How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, billbindc said:

What's interesting about it is that it's not at all official...or at least not directly. It's just a call from some folks at what amounts to a lobbying shop but it has very serious ramifications to costs of trade for Russia. People often imagine soft power is KPop or Hollywood and it is...but it's also something as tangible as this.

Years ago there was a movie staring Tim Robbins called Code 46.  Not a stellar movie, but interesting:

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0345061/?ref_=nm_flmg_t_32_act

The premise is that insurance companies unofficially control the world by doing things just like Billindc just outlined.  Want to travel to India?  Well, you can't because your DNA results show that you have a predisposition to contracting malaria, which makes it risky for you to go.  Insurance companies don't like risk, so you are denied travel insurance.  Since you can't get insurance no airline or shipping company will give you passage.  There's no travel restriction to India, there's no law that says you can't go there, but free market forces make their own rules and you're not going to India because of it.  Sorry chum!

We've talked about no airport wanting to have Russian planes landing on their runways because there's no longer a way to verify that Russian aircraft are being maintained sufficiently.  For sure not all airports are going to deny all Russian aircraft landing privileges 100% of the time, but it doesn't have to be that dramatic to have an impact on Russia's ability to conduct business.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

Speaking of large bags of gas, Big Serge here, to make right all our wrongthink! This is the Ukrainian Verdun, or gonna be, once they secure that there High Ground, any week now!  With 9 to 1 advantage in tubes (shells, hmm, perhaps not so much).

https://bigserge.substack.com/p/russo-ukrainian-war-the-world-blood

The return of static positional warfare, however, also reflects the synergistic effect of increasing Ukrainian exhaustion along with a Russian commitment to patiently attriting and denuding Ukraine’s remaining combat capability. They have found an ideal place to achieve this in the Donbas.

A curious new definition of 'ideal place' of which I was previously unaware. But ok, let's hear the Serge out, he at least attempts to cite 'facts', albeit cherry picked....

The Donbas is a particularly accommodating place to construct formidable defenses. It is highly urbanized and industrial (Donetsk was the most urban oblast in Ukraine prior to 2014, with over 90% of the population living in urban areas), with cities and towns dominated by the typically robust Soviet buildings, along with prolific industrial complexes. Ukraine has spent much of the last decade improving these positions. 

[Map by the Serge, so season heavily with salt, laced with various heavy metals. But weren't the Izyum-Lyman thrusts last summer supposed to outflank these lines?]

At this point, the frontline sits directly on what I have labeled as the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian defensive belts, and both of these belts are now heavily bleeding.

Sure, now define 'heavily', and by whom?

Secondly, lots of the, shall we just say “good stuff” around Slavyansk is to the east of the city, including both the dominating high ground and the major highways. 

Assuming the Russians just get to stroll over there if Bahmut falls. But oh yeah, Zelensky is clean out of hohols and British-Polish mercs, I forgot.

Anyhoo, more like this if you fancy it.

[Battlefront.com]

11 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I don't think it's safe to conclude anything like Russia is unable to attack because it can't. You're negating the possibility of a good decision on their end, which feels dangerous. 

I agree that assessing this is pretty difficult with the information we have on hand.  Whether being done deliberately or because of conditions being imposed upon them (to use The_Capt's terminology), or some combination, what we do know for sure is that strategically the Russians aren't fighting the same way as they fought in 2022.

Personally, I think the Russians have changed their strategy because they have realized what they tried before didn't produce the results they wanted AND they are no longer able to "try, try, try again" through brute force.  Now they not only realize that attacking 100 places every day isn't working for them, they are also realizing that they don't have the resources to do it even if they wanted to.

The really important question we should be focused on is what will replace the 2022 strategy for 2023.  I presume we'll see most of the front remain on a semi-passive defensive footing for the rest of the year. This includes investing in long term defensive works.  The central Donbas front will remain active, but only in a few places at a time in order to harbor resources for the Summer fight.

What is coming up in the Summer is anybody's guess, but like many I expect Russia to attempt some sort of large scale offensive action.  If they are smart they will limit it to one or perhaps two main efforts with very modest territorial gains in mind.  This gets us back to the question of how much has Russia really learned from this war, because Putin might impose another 5-7 prong offensive concept.  I doubt it because of all the defensive activity going on, but it is unknown at this point if Russia really is smarter or just waiting until conditions are right to demonstrate they are still dumb as rocks.

 

The most important element in determining Russia's possible moves in 2023 come down to not being sure what they have for reserves.  We know they've kept sizeable amounts of mobiks away from the front and are training them.  Weaponry is unknown, however supposing they can produce a well equipped army 2-3 times larger than the one they invaded with is going to be a tough argument to make.  There's just too much evidence that it isn't physically possible for them to do so.

Like The_Capt I see the Russian Army of 2023 being almost the total opposite of the 2022 Army.  What we saw last year was a highly equipment centric force that was very short on infantry.  I think 2023 will show that the Russia Army is now heavier in infantry than mechanized force.  The infantry will be "light" and probably very poorly supported with combined arms.  The infantry components will likely be disposable with the heavier equipment organized to survive longer term.

My gut feeling is that the mass infantry attacks being conducted by Wagner is an experiment even if it didn't start out that way.  I think Russia is probably gauging how many bodies it needs to throw at a problem to make the problem weak enough to be dealt with by better forces.  This is troubling because it could be quite effective.

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Zeleban said:

To date, the activity of units and subunits of the Special Forces of the RF Armed Forces as part of an enemy force grouping is recorded only in certain directions and sectors, which is quite possibly due to several reasons:

losses

the desire to hide the main areas of "interest" of the command of the Russian troops

the need to re-equip the relevant units and units of special forces, respectively, bringing their combat abilities to some more or less acceptable level.

As I was reading where the Russian special forces units are deployed I was thinking they can't possibly all be at significant operational strength.  However, placing them along the front creates some challenges for Ukraine because it has to figure out which ones are capable of doing what, which ones are being reinforced/rebuilt, and what even a depleted force might do for a given sector.

In theory Russia should be rotating these units back behind the lines for rebuilding, but keeping them up front does have the above mentioned advantages.  Maybe it is smarter to keep them in the line, given Russia's overall needs right now.

Steve

[kevinkin]

Used the term zombies in jest (sort of) a few days ago, maybe there is more to it:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/02/02/are-drugs-making-russian-soldiers-act-like-zombies/amp/

Edited February 5, 2023 by kevinkin

[billbindc]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I argue that this, if it was a surveillance platform, was a pretty big mistake, not some deliberate strategic machinations by the unknowable Chinese grand strategy.  Sure Chinese have been poking and prodding, intel gathering and playing reindeer games around the globe, so were the Russians...we get it, you guys are flexing.

But this stunt is way above a lot of thresholds.  An incursion into NA airspace with intent (assuming the thing isn't just a weather balloon and all this is so much theatre) is not a small escalation.  Further to do it with a blatantly overt platform, which is now causing all sorts of diplomatic pain does not track along with Chinese methods to date. 

So it looks more like a weird error that is going to end up costing China, as their best play was - like Russia - to keep us all divided on the actual threat.  For example, China is still Canada's second largest trading partner.  So we talk tough and make noise but how much are we really willing to sacrifice here if we are not entirely convinced China is really a threat?  Well plopping balloons all over the place over NA soil, which we shoot down and then show all the evidence to the planet, is just about the worst way to keep us divided on the issue.  So China either decided to throw down and escalate for "reasons" or it was an embarrassing screwup. 

There is no reality in which Xi agrees to meet with Blinken on Sunday/Monday and wants this to happen on Saturday. Somebody in the PLA's 3rd Department screwed up...either with intent or not...and severely embarrassed the leader of the country. One need go no farther to prove that than to note the Chinese apology and the rarity of such in the recent past. The kicker is that either way, it screams both ineptitude and aggression just as China's neighbors are deciding if it's safe to throw in completely with US containment strategy. 

 

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I agree that assessing this is pretty difficult with the information we have on hand.  Whether being done deliberately or because of conditions being imposed upon them (to use The_Capt's terminology), or some combination, what we do know for sure is that strategically the Russians aren't fighting the same way as they fought in 2022.

Personally, I think the Russians have changed their strategy because they have realized what they tried before didn't produce the results they wanted AND they are no longer able to "try, try, try again" through brute force.  Now they not only realize that attacking 100 places every day isn't working for them, they are also realizing that they don't have the resources to do it even if they wanted to.

The really important question we should be focused on is what will replace the 2022 strategy for 2023.  I presume we'll see most of the front remain on a semi-passive defensive footing for the rest of the year. This includes investing in long term defensive works.  The central Donbas front will remain active, but only in a few places at a time in order to harbor resources for the Summer fight.

What is coming up in the Summer is anybody's guess, but like many I expect Russia to attempt some sort of large scale offensive action.  If they are smart they will limit it to one or perhaps two main efforts with very modest territorial gains in mind.  This gets us back to the question of how much has Russia really learned from this war, because Putin might impose another 5-7 prong offensive concept.  I doubt it because of all the defensive activity going on, but it is unknown at this point if Russia really is smarter or just waiting until conditions are right to demonstrate they are still dumb as rocks.

 

The most important element in determining Russia's possible moves in 2023 come down to not being sure what they have for reserves.  We know they've kept sizeable amounts of mobiks away from the front and are training them.  Weaponry is unknown, however supposing they can produce a well equipped army 2-3 times larger than the one they invaded with is going to be a tough argument to make.  There's just too much evidence that it isn't physically possible for them to do so.

Like The_Capt I see the Russian Army of 2023 being almost the total opposite of the 2022 Army.  What we saw last year was a highly equipment centric force that was very short on infantry.  I think 2023 will show that the Russia Army is now heavier in infantry than mechanized force.  The infantry will be "light" and probably very poorly supported with combined arms.  The infantry components will likely be disposable with the heavier equipment organized to survive longer term.

My gut feeling is that the mass infantry attacks being conducted by Wagner is an experiment even if it didn't start out that way.  I think Russia is probably gauging how many bodies it needs to throw at a problem to make the problem weak enough to be dealt with by better forces.  This is troubling because it could be quite effective.

Steve

 

Every tube, every shell, and every counter-battery radar in Europe needs to be headed to the Donbas. from 60mm mortars on upI. If Ukraine can finally achieve real artillery superiority nothing else the Russians are doing is going to work. Western IFVs popping up to put down accurate auto-cannon fire ought to take the starch of any axis that is looking truly dangerous.

There was a picture a week or two ago of a 50 caliber machine gun on some version of a flat bed truck doing the pop up duty some where around Bakmuht. We can do better than that.

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, billbindc said:

There is no reality in which Xi agrees to meet with Blinken on Sunday/Monday and wants this to happen on Saturday. Somebody in the PLA's 3rd Department screwed up...either with intent or not...and severely embarrassed the leader of the country. One need go no farther to prove that than to note the Chinese apology and the rarity of such in the recent past. The kicker is that either way, it screams both ineptitude and aggression just as China's neighbors are deciding if it's safe to throw in completely with US containment strategy. 

 

I am guessing it is unpleasant to be the person that gets the blame for embarrassing Xi...

[LongLeftFlank]

53 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

...what we do know for sure is that strategically the Russians aren't fighting the same way as they fought in 2022....

I think Russia is probably gauging how many bodies it needs to throw at a problem to make the problem weak enough to be dealt with by better forces.  This is troubling because it could be quite effective.

So in the rock-paper-scissors game, while we wait for the drone swarms (that we need Chinese help to make in bulk quickly btw) to kill all the mobiks or all the trucks or whatever, what trumps Dumb Mass of Russian bodies backed by what remains a formidable artillery arm?

1. Starvation -- both munitions and food -- was ultimately the tool used by the Americans against the Japanese, whose sole suit once their Navy went down became fanatical infantry with a little obsolete artillery and a light tank here and there. Of course, interdicting sea logistics was a lot easier than overland, but starvation trumps brutality.

2. Antipersonnel mines: Schu mines, bouncing betties, toepoppers, butterflies, claymores. Yeah sure, treaties Hague norms fairy, whatever. Do you need to kill and maim bushels of badly trained Russians (and bog them down so your artillery can kill or main still more bushels of badly trained Russians) fighting across what is already an ecological and social moonscape, or don't you?

Edited February 5, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

32 minutes ago, dan/california said:

There was a picture a week or two ago of a 50 caliber machine gun on some version of a flat bed truck doing the pop up duty some where around Bakmuht. We can do better than that.

Maybe not. Consider the 1987 'Toyota War' in Chad.

https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/toyota-wars-and-the-next-generation-in-counter-insurgency-strategies

This is simply 'partisans with Panzerfausts' gone mobile. War on the cheap. The Russians have been doing the same for some time as well: the 'tachanka' tradition.

Edited February 5, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Artkin]

I think the summer is going to be really hard on the Ukrainians unless they are able to field a few hundred thousand infantrymen themselves before then. With all the dense foliage infantry and infiltration groups will dominate the battlefield. We are seeing the total opposite now given that there are no leaves on the trees protecting these guys from getting spotted. Mass is working in Bakhmut given that it's a massive city where heavy equipment isn't as effective. I hope there are reserves, there should be since Ukraine has received enough hardware to field 10-15 MRBs since the start of the war.

[Zeleban]

 

[Artkin]

It would be smart to give them all the counterbattery equipment that we can for the summer offensive so Russian infantry would go unsupported

Edited February 5, 2023 by Artkin

[Beleg85]

Some interviews with helicopter pilots who made, among others, daring supply flights into Mariupol:

 

[_Morpheus_]

 

[Ales Dvorak]

10 hours ago, sburke said:

there is only one way to reply to China.  Float our own balloon over Shanghai.

 

Float your ballon over Shanghai and probably you'll find this

https://www.dropbox.com/s/qo0w5rzrxbf69xx/qtIhV.jpeg?dl=0

Edited February 5, 2023 by Ales Dvorak

[kevinkin]

https://news.usni.org/2023/02/02/losing-crimea-would-escalate-russian-ukraine-conflict-former-defense-secretary-says

Gate's on board overall and specifically:

The critical issue for Ukraine is how quickly the United States and NATO allies can get equipment like tanks and other armored vehicles into the country, Gates said. “We ought to be airlifting some of that equipment to Poland now,” he said. This includes the American Abrams M-1A1 tanks and German Leopard tanks, armored personnel carriers and Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected [MRAP] vehicles, Gates said.

Gates was wary about providing Ukrainian armed forces with longer range weapons that could strike targets across the Russian border. He stressed the need for an agreement between Kyiv and Washington on targets, such as logistical depots and rail hubs, and locations. It’s an option “worth considering but with very real limits imposed” before receiving approval, he said.

Gates, a former CIA analyst, said he believes Putin is “a rational decision-maker” who was ill-informed and isolated at the start of the war due to COVID-19 restrictions. He dismissed the idea that replacing Putin would bring an end to the war more quickly by pointing out “the advisers to him are more hawkish than he is.” He mentioned Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group of mercenaries, as one of those closest to Putin, but also a critic of how Russia is fighting the war.

His PhD dissertation was titled: "Soviet Sinology: An Untapped Source for Kremlin Views and Disputes Relating to Contemporary Events in China". Interesting guy who has been around and around the beltway a long time. He is either very good, knows too much or maybe both. 

Note: the C-5 can carry two M1s and the C-17 three Bradley's and they can fly 2000+ miles. Slow going, but what and airlift it would be. 

Edited February 5, 2023 by kevinkin

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So in the rock-paper-scissors game, while we wait for the drone swarms (that we need Chinese help to make in bulk quickly btw) to kill all the mobiks or all the trucks or whatever, what trumps Dumb Mass of Russian bodies backed by what remains a formidable artillery arm?

1. Starvation -- both munitions and food -- was ultimately the tool used by the Americans against the Japanese, whose sole suit once their Navy went down became fanatical infantry with a little obsolete artillery and a light tank here and there. Of course, interdicting sea logistics was a lot easier than overland, but starvation trumps brutality.

2. Antipersonnel mines: Schu mines, bouncing betties, toepoppers, butterflies, claymores. Yeah sure, treaties Hague norms fairy, whatever. Do you need to kill and maim bushels of badly trained Russians (and bog them down so your artillery can kill or main still more bushels of badly trained Russians) fighting across what is already an ecological and social moonscape, or don't you?

AP mines won’t work, you will never get the density to fully stop a mass of infantry.  You can canalized them.

Short answer is - same thing it was in WW1: wires, MGs and artillery.  Wires as in obstacles and communications to coordinate fires.  And the other two are pretty obvious but for artillery it needs to be back to front.  Deep strikes on logistics and any massed breakout troops, and then the AP stuff up front.

A problem I am seeing here is that we have dehumanized the Russians to the point that we are no longer considering the impact losing 1000 people a day is going to have on their home front.  I am not convinced in the least that Russia as a society is some sort of homogeneous zombie mass, even if their troops are starting to act like it.  Russia has a willpower breaking point and tactics like this are pushing towards it.  Disinformation will only go so far.  Everyone is talking about Ukrainian exhaustion but what about Russian exhaustion?

Unless Russia can actually turn these human wave assaults into a breakthrough, and then breakout which is a big ask given the ISR disparities, then this strategy only accelerates the negative internal pressure on the nation. 

[LongLeftFlank]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Short answer is - same thing it was in WW1: wires, MGs and artillery.  Wires as in obstacles and communications to coordinate fires.  And the other two are pretty obvious but for artillery it needs to be back to front.  Deep strikes on logistics and any massed breakout troops, and then the AP stuff up front.

Your other paragraphs are clear enough, but apologies, I am having difficulty parsing this one. And this is not to criticize, I just want to be sure I'm not missing something really new and interesting.

1. Wires... what again, sorry? Entanglements that don't also go BANG? Really? Also, copper wire field phone comms? Really?

2. What's 'AP artillery' if not scatterable bomblets? And you've totally lost me on the back-to-front part....

Apologies again if I'm missing something obvious.

[The_Capt]

Just now, LongLeftFlank said:

Your other paragraphs are clear enough, but apologies, I am having difficulty parsing this one. And this is not to criticize, I just want to be sure I'm not missing something really new and interesting.

1. Wires... what again, sorry? Entanglements that don't also go BANG? Really? Also, copper wire field phone comms? Really?

2. What's 'AP artillery' if not scatterable bomblets? And you've totally lost me on the back-to-front part....

Apologies again if I'm missing something obvious.

“Wires” is a broad descriptor harking back to another time.  So physical obstacles still work - like lakes and rivers, or man made like barbwire (an oldy but a goody).  And the modern equivalent in encrypted comms - although a copper communication wire (eg field phone) is still one of the most secure and safe ways to communicate on the battlefield - low signature and hard to hack or disrupt, problem is range.  Regardless, the ability to coordinate fires and reserves is key to countering human wave assaults.

AP fires - have we not come up with dozens of ways to do this?  Air burst, DPICM, MOAB.  Hell the HIMARs has a tungsten shotgun nightmare round or the flying blender Hellfire blade: https://www.reuters.com/world/little-known-modified-hellfire-likely-killed-al-qaedas-zawahiri-2022-08-02/.  Add to this claymores (command detonated of course) and sharp language, I think we can cover off on the requirements.

And of course the good ole MG…Ma Deuce, long may she reign.

[billbindc]

53 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

https://news.usni.org/2023/02/02/losing-crimea-would-escalate-russian-ukraine-conflict-former-defense-secretary-says

Gate's on board overall and specifically:

The critical issue for Ukraine is how quickly the United States and NATO allies can get equipment like tanks and other armored vehicles into the country, Gates said. “We ought to be airlifting some of that equipment to Poland now,” he said. This includes the American Abrams M-1A1 tanks and German Leopard tanks, armored personnel carriers and Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected [MRAP] vehicles, Gates said.

Gates was wary about providing Ukrainian armed forces with longer range weapons that could strike targets across the Russian border. He stressed the need for an agreement between Kyiv and Washington on targets, such as logistical depots and rail hubs, and locations. It’s an option “worth considering but with very real limits imposed” before receiving approval, he said.

Gates, a former CIA analyst, said he believes Putin is “a rational decision-maker” who was ill-informed and isolated at the start of the war due to COVID-19 restrictions. He dismissed the idea that replacing Putin would bring an end to the war more quickly by pointing out “the advisers to him are more hawkish than he is.” He mentioned Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group of mercenaries, as one of those closest to Putin, but also a critic of how Russia is fighting the war.

His PhD dissertation was titled: "Soviet Sinology: An Untapped Source for Kremlin Views and Disputes Relating to Contemporary Events in China". Interesting guy who has been around and around the beltway a long time. He is either very good, knows too much or maybe both. 

Note: the C-5 can carry two M1s and the C-17 three Bradley's and they can fly 2000+ miles. Slow going, but what and airlift it would be. 

 

Gates is a guy with a long history and despite the fact that it was his specialty, he got Gorbachev and what was happening in Russia then about as wrong as it was possible to be. If he has a talent, it's at being a courtier and a highly skilled bureaucratic infighter a la Henry Kissinger. I'll pass.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-wars-robert-gates-got-wrong

https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1004/04041.html

[LongLeftFlank]

20 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

“Wires” is a broad descriptor harking back to another time.  So physical obstacles still work - like lakes and rivers, or man made like barbwire (an oldy but a goody).  And the modern equivalent in encrypted comms - although a copper communication wire (eg field phone) is still one of the most secure and safe ways to communicate on the battlefield - low signature and hard to hack or disrupt, problem is range.  Regardless, the ability to coordinate fires and reserves is key to countering human wave assaults.

AP fires - have we not come up with dozens of ways to do this?  Air burst, DPICM, MOAB.  Hell the HIMARs has a tungsten shotgun nightmare round or the flying blender Hellfire blade: https://www.reuters.com/world/little-known-modified-hellfire-likely-killed-al-qaedas-zawahiri-2022-08-02/.  Add to this claymores (command detonated of course) and sharp language, I think we can cover off on the requirements.

And of course the good ole MG…Ma Deuce, long may she reign.

OK, that helped, cheers mate.

But let me push the thinking a bit further, quoting ChrisO:

1. The most experienced and well-prepared group of stormtroopers comes first, with excellent equipment. It's comprised of eight men, each with a 'Bumblebee' [possibly meaning an RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launcher, effective against fortified positions.

2. Once fire contact has been made [with the enemy], the group digs into positions. Digging in is taught as meticulously as combat operations, so by military standards, digging in is almost instantaneous and very effective.

3. Even if the group is demolished to zero, the next one already realises where the previous one has reached. The main task is to make contact, dig in and transfer positional data to the artillery. Artillery can fire from an hour to several hours.

4. Groups of 8 people go in waves - usually 4 waves are prepared for the attack. But there have been cases in Soledar where it took 14 waves to take one area. 

5. Groups have drone operators to lead the whole group into position to clear the area.

....

So forget my stuff about mines or starvation. How does UA best defeat this scheme, or accelerate the point at which Russia can't find more meat (women? Norks? Africans? Muscovite IT majors?) to toss into it?

P.S.  This is starting to sound like the 1982 Iranian human wave offensives around Khorramshar.  Anyone here recall how the Iraqis coped with them? (the wikipedia entry is sketchy and skips around various time blocks)

Edited February 5, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[kevinkin]

16 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Gates is a guy with a long history

Forget the past, the New Yorker and the CS lack of science Monitor, what do you think of his present assessment today? That's what is at issue here. A broken clock is right twice a day you know. 

[The_Capt]

8 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK, that helped, cheers mate.

But let me push the thinking a bit further, quoting ChrisO:

1. The most experienced and well-prepared group of stormtroopers comes first, with excellent equipment. It's comprised of eight men, each with a 'Bumblebee' [possibly meaning an RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launcher, effective against fortified positions.

2. Once fire contact has been made [with the enemy], the group digs into positions. Digging in is taught as meticulously as combat operations, so by military standards, digging in is almost instantaneous and very effective.

3. Even if the group is demolished to zero, the next one already realises where the previous one has reached. The main task is to make contact, dig in and transfer positional data to the artillery. Artillery can fire from an hour to several hours.

4. Groups of 8 people go in waves - usually 4 waves are prepared for the attack. But there have been cases in Soledar where it took 14 waves to take one area. 

5. Groups have drone operators to lead the whole group into position to clear the area.

....

So forget my stuff about mines or starvation. How does UA best defeat this scheme, or accelerate the point at which Russia can't find more meat (women? Norks? Africans? Muscovite IT majors?) to toss into it?

Well if it is taking “14 waves to take an area” then perhaps the UA is already effectively defeating this scheme.  Based on maps and reports Russia is back to retaking inches of the Donbas.  They have not achieved an operational breakthrough after months of continuous trying, despite significant losses.

Honestly the UA should just keep doing what it is doing and we should support them in any way to sustain that.

Further what is different about last summer is the lack of Russian artillery superiority.  They used infantry assault then, but only after blasting an area into pulp with WW1 levels of guns.  That appears to be missing this winter. In fact it was noted in that same write up that integration with the guns was spotty.  So the Russians have gotten poorer at this game, not better.

Finally, Russia has mountains of steel.  AFVs and tanks (albeit older) stacked up all the way back to Siberia. After a year of warfare Russia has still not solved for combined arms manoeuvre?  Reinvented the BTG construct to marry it up with all these masses of infantry?  More to the point, why is Russia using a 20th century mechanized force like a WW1 infantry force?  The whole “well Russia sucks” narrative is starting to strain here.  Yes they do but they have all the tools and can read last I checked.  Why are they using the very detailed human wave attacks while all their armor is parked in the back?  I don’t know if the tank is really dead, but for the RA at least, I think it is in palliative care.

[cesmonkey]