lot more data but the withdrawal of the RA from the two northern operational axis had the hallmarks of a collapse.  The question of Loss of Control is somewhat unclear.  I think it is safe to say that there was a level of collapse based on the numbers of abandoned vehicles alone.  Systemic failures were pretty obvious as well.  Time will tell but I think that the evidence will show that we saw a cascade failure on the Northern Front as higher C2 essentially lost control of the situation.

Collapse #2 - Kharkiv.  No other way to paint this one and it was definitely operational level by any measure.  The RA had been eroded so badly in this sector that when the UA broke through they achieved operational level manoeuvre and objectives, Izyum being the big one.  The RA managed to tie this one off but this was a full on rout.

Collapse #3 - Kherson is really debatable.  I honestly think the RA pulled out before it went into complete free fall but it was obvious that the RA was in an untenable position for months.  If there was a collapse it was within the RA chain of command but had the look of a more orderly withdrawal.

So the question really remains - what will it take for a Strategic collapse of the RA?  I think we have tossed this one around at length and honestly I am not sure.  Something like the German Navy mutinies in WW1?  Of course all the elements of erosion are there - poor uncoordinated C2, wasteful use of soldiery, system cracks from force management to force employment and continual battlefield failures.  When or if it will happen remains a mystery.

[The_Capt]

22 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Vindman leads new push to send military contractors to Ukraine (Politico)

Alexander Vindman supports the idea of sending contractors to help the AFU with repairs.

Think I remember this idea brought up on this forum a while ago.

Ben Hodges seems to like this idea.

 

Is this guy reading our thread?  Didn’t we talk about exactly this awhile back?

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Several days ago one soldier has written in twitter that soldiers have to demand from own battalion HQ to supply companies with 60 mm mortars. Because in dense infantry fights its turned out very useful and damgerous weapon. This post summoned many feedback from other soldiers, which were either agree with that or told that 60 mm is a good thing, but it's few skilled crews to use its properly - ther were many accidents of friendly fire with these mortars. 

Here is one of such posts from soldier of 93rd brigade:

Translation:

So it happened that only on last period of our previous rotation in Bakmut 60 mm mortar was appeared and used in our unit. In particular, our aerial-recon unit tried to ajust it fire, when it was needed. Based on results, I also consider that such stuff should be in big numbers on frontline. Heavy infantry clashes are exhausting our potential in part of infantry. And there is no any secret here. Clashes are losses always. Moskovites actively use mortar crews and SPG-9 and this cause problems for our defense. While we expect tanks, IFVs and howitzers, we need to resque those, who hold frontline with own bossoms. And mortars with AGSs can do that. Mimimum one hit with 60 mm mortar helped to stop one of numerous assults of position of our infantry to the south from Bakhmut.  

I can repeat, that AFU has a lack not only howitzers, but also mortars of all calibers. In the autumn Taras Chmut, head of Back-and-Alive charity foundation told that we have defficite in about 300-400 mortars only 120 mm caliber and this is not counting 82 and 60 mm. You can see on numerous videos huge zoo of mortars in our service, sometime from very exotic countries and even from our formal foes, like Iran (probably 82 mm Iranian mortars for Houthi, captured in some way). 60 mm mortars inintially was defined for SOF and TDF units, but soon many other light and not only light infantry evaluated opportunities of these small toys. Alas, load of work for arty and mortars so big, that they are taking out of service not only because enemy fire, but because of huge rate of barrel exhausting. 

Edit: I forgot the top bit.

I have been advocating for the vast utility of 40mm to 60mm indirect fire since CMSF came out. Infantry just vaporize under 60mm mortar fire as modeled in the Marine Module. If you get an AAVB into a good protected spot its almost inexhaustible supply of 40mm grenades just lays waste to any light troops on the map. All of the fires development for the entirety of that time has been directed towards either very long range systems. or very high velocity direct fire systems like the ever larger auto cannon on  AFVs. This has resulted in some really nice weapon systems. BUT, we have missed an entire subset of capability, and one that drones would make that much more useful.

52 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

What would a 'large operational defeat with bad strategic implications' look like in your opinion?

Besides not necessarily HIMARS but I do think that the disappearance of 'HQ' and 'ammo' is not doing morale among soldiers a favor. Especially if combined with Ukraine rolling up important parts of the front/rear.

The AFU cutting the land bridge just to one side of Mariupol, and GLSBD raining down on the Kerch Bridge until it melts. That is the blow Putin cannot propagandize his way around.

47 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Vindman leads new push to send military contractors to Ukraine (Politico)

Alexander Vindman supports the idea of sending contractors to help the AFU with repairs.

Think I remember this idea brought up on this forum a while ago.

Ben Hodges seems to like this idea.

 

They should have been there months and months ago. They should sure as bleep be there by Monday. I mean there are entire corporations whose sole purpose in life is to provide these services to the Gulf countries. Ukraine might be more dangerous, but in a lot of other ways seems like a vastly better place to work. And west of the Dnipro, it isn't THAT dangerous.

Edited February 8, 2023 by dan/california

[Harmon Rabb]

9 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Is this guy reading our thread?  Didn’t we talk about exactly this awhile back?

I remember a user who used to be a regular poster on this topic suggested that the Internet Research Agency is aware of this thread. It would be a nice feeling if some of the good guys also pay attention to it.

Lots of wisdom in this corner of the internet.