How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Absolutely, so the trend line of this war is consistent as ISR, lethality and range has once again taken a leap forward.  The issue with reserve advantage (also in response to @Battlefront.com Steve) is that those reserves are also highly visible and hittable than before, so I am not sure the battlefield management advantage will carry over as it has in the past - reserves are very vulnerable interdiction in this environment and being on shorter higher density lines actually will likely make them more vulnerable, right along with logistics lines. ISR, deep precision strike and dispersed infantry really still dominate this battlefield as far as I can tell and creating narrower higher density battle spaces is likely not a good idea - unless you are the RA still trying to fight the last war.

I've not seen much evidence of significant interdiction of reserves being moved from one sector of front to the other.  The 93rd Mech, for example, moved from the line of contact they operated from for months in Izyum and relocated to Bakhmut, the one place Russia is still actively engaged in large scale offensive activity.

Russia has no deep strike capability worth mentioning, not to mention good ISR, so Ukraine can probably hold reserves as little as 20km from the frontline and have them be safe.  Russians, on the other hand, have to be far more concerned about where they park any reserves.  They have to be out at least twice as far as Ukraine does, so around 40km before things start to get reasonably safe.  In either case, though, those distances are short enough that an emergency reserve could be deployed within a half a day.  "Alarm units" within an hour or two.

Then there's the breakthroughs to be thinking about.  Russia has, so far, been unable to exploit any breakthrough since early March because they lack manpower and/or never achieved more than a tactical breach (I'm including Popasna in that group).  So I'm not sure having a lot of extra riflemen will help them out much.  Ukraine, on the other hand, could have sustained the momentum in Kharkiv much better if it had some of the mech units that were (and still are) tied up in Kherson.  Again, not much evidence that Russia is in a position to squash an influx of new units into a breach situation.

Russia has also suffered heavily from Ukrainian breakthroughs because they lacked ready reserves to hold successive lines of defense.  Ukraine, on the other hand, has had the manpower and military competency to do that.

And then there's simply rotating out spent units for fresh ones.  Both sides would benefit from that.

All of this is why I think that Ukraine will benefit and benefit more than Russia from a shortened lines, though Russia will benefit as well.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

A special thanks to Haiduk and Zeleban for using some of their rationed electricity to help keep us informed!

I think I'm seeing a bit more strategy to the Russian partial mobilization than was apparent to us at the beginning.

What it looks like, to me, is that Russia knew it had three distinctly different problems to deal with:

1. inadequate total men at the front to hold back the current Ukrainian attacks, not to mention the possibility of a third offensive somewhere.
2. multiple front line units at or nearing combat ineffectiveness due to losses.
3. acute shortage of soldiers who can do anything other than drive a truck or fire a rifle.

From the looks of it I'd say that Russia decided to go with a three step plan for solving the manpower shortages.

Step 1 - immediate need to stabilize the front

It seems to me that the 300k mobilization was designed to sacrifice a large portion by pushing them into Ukraine and hoping their dead bodies would stabilize the situation.  Some were formed into new "units" and dumped into soft spots with little or no expectations for their survival.  The rest were fed into standing units as individual replacements.  Putin claims this number is a bit less than 50,000 from what I remember, but I'm guessing the number is significantly higher than that.  Even if we go with the 50,000, that's nearly 20% of the number raised put into combat circumstances with no training. 

The intention here is to stop Ukraine from collapsing another sector of frontage (including Kherson) and/or limiting the fallout from a collapse.  Whatever the case is, this plan amounts to throwing bodies into the spokes of Ukraine's wheels.

 

Step 2 - rebuild something to resemble proper military units

The balance of the mobilized force seems to be used to more properly rebuild units within Russia and Belarus.  That means learning how to operate things like artillery, air defenses, tanks, etc. before coming under Ukrainian fire.  In theory the mobiks being used to rebuild units well to the rear could mean Russia could spring some unpleasant surprises on Ukraine this winter as these units get moved into Ukraine.  Unlike the mobiks encountered thus far, these guys will have at least some amount of training and unit cohesion.

Unlike Step 1, I think Russia has some hopes these guys better keep what Russia has, perhaps take back some of the lost territory, and get Ukraine to negotiate an end to the war.

Step 3 - general offensive

Like many others, I'm guessing that the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory is setting up conditions to use the Fall conscripts to move into Ukraine sometime in the summer.  I think Putin will do this only to the degree necessary, but I doubt he'll let 120,000 equipped and somewhat trained conscripts if things are going badly at the front.  The alternative will be yet another mobilization and I don't see that working out so well.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

And some shocking news.  Kadyrov said he wasn't serious when he hinted at resigning back on September 3rd.  He was simply checking to make sure people wanted him to stay in power.  They apparently do, so he's staying.  Wow, none of us saw that coming (for anybody who did not see our discussion back then, know that this is sarcasm):

https://www.rferl.org/a/chechnya-kadyrov-backtracks-departure/32020829.html

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

This from the November 5th ISW report seems to be a topic worth discussing here:

Quote

Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Security Minister and current DNR military commander Aleksandr Khodakovsky claimed on November 5 that Russian friendly fire may have caused up to 60% of total Russian losses since the end of Russian offensive operations in Mariupol in mid-May.[14] Even if this statistic is exaggerated, the fact that a Russian commander is publicly speculating on such a damning indicator of Russian and proxy competency indicates the deep challenges Russian forces face. Friendly fire typically does account for a limited number of losses in war but ordinarily nowhere near 60% of total casualties, which demonstrates a lack of communication and command and control coordination between Russian forces. Russian and Ukrainian sources also reported that a Russian rotation returning to its base near Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast on November 5 drove into a ditch constructed by army subcontractors without prior discussion or warning, further demonstrating a widespread lack of cross-training and coordination between Russian troops.[15] The frequent replacement of Russian military leaders, promotion of inexperienced soldiers, and cobbled-together Russian force composition including Russian contract soldiers, Russian mobilized soldiers, DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) forces, and Wagner Group forces exacerbate the fragmented nature of the Russian chain of command and ineffectiveness of Russian forces and likely contributes to frequent friendly fire incidents.

Here's a Google translation of Khodakovsky's post on Telegram:

Quote

After the Mariupol operation, we considered that we suffered most of the losses from friendly fire. Someone even called the figure - sixty percent. This is an ordinary phenomenon, but its spread depends, of course, on the competence of commanders - especially artillerymen.

 

We are completing the task, when suddenly mines began to fall on our heads from the rear. Who? Where? Raise the copter, find a mortar battery, rush there...

- Who are these guys!?

- The Ministry of Battalion of such and such a regiment from Russia.

- Why are you hitting on us?

- We are not for you - for a point on the map. We've been assigned a task, and we're doing it. - So no one corrects you, you shoot at the map the old fashioned way ...

- Well, so...

 

Then we didn’t leave them - we corrected them ourselves, downloaded programs to their smartphones, taught them how to use them ... And there were so many of them ... We move around the industrial zone, occupy buildings, hold them at night - we rotate in the morning with other groups so that the guys can relax. We start to rotate - and there are mines on the route ... Where from? Some army general gave a command to his engineers to mine the front, which had gone ahead in a day, but the general did not even bother to ask. As a result, several people died, including the tank crew with the tank company commander, who was on foot to receive the task.

 

They thought that they had already learned not to do at least such stupid things, as tonight the rotation, which was returning to the base with the headlights turned off on the nightlight, flew into the ditch, which army subcontractors from the nth corps dug across the road behind them. There, in general, a wild commander of the engineering service, ruined all the access roads, on the route, because of his art, there are inverted Urals ... In general, with such geniuses, we don’t even need enemies. Lord army chiefs, control the situation - it's time to grow.

 

Yesh, that's some pretty damning (though not surprising) criticism of how Russia's planning rigidity gets a lot of their own people killed.

As much as I think Russia Sucks™ at war, I don't for a second believe Khodakovsky's 60% figure.  Which begs the question as to why did he make such a bold statement.  It would seem he's exaggerating the impact of Russian incompetence to make his side feel better about having their arses handed to them by Ukraine's forces.  I think that's probable, yet at the same time why go out and make a statement like this at all?  Other than blowing off steam, I don't see what this might accomplish.

Steve

[Artkin]

60% caused by friendly fire? How can you have confidence in your leadership when they say things THAT stupid. Jesus. 

Edited November 6, 2022 by Artkin

[dan/california]

This might have been a bum story, probably even. Sorry about that.

[kevinkin]

Khodakovsky's 60% statement is a message to all Russians that the revolution has begun. So, keep your head down and shut up. If you can't tell friend from foe, assume the later. Only a fine public servant would be so bold. 

 

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Khodakovsky's 60% statement is a message to all Russians that the revolution has begun. So, keep your head down and shut up. If you can't tell friend from foe, assume the later. Only a fine public servant would be so bold. 

 

Further explanation please? Not being silly, really want you to elaborate.

[kevinkin]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

Not being silly

I was. 

[cesmonkey]

Reuters has a summary of a Washington Post article:

U.S. privately asks Ukraine to show Russia it's open to talks -Washington Post

Quote

WASHINGTON, Nov 5 (Reuters) - The Biden administration is privately encouraging Ukraine’s leaders to signal an openness to negotiate with Russia and drop their public refusal to engage in peace talks unless President Vladimir Putin is removed from power, the Washington Post reported on Saturday.

The paper quoted unnamed people familiar with the discussions as saying that the request by American officials was not aimed at pushing Ukraine to the negotiating table, but a calculated attempt to ensure Kyiv maintains the support of other nations facing constituencies wary of fueling a war for many years to come.

 

[Haiduk]

6 hours ago, akd said:

Hmm…the military unit (в\ч 2079) referenced doesn’t seem to match with anything but an infectious disease hospital in Voronezh.  I guess they could have been sent there for screening and then directly to the front? Seems a bit odd.

This is border guard unit of FSB Border Guard Service in Belgorod and Voronezh oblasts. Conscripts could be not mobilized to border guards, but just formally trained in it or maybe on the base of this unit really planned to establish some sort of "territorial defense" like told this survived soldier.

Edited November 6, 2022 by Haiduk

[Yet]

4 hours ago, Artkin said:

60% caused by friendly fire? How can you have confidence in your leadership when they say things THAT stupid. Jesus. 

think russian, this probably means in russian: we improve our ways of working, and you dont have to be afraid of the enemy. we now work beter together and will easily crush the enemy.

[Yet]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

A special thanks to Haiduk and Zeleban for using some of their rationed electricity to help keep us informed!

I think I'm seeing a bit more strategy to the Russian partial mobilization than was apparent to us at the beginning.

What it looks like, to me, is that Russia knew it had three distinctly different problems to deal with:

1. inadequate total men at the front to hold back the current Ukrainian attacks, not to mention the possibility of a third offensive somewhere.
2. multiple front line units at or nearing combat ineffectiveness due to losses.
3. acute shortage of soldiers who can do anything other than drive a truck or fire a rifle.

From the looks of it I'd say that Russia decided to go with a three step plan for solving the manpower shortages.

Step 1 - immediate need to stabilize the front

It seems to me that the 300k mobilization was designed to sacrifice a large portion by pushing them into Ukraine and hoping their dead bodies would stabilize the situation.  Some were formed into new "units" and dumped into soft spots with little or no expectations for their survival.  The rest were fed into standing units as individual replacements.  Putin claims this number is a bit less than 50,000 from what I remember, but I'm guessing the number is significantly higher than that.  Even if we go with the 50,000, that's nearly 20% of the number raised put into combat circumstances with no training. 

The intention here is to stop Ukraine from collapsing another sector of frontage (including Kherson) and/or limiting the fallout from a collapse.  Whatever the case is, this plan amounts to throwing bodies into the spokes of Ukraine's wheels.

 

Step 2 - rebuild something to resemble proper military units

The balance of the mobilized force seems to be used to more properly rebuild units within Russia and Belarus.  That means learning how to operate things like artillery, air defenses, tanks, etc. before coming under Ukrainian fire.  In theory the mobiks being used to rebuild units well to the rear could mean Russia could spring some unpleasant surprises on Ukraine this winter as these units get moved into Ukraine.  Unlike the mobiks encountered thus far, these guys will have at least some amount of training and unit cohesion.

Unlike Step 1, I think Russia has some hopes these guys better keep what Russia has, perhaps take back some of the lost territory, and get Ukraine to negotiate an end to the war.

Step 3 - general offensive

Like many others, I'm guessing that the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory is setting up conditions to use the Fall conscripts to move into Ukraine sometime in the summer.  I think Putin will do this only to the degree necessary, but I doubt he'll let 120,000 equipped and somewhat trained conscripts if things are going badly at the front.  The alternative will be yet another mobilization and I don't see that working out so well.

Steve

this is very likely. Belarus is probably partly being used for training the step 2 and step 3 chmobiks as ru needs their trainers at the front (if ru trainers still exist).

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've not seen much evidence of significant interdiction of reserves being moved from one sector of front to the other.  The 93rd Mech, for example, moved from the line of contact they operated from for months in Izyum and relocated to Bakhmut, the one place Russia is still actively engaged in large scale offensive activity.

A move from Izyum to Bakhmut is more of a lateral repositioning, the fact that the UA is forcing the RA to do these sorts of moves is a form of strategic interdiction in itself as the wear and tear of major force shifts causes attrition on its own.  I am not sure people understand how much strain constant the lateral shifting of forces has on C2, logistics and morale impacts a fighting force but the horizontal friction the UA is projecting on the RA is not small.

As to operational or tactical reserves, we may be seeing the evidence in the steady stream of tactical vignettes but we cannot know without context.  We do know the UA waged a successful deep strike campaign on RA logistics nodes in depth, so it is clear that the UA has the capability and intent.  What we do not know is whether they have the means (eg ammunition and bandwidth) to do deep interdiction over time.  I would argue that if the RA are moving reserves as a counter move or in prep of a counter offensive within a tightened area, the UA is going to expend the rounds to interdict them…and more easily than if they were trying to cover a much larger area.

My point being that concentration of mass - as one sees in shortened lines scenario - in this war appears to be more of a liability than a benefit, except in a single scenario at Kharkiv but I suspect there were some very specific pre-cursors to creating that one.  There is a point where traditional massed based conventional warfare works just fine, once you erode your opponent to the point that they are effectively blind and so brittle that they can no longer hold under their own weight.

However, as this war has progressed I think the term “freedom of mass” is worth exploring.  It is clear that the utility of massed forces itself is a dynamic and competitive arena (always has been) but the algorithms of that competition appear to have shifted.  In this contest it appears that the UA have gained higher freedom-of-mass while the RA has lost it - which all goes back to compressing and expanding options spaces.

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

A special thanks to Haiduk and Zeleban for using some of their rationed electricity to help keep us informed!

I think I'm seeing a bit more strategy to the Russian partial mobilization than was apparent to us at the beginning.

What it looks like, to me, is that Russia knew it had three distinctly different problems to deal with:

1. inadequate total men at the front to hold back the current Ukrainian attacks, not to mention the possibility of a third offensive somewhere.
2. multiple front line units at or nearing combat ineffectiveness due to losses.
3. acute shortage of soldiers who can do anything other than drive a truck or fire a rifle.

From the looks of it I'd say that Russia decided to go with a three step plan for solving the manpower shortages.

Step 1 - immediate need to stabilize the front

It seems to me that the 300k mobilization was designed to sacrifice a large portion by pushing them into Ukraine and hoping their dead bodies would stabilize the situation.  Some were formed into new "units" and dumped into soft spots with little or no expectations for their survival.  The rest were fed into standing units as individual replacements.  Putin claims this number is a bit less than 50,000 from what I remember, but I'm guessing the number is significantly higher than that.  Even if we go with the 50,000, that's nearly 20% of the number raised put into combat circumstances with no training. 

The intention here is to stop Ukraine from collapsing another sector of frontage (including Kherson) and/or limiting the fallout from a collapse.  Whatever the case is, this plan amounts to throwing bodies into the spokes of Ukraine's wheels.

 

Step 2 - rebuild something to resemble proper military units

The balance of the mobilized force seems to be used to more properly rebuild units within Russia and Belarus.  That means learning how to operate things like artillery, air defenses, tanks, etc. before coming under Ukrainian fire.  In theory the mobiks being used to rebuild units well to the rear could mean Russia could spring some unpleasant surprises on Ukraine this winter as these units get moved into Ukraine.  Unlike the mobiks encountered thus far, these guys will have at least some amount of training and unit cohesion.

Unlike Step 1, I think Russia has some hopes these guys better keep what Russia has, perhaps take back some of the lost territory, and get Ukraine to negotiate an end to the war.

Step 3 - general offensive

Like many others, I'm guessing that the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory is setting up conditions to use the Fall conscripts to move into Ukraine sometime in the summer.  I think Putin will do this only to the degree necessary, but I doubt he'll let 120,000 equipped and somewhat trained conscripts if things are going badly at the front.  The alternative will be yet another mobilization and I don't see that working out so well.

Steve

And none of this addresses the major operational and strategic issues that brought them to this point of the war (i.e. losing strategic and operational initiatives and on the defence) - the misalignment between political objectives and military strategy's; a poor collective military learning system unable to adapt at the same or better rate than its opponent; the lack of a modernized operationally competitive C4ISR enterprise which underpins an effective joint targeting system; and the continued erosion without any real mitigation of a logistical system stretching from the forward ammo resupply point back to production and procurement.

The RA can churn out units and people all it wants, however, until it entirely retools itself to fight the war it is in and not the one for 1999, it simply will not matter how many troops it can produce…unless there is a failure in support to Ukraine whose single greatest vulnerability is that is is not strategically self-sufficient in the prosecution of this war.

[kevinkin]

This report today mentions something that is or could become the elephant in the room:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-live-briefing-us-nudges-kyiv-to-ease-negotiation-stance-zelensky-calls-out-iran-on-drones/ar-AA13N5kK

Ukraine fatigue.

There were military expediencies for sweeping the RA out of Ukraine as fast as possible during the late summer. But there are public relations/policy reasons as well. Did the US drop the ball here? Patience is key right now, but tell that to John Q Public who likes to see their money behind immediate winners. Given their attention span is as limited as their understanding of how important this war is, support for Ukraine has to be maintained through effective communication about the stakes involved. And this does not have to be propaganda. Polls don't capture US long term commitment to Ukraine. Ask about the World Series yesterday and the polls would show a lot of support for the upstart Phils. This morning those people are just moving on to something else entertaining. Support for Ukraine in the US boils down to those polled feeling sorry for Ukraine and their suffering as they watch horror unfold in 30 sec news clips. It is not a bedrock type of support. But it could be. Putin does a good job positioning himself as evil. The West has to do an outstanding job. Then I think the poll numbers will reflect positive public sediment for long term support of Ukraine including re-building. Right now the positive polls could change in a heart beat. 

Edited November 6, 2022 by kevinkin

[Zeleban]

 

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

unless there is a failure in support to Ukraine whose single greatest vulnerability is that is is not strategically self-sufficient in the prosecution of this war.

Yep, Putin's trump card. Unfortunately, I think he knows it. Fortunately, Russian palace intrigue will probably screw up how it's played. 

Edited November 6, 2022 by kevinkin

[FancyCat]

There is popular sentiment and group sentiment, or in better wording, if an issue is not popularized, elite or influential special interests have more leeway to influence policy. Popular support remains pretty bipartisan in the U.S. If the issue dies down in perception, I remain confident that lobbying interests like the Military Industrial Complex will maintain pressure to keep Congress on the path of supporting Ukraine. Maybe more visible movements to differ on aid, like more oversight or the image of oversight, but basically the same aid occurs.

[Haiduk]

During several days two articles in NYT and WP with a sense "US must force Ukraine to negotiations with Russia"

NYT (author professor of international relations C.Kupchan) - "Ukraine's battlefield succeses could go too far. Risk od wider war, undermining democracies, total defeat of Russia is udesirable" 

WP (as if source in Biden's Administration told that US privately encouraging Ukraine to negotiaions, because Zelenskiy's ban of talks wih Putin generated concern in part of US partners in Eurpope,  Africa and Latin America): https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/11/05/ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations/?fbclid=IwAR0NI93cYh8697VA1g1qMRmdqsyAAHe9rk_PrkQ_VJCQq9JL4GLawuVXcos

 

Edited November 6, 2022 by Haiduk

[Offshoot]

7 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

During several days two articles in NYT and WP with a sense "US must force Ukraine to negotiations with Russia"

Add the Guardian but with a slightly different angle (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/nov/05/ukraine-democracy-russia-zelenskiy-us-washington)

"That means an urgent search for a diplomatic track. As Ukraine’s primary arms supplier and funder, Washington needs to call for immediate negotiations to begin that process.

This doesn’t mean twisting Ukraine’s arm to accept Moscow’s demands – decisions of what to concede or not in any negotiations is up to Kyiv, not Washington.

But the US could help diplomacy gain traction by immediately initiating its own direct talks with Russia on issues shaping bilateral relations between the nuclear giants..."

[FancyCat]

My impression of the ban on talks with Putin was for internationally, for Ukraine to effectively mark Russia as a rogue/“terrorist” state. I believe at least in the West, that has been achieved. Now, that has gone down, several points about this can be made. One, the U.S pressuring Ukraine to “talk” or concede something. If we take the view that the U.S controls Ukraine, a common pro-Russian point, with all the implications it brings, the U.S is indicating to Russia and to states and people with more pro-Russian sentiment that they want to push peace. 
 

On the face of it, it’s bad, but I think it’s good. Signaling concern for the views of other states internationally is important, especially for countering Russia. The same principles of Ukraine positions, the withdrawal of all Russian forces in Ukraine before talks remains. The concession of what is a now a minor issue does more than retaining the ban. 

[cesmonkey]

In my opinion, this is the kind of policy you get when you have a greater concern about Russia losing than you do about Russia being stopped, deterred,  neutralized, and punished. 

If Ukraine had been given more support earlier on, the chances of hitting a long-protracted stalemate, slowing down the world economy, would be much less than they are now.

I want to assume that this pressure on Ukraine to show a willingness to negotiate is not being applied by its more spirited allies in the Baltic states, Poland, and the UK.  But I would be interested in finding out.

I'm sure China is watching what develops from here on out with interest w.r.t. Taiwan.

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

During several days two articles in NYT and WP with a sense "US must force Ukraine to negotiations with Russia"

NYT (author professor of international relations C.Kupchan) - "Ukraine's battlefield succeses could go too far. Risk od wider war, undermining democracies, total defeat of Russia is udesirable" 

WP (as if source in Biden's Administration told that US privately encouraging Ukraine to negotiaions, because Zelenskiy's ban of talks wih Putin generated concern in part of US partners in Eurpope,  Africa and Latin America): https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/11/05/ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations/?fbclid=IwAR0NI93cYh8697VA1g1qMRmdqsyAAHe9rk_PrkQ_VJCQq9JL4GLawuVXcos

 

New York Times huh. Thank you for reminding me why I don't waste money on a monthly subscription to read such "wisdom".

First the appeasers told us that arming Ukraine would not help Ukraine fight this war now, "Ukraine’s battlefield successes could go too far." No winning with these people.

 

Edited November 6, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

During several days two articles in NYT and WP with a sense "US must force Ukraine to negotiations with Russia"

NYT (author professor of international relations C.Kupchan) - "Ukraine's battlefield succeses could go too far. Risk od wider war, undermining democracies, total defeat of Russia is udesirable" 

Leak could be connected to recent unscheduled visit by Jake Sullivan to Kyiv. As far as I understand opinions of different coteries in White House, he was initially supporter of less "assertive" and more dyplomatic attitude toward Russia but was outvoted. It appears that something may be happening in the cabinets regarding dyplomatic front.

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

 

On the face of it, it’s bad, but I think it’s good. Signaling concern for the views of other states internationally is important, especially for countering Russia. The same principles of Ukraine positions, the withdrawal of all Russian forces in Ukraine before talks remains. The concession of what is a now a minor issue does more than retaining the ban. 

Could be such controlled leak, but it may be signalling weakness on Ukrainian part and unstability of American help, which is exactly what Putin is counting on.

Edited November 6, 2022 by Beleg85