Any modules ? National Family extensions or patches in the works ?

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Ivanov said:

. It has more to do with the terrain and tactical situation, than with the potential range of the main tank armament.

Exactly my intuition. 

I guess from there it's really a matter of penetrative effect and defeating the armor system. 

[VladimirTarasov]

I saw a quick mention of Yugoslavia vs NATO war,

Serbs did pretty good with the old equipment they had, how ever it also showed that NATO's aerial sensors were advanced. Serbs also exposed the importance of decoy operations which they skillfully used against NATO forces, however of course Serbia stood no chance NATO was way more advanced and in way greater numbers, and obviously capable enough to destroy the Serb forces.

10 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

 Further the Serbian military could afford to take measures well beyond what the Russians could afford to accomplish (and still be mission-capable) to protect assets. 

How is that? In other terms in which way do you mean that? 

10 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Do try to find some real life 4-5 KM sight lines.  I'll be waiting.

Or less sarcastically, even fairly flat land often holds a variety of terrain features that prevent unobstructed shooting out to max range.  Outside of select parts of open deserts, and very large firing ranges, it's just not common, or reliable enough to expect reasonable very long engagement ranges.

In the eastern Ukraine regions there is steppe type terrain (hilly and flat) that lead well out to kilometers of LOS. Basically the dream of Kornets and TOWs, and AT-15s. Also favorable terrain for air assets, and anti air assets. There are also foliage and forests of course which covers LOS and limits it. So LOS that leads well out a few kilometers is common in Eastern Ukraine. However the more west you go the less steppe terrain there will be, which is more favorable for the force that is using the terrain to its advantage, be it offensive or defensive.

[Ivanov]

5 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

In the eastern Ukraine regions there is steppe type terrain (hilly and flat) that lead well out to kilometers of LOS. Basically the dream of Kornets and TOWs, and AT-15s. Also favorable terrain for air assets, and anti air assets. There are also foliage and forests of course which covers LOS and limits it. So LOS that leads well out a few kilometers is common in Eastern Ukraine. However the more west you go the less steppe terrain there will be, which is more favorable for the force that is using the terrain to its advantage, be it offensive or defensive.

Keep in mind, that this is not WW2 and tank duels in the open steppes would not be so common. In modern combat the force ratio to the space would be very low and most of the fighting would take place around and in various towns, hamlets and critical road junctions, so it wouldn't be so easy to find few kilometers of uninterrupted LOS.

Edited June 17, 2016 by Ivanov

[Codename Duchess]

All of the fancy Russian jamming in the world isn't going to hide a T-72 crossing the open from a targeting pod or the Mk.1 eyeball, so I contend that NATO air to ground superiority will shine once the Russian air defenses are degraded (see: the 100 other discussions we've had for timeliness, capabilities, and discussions of Port security). That is apples to oranges compared to an ATGM team in the woods, but the point had merit. Plus with the prevalence of AESA radars in tactical and strategic reconnaissance aircraft, jamming is much less effective* thanks to the joys of magic I mean physics.

Also keep in mind that NATO has the optics/sensors advantage on the ground still, and every difficulty they face against the Russians due to terrain equally applies in the reverse. 

*I'm not nearly qualified enough and almost certainly not allowed to discuss the how.

[sburke]

Keep in mind a lot of wide open steppe with good LOS also means the tracks that show an armored force has been or is in the area are gonna show up really well even w/o fancy thermals.  Once you know you should be looking......

A lot of tracking of the involvement of Russian armor included seeing the traces they left.  Armor tracks coming from the border kind of blew the lie that all those tanks were just captured or found in armories.  Not like there was this huge demand for caterpillar tractors to harvest crops during the period...  

[VladimirTarasov]

I'm not saying the advantage will be on the Russian side, I'm talking about how the terrain is. Of course NATO militaries have better sensors. How ever, Russia has enough capabilities to counter NATO advantages and make it difficult for NATO to be able to operate in 100% effectiveness.

2 hours ago, Codename Duchess said:

All of the fancy Russian jamming in the world isn't going to hide a T-72 crossing the open from a targeting pod or the Mk.1 eyeball, so I contend that NATO air to ground superiority will shine once the Russian air defenses are degraded (see: the 100 other discussions we've had for timeliness, capabilities, and discussions of Port security). That is apples to oranges compared to an ATGM team in the woods, but the point had merit. Plus with the prevalence of AESA radars in tactical and strategic reconnaissance aircraft, jamming is much less effective* thanks to the joys of magic I mean physics.

I wasn't talking about jamming although however, EW is definitely still very capable against certain targets. But NATO being able to effectively degrade Russian air defense systems in a short period is very doubtful, I was reading on a Rand report of how China can pose a challenge in guarding its sea against NATO, also degrading NATO air power to be able to get its mission done in a invasion of Taiwan. I'm pretty sure Russia would be better than China at that. But anyways I'm not trying to open a very large argument, I'm just trying to say NATO wouldn't be flying air planes and ships to fight in Ukraine like how they did in Iraq. Russian defenses are layered, and have multiple systems like S-400s for aerial denial over high altitudes and large areas, S-300 variants to also deny air space, than you have BUK-M(1,2) systems for medium ranges, to defend these systems there are vehicles like Pantsirs and TORs and Tunguskas which can engage incoming missiles against these systems.

S-400 and S-300 batteries usually have decoy systems as well. Then you'll have the RuAF that will plug in gaps in air defenses, ect, ect. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying NATO cannot be successful in Ukraine, but obviously Russia is capable enough to defend itself to a certain extent against NATO superiority in numbers and in other areas technology. I think it was Steve that said it once, Russia must be quick to get the desired goals in order to win, the more a war like this lasts the less chances Russia would have against NATO. 

2 hours ago, Codename Duchess said:

Also keep in mind that NATO has the optics/sensors advantage on the ground still, and every difficulty they face against the Russians due to terrain equally applies in the reverse.

In optics/thermals certainly NATO forces are the most advanced, how ever there are tactics that can be used to not be exposed to this advantage(if possible if not then Rest in Peace Redfor commander). For example don't engage at night over long distances, where NATO ground vehicles obviously will slaughter Russian tanks, APCs, IFVs because they won't be able to see NATO armor at the ranges NATO armor can see them.

[VladimirTarasov]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

Keep in mind a lot of wide open steppe with good LOS also means the tracks that show an armored force has been or is in the area are gonna show up really well even w/o fancy thermals.  Once you know you should be looking......

A lot of tracking of the involvement of Russian armor included seeing the traces they left.  Armor tracks coming from the border kind of blew the lie that all those tanks were just captured or found in armories.  Not like there was this huge demand for caterpillar tractors to harvest crops during the period...  

It is arguable  but I see what you mean, of course you can use sattelites to identify troop movements. And this is where NATO has the advantage because of its superior thermal sensors, where it can do operations at night and not be exposed to sattelites where as the Russian Ground Forces will only be able to move at night, engagements at night should be avoided against an enemy with superior sensors in every category.

[VladimirTarasov]

14 hours ago, Ivanov said:

Keep in mind, that this is not WW2 and tank duels in the open steppes would not be so common. In modern combat the force ratio to the space would be very low and most of the fighting would take place around and in various towns, hamlets and critical road junctions, so it wouldn't be so easy to find few kilometers of uninterrupted LOS.

I know, I was saying there are terrain like this in Ukraine. Of course most of the fightings will be in towns and cities or other important areas it makes no sense for fighting to be in the open.  

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

21 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I saw a quick mention of Yugoslavia vs NATO war,

Serbs did pretty good with the old equipment they had, how ever it also showed that NATO's aerial sensors were advanced. Serbs also exposed the importance of decoy operations which they skillfully used against NATO forces, however of course Serbia stood no chance NATO was way more advanced and in way greater numbers, and obviously capable enough to destroy the Serb forces.

How is that? In other terms in which way do you mean that? 

In the eastern Ukraine regions there is steppe type terrain (hilly and flat) that lead well out to kilometers of LOS. Basically the dream of Kornets and TOWs, and AT-15s. Also favorable terrain for air assets, and anti air assets. There are also foliage and forests of course which covers LOS and limits it. So LOS that leads well out a few kilometers is common in Eastern Ukraine. However the more west you go the less steppe terrain there will be, which is more favorable for the force that is using the terrain to its advantage, be it offensive or defensive.

Simply the Serbs did not have to actually fight a ground war.  They could afford to hide everything and disperse units well beyond having any tactical value.

In a ground war they'd have had to concentrate forces, and deploy them in a way that was much less concealed.  The losses to aircraft would have likely gone through the roof had the Serbs chosen to continue the war long enough for NATO ground forces to invade.  

In regards to the steppe, again just because you can see the horizon, you shouldn't confuse it for being truly long LOS.  If you're a yankee imperialist on training rotation, you'd have the 11 ACR to disabuse you of the concept of "open desert."  However again, no terrain is really flat.  You might see tanks far off, but seeing them long enough for an accurate engagement, or keeping them under fire once they've been alerted to the fact to see cover is going to be difficult.  

Also historically looking at where battles occur, you can draw some interesting conclusions about hinterlands.   

[VladimirTarasov]

1 minute ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Simply the Serbs did not have to actually fight a ground war.  They could afford to hide everything and disperse units well beyond having any tactical value.

In a ground war they'd have had to concentrate forces, and deploy them in a way that was much less concealed.  The losses to aircraft would have likely gone through the roof had the Serbs chosen to continue the war long enough for NATO ground forces to invade.  

In regards to the steppe, again just because you can see the horizon, you shouldn't confuse it for being truly long LOS.  If you're a yankee imperialist on training rotation, you'd have the 11 ACR to disabuse you of the concept of "open desert."  However again, no terrain is really flat.  You might see tanks far off, but seeing them long enough for an accurate engagement, or keeping them under fire once they've been alerted to the fact to see cover is going to be difficult.  

Also historically looking at where battles occur, you can draw some interesting conclusions about hinterlands.   

I see what you mean, I just didn't understand. In that case you're totally right.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

On 6/17/2016 at 0:07 PM, Ivanov said:

Keep in mind, that this is not WW2 and tank duels in the open steppes would not be so common. In modern combat the force ratio to the space would be very low and most of the fighting would take place around and in various towns, hamlets and critical road junctions, so it wouldn't be so easy to find few kilometers of uninterrupted LOS.

I don't see why combat could not take place in the open steppes. Here armoured combat would be fast paced as it was ibn Desert Storm (1991) From a strategic/operational view the roads would be important. Initially, in South Ukraine I would expect major Russian pushes down the M14 coast road to link up with the Crimea, down the M04 (Donetsk - Dnepropetrovsk. A later NATO counter offensive would, as one of the military/political objectives seek to liberate Southern Ukraine from Russian occupation. Potentially advances might be made into Crimea and the Donetsk Region. While less likely there might be an advance over the Russian border proper at me point,most likely if Putin had does something really stupid like using the Novichok type chemical weapons (a really serious escalation like this  may well case NATO war aims to expand beyond liberating occupied areas of Ukraine. While unlikely it might be interesting to allow a branch f the campaign scenario to consider the option of an expanded war (most likely this would be limited operations over the Russian border to punish and destroy significant portions of the Russian army and occupy some Russian territory as a future political bargaining chip. A march on Moscow and regime change seems very unlikely as it would drive Putin too close to the nuclear threshold. There could be a modern day version of II SS Panzer Korp's battles - gaming those with US forces (or modern Germans) could be interesting scenarios though obviously we would be gaming from a Combat Team Commander level on the same terrain. The ultimate military/political objective can, as in 1943, be assumed to be the capture of Kursk prior to negotiating a ceasefire on terms favourable to NATO. In the South perhaps there would be similar operation aimed at capturing places like Rostov on Don and Luhansk prior to a ceasefire, again for use as political bargaining counters. Again, all of this must be considered as a possible branch of the NATO victory timeline for purely war gaming  reasons as a scenario background

[LUCASWILLEN05]

On 6/18/2016 at 4:05 AM, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Simply the Serbs did not have to actually fight a ground war.  They could afford to hide everything and disperse units well beyond having any tactical value.

In a ground war they'd have had to concentrate forces, and deploy them in a way that was much less concealed.  The losses to aircraft would have likely gone through the roof had the Serbs chosen to continue the war long enough for NATO ground forces to invade.  

In regards to the steppe, again just because you can see the horizon, you shouldn't confuse it for being truly long LOS.  If you're a yankee imperialist on training rotation, you'd have the 11 ACR to disabuse you of the concept of "open desert."  However again, no terrain is really flat.  You might see tanks far off, but seeing them long enough for an accurate engagement, or keeping them under fire once they've been alerted to the fact to see cover is going to be difficult.  

Also historically looking at where battles occur, you can draw some interesting conclusions about hinterlands.   

I think you could look at Steppe fighting in similar terms as modern desert warfare (Desert Storm, Arab - Israeli Wars nd, to some extent the India - Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971)

Regarding the Serbs, had they not agreed to a ceasefire there might well have been a NATO ground invasion

[LUCASWILLEN05]

On 6/18/2016 at 2:01 AM, VladimirTarasov said:

I'm not saying the advantage will be on the Russian side, I'm talking about how the terrain is. Of course NATO militaries have better sensors. How ever, Russia has enough capabilities to counter NATO advantages and make it difficult for NATO to be able to operate in 100% effectiveness.

I wasn't talking about jamming although however, EW is definitely still very capable against certain targets. But NATO being able to effectively degrade Russian air defense systems in a short period is very doubtful, I was reading on a Rand report of how China can pose a challenge in guarding its sea against NATO, also degrading NATO air power to be able to get its mission done in a invasion of Taiwan. I'm pretty sure Russia would be better than China at that. But anyways I'm not trying to open a very large argument, I'm just trying to say NATO wouldn't be flying air planes and ships to fight in Ukraine like how they did in Iraq. Russian defenses are layered, and have multiple systems like S-400s for aerial denial over high altitudes and large areas, S-300 variants to also deny air space, than you have BUK-M(1,2) systems for medium ranges, to defend these systems there are vehicles like Pantsirs and TORs and Tunguskas which can engage incoming missiles against these systems.

S-400 and S-300 batteries usually have decoy systems as well. Then you'll have the RuAF that will plug in gaps in air defenses, ect, ect. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying NATO cannot be successful in Ukraine, but obviously Russia is capable enough to defend itself to a certain extent against NATO superiority in numbers and in other areas technology. I think it was Steve that said it once, Russia must be quick to get the desired goals in order to win, the more a war like this lasts the less chances Russia would have against NATO. 

In optics/thermals certainly NATO forces are the most advanced, how ever there are tactics that can be used to not be exposed to this advantage(if possible if not then Rest in Peace Redfor commander). For example don't engage at night over long distances, where NATO ground vehicles obviously will slaughter Russian tanks, APCs, IFVs because they won't be able to see NATO armor at the ranges NATO armor can see them.

By the time we get to a NATO counter offensive phase NATO has probably got control of the air but Russian SAMs will continue to be an issue, probably a serious one. This would not be like Desert Storm. If anything perhaps it would be more like the closing stages of the Yom Kippur War (closest analogy I can think of right now :-) )

[womble]

8 minutes ago, LUCASWILLEN05 said:

By the time we get to a NATO counter offensive phase NATO has probably got control of the air but Russian SAMs will continue to be an issue, probably a serious one. This would not be like Desert Storm. If anything perhaps it would be more like the closing stages of the Yom Kippur War (closest analogy I can think of right now :-) )

Once the fast-movers are gone, the air defense ground network won't be far behind. The occasional mobile launcher operating solo without any supporting remote sensing isn't going to be as effective as an integrated multi-platform defense network.

[Kinophile]

5 hours ago, LUCASWILLEN05 said:

I don't see why combat could not take place in the open steppes. Here armoured combat would be fast paced as it was ibn Desert Storm (1991) From a strategic/operational view the roads would be important. Initially, in South Ukraine I would expect major Russian pushes down the M14 coast road to link up with the Crimea, down the M04 (Donetsk - Dnepropetrovsk. A later NATO counter offensive would, as one of the military/political objectives seek to liberate Southern Ukraine from Russian occupation. Potentially advances might be made into Crimea and the Donetsk Region. While less likely there might be an advance over the Russian border proper at me point,most likely if Putin had does something really stupid like using the Novichok type chemical weapons (a really serious escalation like this  may well case NATO war aims to expand beyond liberating occupied areas of Ukraine. While unlikely it might be interesting to allow a branch f the campaign scenario to consider the option of an expanded war (most likely this would be limited operations over the Russian border to punish and destroy significant portions of the Russian army and occupy some Russian territory as a future political bargaining chip. A march on Moscow and regime change seems very unlikely as it would drive Putin too close to the nuclear threshold. There could be a modern day version of II SS Panzer Korp's battles - gaming those with US forces (or modern Germans) could be interesting scenarios though obviously we would be gaming from a Combat Team Commander level on the same terrain. The ultimate military/political objective can, as in 1943, be assumed to be the capture of Kursk prior to negotiating a ceasefire on terms favourable to NATO. In the South perhaps there would be similar operation aimed at capturing places like Rostov on Don and Luhansk prior to a ceasefire, again for use as political bargaining counters. Again, all of this must be considered as a possible branch of the NATO victory timeline for purely war gaming  reasons as a scenario background

The second NATO looks like it's going to cross the border Russian nukes  will launch. 

Absolutely guaranteed. It's WHY they have nukes. 

Edited June 19, 2016 by kinophile

[Codename Duchess]

48 minutes ago, kinophile said:

The second NATO looks like it's going to cross the border Russian nukes  will launch. 

Absolutely guaranteed. It's WHY they have nukes. 

Hell, the second the Russians gas NATO nukes will fly. US doctrine does not distinguish between WMDs and the use of one calls for a nuclear response. 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

6 hours ago, LUCASWILLEN05 said:

I think you could look at Steppe fighting in similar terms as modern desert warfare (Desert Storm, Arab - Israeli Wars nd, to some extent the India - Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971)

Regarding the Serbs, had they not agreed to a ceasefire there might well have been a NATO ground invasion

And again, even in terrain that most of us imagine to be simply open flat parade ground, there's a crap ton of terrain both large and small.  

As to the rest, we've gone down this route and discussed how it to death.  The odds of NATO crossing any boundaries into Russia proper, or Russia eviscerating itself trying to replicate a Tom Clancy novel are pretty nil.  

[LUCASWILLEN05]

16 hours ago, Codename Duchess said:

Hell, the second the Russians gas NATO nukes will fly. US doctrine does not distinguish between WMDs and the use of one calls for a nuclear response. 

Political and military leaders know what will happen when someone stars throwing nukes about.There as never been a war between nuclear armed powers hence we have no idea how this scenario will play out. However in WW2 both sides had large stocks of chemical weapons that were never used. in a future conflict it could very well be the same with nukes. Although Russian doctrine says they should be used that does not mean they will be. Personally I think Putin will only use nukes if NATO actually marched on Moscow and St Petersburg and the survival of Putin's government was at sake. If NATO made it clear that it was conducting limited operations on Russian territory and any territory captured would be returned post war negotiations (in return for any NATO/Ukrainian territory held  by Russia for instance or for some other political concessions. I don' tsee Putin risking nuclear Armageddon for the Crimea. Kursk, Rostov on Don etc. If NATO advanced to and captured St Petersburg  rather than surrounding the city then that would be a different matter entirely.

In regard to use of Russian chemical weapons I doubt the alliance would go nuclear over  that. More likely NATO war aims would be expanded beyond simply liberating any occupied NATO or Ukrainian territory. Limited war aims would be announced such as disarming Russia's WMD capability and limiting or destroying conventional forces. Unless Putin did something very stupid regime change would not be on the agenda and that would likely be stated explicitly

[LUCASWILLEN05]

17 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

And again, even in terrain that most of us imagine to be simply open flat parade ground, there's a crap ton of terrain both large and small.  

As to the rest, we've gone down this route and discussed how it to death.  The odds of NATO crossing any boundaries into Russia proper, or Russia eviscerating itself trying to replicate a Tom Clancy novel are pretty nil.  

Indeed. Look for example at the terrain the Germans and Red Army fought over during the Battle of the River Mius (July - August 1943) detailed in Decision n the Ukraine (George Nipe) Plenty of ravines (balkas as they are known locally), crops and unduations. The steppes are certainly not a billiard table https://uk.images.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search;_ylt=A7x9UnK2smdX6gIAK4h3Bwx.;_ylu=X3oDMTBsYWhiN2NvBHNlYwNzYwRjb2xvA2lyMgR2dGlkAw--?_adv_prop=image&fr=yhs-SGMedia-sgm_fb&va=ukrainian+steppes&hspart=SGMedia&hsimp=yhs-sgm_fb

[LUCASWILLEN05]

23 hours ago, womble said:

Once the fast-movers are gone, the air defense ground network won't be far behind. The occasional mobile launcher operating solo without any supporting remote sensing isn't going to be as effective as an integrated multi-platform defense network.

Eventually yes. But it could still be a while before this phase is reached

[LUCASWILLEN05]

17 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

As to the rest, we've gone down this route and discussed how it to death.  The odds of NATO crossing any boundaries into Russia proper, or Russia eviscerating itself trying to replicate a Tom Clancy novel are pretty nil.  

There are plausible reasons and motivations for NATO to conduct strictly limited conventional operations near the Ukrainian border

Anyway this is a war game and we can assume, for scenario purposes that the nuclear decision has either not been taken yet or that the war leaders are all too scared of the consequences and the war remains a conventional conflict. At the level we are gaming (roughly Company Combat Team) the nuclear decision is a long way above our pay grade. Any NATO operations on Russian territory will be strictly limited as I already said. Operations to capture Kursk for example given that the city is close to the Ukraine - Russia border, A march on Moscow and regime change are unlikely to be considered unless something really extreme happens.

All we are talking about are limited military operations on Russian territory aimed at securing negotiating chips prior to a ceasefire and maybe destroying or capturing mobile elements of the Russian army so they cannot r-invade Ukraine in the future.There is no reason the Russian army should be permitted a secure base on Russian territory while a state of war continues to exist. Even if NATO chooses not to actually occupy Russian territory on the border that should not rule out temporary incursions to secure military objectives close to the Ukrainian border such as destroying Russian offensive capabilities prior to a ceasefire. That would be a sensible alternative NATO decided it did not need an important border city like Kursk as a negotiating chip.

Our war game can assume one or more of the above options for a scenario depicting limited operations on Russian territory. It is probable that both sides know he war is nearing its' end at the point we are discussing. Maybe the Russians still occupy some territory in Ukraine and NATO wants some Russian territory it can use in future peace talks.

 

[Baneman]

48 minutes ago, LUCASWILLEN05 said:

...Any NATO operations on Russian territory will be strictly limited as I already said. Operations to capture Kursk for example given that the city is close to the Ukraine - Russia border, A march on Moscow and regime change are unlikely to be considered unless something really extreme happens.

All we are talking about are limited military operations on Russian territory aimed at securing negotiating chips prior to a ceasefire and maybe destroying or capturing mobile elements of the Russian army so they cannot r-invade Ukraine in the future.There is no reason the Russian army should be permitted a secure base on Russian territory while a state of war continues to exist. ...

 

This seriously underestimates the well-documented Russian paranoia about the West.

According to current propaganda, the West/NATO are itching to invade right now ( and have been for decades ).
If NATO boots actually crossed the border, even if we know it's a limited operation, that doesn't mean that's how it will be perceived (or reported) by the opposition.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

23 minutes ago, Baneman said:

This seriously underestimates the well-documented Russian paranoia about the West.

According to current propaganda, the West/NATO are itching to invade right now ( and have been for decades ).
If NATO boots actually crossed the border, even if we know it's a limited operation, that doesn't mean that's how it will be perceived (or reported) by the opposition.

However it is most unlikely Russia would risk nuclear annihilation over a limited cross border operation particularly if it has been stated publicly and through private back channel messages  Similar hints were apparently made to Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf War n regard to the consequences of chemical weapons use. in political terms Putin might be informed that, though NATO troops were operating on Russian territory there was no intent tobring bout regime change, NATO would not advance major forces towards Moscow or within a certain distance of Moscow.It might also be stated that NATO forces would not enter St Petersburg. NATO would very likely reiterate  its no frst use policy but make it clear it would retaliate proportionately to any Russian nuclear strike.

However, as I sated earlier these issues are far above the pay grade of the commanders into whose combat boots we are stepping for a CMBS war game. If someone wants to do scenarios involving limited cross border operations late in the war or even a hypothetical "March on Moscow" then so be it. This is a war games scenario, Nothing more.

As for so kind of Operation Barbarossa 2 I simply don't see this happening short of a massive provocation on Russia's part. We are talking about something on the scale of the accidental nuclear attack portrayed in Eric L Harry's novel Arc Light. If someone wants to do war game scenarios based around a 2017 version of that then I would say fair enough, go right ahead and do it. It is after all just a war game, not the real world

[VladimirTarasov]

2 hours ago, Baneman said:

This seriously underestimates the well-documented Russian paranoia about the West.

According to current propaganda, the West/NATO are itching to invade right now ( and have been for decades ).
If NATO boots actually crossed the border, even if we know it's a limited operation, that doesn't mean that's how it will be perceived (or reported) by the opposition.

Wrong, Russian "propaganda" is saying NATO is surrounding Russia and doing stuff against Russia. I don't think any normal person in Russia believes NATO is going to invade Russia anytime soon, how ever certain countries in NATO are certainly interfering with Russian interests and this is known among the people. If NATO were to confront Russia in Ukraine, it wont go nuclear unless some one in NATO decides that invading Kaliningrad is rational.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Just no.  

Ask yourself, in the political-national policy area what in the hell rolling into Russia accomplishes.  The risks/costs outweigh the benefits to a degree that makes it frankly ludicrous. 

Just what in the world do you think it'd accomplish that would not have been accomplished through a conventional victory in Eastern Europe?