Armata soon to be in service.

[ikalugin]

BMDs (and the BMP3) have rear engine for better stability and balance.

 

While the old Soviet patern BTR units remain (with tanks and other heavy equipment) the new patern medium wheeled BDEs would (likely) be formed after Bumerang introduction.

Edited March 29, 2015 by ikalugin

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

You also still haven't answered my initial questions - who Russian military needs to be better than, and in what?

 

I guess I'll have to break it down Gomer Pile for you.  

 

The USSR bankrupted itself on unrealistic military expenditures in an attempt to stave off a Western invasion that frankly was not happening.  The Russian military is currently expanding at a rapid rate (while maintaining significant military reserves) in an attempt to stave off a Western frankly is not happening.

 

There's simply not a mission for what exists these days.  The conventional threat from the west is negligible, about the only way there's going to be a NATO-Russia shooting war involves Russia invading a NATO country which appears to be a bit beyond Russian ambitions these days.  Same deal from the Pacific.  And further the Russian deterrence policy of "any invasion of Russian territory=nuclear war!" rather puts a damper on the possibility of external threats to Russia proper.

 

This goes to two points:

 

1. The military district system as is, is increasingly obsolete.  No one is going to drive across the Ukraine and drive to Moscow humming panzerlied.  Having a smaller, better equipped, more agile military force, aligned against strategic movement assets (such as the highly functional rail system) better matches the current Russian military realities of covertly invading neighbors reacting to regional crises with fairly small forces.

 

2. The Russian military, and the Soviet military before it was the biggest threat to the peace and security of the Russian people.  Simple as that.  The troubles of the 1990s have very little to do with what the west "imposed" on Russia, and everything to do with the rows and rows of T-80Us rusting away, and thousands of missiles intended for global holocaust.  The only route to Russian security, true Russian security is meaningful economic development which as this drop in oil prices has shown, is something that has not happened (indeed, minus weapons the Russian exports are largely raw materials, to be made into much more expensive, and valuable goods elsewhere),  Under the current nuclear umbrella the threat of actual invasion, or hostile beyond reason action (refusing to trade with Russia, or be engaged with Russia as a result of objection over Russian actions is something any nation has the right to do) from outside is about nil.  Simple as that.  Whatever ground or air forces Russian maintains has no value against the west compared to the nuclear element.   

 

It is certainly tempting to point at the US defense outlay and claim it to be:

 

1. A threat

2. An example of how Russia is spending quite reasonably.

 

This would be a mistake.  The first is easiest to deal with.  The US economy is the abjectly most powerful on earth.  Russia's is about on par with Italy's.  Because your neighbor buys a larger sports car than you do does not make your spending more reasonable if he owns a company, and you are the manager at Starbucks in terms of spending capabilities.  The first is a bit more complicated, but looking at what the US does have, it is largely focused on force projection (which is expensive, but is simply the reality of putting what combat power you have forward), and remains almost entirely focused on status quo enforcing missions short of full spectrum conflict.  While its pretty easy to object (and not without good reason!) to the US global presence, the numbers on the ground, it is not forces allocated to offer much more than a token threat (see the idiot maps that show Russia encircled with US bases that neglect to show that all told those have something like 3-4 Brigades total worth of combat power) unless massed in one location , which again could be equally met by a smaller more agile Russian force moving on internal lines.

 

So to that end the Russian military shouldn't be a giant pile of cold war castoffs like the BMP-2 (which frankly without some major overhauling is pretty much as obsolete as the BMP-1 at this point), some newerish hardware like the 90's T-90As and BMP-3s and a small handful of Armatas and KA-52s, it should be going for broke with newer systems with a much smaller endstate manning level.  

 

 

 

It is a very good point, if you can establish the idea of tanks always riding in the same column with BTRs as a solid fact. Which it is not.

 

When pairing armor with infantry/infantry with armor proximity and rate of march is pretty important.  They're not always riding in the same column, but having worked with mixed organization, your wheeled/tracked vehicles have very different needs and capabilities.  One of the reasons why the fully-tracked APC was so revolutionary was infantry could now operate literally alongside armor, and keep pace with them over the marginal terrain.  Conversely motorized infantry remained attractive because of the speed and strategic mobility involved.  

 

By combining the two, even at higher levels you're basically negating both their mobility advantages.  A wheeled AFV "pure" organization is much better at strategic mobility (which is honestly the one advantage wheeled APCs have IMO), while a tracked "pure" organization is best suited to the sort of high intensity combat that goes hand in hand with tanks.

 

 

 

Again, I'm having an impression that you did not read my previous answers to you, where I gave you the numbers of BMP-2 and BMP-3 available.

 

Oh I did, but I took it to be a sign of how wasteful the Russian defense plans are.  The thousands of BMP-2s have long since passed the point where they're really "useful" against peer threats.  However they're available in numbers than can only really be justified in a real shooting war against someone who is equal to or stronger than Russian capabilities.  The BMP3 despite being honestly the only in service PC the Russians have that's worth bringing to a shooting war, is available in the sort of numbers that simply do not support a high intensity conflict at this time.

 

So either a BMP-2 fleet modernized (as contemporary designs like the Bradly, Marder, Warrior etc have all kept more or less up to speed with modern warfare) enough to be worth using, or a BMP3 fleet large enough to support a conventional war makes sense, but not this odd split that's ongoing right now.

 

 

 

Aaaand again. That's a wrong statement. First, because, as I've said, Russia is the biggest country in the world, and it needs to cover all it's borders. Second, it's wrong because the size of Russian Armed Forces is shrinking every year, while trading numbers for more quality, in both personnel and equipment.

 

It does not need to cover its borders with men any more than the US military is at dangerously low force levels in Alaska.  The threat of invasion is met by the cost of invasion being so great as to make it simply unfeasible or irrational.  The Russian threat of nuclear war, or even the threat offered by seriously modernized forces is more than enough without the currently bloated Russian defense structure.  

 

 

 

So it does not cost pretty much anything to maintain them. At the same time, to replace all of them with shiny new BMP-3s would cost a lot of money. 

 

Again I'd argue that simply not having them is the more rational choice, if NATO went crazy and invaded that force would likely be overrun in the mothballs yard if not simply crushed because lol bmp-1, and much the same for China.  

 

It's like looking at old battleship armor arrays.  If you're looking at it simply as a question of armor, some armor>no armor.  However if you're looking at the overall picture of cost, weight and how the armor affects the rest of the ship, the cost in those factors often outweighs the value of putting anything but the best in place, over what is most important.

 

So to that end these packets of thousands of vehicles that frankly in a shooting war would be grease stains on contact, no matter how "small" the cost, are still too expensive for the abject lack of meaningful protection they provide.  And that small amount could totally buy I don't know, like 1.5 Armatas or something would WOULD be much more meaningful in the broader sense of preparedness.

 

It's really fallacy to put much stock in mothballs stuff.  If it's not well maintained and kept at a pretty advanced readiness state (and are rarely actually less expensive to maintain) it is going to take longer to get combat ready than a force already activated that simply has a few long train rides ahead of it.  The US prepo stuff has either pretty extensive maintenance standards (someone is keeping the lights on on a pretty frequent basis) or they're set up with the understanding that it's going to be a few days to a few weeks from boat docking to first tanks rolling downrange, and there's all sorts of lift assets aligned against getting the parts, equipment, and men to them.

 

Just as addendum:

 

 

 

The M60 analogy, though not without certain merit, is faulty, as M60 is a derivative of earlier patton tanks in the same way all late Soviet tanks are derivatives of the T64 desighn (the one with the smouth bore 115mm) and not of the WW2 era T44.

 

Again looking at the post-1985 upgrades, from the "super" M60, to the ERA arrays, to the more dramatic Israeli and Turkish upgrades, a 2015 M60 force would be just as reasonable as a 2015 T-72 force given different priorities.  The statement is not at all M60=T-72 and much more to do with keeping obsolete tanks running and "ready" just to have more tanks.

 

 

 

Current idea (within GPV2015/2020) is to replace existing fleet of vehicles (such as the BMP2s) with all new ones (such as Kurganets and Bumerang). The upgrades were intended to provide work loads for the factories to keep the workforce busy and ready for serial production of new vehicles.

 

Which again, given numbers of BMP-2s and how hard it was to replace them with BMP-3s makes me believe we're simply looking at a 3000 BMP2, 500 BMP3 and 230 Kurganets fleet vs a truly modern fleet without major cuts.  

[DreDay]

I meant more operational freedom. At the same time, APC formations (BTR and MT-LB based) have additional organic assets like ATGMs and AGLs. But yeah, there are some pure BTR-based formations as well.

 

Fair enough, the BTG concept allows for the dynamic creation of battle groups based not only on the combat needs but also on operational restrictions; so there is nothing stopping the Russians from deploying lighter BTR/MTLB BTGs as a rapid reaction force while their heavy organic assets are still on the way...Although, realistically speaking that is what they have VDV for in a first place...

[DreDay]

BMDs (and the BMP3) have rear engine for better stability and balance.

 

Not just BMDs and BMP3s, but BTRs as well. That concept works well if you look at those vehicles simply as light tanks; but it significantly complicates the the comfort and the exit capacity for the dismounts. Russian MOD seems to have come to the same conclusion and that is why they had vetoed the deployment of BTR-90 and other rear-engine based APCs/IFVs.

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Fair enough, the BTG concept allows for the dynamic creation of battle groups based not only on the combat needs but also on operational restrictions; so there is nothing stopping the Russians from deploying lighter BTR/MTLB BTGs as a rapid reaction force while their heavy organic assets are still on the way...Although, realistically speaking that is what they have VDV for in a first place...

 

The best way to look at it is from mission perspective. Everybody knows that, but I'll say it anyways. Heavy tank and/or IFV based forces (and BMDs = IFVs too) are intended for offense, while APC based forces are better as reinforcements, mop-ups, and to establish defense. Elastic defense on larger front is a perfect example. Tanks are just supplements, and not intended to always to keep up with BTRs.

[L0ckAndL0ad]

The USSR bankrupted itself on unrealistic military expenditures in an attempt to stave off a Western invasion that frankly was not happening.  The Russian military is currently expanding at a rapid rate (while maintaining significant military reserves) in an attempt to stave off a Western frankly is not happening.

 

You're starting with false facts. The number of personnel of Russian Armed Forces have been decreasing since the fall of SU each year. Theoretical numbers are 1 million, but the actual ones are below 800-700 thousands at the moment. All units except high readiness ones are understrength (so called peacetime TOE).

 

There's simply not a mission for what exists these days.  The conventional threat from the west is negligible, about the only way there's going to be a NATO-Russia shooting war involves Russia invading a NATO country which appears to be a bit beyond Russian ambitions these days.  Same deal from the Pacific.  And further the Russian deterrence policy of "any invasion of Russian territory=nuclear war!" rather puts a damper on the possibility of external threats to Russia proper.

 

This goes to two points:

 

1. The military district system as is, is increasingly obsolete.  No one is going to drive across the Ukraine and drive to Moscow humming panzerlied.  Having a smaller, better equipped, more agile military force, aligned against strategic movement assets (such as the highly functional rail system) better matches the current Russian military realities of covertly invading neighbors reacting to regional crises with fairly small forces.

 

2. The Russian military, and the Soviet military before it was the biggest threat to the peace and security of the Russian people.  Simple as that.  The troubles of the 1990s have very little to do with what the west "imposed" on Russia, and everything to do with the rows and rows of T-80Us rusting away, and thousands of missiles intended for global holocaust.  The only route to Russian security, true Russian security is meaningful economic development which as this drop in oil prices has shown, is something that has not happened (indeed, minus weapons the Russian exports are largely raw materials, to be made into much more expensive, and valuable goods elsewhere),  Under the current nuclear umbrella the threat of actual invasion, or hostile beyond reason action (refusing to trade with Russia, or be engaged with Russia as a result of objection over Russian actions is something any nation has the right to do) from outside is about nil.  Simple as that.  Whatever ground or air forces Russian maintains has no value against the west compared to the nuclear element.   

 

It is certainly tempting to point at the US defense outlay and claim it to be:

 

1. A threat

2. An example of how Russia is spending quite reasonably.

 

This would be a mistake.  The first is easiest to deal with.  The US economy is the abjectly most powerful on earth.  Russia's is about on par with Italy's.  Because your neighbor buys a larger sports car than you do does not make your spending more reasonable if he owns a company, and you are the manager at Starbucks in terms of spending capabilities.  The first is a bit more complicated, but looking at what the US does have, it is largely focused on force projection (which is expensive, but is simply the reality of putting what combat power you have forward), and remains almost entirely focused on status quo enforcing missions short of full spectrum conflict.  While its pretty easy to object (and not without good reason!) to the US global presence, the numbers on the ground, it is not forces allocated to offer much more than a token threat (see the idiot maps that show Russia encircled with US bases that neglect to show that all told those have something like 3-4 Brigades total worth of combat power) unless massed in one location , which again could be equally met by a smaller more agile Russian force moving on internal lines.

 

This is more of a political question, rather than military. And I do not wish to discuss politics.

 

So to that end the Russian military shouldn't be a giant pile of cold war castoffs like the BMP-2 (which frankly without some major overhauling is pretty much as obsolete as the BMP-1 at this point), some newerish hardware like the 90's T-90As and BMP-3s and a small handful of Armatas and KA-52s, it should be going for broke with newer systems with a much smaller endstate manning level.

 

Let's make it more pleasant and interesting, and play a game.

 

Imagine that you're the Commander in Chief on Russian Armed Forces. You've got around 500-600 T-90A, 500-600 BMP-3, and thousands of T-72s, BMP-2/1s, etc. Your current Armed Forces Personnel is 800 thousand men, with 50%+ of them being professional military. Current plan is to increase the numbers of contracted personnel to 70-80%. The size of your country is 17 million square kilometers. What are your orders, sir?

 

I'm genuinely interested to hear what exactly would you do.

 

When pairing armor with infantry/infantry with armor proximity and rate of march is pretty important.  They're not always riding in the same column, but having worked with mixed organization, your wheeled/tracked vehicles have very different needs and capabilities.  One of the reasons why the fully-tracked APC was so revolutionary was infantry could now operate literally alongside armor, and keep pace with them over the marginal terrain.  Conversely motorized infantry remained attractive because of the speed and strategic mobility involved.  

 

By combining the two, even at higher levels you're basically negating both their mobility advantages.  A wheeled AFV "pure" organization is much better at strategic mobility (which is honestly the one advantage wheeled APCs have IMO), while a tracked "pure" organization is best suited to the sort of high intensity combat that goes hand in hand with tanks.

 

 Why do you neglect the importance of APCs at operational level? Also, I've replied regarding this in my previous post (regarding offensive/defensive missions).

 

It does not need to cover its borders with men any more than the US military is at dangerously low force levels in Alaska.  The threat of invasion is met by the cost of invasion being so great as to make it simply unfeasible or irrational.  The Russian threat of nuclear war, or even the threat offered by seriously modernized forces is more than enough without the currently bloated Russian defense structure.

 

US is shielded against ground attacks with ocean. Russia is not. Advancing through Alaska is nonsense. But lets see what would be your reply regarding "your orders" as Commander in Chief.

 

[Codename Duchess]

By that token then shouldn't we keep all of our land forces at the US and Canadian borders?  I mean we've fought wars with both of them, and our border with Canada is quite large (~4000 miles using google earth ruler tool, not exact but good enough).  By comparison, the Russian border with all of Europe is ~1500 miles, and a similar number with Eastern China (Going to go ahead and assume Kazakhstan isn't a major potential adversary).  We also have a 1200 mile border with Mexico.  Again rough numbers, but still.

I believe the point he is trying to make is that the positioning and usage of Russian military forces is both antagonistic and wasteful.  There's no motivation amongst European nations to invade Western Russia, and yet I get the impression that there is a lot of drumbeating* saying that the might Russian army (and it is mighty) at the western borders is all that is keeping the German/Polish hordes from repeating 1941.  I understand the need for border security, but when you have large standing forces with "colorful" rhetoric, it causes unease in the European community, and that's exactly what we're seeing.  Why does Russia need to keep so many forces at the border? Why not use larger centralized garrisons, a la the US?*

*I have no specific examples of this, forgive me, but it is the general tone I have seen in news reports and inferred from online interactions with people.

**This does not include forward deployed US units but those have already been covered as being comparitively weak.  Additionally, the role of the US in the modern era is not the same as that of the Russian Federation.

Edited March 29, 2015 by Codename Duchess

[L0ckAndL0ad]

By that token then shouldn't we keep all of our land forces at the US and Canadian borders?  I mean we've fought wars with both of them, and our border with Canada is quite large (~4000 miles using google earth ruler tool, not exact but good enough).  By comparison, the Russian border with all of Europe is ~1500 miles, and a similar number with Eastern China (Going to go ahead and assume Kazakhstan isn't a major potential adversary).  We also have a 1200 mile border with Mexico.  Again rough numbers, but still.

 

No? Because US and Canada are allies?

 

I get the impression that there is a lot of drumbeating saying that the might Russian army (and it is mighty) at the western borders is all that is keeping the German/Polish hordes from repeating 1941.  I understand the need for border security, but when you have large standing forces with "colorful" rhetoric, it causes unease in the European community, and that's exactly what we're seeing.  Why does Russia need to keep so many forces at the border? Why not use larger centralized garrisons, a la the US?*

*This does not include forward deployed US units but those have already been covered as being comparitively weak.  Additionally, the role of the US in the modern era is not the same as that of the Russian Federation.

Uhm, what? Military Districts = distributed garrisons. They do not sit entrenched along the border. They are stationed at their bases. How is that a threat to NATO? And please, leave politics aside. Military assessment only.

 

Not sure what you mean by "centralized", and how is it done in the US, but I'd say that anything centralized is easier to destroy. And, while US only forces may be comparatively weak, combined NATO forces are not.

 

Most people I know think that a war between NATO and Russia is impossible. At the same time, Armed Forces job is to be prepared for anything. Current Russian Armed Forces personnel is under 0.8 million, and keeps decreasing. What do you propose? Make it 500 thousand? 300 thousand? 100 thousand? What armament should it use? Right today. There's a reason why I asked panzersaurkrautwerfer to play Commander in Chief. You can participate in this too.

Edited March 29, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[Codename Duchess]

Unfortunately I don't know of any way to answer that without delving too far into the political realm, which is both expressly forbidden in the forums and a line we've likely already crossed.  PM me if you want my opinion, but I'll try and summarize it below.

What I will clean it up to say is I frankly don't see the need in the 21st century for either NATO or the Russians to maintain huge forces arrayed against each other.  NATO has no desire to go East, and presumably Russia has no desire to go West.  And yet both sides waste billions of dollars pointing tanks at each other and justify it because "well they started it". 

What would I do if I was in charge of the Russian military?  I'd focus on my nuclear weapons for homeland defense.  Hordes and hordes of tanks is redundant at that point.  If you want an expeditionary force similar to the US there's a lot of restructuring that would need to be done which includes ditching all those tanks in storage.  The US has the economy to mix the two, Russia does not.

Out of curiosity, what is the general status and array of ground forces in the east (aimed at China).  If we're talking implausible but possible, I'd say China going north would have been just as likely as NATO going east.
 

 

 

Not sure what you mean by "centralized", and how is it done in the US, but I'd say that anything centralized is easier to destroy.

 

Right with a nuclear weapon, and at that point it doesn't matter.

Edited March 29, 2015 by Codename Duchess

[DreDay]

What would I do if I was in charge of the Russian military?  I'd focus on my nuclear weapons for homeland defense.  Hordes and hordes of tanks is redundant at that point.

 

While I realize that this was not your original intent, you have pretty much described the Russian military procurement strategy that has been in place for the past 20 years. What you suggest that they do, is precisely what they have been doing up until now.

[Codename Duchess]

No I get that, and it makes sense with how they're going about it.  The problem is there are a lot of legacy systems in mothballs that could be scrapped at this point.  It also doesn't help that the general explanation is that NATO is the greatest threat to Russian security when up until this "situation" in Ukraine, no one in NATO particularly cared about Russian aggression at this point.  So with that frame of reference now in mind, suddenly Backfires supersonic over the North Sea, or Russian VDV training on the Estonian border, or the entire Northern fleet scrambling.  And now these same formations are getting the latest toys...

Well it just doesn't look that friendly anymore

Edit:  I'm having a hard time phrasing it, so let me ask a question.

Why is NATO a threat to Russia?

Edited March 29, 2015 by Codename Duchess

[L0ckAndL0ad]

What I will clean it up to say is I frankly don't see the need in the 21st century for either NATO or the Russians to maintain huge forces arrayed against each other.  NATO has no desire to go East, and presumably Russia has no desire to go West.  And yet both sides waste billions of dollars pointing tanks at each other and justify it because "well they started it".

I agree completely.

 

What would I do if I was in charge of the Russian military?  I'd focus on my nuclear weapons for homeland defense.  Hordes and hordes of tanks is redundant at that point.  If you want an expeditionary force similar to the US there's a lot of restructuring that would need to be done which includes ditching all those tanks in storage.  The US has the economy to mix the two, Russia does not.

Nuclear weapons are projected to be 100% upgraded/renewed. This is in fact their main focus.

 

Exp Forces - there's no need in them in Russia. Highly mobile? Yeah. And, while hordes of tanks might be redundant, tanks themselves are still needed. Scrapping stuff also costs money. I'd say that one should make new things first, then scrap old stuff. And while we're at it, two years ago they've announced that they'll remove T-80s from service in 2015.

 

Out of curiosity, what is the general status and array of ground forces in the east (aimed at China).  If we're talking implausible but possible, I'd say China going north would have been just as likely as NATO going east.

No idea, really.

Edited March 29, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Why is NATO a threat to Russia?

Like you've said yourself, this isn't the place to discuss these sort of things.

[Stagler]

Intent + Capability = threat.

[vincere]

Intent + Capability = threat.

For a real politic it's Intent Capability= threat. Because intent can change in a day.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

Like you've said yourself, this isn't the place to discuss these sort of things.

 

It is not in terms of the politics, but it is essential to understanding the "why" of Russian defense planning.  Clauswitz was pretty clear on the link between the politics-military affairs relations, and that is still quite valid.  Russian force posture will continue to reflect is political beliefs and orientation, just as much as a nation who's defense priorities include "brain slug defense" will invest heavily in hats made of salt.

 

Which is really why asking me to array Russian forces is silly.  I know there's no conventional threats to Russia, and that much of the thousands and thousands of T-72 and BMP-2 type stuff is simply underutilized scrap metal at this point.  Into the smelter with all of them, buy the six or seven Armatas with the proceeds.  Nuclear modernization is honestly the only "defense" project Russia needs at this point because it is, and remains, a defense to which there's no effective counter (the current generations of ABMs being great for ensuring the three missiles or so Iran/DPRK has get shot down, but doing about zero against anything more than a handful of missiles).  There is also a total and abject lack of countries with a reasonable intent to invade Russian soil, legitimately Russian or otherwise.  

 

But if I believe Merkle is about a very small mustache away from releasing the "real" German military which is hiding in the cellars of Berlin to come and eat all our babushka wearing grandmas and to rape the soil itself in a physical sense (the soil was asking for it, dirty whore soil!), then simply waves of obsolete, wastes of money, time, and soldier equipment will be essential in the forthcoming struggling of patriotic fervor! I must keep all the tanks!  Or else!  Something!  Really!

 

Which paradoxically makes Russia less secure in the long run, because this narrative of constant threat against the Russian people is equally met by the historical narrative of Russians coming west with equal terror and rapey nature to the eastward invasions.  And to that end it ensures the only way to really make a threat to Russia is for Russia to give the west a reason to suspect it which by god Russia has been just great at that from about 1946 on with tanking a short break circa 1991-2002 or so.

 

Anyway.  Acting like defense exists purely in some sort of apolitical vacuum is simply not enough analysis to be worthy of the name.  Russia needs conventional defenses like we need more reality TV shows at this point.

 

 

 

You're starting with false facts. The number of personnel of Russian Armed Forces have been decreasing since the fall of SU each year. Theoretical numbers are 1 million, but the actual ones are below 800-700 thousands at the moment. All units except high readiness ones are understrength (so called peacetime TOE).

 

And it's already a poor return on investment if it's tromping around in outdated hardware "just in case!" nuclear deterrence fails.  I imagine you could get away with 500-600 and not feel less safe.  There's simply no realistic mission for any of them (troops coming in being doubtful in the extreme, and an offensive into NATO is already pointless, with the "forces" arrayed in the East  China could likely take what it wanted already if it was simply a matter of force imbalance).  The realistic mission for Russian ground forces is limited warfare conducted against neighbors, and being the extreme end of internal security matters (as there's already more than a few internal security agencies).  Simple as that.  The US military has something like 700,000 active "ground" branch personnel but that is with global commitments and a logistical branch to match.  With no global reach outside of what is done with nuclear weapons, and no realistic missions that do not share a land border with Russia, 700,000-1 million is having a suitcase full of parkas in the Sahara.  Wasteful, pointless, and a burden to the person who has to carry it.

 

 

 

Imagine that you're the Commander in Chief on Russian Armed Forces. You've got around 500-600 T-90A, 500-600 BMP-3, and thousands of T-72s, BMP-2/1s, etc. Your current Armed Forces Personnel is 800 thousand men, with 50%+ of them being professional military. Current plan is to increase the numbers of contracted personnel to 70-80%. The size of your country is 17 million square kilometers. What are your orders, sir?

 

Smartass answer:

 

I'm going to scrap it all, build the biggest dacha I can, and sleep comfortably under a nuclear umbrella.

 

Less smartass answer:

 

I'm going to seriously assess what parts of Russia are essential to Russia being able to exist as a functional country.  I'll align assets against those first.  Then I'm going to assess what routes from the proverbial hinterlands to the heartlands are most able to support military operations.  A simple reality is that while tanks can go all over, the logistics train cannot, there's going to be something that a potential invader will tie his logistics to (or potentially a network of lesser routes).  From that, I'll build a comprehensive asset denial plan to make transiting those hinterlands difficult (demolition, flooding etc etc) that can be carried out by local security forces or even civil servants.  Then I'll allocate some manner of forces to cover these approaches.  Basically mirroring the old American type ACR, armor heavy but all arms under the same BDE/REG structure, their job would be to keep the enemy from being able to advance rapidly, or threatening flanks and rear areas.

 

The only realistic way to defend Russia is a mobile type defense. Right now in so many words you have the "good" stuff concentrated regionally but not against threats.  Then you have lots of stuff that still costs money that is of minimal value against a force that can actually invade Russia.  This is dumb.  If in a few years the western thing settles down, but by god China is getting uppity it requires a much more pronounced realignment.  Having forces that may be garrisoned centrally, but that are capable of rapid movement is by far more optimal, and instead of simply wasting region's forces away, instead having a smaller Cavalry style organization who's job is to die gallantly while giving time for mobile forces to mass in theater (as again, this is not 1941 and there are simply not the forces to have more than one primary theater) for the counter attack is a better use of money, and resources.  

 

Anyway it's a moot point as the whole nuclear weapons thing makes this about as likely as discussing the Mexican invasion of Texas.  But right now it's forces spread thin, often protecting "space" vs "things."  A smaller, mobile force with more cutting edge equipment that can be massed while screening forces buy time is the best solution.

 

 

 

 Why do you neglect the importance of APCs at operational level? Also, I've replied regarding this in my previous post (regarding offensive/defensive missions).

 

 

I don't.  It's just marginal utility without more wheeled assets in terms of AT or direct fire support.  I think there's like 50 Nona-SVKs for the entire Russian military?  There really needs to be something that can fill some tanklike roles in the BTR formations without being a tank.  Or else you can move rapidly all over and get your teeth kicked in by Type 98s or whatever.

 

 

 

US is shielded against ground attacks with ocean. Russia is not. Advancing through Alaska is nonsense. But lets see what would be your reply regarding "your orders" as Commander in Chief.

 

We have been invaded through Canada, and Russian Imperialist claims are still voiced by members of the Russian government!  It is at least as serious of a threat as NATO is to Russia.  Also Sarah Palin can totally see you guys and that stuff you're doing.

[Wicky]

Russian mobile 'defence' routes....

 

http://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/russian-railways-ceo-proposes-a-trans-continental-highway/

 

[L0ckAndL0ad]

-skip-

 

But if I believe Merkle is about a very small mustache away from releasing the "real" German military which is hiding in the cellars of Berlin to come and eat all our babushka wearing grandmas and to rape the soil itself in a physical sense (the soil was asking for it, dirty whore soil!), then simply waves of obsolete, wastes of money, time, and soldier equipment will be essential in the forthcoming struggling of patriotic fervor! I must keep all the tanks!  Or else!  Something!  Really!

 

Which paradoxically makes Russia less secure in the long run, because this narrative of constant threat against the Russian people is equally met by the historical narrative of Russians coming west with equal terror and rapey nature to the eastward invasions.  And to that end it ensures the only way to really make a threat to Russia is for Russia to give the west a reason to suspect it which by god Russia has been just great at that from about 1946 on with tanking a short break circa 1991-2002 or so.

 

-skip-

 

Uh-oh.. We don't take kindly to this kind of tirades in here.

 

https://youtu.be/ITi7lG0x0IE

 

And it's already a poor return on investment if it's tromping around in outdated hardware "just in case!" nuclear deterrence fails.  I imagine you could get away with 500-600 and not feel less safe.  There's simply no realistic mission for any of them (troops coming in being doubtful in the extreme, and an offensive into NATO is already pointless, with the "forces" arrayed in the East  China could likely take what it wanted already if it was simply a matter of force imbalance).  The realistic mission for Russian ground forces is limited warfare conducted against neighbors, and being the extreme end of internal security matters (as there's already more than a few internal security agencies).  Simple as that.  The US military has something like 700,000 active "ground" branch personnel but that is with global commitments and a logistical branch to match.  With no global reach outside of what is done with nuclear weapons, and no realistic missions that do not share a land border with Russia, 700,000-1 million is having a suitcase full of parkas in the Sahara.  Wasteful, pointless, and a burden to the person who has to carry it.

 

Should every country that does have nuclear weapons disband it's military now?

 

Less smartass answer:

 

I'm going to seriously assess what parts of Russia are essential to Russia being able to exist as a functional country.  I'll align assets against those first.  Then I'm going to assess what routes from the proverbial hinterlands to the heartlands are most able to support military operations.  A simple reality is that while tanks can go all over, the logistics train cannot, there's going to be something that a potential invader will tie his logistics to (or potentially a network of lesser routes).  From that, I'll build a comprehensive asset denial plan to make transiting those hinterlands difficult (demolition, flooding etc etc) that can be carried out by local security forces or even civil servants.  Then I'll allocate some manner of forces to cover these approaches.  Basically mirroring the old American type ACR, armor heavy but all arms under the same BDE/REG structure, their job would be to keep the enemy from being able to advance rapidly, or threatening flanks and rear areas.

 

The only realistic way to defend Russia is a mobile type defense. Right now in so many words you have the "good" stuff concentrated regionally but not against threats.  Then you have lots of stuff that still costs money that is of minimal value against a force that can actually invade Russia.  This is dumb.  If in a few years the western thing settles down, but by god China is getting uppity it requires a much more pronounced realignment.  Having forces that may be garrisoned centrally, but that are capable of rapid movement is by far more optimal, and instead of simply wasting region's forces away, instead having a smaller Cavalry style organization who's job is to die gallantly while giving time for mobile forces to mass in theater (as again, this is not 1941 and there are simply not the forces to have more than one primary theater) for the counter attack is a better use of money, and resources.  

 

Anyway it's a moot point as the whole nuclear weapons thing makes this about as likely as discussing the Mexican invasion of Texas.  But right now it's forces spread thin, often protecting "space" vs "things."  A smaller, mobile force with more cutting edge equipment that can be massed while screening forces buy time is the best solution.

 

What tanks would you use to make it "armor heavy", Commander? And by "keeping it all under the same BDE/REG", do you mean like having BTR-based BDEs have tanks in them? 

 

"Good stuff", and forces overall, are dispersed along the most threatening axis. These are the exact words from Ru MoD.

 

I don't.  It's just marginal utility without more wheeled assets in terms of AT or direct fire support.  I think there's like 50 Nona-SVKs for the entire Russian military?  There really needs to be something that can fill some tanklike roles in the BTR formations without being a tank.  Or else you can move rapidly all over and get your teeth kicked in by Type 98s or whatever.

 

That's a very constructive point. BTRs are not intended to move rapidly into enemy's territory. BTR-90 should have had ATGM, Boomerang will have ATGM, but those BTRs in actual service indeed do not have ATGMs. There's BRDM-based ATGM (and the one on Tigr-M chassis in the production as well), but AFAIK it's used in separate anti-tank formations that can be attached where it's needed.

 

Nona is a versatile mortar/light arty system, it is not intended to be used against tanks.

 

ps: To comrades https://youtu.be/yX_AvU7B1y4

[ikalugin]

This is the old argument, should the country with nukes disband it's armed forces (even if country in question drops the requirement for some degree of global power projection)? No, as those armed forces have following missions:

- defending the nukes.

- defending the borders from insurgents, including near-abroad power projection capability.

- defeating limited conventional attacks without going to strategic nukes.

 

Ie what does Russia do if Japan decides to take Kurils? Or PRC decides to secure general area around Vladivostok (hypotheoretical scenarios but still)?

 

In general I think GPVs (and the reforms) build sufficient military, which could conduct the missions described above (with healthy emphasis on nuclear platforms and various defense arms - such as the S300PM2 upgrade and S400 procurement).

[ikalugin]

On the topic of building conventional military, the current structure is:

- "large" MDs arrayed against general geographical/strategical threat axis (new "Northern" MD is being set up do deal with arctic stuff).

- mobile strategic reserves (VDV, pre placed equipment and supplies for rapid unit relocation between theatres).

- tactical mobility/firepower focus with BDEs being heavy on tanks and arty.

 

Rearmament is done by the "large" MD, as to reduce logistical costs by having common equipment (and supporting stuff) within that MD. The order of rearmament appears to be:

southern->western->eastern->central.

 

 

Current idea is to have following line Ground Forces formation types:

- "Heavy MR"/Tnk BDEs (Armatas everywher).

- classical tracked MR BDEs.

- wheeled MR BDEs (ie Bumerang only, sort of simmilar to Stryker BDEs, but with emphasis on operational and not strategic mobility).

- "light" BDEs (ie specnas).

Edited March 30, 2015 by ikalugin

[DreDay]

In general I think GPVs (and the reforms) build sufficient military, which could conduct the missions described above (with healthy emphasis on nuclear platforms and various defense arms - such as the S300PM2 upgrade and S400 procurement).

 

You make very good and well researched points that I generally agree with; but just out of curiosity - What does GPV stand for in this context?

[ikalugin]

You make very good and well researched points that I generally agree with; but just out of curiosity - What does GPV stand for in this context?

GPV=ГПВ=Российская государственная программа развития вооружений=state rearmament program (not exact translation).

 

There are 2 existing programs (GPV2015 and GPV2020) and 1 future one (GPV2025). Year (after GPV) is the year in which the program ends.

[ikalugin]

http://paralay.iboards.ru/download/file.php?style=12&id=18595&mode=view

 

Paralay's scale drawings on Armata using open source materials.

 

Vehicle behind Armata is the obj 195.

Edited March 30, 2015 by ikalugin

[Stagler]

 

Nona is a versatile mortar/light arty system, it is not intended to be used against tanks.

 

 

Can be, but I wouldnt if I was a gunner on the platform.

 

Nona-SVK is only in service with VDV and Morpeh anyway. So its likely that only a small number are in service, but they are nothing to do with anti-tank. BTR formations have the integral AT formation for that. Or the tanks that would likely be attached in any combat situation as the formation operates as either a BTG based around the BTR unit or as part of the MRR.

Edited March 30, 2015 by Stagler

[ikalugin]

The truth is that there was a lot of work done into making pure, wheels only, formations. Now adays it is completely doable with existing vehicles if towed arty is used (BTR82A, Msta-B, Sprut-B, wheeled ATGMs, Panzir-S). Future medium -wheeled- BDEs would probably get their own SP arty (AT included), on the new platform - Bumerang.

 

 

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