How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[womble]

18 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This kind of indicates something we read awhile back - UA is using their IFVs as battlewagons to get them to the fight but are dismounting and spreading out (in some cases up to a km) from the vehicle when in contact....In close contact the IFVs are looking more like direct fire escorts a la tanks, or being left a bound back as dispersed infantry do the forward work.

11 hours ago, paxromana said:

Wasn't this the original intent of APCs (as opposed to IFVs)? To act as Battle Taxis and for them to support their dismounted infantry with their HMGs? 

Even when APCs were recognised as "just taxis", there were some occasions when they could be used in direct support roles, aye: once the anti-armour weapons of the opposition were neutralised, they could come onto the firing line or be used to get infantry through a belt of small arms fire. It's going to be a rare situation in Ukraine 2022-plus though, with effective responses to light armour, with enough range to answer HMGs so broadly distributed.

I think the suggestion upthread of arming the troop transport with indirect fire weapons like auto-GLs, which, with the emergent battlefield net, could be almost instantaneous fire support responses available to a front line observer. I don't know how effective CB radar is against a "stream" of 40mm projectiles, but I suspect it will localise the origin less well than it could pinpoint mortars.

Such a system would still be a target for enemy eyes covering your backfield, but at least wouldn't be fodder for every shoulder-held LAW. 

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:

My recollection which may be faulty is that Defense publicly alluded to this months, when pressured  during a live presser. May have been Blinken. Along the lines of, Ukraine has the right to defend itself including striking legitimate targets from which it has been attacked. What has been insisted is a ban on using weapons from the USA ( I am unclear about status of weapons provided by other nations). We certainly have seen a lot of bases and installations in Russia being hit for months now, all presumably with Ukraine’s own weapons.

IF the USA is removing its ban now, that is a very good change in policy. And about damn time.

 

It is not in the least.

There is one very big caveat to this that everyone is glossing over- who is developing the targeting packages, and with what?

The risk of escalation is not so much weak-kneed western resolve it is trying to avoid direct acts of war between the US and Russia. Of course Ukraine can hit legitimate military targets in Russia, particularly if they are part of this “special military operation”.  And the nuclear escalation equation is also part of all this but the spin here is that the US is avoiding direct involvement in this war because then it turns the war into something else.

For the same reason the US is not conducting airstrikes, they are pretty cautious with their ISR data. So Ukraine get ATACMS or whatever - whose data are they using to hit the right targets in Russia?  If the UA fires blind they could wind up hitting a civilian neighbourhood, which is going to harm their cause - and I get the unfairness as Russia pound civilians in Ukraine but as we discussed before one warcrime does not justify retaliation warcrimes.  And there is the risk that a Google Earth long range fire hits something Russia does take seriously enough to escalate over.  

For those in the “Russia is full of crap on escalation, always” camp - ok Tex, what is the Russian red line then?  Would a NATO ground invasion of Russia set them off?  If you answer is “yes” - ok, let’s walk it back from that and in your professional opinion tell me when to stop. A direct strike on Russian political leadership?  A strike on Russias nuclear arsenal?

 If your answer is “no” - please leave for a bit because you are no longer part of a rational conversation.

Regardless, we are back to “where is the ISR coming from?”  If the US or any other western nation is developing targeting data or packages for direct strikes on another nation it is an act of war.  Imagine if Russia or China was a third party in a conflict and was providing targeting data into a western nation…ya, that. I am pretty sure the US ISR architecture is tying itself in knots to avoid being pulled into Russia right now.  If the UA can use their own ISR - and I suspect HUMINT is being employed - good on them and please don’t do something dumb. However, Ukraine is a free independent nation defending itself with its own resources.  The US developing data and packages on Russian targets, in Russia, is an escalation on our end - a pretty serious one. It definitely shift to strategic offence which is a pretty severe line to cross just because we will feel better.  Further, it may not shorten this war, it may lengthen it.

The single biggest fear in the west is that Russia will widen the conflict and directly strike out at a NATO nation.  Why? Because we would have to respond, NATO is too big to fail.  If Russia calls our bluff and we do directly respond the whole thing gets crazy fast. Now Putin has justification for broader escalation and that is a train we might not be able to get off.  Further it may split resolve in the western world - I am not sure how keen the rest of Europe is on dying for Ukraine. The evil truth is that Ukraine may be more important to Russia than it is to the West when we get into that sort of calculus…maybe.

The US president was pretty clear and I agree with him - the second this conflict widens into the western sphere, pulling NATO in, we are talking about WW3. And that will involve strategic nuclear escalation because it is all Russia really has left in the bag for a conflict of that scale.  We might get lucky and Russia blinks and someone shoots Putin in the head before it comes to it - but that is a hope, not a plan.

[_Morpheus_]

Fields near Bakhmut:

 

[Haiduk]

15 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Thanks @Haiduk.  Keeps is realistic about the ZSU -  a lot improved, a lot left to do. 

Here is one more of back side of medal of UKR successes from the servicemen, he is a sniper, probably of 73rd Maritime SOF Center. He says about phrase "remember a cost", which media became to share after Kherson liberation.

Translation: Now a time to say about Kherson. "Remeber a cost". Remember a cost of unprofessionalism and untraining of soldiers, which weren't trained by platoon commanders, because they filled in journals, because thier company commnaders wanted more [of journals], because battalion commander was bored.

Remember a cost of stolen diesel and fuc..g bad tenders /means official MoD purchases for army/.

Remember a cost of liaison absence. And a cost of communication absence between units. A cost of fu...g unreasoned tasks with shouts "an order is an order!"

Remember a cost of unprepared assaults. A cost of fuc..g lost minefileds maps. A cost of cowards remember too and cost of people, who slept, standing on watches...

Edited December 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Melitpol airbase area last night

Other yesterday strike on Melitopol at recreation complex "Hunter's halt" was conducted with Turkish-made missiles TRLG-230 (and now we know that UKR forces could lase trgets with UAVs). On the video - result of hits and remains of this missile. On the night video with bodies recovering Caucasians accent was heard. By unconfirmed information Murad Saidov - Kadyrov's approximate could be killed there. This complex was lovely place for local collaborationis administration and Russian top-officers. 

Also one more yesterday strike aftermath - during strike on Dmytrivka village vicinity in 15 km NW from Berdiansk (105 km from frontline) there was hit a recharging and maintenance site of S-300 battalion. This place was revealed by recons as far as month ago and all this time the strike has been prepared. Russians came there not each day and not always in full composition, so additional recon has been conducted constatly and two days ago whole AD battalion was spotted, being apperard for recharging and tech.works again. Total about 25 vehicles were spotted. After the strike huge detonation took place and at least seven vehicles were destroyed. Just still unclear what weapon was used to reach this site. 

One more AD supressing work - some "western weapon" destroyed newest Russian Buk-M3 near Vesele village

  

[FancyCat]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

It is not in the least.

There is one very big caveat to this that everyone is glossing over- who is developing the targeting packages, and with what?

The risk of escalation is not so much weak-kneed western resolve it is trying to avoid direct acts of war between the US and Russia. Of course Ukraine can hit legitimate military targets in Russia, particularly if they are part of this “special military operation”.  And the nuclear escalation equation is also part of all this but the spin here is that the US is avoiding direct involvement in this war because then it turns the war into something else.

For the same reason the US is not conducting airstrikes, they are pretty cautious with their ISR data. So Ukraine get ATACMS or whatever - whose data are they using to hit the right targets in Russia?  If the UA fires blind they could wind up hitting a civilian neighbourhood, which is going to harm their cause - and I get the unfairness as Russia pound civilians in Ukraine but as we discussed before one warcrime does not justify retaliation warcrimes.  And there is the risk that a Google Earth long range fire hits something Russia does take seriously enough to escalate over.  

For those in the “Russia is full of crap on escalation, always” camp - ok Tex, what is the Russian red line then?  Would a NATO ground invasion of Russia set them off?  If you answer is “yes” - ok, let’s walk it back from that and in your professional opinion tell me when to stop. A direct strike on Russian political leadership?  A strike on Russias nuclear arsenal?

 If your answer is “no” - please leave for a bit because you are no longer part of a rational conversation.

Regardless, we are back to “where is the ISR coming from?”  If the US or any other western nation is developing targeting data or packages for direct strikes on another nation it is an act of war.  Imagine if Russia or China was a third party in a conflict and was providing targeting data into a western nation…ya, that. I am pretty sure the US ISR architecture is tying itself in knots to avoid being pulled into Russia right now.  If the UA can use their own ISR - and I suspect HUMINT is being employed - good on them and please don’t do something dumb. However, Ukraine is a free independent nation defending itself with its own resources.  The US developing data and packages on Russian targets, in Russia, is an escalation on our end - a pretty serious one. It definitely shift to strategic offence which is a pretty severe line to cross just because we will feel better.  Further, it may not shorten this war, it may lengthen it.

 

From what I recall, the Moskva, Ukraine asked the U.S for confirmation on its location before firing. Mind you, I'm not so sure ISR sharing is "act of war".

First, Ukraine did just hit the one of the airbases vital to the Russian nuclear triad, with their own indigenous weapons. So we should recognize that out of things being serious, that would probably count as something to escalate over, no? Has not occurred yet.

Let us also double back and recall Russian statements have long accused the west of sharing intelligence and providing weapons to Ukraine as acts of war. Example, Moskva. Then the naval boat attacks on the "grain escorts" in the Black Sea.

Furthermore, mind you, Russia claims Crimea, Donbas as their territory. Strikes on them, their forces could also be claimed as acts of war and be justified under your scenario. Which they might be, but Russia has chosen not to act on it, thereby legitimating it.

[FancyCat]

Plus considering the record of caution by the West, while it's important to note things could change, it's probably a safe bet that any isr, targeting packages, etc for strikes on Russia proper, will be very strictly limited to stuff like equipment, personnel directly involved in the Ukrainian conflict and probably not leadership. I mean we still are kneecapping Ukraine with no Leopard tanks. And no ATACMS. So worry about ISR seems preemptive considering the fact these are not provided.

And you know, say Ukraine did want to strike a target and asked the U.S for verification on targets, it would be best for the U.S to ensure everything goes well and the target and not collateral is hit.

Edited December 11, 2022 by FancyCat

[sburke]

Vladimir Putin To Spend A Third Of Russia's Budget On Defence As Ukraine War Continues (msn.com)

[Haiduk]

According the words of Khodakovskiy, former commander of DPR "Vostok" battalion (now regiment), enemy troops today activeted on Velyka Novosilka direction (south of Donetsk oblast) and conducted enough strong attack, as if pusing UKR troops back from forward positions, but were stopped on second defense line with coming reserves and now "situation is fluent"

UKR insides partially confirmed this info (about withdrawing from forward positions), but on other hand showed results of repelling enemy attack - 231st TD battalion of 128th TD brigade (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) showed destoyed enemy armor near Neskuchne village

  

Edited December 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

It is not in the least.

There is one very big caveat to this that everyone is glossing over- who is developing the targeting packages, and with what?

The risk of escalation is not so much weak-kneed western resolve it is trying to avoid direct acts of war between the US and Russia. Of course Ukraine can hit legitimate military targets in Russia, particularly if they are part of this “special military operation”.  And the nuclear escalation equation is also part of all this but the spin here is that the US is avoiding direct involvement in this war because then it turns the war into something else.

For the same reason the US is not conducting airstrikes, they are pretty cautious with their ISR data. So Ukraine get ATACMS or whatever - whose data are they using to hit the right targets in Russia?  If the UA fires blind they could wind up hitting a civilian neighbourhood, which is going to harm their cause - and I get the unfairness as Russia pound civilians in Ukraine but as we discussed before one warcrime does not justify retaliation warcrimes.  And there is the risk that a Google Earth long range fire hits something Russia does take seriously enough to escalate over.  

For those in the “Russia is full of crap on escalation, always” camp - ok Tex, what is the Russian red line then?  Would a NATO ground invasion of Russia set them off?  If you answer is “yes” - ok, let’s walk it back from that and in your professional opinion tell me when to stop. A direct strike on Russian political leadership?  A strike on Russias nuclear arsenal?

 If your answer is “no” - please leave for a bit because you are no longer part of a rational conversation.

Regardless, we are back to “where is the ISR coming from?”  If the US or any other western nation is developing targeting data or packages for direct strikes on another nation it is an act of war.  Imagine if Russia or China was a third party in a conflict and was providing targeting data into a western nation…ya, that. I am pretty sure the US ISR architecture is tying itself in knots to avoid being pulled into Russia right now.  If the UA can use their own ISR - and I suspect HUMINT is being employed - good on them and please don’t do something dumb. However, Ukraine is a free independent nation defending itself with its own resources.  The US developing data and packages on Russian targets, in Russia, is an escalation on our end - a pretty serious one. It definitely shift to strategic offence which is a pretty severe line to cross just because we will feel better.  Further, it may not shorten this war, it may lengthen it.

The single biggest fear in the west is that Russia will widen the conflict and directly strike out at a NATO nation.  Why? Because we would have to respond, NATO is too big to fail.  If Russia calls our bluff and we do directly respond the whole thing gets crazy fast. Now Putin has justification for broader escalation and that is a train we might not be able to get off.  Further it may split resolve in the western world - I am not sure how keen the rest of Europe is on dying for Ukraine. The evil truth is that Ukraine may be more important to Russia than it is to the West when we get into that sort of calculus…maybe.

The US president was pretty clear and I agree with him - the second this conflict widens into the western sphere, pulling NATO in, we are talking about WW3. And that will involve strategic nuclear escalation because it is all Russia really has left in the bag for a conflict of that scale.  We might get lucky and Russia blinks and someone shoots Putin in the head before it comes to it - but that is a hope, not a plan.

You are, as always, correct. But I think you are perhaps less correct than usual. If somewhere north of 75,000 KIA isn't enough of a casus belli to to attack the supply bases in Poland ,it leads me to a really strong conclusion that the Russian leadership understands they don't want to attack Poland. So let's get back to red lines. first of all the only red line left within the border of Ukraine is the actual invasion of Crimea. Even after the Kerch bridge attack Russia just sat there and tried to make Ukrainian civilians more miserable, and that might have been their preexisting plan anyway. So for starters, why don't we give the Ukrainians the missiles to put a kilometer of said bridge in the water, and utterly wreck the the one strand of the Russian logistics system that still functions across the land bridge? 

Let me restate, U.S./NATO has decided the current slow motion meat grinder that is slowly but systematically mincing both Ukraine and Russia into dog food is the lowest risk option on the table. I disagree, among other things nuclear nonproliferation is already dead, or on life support. Why would Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, or for that matter Kazakhstan ever take our security guarantees seriously, after Ukraine gave up a thousand plus nukes and then had this happen? Does a world with 25 or thirty nuclear powers have better or a worse chance of making it to 2100 without a major nuclear exchange?

And yes, we all have to acknowledge that the actual decision makers have a LOT of information we don't, but we have been ignoring that for 1800 pages and counting.

Edited December 11, 2022 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Furthermore, mind you, Russia claims Crimea, Donbas as their territory. Strikes on them, their forces could also be claimed as acts of war and be justified under your scenario. Which they might be, but Russia has chosen not to act on it, thereby legitimating it.

This is something that we've touched on, but not exactly in this way.  We've said that Russia very likely doesn't want to cross a line with NATO because if it does that, well, as The_Capt says... things get crazy fast and Russia knows that it has no capacity to respond to either crazy events or fast moving ones.  They're toast if they screw with NATO directly.

What this means is Russia also fears escalation and is holding back on striking things out of concern of widening the war with NATO.  For example, it has been very cautious about striking targets near Poland despite all the weapons flowing over the border. 

As long as both NATO and Russia are trying to not find each others' redlines, then it is likely neither will cross them.  NATO is smart for doing its part to keep it that way.

We've said a million times that if Russia didn't have nukes, this war would have been over in early March.  But they do, so the war drags on because nobody benefits from things spiraling out of control.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Here is one more of back side of medal of UKR successes from the servicemen, he is a sniper, probably of 73rd Maritime SOF Center. He says about phrase "remember a cost", which media became to share after Kherson liberation.

This is very important to remember.  Ukrainians are winning for a variety of reasons, but I do not think consistently good offensive tactical combat is one of them.  The operation in Kherson would have been over quicker and with less losses if that were the case.  The Luhansk slowdown would not continue either.

We've seen, heard, and read of poorly coordinated and ill conceived assaults by Ukrainian forces.  Sometimes for the same idiotic reasons as the Russians conduct theirs (i.e. some couch potato senior officer said to attack so he can show progress and that's that).  The only reason Ukraine isn't coming out worse for these sorts of attacks is that seem to not repeat the same mistake in the same place more than once.  Russians will go on for months doing the same thing.

I know it is anecdotal, but it seems Ukraine's improvements towards fighting a NATO style war instead of a Soviet one is slow and uneven.  This is not surprising, really, because it will probably take years.  I'm a little disappointed that the last 8 years didn't produce better results ahead of this war, however I also know that Ukraine as a nation had a lot of reforms to tackle.  It is understandable that progress has been slow and uneven prior to February 2022.

Steve

[chrisl]

15 minutes ago, sburke said:

Vladimir Putin To Spend A Third Of Russia's Budget On Defence As Ukraine War Continues (msn.com)

And what's he going to get with that money?

There are very limited sellers available, and their access (Iran) or willingness (China) to provide the stuff he really needs is limited.  Russia can spend 1/3 its budget on war materiel, but do they have the factory capacity to do that?  do they have the capability to increase the factory capacity on the necessary short time scale to do it?  Or will the factory owners just pocket the extra rubles (worth less and less) beyond their current or at most slightly expanded capacity?

[dan/california]

23 minutes ago, chrisl said:

And what's he going to get with that money?

There are very limited sellers available, and their access (Iran) or willingness (China) to provide the stuff he really needs is limited.  Russia can spend 1/3 its budget on war materiel, but do they have the factory capacity to do that?  do they have the capability to increase the factory capacity on the necessary short time scale to do it?  Or will the factory owners just pocket the extra rubles (worth less and less) beyond their current or at most slightly expanded capacity?

If, big if, sanctions are succeeding one of the effects should be to significantly increase the cost of just continuing their current rates of production. I mean it is pretty clear that most sanctions can be evaded, but it costs more. Just to pick apart the canonical example, if Russia really is buying washing machines just to rip them apart for their control systems, they are paying a rather large mark up on the price of ordering those chips legally from Samsung. Now if Siemens and the other machine tool manufacturers would get off their rear ends and send the Russians a very special "software update" that made every third part come out just wrong enough, the cost of running say a BMP production line would get positively painful. Western intelligence agencies need to start a systematic sabotage campaign too, feed bad chips into the Russian Sanction busting operations and so on.

Edited December 11, 2022 by dan/california

[Simcoe]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is very important to remember.  Ukrainians are winning for a variety of reasons, but I do not think consistently good offensive tactical combat is one of them.  The operation in Kherson would have been over quicker and with less losses if that were the case.  The Luhansk slowdown would not continue either.

We've seen, heard, and read of poorly coordinated and ill conceived assaults by Ukrainian forces.  Sometimes for the same idiotic reasons as the Russians conduct theirs (i.e. some couch potato senior officer said to attack so he can show progress and that's that).  The only reason Ukraine isn't coming out worse for these sorts of attacks is that seem to not repeat the same mistake in the same place more than once.  Russians will go on for months doing the same thing.

I know it is anecdotal, but it seems Ukraine's improvements towards fighting a NATO style war instead of a Soviet one is slow and uneven.  This is not surprising, really, because it will probably take years.  I'm a little disappointed that the last 8 years didn't produce better results ahead of this war, however I also know that Ukraine as a nation had a lot of reforms to tackle.  It is understandable that progress has been slow and uneven prior to February 2022.

Steve

What would you say are the differences between the NATO and Soviet style war at this point? Seems like the only difference at this point is winning fire superiority with artillery and long range missiles vs airpower.

[Haiduk]

Serviceman of 93rd mech.brigade says, their 4-months campaign in Bakhmut is over. They inflicted alot of losses to the enemy, but their losses also enough big. They are going to rotation for R&R (or likely already left the sector) and wish good luck to those, who will come to substitute them.

 

Maybe toughest brigade of AFU. Heavy fights since May under endless Russian arty rains southern from Izium and after this heaviest fights since autumn near Bakhmut. Thanks, guys, you are titans and no one Marvel superhero can't stand nearby

 

Edited December 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

5 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Serviceman of 93rd mech.brigade says, their 4-months campaign in Bakhmut is over. They inflicted alot of losses to the enemy, but their losses also enough big. They are going to rotation for R&R (or likely already left the sector) and wish good luck to those, who will come to substitute them.

 

Maybe toughest brigade of AFU. Heavy fights since May under endless Russian arty rains southern from Izium and after this heaviest fights since autumn near Bakhmut. Thanks, guys, you are titans and no one Marvel superhero can't stand nearby

 

No inside knowledge whatsoever, but I sincerely hope he next time we see them they are in NATO tanks and IFVs!

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

What would you say are the differences between the NATO and Soviet style war at this point? Seems like the only difference at this point is winning fire superiority with artillery and long range missiles vs airpower.

It seems that both sides are content with isolated reinforced platoon sized attacks.  I understand that part of the reason for this is how difficult it is to form up for attack, so going with smaller force size means quicker to get into play and less chance of being noticed on the way to the line of contact.  The downside, of course, is that it presents the defender with fewer targets to concentrate artillery and drones on, which theoretically decreases the chances of the small scale attack being successful.

Of course this is the armchair general in my speaking, but to me it seems things would be more productive to wait until there's 2 or 3 company sized forces that can attack simultaneously or don't attack at all.  One is the main effort, the other one or two are supporting.  Also, ISR the hell out of wherever you're going to attack.  There's pretty much no reason the attack should be surprised by what the defender has sitting on the immediate objective.

This is just the basics.  Getting more creative, Brigade commanders should have supporting battalion's units conduct operations to obscure intentions and distract the defenders.  For example, have the entire brigade conduct intensive drone and foot recon in the morning concurrently.  Use artillery to lay into the defenders where discovered, be they in the path of the main effort or not.  Then launch the attack while the enemy is confused as to the scope and location of the operation.

I have no solid info, but my gut tells me that the Ukrainians are not consistently coordinating arms and supporting units to this degree.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

37 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Thanks, guys, you are titans and no one Marvel superhero can't stand nearby

93rd deserves a break, for sure.  I hope they get the rest and replenishment they have so totally earned.

Steve

[Beleg85]

Tank from 92 Bgde pounding Russian armour into oblivion; note wrecks of other pieces detroyed in earlier fights.

5 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Other yesterday strike on Melitopol at recreation complex "Hunter's halt" was conducted with Turkish-made missiles TRLG-230 (and now we know that UKR forces could lase trgets with UAVs). On the video - result of hits and remains of this missile. On the night video with bodies recovering Caucasians accent was heard. By unconfirmed information Murad Saidov - Kadyrov's approximate could be killed there. This complex was lovely place for local collaborationis administration and Russian top-officers.

Would be pretty high Kadyrovite commander if true. However we should be very careful, as unsubstanciated deaths of other field commanders who came back alive paradoxially strengthened their social standing within Chechnya, helping to build their legends and legitimate Kadyrov regime. Caucasian notion of dzygit works very similar to Progozhin's trickster attitude to death and danger- the more times they are publically acclaimed as "killed", the more powerful they become in the eyes of followers.

[womble]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

And what's he going to get with that money?

 

And what's going to happen to the rest of "whatever the Russian Government usually does"?

If other nations struggle to spend 2% of their budget on defense, how can the Russians shake loose so large a proportion of revenues? I know they aren't exactly supporting an NHS/DHSS-standard social safety net...

[Haiduk]

58th motorized infantry brigade also left Bakhmut sector. 

Railroad bridge destroyed north from Bakhmut. It's unknown either this was enemy strike, or the bridge was demolished by UKR forces

Southern from Bakhmut Russian Wagner and VDV troops concentrate forces in Kurdiumivka  to next attack  the section Dyliivka - Bila Hora. If they success, not only Kostiantynivka - Bakhmut road will be under threaten, but Kostiantynivka town itself too. Today over the town UKR Mi-8 is crashed by technical reasons. One sources write pilots alive,other - all three dead.

 

Edited December 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Would be pretty high Kadyrovite commander if true.

He is alive. He already has filmed a video near ruined "Hunter's halt"

Edited December 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[NamEndedAllen]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

You are, as always, correct. But I think you are perhaps less correct than usual. If somewhere north of 75,000 KIA isn't enough of a casus belli to to attack the supply bases in Poland ,it leads me to a really strong conclusion that the Russian leadership understands they don't want to attack Poland. So let's get back to red lines. first of all the only red line left within the border of Ukraine is the actual invasion of Crimea. Even after the Kerch bridge attack Russia just sat there and tried to make Ukrainian civilians more miserable, and that might have been their preexisting plan anyway. So for starters, why don't we give the Ukrainians the missiles to put a kilometer of said bridge in the water, and utterly wreck the the one strand of the Russian logistics system that still functions across the land bridge? 

Let me restate, U.S./NATO has decided the current slow motion meat grinder that is slowly but systematically mincing both Ukraine and Russia into dog food is the lowest risk option on the table. I disagree, among other things nuclear nonproliferation is already dead, or on life support. Why would Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, or for that matter Kazakhstan ever take our security guarantees seriously, after Ukraine gave up a thousand plus nukes and then had this happen? Does a world with 25 or thirty nuclear powers have better or a worse chance of making it to 2100 without a major nuclear exchange?

And yes, we all have to acknowledge that the actual decision makers have a LOT of information we don't, but we have been ignoring that for 1800 pages and counting.

Agreed!
To be clear, I was referring earlier strictly to the USA’s own statement apparently ending its prohibition on using weapons it provides to Ukraine, on targets within Russia. I have no special knowledge about the employment of ISR or other assistance from the USA. But I strongly doubt that the statement suggests any hint of escalating by actively targeting and directing strikes in Russia. The long and openly recognized ISR the USA has already been providing since early days has been plenty valuable. It hasn’t caused any widening of the war, let alone a nuclear holocaust. And Ukraine has shown it can identify and attack targets itself, within Russia - without massive collateral damages. Ukraine has consistently demonstrated its adherence to avoiding targeting civilians and massive accidents anywhere, throughout the war. Ukraine hasn’t shown any propensity for firing blindly, within or outside of its borders. I imagine that has been deeply recognized by the USA and the European Allies. 

I don’t believe we should read more into the apparent dropping of the ban - *if* accurate - on use of provided weapons.  I agree that the basis was the generalized fear of broadening the war. However *this* specific prohibition, splitting hairs over the provenance of what weapon is used where, has been eclipsed by the events on the ground. The recent statement seems to simply recognize the dark absurdity of tying the victim’s hands any longer, in this way, in his own home. As has been asserted here by nearly everyone, Russia is coming apart at the seams just trying to survive its war against Ukraine. Absent Poland or another neighbor, out of the blue *massively* launching its military into Ukraine or Russia, Russia’s cost/benefit analysis for attacking a NATO nation is absurdly prohibitive.

(We don’t need to spend time on red herrings like Ukraine somehow miraculously wiping out Russia’s entire widespread nuclear arsenal! Although if Ukraine could somehow have this impossible superpower ability, to defang the wobbly bear, just the threat of it would have already ended the war. The emperor would truly have no clothes.)

[FancyCat]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is very important to remember.  Ukrainians are winning for a variety of reasons, but I do not think consistently good offensive tactical combat is one of them.  The operation in Kherson would have been over quicker and with less losses if that were the case.  The Luhansk slowdown would not continue either.

We've seen, heard, and read of poorly coordinated and ill conceived assaults by Ukrainian forces.  Sometimes for the same idiotic reasons as the Russians conduct theirs (i.e. some couch potato senior officer said to attack so he can show progress and that's that).  The only reason Ukraine isn't coming out worse for these sorts of attacks is that seem to not repeat the same mistake in the same place more than once.  Russians will go on for months doing the same thing.

I know it is anecdotal, but it seems Ukraine's improvements towards fighting a NATO style war instead of a Soviet one is slow and uneven.  This is not surprising, really, because it will probably take years.  I'm a little disappointed that the last 8 years didn't produce better results ahead of this war, however I also know that Ukraine as a nation had a lot of reforms to tackle.  It is understandable that progress has been slow and uneven prior to February 2022.

Steve

Considering the inherent benefits afforded to NATO vs Russia (or would we be talking about peer vs peer, NATO vs a actually competitive Russia?) vs Ukraine vs Russia, shouldn't it be expected that Ukraine is not utilizing NATO style war? Now, I will attest to being wrong plenty, so feel free to correct me, and certainly I may be missing the mark on what your saying.

If we are referring to how Ukraine is unable to do coordinated and planned assaults, I do want to suggest that certain aspects that are particular to the war, make it exceedingly difficult for offensive tactical operations to proceed, and that if NATO were subjected to the same conditions, its not entirely clear that they would be able to fall into the same pitfalls as Ukraine and Russia are. 

Referring to the RUSI report, pg.62, quoted below, 

 

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In general, the importance of dispersion was vindicated by the data from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian infantry companies tend to disperse across a 3-km frontage. Greater concentration often decreases the survivability of units because it begins to make the use of precision munitions and the allocation of ISTAR assets economical in terms of the effect delivered per munition. One important consequence of dispersion is that it increases the tactical commander’s span of control. When combined with the multiple enablers necessary for a formation to be competitive, it is evident that a battalion commander in this conflict is often dealing with a comparable frontage to that traditionally occupied by a brigade, with similar effects in terms of their ability to maintain a physical presence among their troops. Since battalion staffs are not staffed like brigades – and would not be survivable if they were – there is considerable strain placed on company and battalion commanders. The British Army, which tends to put senior personnel within their rank into command positions, is in a reasonable position to handle this challenge. Nevertheless, developing C2 tools to allow beyond-line-ofsight C2 in sub-units is critical. Another challenge for dispersed forces, especially if they must echelon through one another, is identifying friend from foe. Ukrainian troops have tended to sacrifice camouflage for clear identification (using coloured bands) for their manoeuvre forces, relying on speed rather than concealment for survivability.

Pg. 60, on EMS warfare,

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Military discourse has – for several years – focused on the problem of EMS denial. Its denial was a major challenge for the UAF in 2014 and 2015. Measures were taken to make the force more resilient. The 2022 invasion therefore provides a better canvas to assess the impact of EW on militaries with appropriately resilient systems, and tactics, techniques and procedures. The effect is not EMS denial. Limitations of power, the tactical necessity to manage signatures and the consequences of EMS fratricide all mean that even forces with large EW capabilities cannot achieve blanket denial across large geographic areas for a sustained period. Denial can be achieved for a short period, or across a limited geographic area. Targeted denial can be delivered for a sustained period over a wide area. However, any kind of targeted denial of bands of the EMS can be evaded through altering frequencies or bearers. The result is that EMS interference and disruption is continual, but denial is limited.

Pg. 58, UAS warfare,

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While the evolution of the system of governance for UAS has proceeded logically and the structures around their use made sense when they were formulated, they have produced forces poorly suited for the operating environment, as observed in Ukraine and elsewhere. For pilots and other elements of the force, the expectation that UAS can be excluded from airspace is not viable. There will be many enemy UAS in the airspace. Training to manage this flight risk, therefore, is critical; training in an airspace without this hazard simply transfers risk from training to operations. In any case, given the need for troops to manage their electromagnetic signature and the impact of jamming, tactical echelons cannot guarantee getting information about their flight plans back to higher headquarters.

The RUSI report of course is pre-offensives, so who knows how Ukraine is adapting, but I guess what I'm suggesting, do we actually know if we removed the same advantages afforded by NATO like air supremacy, EMS supremacy, UAS supremacy, the ability for encrypted communications to be kept, and placed NATO forces under the same constraints requiring broad dispersion, UAS profilteration by the enemy (and currently UAS profiltation in NATO is vastly centralized and not afforded to tactical units), do we think NATO would do better than Ukraine at launching tactical attacks? 

Oh, and the limitation of having major losses of experienced personnel. NATO HQs in the RUSI report are pointed out as functionally impossible on pg. 54. Of course if NATO retained the advantages of air superiority and a home front safe from the frontlines, etc, a NATO style war would be highly successful. 

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The historical approach of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and 3 UK Division of erecting tented cities – command posts with a large physical footprint – is non-viable in wartime on the modern battlefield. These sites will be identified and struck. Moreover, as the Russians have found to their detriment, concentrated command posts inside requisitioned civilian buildings are similarly vulnerable to long-range precision fires unless all staff retain rigid communications discipline. Even here, the HUMINT threat means that locations should be moved frequently and key components of a staff dispersed. The capacity to access staff work remotely means that it is not strictly necessary to concentrate all headquarters components in close physical proximity to one another.