How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Zeleban]

2 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

Probably this war won't be won on western equipment alone but how many personnel Ukraine will have left in the end. 

We are bashing Russia for sending ill prepared troops in human wave style assaults but I haven't seen  mentioning that a lot of UKR troops were lost in encircled traps like in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Soledar, Bakhmut etc while they could have withdrawn to fight another day with better chances. 

On the contrary RU has shown much more preservance reflexes(at least in defense) , pulling out of unfavorable situations instead of fighting to the last man. I understand the different mentality of someone defending his homeland but it seems these "no step back" decisions are coming from above.

A lot men have left Ukraine as well. And a lot have deserted to the east or joined the DPRs and LPRs and some videos of enforced recruitment have been circulating lately. How many can Ukraine sacrifice and how many losses can the foreign volunteers replace as the war widens. 

 

 

 

An interesting attempt to equalize the Russian and Ukrainian systems of government. But as we see the number of losses on one side and the other varies greatly, don't you think that this is evidence of different approaches to command and control?

[FancyCat]

2 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

We are bashing Russia for sending ill prepared troops in human wave style assaults but I haven't seen  mentioning that a lot of UKR troops were lost in encircled traps like in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Soledar, Bakhmut etc while they could have withdrawn to fight another day with better chances. 

Its my impression that at least for Mariupol is that withdrawal from favorable urban terrain is not recommended, and served as the best ground for Ukraine to sap Russian strength with the best chance of maintaining Ukraine's strength. In the summer, the defenses in urban terrain best keep Russian artillery and combined arms from annihilating Ukrainian forces.

 

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Seminole said:

How does one objectively measure the value of whatever grip Russia exercises on the ‘stans with not having NATO stationed in Ukraine?

You can objectively measure how many miles from Moscow to Kiev, but the value you or any Russia puts on having NATO in Kiev is subjective, and can’t be objectively defined.  
 

Is it more important to them than 1 million young Russian men’s lives?

10 million?

Exercises. Pipeline construction. Diplomatic time and effort.

 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-01-31/putin-s-war-is-unnerving-russia-s-old-friends

[panzermartin]

1 minute ago, Zeleban said:

An interesting attempt to equalize the Russian and Ukrainian systems of government. But as we see the number of losses on one side and the other varies greatly, don't you think that this is evidence of different approaches to command and control?

My intention is not to equalize, but to question the decisions of an otherwise troop preserving top command. And we don't really know the actual casualties of UKR. 

[NamEndedAllen]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So coming back to this part.  What makes this war very different is the whole “paternalistic” part.  In this war the direction has gone the other way.  In almost all of our wars of intervention or proxy we have had to do the pushing and shoring.  We have pushed partners to our tempos and timelines because they have become more about us than the people fighting them.

In Ukraine the entire thing has gone the other way.  Ukraine is leading the dance on this thing. They are the ones pulling us into their tempo and timelines - they are shoring us.  We are not pushing them, we are barely keeping up.  In fact the major concern now is that they may accelerate away from us into escalation. That is fundamentally different than just about every other morass we have been pulled into as we try and solve for humanity in the 20th and 21st century.

This is an excellent summation of the critical distinction and context. It’s a full on conventional war in Europe, started by the country NATO was formed to defend against. Except NATO isn’t the direct target. So, it’s complicated. Maybe the point is obvious - once so clearly stated by @The_Capt -  but underscoring the singular push/pull difference to so many other conflicts surely will be central in future histories analyzing the shaping of post WWII conflicts.
 

The Korean War is the only vaguely similar circumstance that comes to mind - really vague, given the bloody UN combat intervention. The Arab-Israeli wars and the proxy roles were each too brief to bear much comparison. Thanks again for the post.

Edited February 1, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[Zeleban]

1 minute ago, panzermartin said:

My intention is not to equalize, but to question the decisions of an otherwise troop preserving top command. And we don't really know the actual casualties of UKR. 

That is, you assume that the losses of Ukraine are equal or even greater than those of Russia, despite circumstantial evidence to the contrary from various independent resources like ORYX?

[The_Capt]

13 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

Probably this war won't be won on western equipment alone but how many personnel Ukraine will have left in the end. 

We are bashing Russia for sending ill prepared troops in human wave style assaults but I haven't seen  mentioning that a lot of UKR troops were lost in encircled traps like in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Soledar, Bakhmut etc while they could have withdrawn to fight another day with better chances. 

On the contrary RU has shown much more preservance reflexes(at least in defense) , pulling out of unfavorable situations instead of fighting to the last man. I understand the different mentality of someone defending his homeland but it seems these "no step back" decisions are coming from above.

A lot men have left Ukraine as well. And a lot have deserted to the east or joined the DPRs and LPRs and some videos of enforced recruitment have been circulating lately. How many can Ukraine sacrifice and how many losses can the foreign volunteers replace as the war widens. 

 

 

 

So now we are talking about the harsh calculus of the game.  From all accounts it looks like the UA has lost about 1/3 to 1/2 of what the RA has lost.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War#:~:text=Excluding the Russian and Ukrainian,of the foreign fighter casualties.  I kind of trust the Ukrainian Government numbers, they are not likely exact but Ukraine is still a pretty open society - and currently has a lot of foreign contractors and observers on the ground - trying to hide losses well above those they are publicly declaring is going to be much harder than in Russia.

As to "why doesn't the UA pull back?"  Well I given what happened at Severodonetsk last summer, I do not think this is "not one step back mentality".  I think it is pulling the RA in close and trading attrition towards an advantage.  It is brutal calculus but if the UA can kill 6 Russians for every loss in a local area, it sets them up for follow on offensive operations later, while straining the RA logistical system as it tries to keep up with the losses.  This is what we think we saw at Kharkiv, and Kherson to some extent.

So Bakhmut and its locals look like an attrition strategy in motion.  Now whether or not it can be turned into an offensive strategy is a really excellent question.  I think a really big problem a lot of westerners are having is that the UA is employing an attritional strategy - we have largely abandoned them in our doctrines.  But we could very well be totally wrong-headed here and attritional warfare is back with a vengeance in the 21st century, for a lot of the reasons we have discussed here (e.g. death of mass).

Whatever the UA is doing, it has worked very well so far by any measures.  The question, which we cannot answer, is who breaks first?  Given the shoring of western support and the signals coming out of the political level in Ukraine, my money is still on them.

[panzermartin]

8 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

That is, you assume that the losses of Ukraine are equal or even greater than those of Russia, despite circumstantial evidence to the contrary from various independent resources like ORYX?

I assume they could be equal, at least in human losses. Especially because of the great volume of enemy artillery and the stubborn UKR static defenses in a a year of fights. Plus RU had the ability to strike bases, barracks and concentrations of troops relentlessly in a daily base with a variety of long range rockets and air force, an ability UKR didn't have for a long time and somewhat the HIMARS covered that gap later. 

As for the numbers on ORYX and other sites, I don't really trust them especially in human losses. I think they are probably accurate in vehicle losses for RU, those were enormous. 

[MikeyD]

Some months back a Ukraine official said combat deaths were running 6.5 to 1 in Ukraine's favor. Recently posted estimates seem to confirm that number, though there's also been considerable debate here about whether we should be believing posted death estimates or not. Initially the argument was 'Russian loss reports are obviously much too inflated' but as the slaughter has continued people have reconciled themselves to the fact that Russia is indeed suffering losses on that scale.

[Zeleban]

9 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

I assume they could be equal, at least in human losses. Especially because of the great volume of enemy artillery and the stubborn UKR static defenses in a a year of fights. Plus RU had the ability to strike bases, barracks and concentrations of troops relentlessly in a daily base with a variety of long range rockets and air force, an ability UKR didn't have for a long time and somewhat the HIMARS covered that gap later. 

As for the numbers on ORYX and other sites, I don't really trust them especially in human losses. I think they are probably accurate in vehicle losses for RU, those were enormous. 

But this is already interesting, if you do not trust ORYX statistics, then you have more reliable resources where you get your information. Could you share your source with us.

And about the relationship between the loss of equipment and personal. Do you really think that equipment fights on its own, without a crew?

Edited February 1, 2023 by Zeleban

[Twisk]

@panzermartinMy impression of the last stands, especially Mariupol, is that the decisions were not fully made by Ukrainian leadership but by local commanders. This was during the period of relatively fast Russian progress and independent Ukrainian action to stem that progress.

And I've brought this up a few times but to reiterate it. Russia is attacking, and making progress, on relatively narrow frontages. Frontages that seem so small that they I don't think its possible for them to be attritioning the Ukrainian Army faster than it can generate new forces. Ukraine can only fit so many men per given kilometer of frontage and that is going to put some sort of cap on the number of daily casualties that can possibly be sustained.

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

As to "why doesn't the UA pull back?"  Well I given what happened at Severodonetsk last summer, I do not think this is "not one step back mentality".  I think it is pulling the RA in close and trading attrition towards an advantage.  It is brutal calculus but if the UA can kill 6 Russians for every loss in a local area, it sets them up for follow on offensive operations later, while straining the RA logistical system as it tries to keep up with the losses.  This is what we think we saw at Kharkiv, and Kherson to some extent.

Yes, I would say that the current fighting looks like an economy of force exercise for Ukraine. I would also like to ask... If Ukraine retreated X kilometers to a new position why would the Russians not follow and restart this grinding fight there or somewhere else along the line? What is the logic of pulling back?


Another thing many posts ago I converted WW2 loss rates to Ukraine's population size. (E.G. the US loss .5% of its population what would that look like for Ukraine). The U.K. loss .9% of its 1939 population and, as far as I know, faced an economic post-war crisis but not a demographic one. The equivalent for Ukraine would be 385.400 KIA and taking the worst numbers from wiki Ukraine has lost about 120.000 KIA currently. So at the current loss rate Ukraine would be able to continue at the current casualty rate for roughly 2 more years. Its an unpleasant thing to say that Ukraine can afford 240.000 more dead but the fact of the matter is that Ukraine could reasonable absorb that given its pre-war population.

[Zeleban]

11 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

the stubborn UKR static defenses in a a year of fights

Tell me, who, in theory, suffers the most losses - the defender or the attacker? And also who conducts more offensive actions Ukraine or Russia

[Lethaface]

3 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

Tell me, who, in theory, suffers the most losses - the defender or the attacker? And also who conducts more offensive actions Ukraine or Russia

plus who sends penal units through the open field with little support? 

 

[JonS]

16 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

who, in theory, suffers the most losses - the defender or the attacker?

That depends on how the battle turns out. If the attacker wins (takes the objective, send the defending forces into retreat where they can ideally be scooped up wholesale) - the defender can expect to lose more. If the defender wins (retains the objective and sends the attackers back to their start line) - the attacker can expect to lose more.

Edited February 1, 2023 by JonS

[Zeleban]

1 minute ago, JonS said:

That depends on how the battle turns out. If the attacker wins - the defender can expect to lose more. If the attacker wins - the defender can expect to lose more.

And how do most of the Russian offensives go?

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

Yeah, command is hard.

In peacetime - and wartime to a degree - a lot of armies alternate their officers between so called 'command' appointments (platoon commander, company commander, battalion commander ... army commander) and 'staff' appointments (x1, ... x9 in operational units, or really in-the-rear-with-the-gear at a camp or higher HQ). Partly that's to provide well rounded leaders who've had first-hand experience at different aspect of the big green machine, but also to provide mental and emotion relief between command appointments. Oh, and there's also coursing which will routinely take an officer out of the mill for a few weeks or months every year, and by the time you get up to staff college it's a full year. Intellectually hard, to be sure, but you aren't constantly having to deal with Private Ballbags getting drunk every pay and beating up his wife, or Cpl Snooks forgetting to order ammo for range week again.

As you note, there's plenty of examples - there is a fairly robust theory that after Normandy Montgomery was done. He'd been in command on active operations since September 1942 (in addition to his not insignificant involvement in France 1940), so the better part of 2 years, all of it at the forefront of Britain's most significant operations. He'd personally planned and directed ... what ... at least three amphibious invasions, fought Rommel to a standstill then back across about 2000km of dust, then Sicily, and Italy, as well as directing the ground campaign in Normandy. And, of course, his abrasive personality ensured that he was fighting with his own side as much as with the Germans. Anyway, by the end of 1944 he must have been exhausted emotionally and mentally, and I think it shows in the lead up to Market Garden and the drifting operations that followed until the Battle of the Bulge started.

Allenbrook, too, in his diaries talks about the stress of managing Britain's military effort and campaigns, compounded by the additional stress of managing Churchill's whims on a daily basis. He needed to take breaks occasionally and just go off bird watching or fly fishing for a few weeks.

At the other end of the spectrum, Sydney Jary's '18 Platoon' is a good read. To briefly recap: his first posting was to a battalion in Normandy in July as a battle-casualty replacement platoon commander. He held that position - in the same platoon - until about March '45 I think, at which point he was sent off to a staff appointment. Someone (Monty? It's been a while since I read it ... I need to fix that) realised he'd been in that position too long, and had earned/deserved/needed a break.

And that highlights a rather harsh reality of mass-war: combat leaders tend not to last very long - weeks, or maybe months if they're lucky, before they're either killed or wounded - so the mental and emotional exhaustion tends not to become a problem. The conflicts over the last several decades have either been short overall (Gulf 1, Falklands^, Panama, etc) or covered by regular troop rotations, in part to manage this exhaustion. I believe the UN's recommended tour length is no more than 6 months, but that often isn't practical and some militaries opt for 12 month rotations, or longer, and deal with (or ignore) the trauma later back home.

Sooo ... Ukraine. And Russia. I don't know what they're doing. I suspect that casualties and promotion of the survivors, and unit rotations, means that combat commanders aren't having to command combat operations for months at a time. Russia is, of course, regularly scapegoating their own senior commanders, which ... might be good for them from a mental health perspective? The senior commanders of the Ukraine armed forces (and Zelenskyy) will be drawing deep on their reserves of resilience though, even though the war isn't yet a year old.

 

^ curiously, the battalions sent to the Falklands each only conducted one deliberate battle - mostly the attacks into the hills around Port Stanley. The exception was 2Para, who got to play down at Goose Green as well as at Stanley. It was noted at the time that they were the first British battalion in decades to have to conduct a deliberate battle while still dealing with the aftermath of a previous one.

Great post, will look for that book.

1 hour ago, panzermartin said:

Probably this war won't be won on western equipment alone but how many personnel Ukraine will have left in the end. 

We are bashing Russia for sending ill prepared troops in human wave style assaults but I haven't seen  mentioning that a lot of UKR troops were lost in encircled traps like in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Soledar, Bakhmut etc while they could have withdrawn to fight another day with better chances. 

On the contrary RU has shown much more preservance reflexes(at least in defense) , pulling out of unfavorable situations instead of fighting to the last man. I understand the different mentality of someone defending his homeland but it seems these "no step back" decisions are coming from above.

A lot men have left Ukraine as well. And a lot have deserted to the east or joined the DPRs and LPRs and some videos of enforced recruitment have been circulating lately. How many can Ukraine sacrifice and how many losses can the foreign volunteers replace as the war widens. 

 

 

 

Mariupol is the only battle where the AFU's defense and maneuver plan was not entirely deliberate. Mariupol deserves not just it own post, but its own book and staff college thesis. Let's put that that one aside for now.

All of the others you site were deliberate defenses that Ukraine maintained for exactly as long the loss ratio was sufficiently in their favor, and withdrew successfully. Now they took/are taking losses in all of these places. But this is an attritional artillery focused conflict, because neither side has the capability to to do anything else right this minute. Based on what we know, which a small fraction of the information the AFU command is working with, they have made good decisions over all. There have been mistakes, tragic and expensive mistakes. But those happen in a real war. There is just no indication that Ukraine is doing anything but fighting a least cost deliberate defense, and doing so rather well. As discussed at length above the next decision point is when the weather gets back to a point where real offensive action is possible. Which side shows up with ability to do a meaningful attack?

Edit; Cross posted with The_Capt, he said all of it much better.

Edited February 1, 2023 by dan/california

[Lethaface]

It's an ugly war, Russia has shot up half the country. It's to be expected that Ukraine will also take gruesome losses. That's the cost of war. Obviously some units in some places will not be glad about high command. There will be places where the situation is SNAFUBAR. Expecting anything else is naïve.
Ukraine high command is controlling the information on this subject, which is probably wise. They also employ propaganda to control the group psychology, also wise. They are trying to win this war and it seems that the majority of the population is in it for the run. 

I think I've read or saw here, a Brit who'd imagined how orderly Britain would be defending itself when it had just been invaded by Russia. Bloody chaotic was what he was thinking. Ukraine needs to learn on the spot, so far they have shown to be rather good and creative students. Steadfast as well. That doesn't mean they are supermen that can't die.

Sometimes I think or am reminded of fellow countrymen / western people probably living lives in such 'soft conditions' that they are more scared of Ukrainian losses compared to Ukrainians themselves. 'They'd better not fight too hard or their country will get destroyed and a lot will die'. That maybe so, but that's their own choice. 
I feel the same about speculating how sustainable the casualties Ukraine is taking are. Their country is getting destroyed, of course that's not 'sustainable indefinitely'. However they have a large population, plenty of men of service age. 
Speculating about when exactly the will to fight or pool of soldiers will dry up, while we don't have any real info about it, is pointless.

Major defeats on the operational battlefield would be an indication of problems, but I haven't seen those.

Edited February 1, 2023 by Lethaface

[Butschi]

17 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Mariupol is the only battle where the AFU's defense and maneuver plan was not entirely deliberate

Unless you have a spy in the AFU's general staff that is a very bold statement to make.

Edited February 1, 2023 by Butschi

[billbindc]

 

I've said earlier in this thread that I expected that Russia has one more offensive worth the name left in it before it's all done. The Economist military correspondent seems to think so too. 

[sross112]

49 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

My intention is not to equalize, but to question the decisions of an otherwise troop preserving top command. And we don't really know the actual casualties of UKR. 

I may be wrong, and those in the know feel free to correct me, but if you are being attacked and fighting a defensive war, well, at some point you have to stand and fight. So if you are smart, you pick the good defensive terrain and make the enemy attack you there. In this war we have seen that the urban areas seem to be favored by both sides as they allow for more protection and negate some of the opposing force's ISR. I haven't seen or don't recall the RA making a bunch of cauldron's but I do recall the UA fighting in areas right up to the last minute before pulling out. Severdonetsk was a good example of that. Irpin, south of Irpin, most of Luhansk in the first few days and Popasna are other examples that come to mind.

The second thing that I'm sure plays a part in holding the line as far forward as possible for the Ukrainians is that they know every town and village that they give up to the Russians is another Bucha. It appears that Ukraine as a whole has decided that it is preferable to die on their feet than to live on their knees. Can they really be faulted for making the Russians pay for every square meter in blood? 

As for sacrificing units like in Mariupol, that is pretty much the only example I can think of where it happened at any scale. Whether that was a command decision or a local commander decision I don't know. I do know that it tied up a large logistics hub and more than one RA division for several weeks while virtually destroying multiple BTG's for minimal combat power loss to the UA forces of the Azov Bn and Ukr Marine units. It gave the UA time to establish a defensive line from south of Donetsk to the Dnepr and denied the logistic routes and combat power that could have made a push from the south possible if they hadn't held. So yep, sucks for those that stayed and fought, but their service and sacrifice was not in vain and in retrospect was probably a pretty big part in the stabilization of the southern front in those early days. Sometimes the big picture makes more sense than the singular event.

[Zeleban]

 

a rather rare type of TOR-M2 equipment in the Arctic version

[Haiduk]

On 1/30/2023 at 3:52 AM, The_Capt said:

So other than some pretty suspicious sounding “Israeli Elites” rumours, how is Israel or Russia dependant on each other in any meaningful way?  Israel sold them some drones, but they sold those drones all over the world.

They didn't "sell several drones", they sold to Russia manufacturing licence and handed over technologies. And despite they "sold drones all over the world", Israel rejected to sell it to Ukriane. Why? 

About "Israeli elites" and relations... Heh... Not only dry digits of statistic matter. Westerners again try to explain all from rational side. Do you know, that many Russian top officials and oligarhas are Jews and many of them have Israeli citizenship ? Abramovich. Rottenberg. Vekselberg. Closest persons to Putin. Or for example Zhirinovskiy. List can be continued. Many of known Soviet/Russian cultural figures were Jews. Relations on "irrational" level enough strong. Ukraine has strong Jewish community led by mighty oligarch Kolomoiskiy, many our businesman and politics also Jews and have Israeli citizenship, but Israel always oriented in own relations on post-Soviet space exactly on Russia. By the way, several leaders of our pro-Russian "Opposition bloc" also were Jews and had Israel citizenship (for example, Rabinovich) and before the war have fled to Israel.  

Many of people, who visited Israel told, that enviromnemt of ex-USSR/CIS migrants and their ancestors mostly is pure "vata" and their moods similar to Briton Beach public. Because you can easily get out from USSR/Russia, but looks like it's too hard that USSR/Russia get out from you. Israel will not support Russia directly, but also will not put sanctions. 

[billbindc]

12 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

They didn't "sell several drones", they sold to Russia manufacturing licence and handed over technologies. And despite they "sold drones all over the world", Israel rejected to sell it to Ukriane. Why? 

About "Israeli elites" and relations... Heh... Not only dry digits of statistic matter. Westerners again try to explain all from rational side. Do you know, that many Russian top officials and oligarhas are Jews and many of them have Israeli citizenship ? Abramovich. Rottenberg. Vekselberg. Closest persons to Putin. Or for example Zhirinovskiy. List can be continued. Many of known Soviet/Russian cultural figures were Jews. Relations on "irrational" level enough strong. Ukraine has strong Jewish community led by mighty oligarch Kolomoiskiy, many our businesman and politics also Jews and have Israeli citizenship, but Israel always oriented in own relations on post-Soviet space exactly on Russia. By the way, several leaders of our pro-Russian "Opposition bloc" also were Jews and had Israel citizenship (for example, Rabinovich) and before the war have fled to Israel.  

Many of people, who visited Israel told, that enviromnemt of ex-USSR/CIS migrants and their ancestors mostly is pure "vata" and their moods similar to Briton Beach public. Because you can easily get out from USSR/Russia, but looks like it's too hard that USSR/Russia get out from you. Israel will not support Russia directly, but also will not put sanctions. 

Bad analysis and more than borderline to places you do not want to go. Israel has interests in Syria and elsewhere that are vital to it where Russia can make things quite difficult for the Israeli armed forces. Leave the essentializing out please.

PS: https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/02/01/netanyahu-military-aid-ukraine/

Edited February 1, 2023 by billbindc

[JonS]

Was withdrawing from Mariupol even an option?

I wasn't paying a great deal of attention at the time (we had our own issues - I was dealing with that daily, and saw and smelt the smoke when the whole thing went tits up) but I gained the impression that Mariupol was cutoff and surrounded pretty quickly. After than it was either "hands up boys, it's over", or try and resist the boa constrictor as long as possible. They chose option 2, and did it well, but there was no Option 3: Run away discretely.

Edited February 1, 2023 by JonS

[Lethaface]

47 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Bad analysis and more than borderline to places you do not want to go. Israel has interests in Syria and elsewhere that are vital to it where Russia can make things quite difficult for the Israeli armed forces. Leave the essentializing out please.

PS: https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/02/01/netanyahu-military-aid-ukraine/

One thing I don't get is why Israel is let of the hook because 'interests', while other countries who also have 'interests' are bashed upon for doing the same. But I'll leave my opinions about Israel out of this thread.