How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Fernando]

11 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I guess to me the French General’s assessment is nonsense as the role of the operational level is to 1) align tactical actions and outcomes “the right battles” to strategic objectives - the campaign design and 2) to enable and “scene set” the tactical level, again in line with strategy in order to create advantage.

To say “the Russians are failing Strategically and Tactically but succeeding Operationally” basically means that you are aligning failures and enabling them at the same time…and call it success.

The example of losing every battle but winning the war is true but that normally means a really switched on operational level to ensure you can keep feeding the fires in the right places to eventually let attrition pressures succeed.

Anyway, I am seeing a complete failure at the Operational level on the Russian side as there is no real alignment or design at play here and we know enablers have been a major issue.  One could argue the military Strategy was not bad, a 5 axis overwhelming assault designed to shock the Ukrainian defence (personally I would have focused on a western cutoff to isolate first) and come at what they think was the UKR Center of Gravity, Kyiv from multiple angles.  Of course the Strategy is useless if on cannot actually do the “overwhelming” part and that is on Operational and Tactical level.

I guess, the French generals wanted to say that at the strategic level the war was lost (Putin won't be able to conquer Ucrania) and at the tactical level, ucranians are far better than Russians, but at operational level Russians were still advancing in some places, putting ucranian forces (mainly those east of Kharkov and opposite Donetsk and Lugansk) in a very dangerous position. I am afraid that if Russians manage to encircle them, then the Ucranians forces trapped there would be destroyed in a sort of Stalingrad 2.0, whether they remain inside the pocket or try to scape. The Rusiand have NOT the troops for a thight encirclement, and they would suffer a lot, and perhaps even beign destroyed by the ucranians, but we don't know it for sure and Russia may still mobilize conscripts and reservist to increase their forces.

Edited March 13, 2022 by Fernando

[Haiduk]

delete

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

3 hours ago, Cobetco said:

Kraze and Haiduk will correct me if i'm wrong, as I have been in the past. But I thought the yellow arm bands where emblematic of the territorial units, not the army. the BTR is interesting however, no big stupid Z, but it looks like an 82, I was under the impression Ukraine didn't operate those (unless its a capture)

Yellow tape is traditional since 2014 for all, not only TD. Though, in Mariupol now our troops use blue tape - probably there is defficite of yellow %) 

There is information appeaed that Russians sometime also put yellow tape on the arm and on the leg (or troops put only on arms arms and sometime on the helmet). 

[BletchleyGeek]

47 minutes ago, laribe said:

If a No-Fly zone is out how would a anti missile barrier from the Polish border go down ie: Patriot missiles

Good question - the US deployed 2 (?) batteries of Patriot to Rzezsow a few days ago. That is about 60 kms west of Lviv as the crow flies. The PAC-2 has a range of up to ~190 kms, so it is possible, in principle, to open the "umbrella" and cover at least Lviv. Yet I am not confident those range numbers I dug up are very reliable. Effective range would definitely be the kind of attribute you would want an adversary to not know precisely at all.

Edited March 13, 2022 by BletchleyGeek

[Haiduk]

I update Kraze post about captured Russian EW asset.

This is one of vehicles of Borisoglebsk-2 EW complex, Russian modernization of Soviet R-330 EW complex.  This is SIGINT means and the jammer of HF and VHF military communication systems

10th mountain-assault brigade units, which captured this thing, appeared several days ago in Zhytomyr oblast and on the boudary of Zhytomyr and Kyiv oblast. Russians now have to distract some forces to maintain own flank and rear  

[Fernando]

From an operation and strategic point of view, at this stage, this war reminds me somewhat of the American Civil War. Washignton and Richmond were the center of the war. The best generals and armies were there, but the war was NOT really won or lost there. It was won by controling the Mississippi, occupation of almost all confederate coastal port, and cutting the South in half (by Sherman) by the campaigns west of the Appalachians. No matter how good Lee manouvered against Grant, the war was already lost in 1864-65. Sherman was advancing on Lee from the South, so in the end it was just a matter of how much time it would take.

I think Kiev is the strategic objetive, a sort of ucranian Richmond, where most forces are concentrated. The ucranians behave  there as a sort of Lee and his ANV against McClelland, Burnside, Hooker etc. but the war might be decided east of Kharkov and in the Mariupol, Donets and Lugansk areas. Then the Russians would try to encircle Kharkov and advance to the Dnieper, that is as far as I think they would be able to reach, then start conversations of peace.

It is clear that Russians have mostly stopped their advances and have suffered staggering losses by now, but it may be an operational pause before a new offensive. In this case Rusisians will surely be led by Rosecrans and McClelland again, but maybe some more capable leaders may show up at lower levels, as Grant and Sherman did.

 

Edited March 13, 2022 by Fernando

[Haiduk]

8 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Good question - the US deployed 2 (?) batteries of Patriot to Rzezsow a few days ago. That is about 60 kms west of Lviv as the crow flies. The PAC-2 has a range of up to ~190 kms, so it is possible, in principle, to open the "umbrella" and cover at least Lviv. Yet I am not confident those range numbers I dug up are very reliable. Effective range would definitely be the kind of attribute you would want an adversary to not know precisely at all.

This night Russian strategic bombers probably from Engels airfield, Saratov oblast launched 30 cruise missiles from Black Sea area. Part of missiles were intercepted, but part hit Ivano-Frankivsk airport and military airfield and 8 missiles hit International Peacekeepers training center near Yavoriv town in 25 km from the Polish border. 35 KIA, 134 injured. 

 

  

 

[BletchleyGeek]

13 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Part of missiles were intercepted, but part hit Ivano-Frankivsk airport and military airfield and 8 missiles hit International Peacekeepers training center near Yavoriv town in 25 km from the Polish border

Interesting to hear about the interceptions and the target's actual distance to the border. The missiles that got through seemingly did significant damage.

[Haiduk]

5 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Interesting to hear about the interceptions

Our AD already intercepted dozen of missiles, especially over Kyiv, which most protected with AD. Probaby our comamnd reduced AD of other cities to hold sky over the capital.  Russians many times tried to hit critical HQ buildings and imlitary facilities in Kyiv, but thanks God anf our guys in S-300, all missiles were destroyed. But I afraid 30 missiles salvo at Kyiv can be hard to repell...

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[Markus86]

Maybe a stupid question, but can Russia produce these cruise missiles independently or are they restricted to what's in stock? 

[Haiduk]

Next Stugna-P hit

Russian jet shot down over Izium, Kharkiv oblast. Claimed today morning, but more likely this happened yesterday, there is also was claimed about shot down jet. Two pilots ejected, probably Su-30SM or Su-34

 

 

 

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, sross112 said:

Also there has been several references to whether or not heavy formations are still viable and this conflict will be studied a lot. My take is that not much will change with the heavy force compositions. I think they still have a place and can still be decisive. I believe the invaders have grossly mishandled their assets from top to bottom.

So we are probably overdue on a discussion on what is going on at the tactical level.  I have held off trying to do an analysis because things were simply too turbulent to draw any real conclusions, still are in fact.  However, I  will offer a hypothesis of what I think is occurring and we can try and go from there.

In the west we have been watching these "Russian wars" with a lot of interest over the last 8 years. The reason for this is that we are all very paranoid of becoming a 21st century version of the WW1 generals - discovering on the battlefield that our doctrine has become completely obsolete.  In WWI at the tactical level it was machine guns and fast firing artillery at long ranges, at the operational and strategic it was railways, telegraph wires and canned food preservation.  They all added up to totally different war than anyone was expecting that included the end of some pretty major stuff like cavalry.

So in this war we have all been watching and scratching our heads as to "what just happened?"  At the tactical level back in 2014, and was confirmed in the short Azer-Armenian war, that something had changed.  The Russians had linked UAVs and massed fires at the tactical level, the Azerbaijanians mimicked this in 2020, and the effect was to be able to crush massed enemy armor formations over the horizon and then move in mechanized forces for what was essentially a "sweep up" close battle.  Everyone was expecting the same for this war.

The Ukrainians, being at the receiving end in 2014 have likely figured out that playing by the old rulebook will not work.  So my hypothesis is 1) the Russians have been trying to follow their doctrine of long range Find, Mass Fires Fix/Attrit and Heavy Close clean up to Finish, but 2) The Ukrainians have adopted tactics that negate #1.

The evidence for #1 is the fact that the Russians have appeared to stick with the BTG which is a concept with massed fires at the tactical level baked-in:

  

(https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/images/btg-image01.jpg|||Battalion Tactical Group)

In western doctrine a BG will have integral mortars and likely a Arty Bn in close support.  The Russians added 6 x MLRS to this mix and if you look at Soviet doctrine, MLRS are normally at Regimental/Div level.  This matched what we saw in the field in 2014 and 2020 very closely.

The evidence for #2 is all over social media.  The Ukrainians, learning quickly from 2014, look like they have dis-aggregated. More importantly and to the point, they have largely abandoned defensive mass but have not lost lethality.  I think the Ukrainians are still forming mass for offensive actions but the defensive is a lot of small units dispersed all over the place with weapon systems that are light, portable and have really extended range and reach; they have become the swarm the Russians are trying to hit with a shotgun.  Further, by dis-aggregating the Ukrainians look like they have turned some ideas about maneuver on its head.  Rear areas are not not "rear" anymore, it is all FEBA because small units with next gen ATGMs are cutting Russian logistics to pieces, making all the Russian mass heavily dislocated (or perhaps contributing to Russian mess ups).

We spend a lot of time slagging Russian failures, and there are quite a few and well earned, but we should also keep an eye on Ukrainian victories, because they might very well be happening on their own merits and not all on Russian screw ups.  For example, we may be seeing a lot of abandoned Russian MBTs because there are no refueling or recovery assets left due to Ukrainians adopting a new path very effectively.

So what?  Well the question is, "are we seeing an anomaly or trend?"  As we look over at our own heavy steel, we have to ask ourselves "what if our next opponent looks and fights like the Ukrainians and not the Russians?"   The answer to that question may be a blip in military force development but is also may be a signpost much in the same way 1914 was because the technology that enables the Ukrainian tactics is accelerating - smart, very long range autonomous systems that can overwhelm current mechanized protection/shield at a system level.  

Personally, I think it is too soon to call it.  There may be times ahead where mass demonstrates it merits and they may be decisive; however, it is all worth watching closely because none of us want to the a "horse cavalry commander" in the next war. 

[Haiduk]

Situation on Donbas still very hard for our troops.

- Russian and DNR forces launched assault of important Avdiivka town. Since the night they heavy bombarded and shelled the town and APU positions around. Reportedly our troops shot down a jet two hours ago

- Heavy clashes around Vuhledar town. Units of 53rd mech.brigade withdrew there from Volnovakha, but Russians and DNR forces have big personnel superiority. Also right flank of Russian southerth group (58th Army) is advancing from the left bank of Dnieper in NE direction. Simultainously Russians trying to crush our defense  in Izium area to move in southern direction on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. If this two groups will meet, our Donbas group can be encircled.

- Russians hit with a missile Karachun hill in Kramatorsk to disable TV tower. Outskirts od Sloviansk was bombed. Reportedly Su-34 was shot down yesterday over Kramatorsk.

- In Luhansk oblast Russians are heavy shelling, bombing and assaulting Siverodonetsk city. But looks like on this direcion mostly LNR troops involved with Russian air and arty support and all waves of this zomby-rush  sucсed to repel for now.

- Mariupol. Despite the desperate situation, our troops still stand and even partially pushed out enemy form some eastern city blocks. Reportedly just Azov claimed they destroyed for last day 6 tanks, 2 BTRs, 1 Tigr and captured 12 Russians. 

On the photo KORD special police serviceman guards captured Russians in Mariupol

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Abandoned Russian TOR. Maybe old one, but already looted on the metal

State Emergency Service recovers next unexploded OFAB-500 bomb, which hit residential building in Chernihiv. The writings claims this is third unexpolded bomb for the day.

 

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[BeondTheGrave]

30 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So we are probably overdue on a discussion on what is going on at the tactical level.  I have held off trying to do an analysis because things were simply too turbulent to draw any real conclusions, still are in fact.  However, I  will offer a hypothesis of what I think is occurring and we can try and go from there.

In the west we have been watching these "Russian wars" with a lot of interest over the last 8 years. The reason for this is that we are all very paranoid of becoming a 21st century version of the WW1 generals - discovering on the battlefield that our doctrine has become completely obsolete.  In WWI at the tactical level it was machine guns and fast firing artillery at long ranges, at the operational and strategic it was railways, telegraph wires and canned food preservation.  They all added up to totally different war than anyone was expecting that included the end of some pretty major stuff like cavalry.

So in this war we have all been watching and scratching our heads as to "what just happened?"  At the tactical level back in 2014, and was confirmed in the short Azer-Armenian war, that something had changed.  The Russians had linked UAVs and massed fires at the tactical level, the Azerbaijanians mimicked this in 2020, and the effect was to be able to crush massed enemy armor formations over the horizon and then move in mechanized forces for what was essentially a "sweep up" close battle.  Everyone was expecting the same for this war.

The Ukrainians, being at the receiving end in 2014 have likely figured out that playing by the old rulebook will not work.  So my hypothesis is 1) the Russians have been trying to follow their doctrine of long range Find, Mass Fires Fix/Attrit and Heavy Close clean up to Finish, but 2) The Ukrainians have adopted tactics that negate #1.

The evidence for #1 is the fact that the Russians have appeared to stick with the BTG which is a concept with massed fires at the tactical level baked-in:

  

(https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/images/btg-image01.jpg|||Battalion Tactical Group)

In western doctrine a BG will have integral mortars and likely a Arty Bn in close support.  The Russians added 6 x MLRS to this mix and if you look at Soviet doctrine, MLRS are normally at Regimental/Div level.  This matched what we saw in the field in 2014 and 2020 very closely.

The evidence for #2 is all over social media.  The Ukrainians, learning quickly from 2014, look like they have dis-aggregated. More importantly and to the point, they have largely abandoned defensive mass but have not lost lethality.  I think the Ukrainians are still forming mass for offensive actions but the defensive is a lot of small units dispersed all over the place with weapon systems that are light, portable and have really extended range and reach; they have become the swarm the Russians are trying to hit with a shotgun.  Further, by dis-aggregating the Ukrainians look like they have turned some ideas about maneuver on its head.  Rear areas are not not "rear" anymore, it is all FEBA because small units with next gen ATGMs are cutting Russian logistics to pieces, making all the Russian mass heavily dislocated (or perhaps contributing to Russian mess ups).

We spend a lot of time slagging Russian failures, and there are quite a few and well earned, but we should also keep an eye on Ukrainian victories, because they might very well be happening on their own merits and not all on Russian screw ups.  For example, we may be seeing a lot of abandoned Russian MBTs because there are no refueling or recovery assets left due to Ukrainians adopting a new path very effectively.

So what?  Well the question is, "are we seeing an anomaly or trend?"  As we look over at our own heavy steel, we have to ask ourselves "what if our next opponent looks and fights like the Ukrainians and not the Russians?"   The answer to that question may be a blip in military force development but is also may be a signpost much in the same way 1914 was because the technology that enables the Ukrainian tactics is accelerating - smart, very long range autonomous systems that can overwhelm current mechanized protection/shield at a system level.  

Personally, I think it is too soon to call it.  There may be times ahead where mass demonstrates it merits and they may be decisive; however, it is all worth watching closely because none of us want to the a "horse cavalry commander" in the next war. 

There is a quote written by some admin official on the legacy of the Vietnam war, I cant find the exact quote now nor can I remember who said it. Shame on me I suppose, but the quote went something like "The real lesson of the Vietnam goal is to avoid becoming involved in a civil war in a former French Colony, with a regular monsoon season, in which objectives are unclear, and the host government is unpopular, against a determined enemy, supported materially by China and the USSR...." You get the picture. The point he was trying to make being that Vietnam was a one off and that policymakers should focus on the future, not the past. I dont want to get in to the Vietnam war stuff, I think BFCElvis' heart would explode.

Instead I bring it up because I wonder if the lesson of this war is "Avoid committing Russian troops to a former USSR satellite, sitting on the Black Sea, during the spring thaw, which possesses a charismatic leader, is supported by outside western powers...." I mean to your point I dont really think well know for sure one way or the other, but it seems to me that a lot of the outcome of this war has been contingent on high quality western hardware plus a massive and overwhelming desire on the part of the Ukrainians to make good use of it. I wonder, for example, if we reran 2003 in 2023 if the Iraqi people really would have stood up for Saddam in the same way. Really the country most concerned should be China. I mean compared to what the US has given them, the stuff Ukraine has gotten is just a drop in a bucket. 

I do think that as long as Putin remains in office, US presidents will do well to avoid getting enmired into conflicts along the Russian periphery moving forward. I think Putin will be eager to pay American troops back for all of this. 

[The_Capt]

7 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

There is a quote written by some admin official on the legacy of the Vietnam war, I cant find the exact quote now nor can I remember who said it. Shame on me I suppose, but the quote went something like "The real lesson of the Vietnam goal is to avoid becoming involved in a civil war in a former French Colony, with a regular monsoon season, in which objectives are unclear, and the host government is unpopular, against a determined enemy, supported materially by China and the USSR...." You get the picture. The point he was trying to make being that Vietnam was a one off and that policymakers should focus on the future, not the past. I dont want to get in to the Vietnam war stuff, I think BFCElvis' heart would explode.

Instead I bring it up because I wonder if the lesson of this war is "Avoid committing Russian troops to a former USSR satellite, sitting on the Black Sea, during the spring thaw, which possesses a charismatic leader, is supported by outside western powers...." I mean to your point I dont really think well know for sure one way or the other, but it seems to me that a lot of the outcome of this war has been contingent on high quality western hardware plus a massive and overwhelming desire on the part of the Ukrainians to make good use of it. I wonder, for example, if we reran 2003 in 2023 if the Iraqi people really would have stood up for Saddam in the same way. Really the country most concerned should be China. I mean compared to what the US has given them, the stuff Ukraine has gotten is just a drop in a bucket. 

I do think that as long as Putin remains in office, US presidents will do well to avoid getting enmired into conflicts along the Russian periphery moving forward. I think Putin will be eager to pay American troops back for all of this. 

Lotta lessons no doubt, but at the tactical level the one I am watching for is "are highly mobile and connected light infantry upscaling and able to effectively stop heavy mech through a combination of speed, range, lethality and self-synchronization?", has "Deep Battle" become "360 Battle" in conventional warfare?

For the historians in the group, one of the last times this happened the Mongols took over most of the known planet...so there is that.

[BeondTheGrave]

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Lotta lessons no doubt, but at the tactical level the one I am watching for is "are highly mobile and connected light infantry upscaling and able to effectively stop heavy mech through a combination of speed, range, lethality and self-synchronization?", has "Deep Battle" become "360 Battle" in conventional warfare?

For the historians in the group, one of the last times this happened the Mongols took over most of the known planet...so there is that.

So what youre saying is, Zelensky wont stop at Moscow? Lol

An interesting point. And you might be right, it seems very effective here. I wonder how a mech force ought to try and counter these tactics. Is the Thunder Run now more valid than ever, or a huge mistake? Should a commander focus on 'going slow' and fighting a battle of dismounts with tanks moving up as backup? In a way that almost reminds me of many combined arms battles in WWII, at least on the western front. Slow but steady. 

I would love to see the TRADOC 'Lessons of the Ukrainian War' study that will surely hit desks later this year.

[Phantom Captain]

15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Lotta lessons no doubt, but at the tactical level the one I am watching for is "are highly mobile and connected light infantry upscaling and able to effectively stop heavy mech through a combination of speed, range, lethality and self-synchronization?", has "Deep Battle" become "360 Battle" in conventional warfare?

For the historians in the group, one of the last times this happened the Mongols took over most of the known planet...so there is that.

On a smaller scale, John Wilder's Lightning Brigade in the ACW was very much doing the same thing.  Light infantry on horses, specifically NOT cavalry, armed with repeating Spencer rifles.  It was never implemented on a larger scale though in the way he wanted his "mounted light infantry" to be.  I think we are seeing the modern equivalent of the same on that larger scale.

They could move with impunity behind enemy lines and rapidly.  They had repeating rifles and would dismount and fight as infantry, the rifles being a force multiplier and could stand up to much larger enemy formations and beat them.  Then quickly mount again and move on.  Very similar.  

Edited March 13, 2022 by Phantom Captain

[rocketman]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Pretty informative look at the slat armor on the roofs of T-72s:

 

I found this interesting. Steve, would it be lots of work for Charles to model this type of slat armor on top of existing tanks in CMBS? Would be interesting, not only for the CM community, to see how the Javelin would fare against it using the CM-engine for real life analysis. Is it viable for full protection? Mitigation of damage etc?

Also, Steve, after seeing this - what would be your guess as how effective it is against NLAW?

Edited March 13, 2022 by rocketman

[Haiduk]

The help of our ancestors. It's became knowingly, several days ago Russian forward groups, searching the ways couldn't overcome ancient Serpent Ramparts (ukr. Zmiyevi valy) near Bilihorodka village,west from Kyiv. Theese ramparts were built in 10-11th centuries against steppe nomads attacks on the base of more early fortifiacations.

They girds Kyiv outskirts from the west to southern east in several lines. This was huge alot of work in that times. Now many of them plowed up, but theese save itself and came useful again since 1000 years

   

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, Phantom Captain said:

On a smaller scale, John Wilder's Lightning Brigade in the ACW was very much doing the same thing.  Light infantry on horses, specifically NOT cavalry, armed with repeating Spencer rifles.  It was never implemented on a larger scale though in the way he wanted his "mounted light infantry" to be.  I think we are seeing the modern equivalent of the same on that larger scale.

They could move with impunity behind enemy lines and rapidly.  They had repeating rifles and would dismount and fight as infantry, the rifles being a force multiplier and could stand up to much larger enemy formations and beat them.  Then quickly mount again and move on.  Very similar.  

Very good analogy.  In this case, as could be for the Ukrainians, an evolving primary role for infantry is not just to take and hold ground, it is to project friction onto an opponents system to such an extent you can break it.  This effectively makes mass a liability as it is vulnerable to its own weight.

This is evolution of light unconventional use of infantry we have been seeing for some time now.  Except now those mounted light infantry have comms, drones and portable ATGMs with a range, reach and lethality we only saw in vehicle mounted platforms.  Thing about evolutionary moments, you really don't realize what happened until it is too late. 

I suspect one could model this in CMBS right now.

[chuckdyke]

Remember Putin's move against militants in Moscow? They were all knocked out by a chemical agent. Hostages and militants alike. Another strike like that is on the cards now it moves in the urban phase of the campaign. 

[Haiduk]

@The_Capt

I think, you judge mostly of territorial defense footage, so you might get the impression that we are fighting only with light infantry, heavy armed with modern toys. But this is because there is too few footage from our "line" units. But they fight hard with all own equipment from the tanks to BMP and artillery, though in conditions of cities defense, even these units often use "light infantry raids" tactic.

Yes, territorial defense actions are making outstanding controbution and their shoot and scoot actions release our "big army" for more hard tasks, TD work is winning a time for Reserve corps brigades and "second waves" of existing brigades deployment.    

[chuckdyke]

15 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

but theese save itself and came useful again since 1000 years

A little like the bocage in Normandy. 

[billbindc]

Gents, I wanted to take a second to thank you guys. This forum has turned out to be extremely informative. I'm an old grognard from the dosomefink days who hadn't been on this site for years and it's turned out to be one of the better places to get unregurgitated info. Elvis, thanks for luring me back and thanks to everyone else for the cornucopia of excellent information. Slava Ukrainyi, etc and so forth.