Armata soon to be in service.

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Possibly the last pic is a later version?

Khlopotov said these are two different vehicles.

 

 

A much older concept for a heavy BMP shows some similarities to T-15:

Yeah yeah yeah. That's why I called T-15 Soviet. Especially when they'll refit it with 57mm module, it'll look exactly like that. And that stinky stupid tunnel.. Eww...

Edited March 27, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[akd]

Khlopotov said these are two different vehicles.

 

 

Yeah yeah yeah. That's why I called T-15 Soviet. Especially when they'll refit it with 57mm module, it'll look exactly like that. And that stinky stupid tunnel.. Eww...

 

I think the interior arrangement will be more like Namer.  The RWS should not protrude down into the compartment that way, and storing the fuel in the center rather than using it as part of the armor array would be stupid.

[BTR]

Gur Khan is very buthurt now.

Oh, it's burning bright and warm. 

[L0ckAndL0ad]

I think the interior arrangement will be more like Namer.  The RWS should not protrude down into the compartment that way, and storing the fuel in the center rather than using it as part of the armor array would be stupid.

Yeah, RWS is an obvious difference. But I meant the silhouette. As for the Namer-like appearance, we'd have to wait and see. My bet is on BMP-1/2 on steroids.

[exsonic01]

(Click to enlarge) 

 

Was this picture introduced? Anyway, this is a picture of Obj 195 (T-95). This could be a decent level tank, but as we all know, price was too high. But the technology and spirit of this experimental weapon were inherited to T-14. Already the turret looks similar with T-14 leaked pictures, though it was hidden behind the curtains.  Anyway, I imagine that if T-14 have a 30mm autocannon, it should be like T-95, just a bit left side of a main gun. Also I can see CITV, APS, and radar(?) of T-95..... I guess Armata might adapted this T-95's design, specially for turret part.  

 

Murakhovski "praised" T-14 a lot. (He is a very reliable Russian expert, unlike the other bluffers). As the more leakages coming out, more I feel that the Armata might be a real thing, enough to break my bias against Russian weapons. (well, like I mentioned somewhere in the forum, I still think that overall tech level is not enough against US)  Abrams will begin ECP1 in 2017, so I hope the next expansion of CM:BS would include T-14 and M1A2 SEP v3 ECP1 (or M1A2 ECP1 ?? ) That will be really interesting match. 

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Was this picture introduced?

 

Somebody (Khlopotov?) decided to leak T-95 photo. The turret indeed looks very unarmored, which makes the T-95 not really a tank, but a SPA/TD. This makes a possibility of T-14 using similar type of turret even less likely.

Murakhovski "praised" T-14 a lot. (He is a very reliable Russian expert, unlike the other bluffers). As the more leakages coming out, more I feel that the Armata might be a real thing, enough to break my bias against Russian weapons. (well, like I mentioned somewhere in the forum, I still think that overall tech level is not enough against US) Abrams will begin ECP1 in 2017, so I hope the next expansion of CM:BS would include T-14 and M1A2 SEP v3 ECP1 (or M1A2 ECP1 ?? ) That will be really interesting match.

How can it be? With 10 times less budget. With both countries having nukes, there's no way we're gonna be doing just ground warfare. A war between US and Russia is impossible. Only by mistake (there were quite a few instances when it could've actually happened due to glitches in the systems).

 

[ikalugin]

If I recall it right Vim was quite enthusiastic about Armata as a desighn, just not about it's serial production.

Edited March 27, 2015 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

Я танкист. Т-14 и Т-15 видел своими глазами. Общался с заказчиками и Главным конструктором. Впечатления: фото хреновые, машины хорошие. После ГИ и ВИ станут отличными.

Про впечатления скажу так. Самые офигительные получил при первом знакомстве с об.195 - разрыв шаблона, настроенного на классическую компановку, продолжительный опыт тесного "общения" с панцерами от Т-54 до Т-80, их зарубежными "партнерами". Поткин возглавил революцию в мировом танкостроении. Чертили многие, а он с соратниками из НТ воплотил. Семейство "Армата" - наследник решений того времени, при всем уважении к нынешним работникам УКБТМ. Но и перед Терликовым стоит гигантская задача - запустить семейство в серию. Если посмотреть на кооперацию до нижнего уровня - на душе становится тревожно. Надеюсь, что Терликов справится.

 

Specific text by Vim, to illustrate my point.

[Agiel]

I suppose it illustrates the point that an excellent _platform_ and and excellent _program_ are not necessarily the same thing.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

One of these days I'll get back to this thread (I'm moving my wife into my house, leaving the Army, and getting set up for college all within the same month or so of time. Only posting because I am stuck in line turning in equipment).

Surprised at the apparent move to larger tanks and acceptance of heavier weight. Bit of a sea change. Otherwise looks like combination of known hardware in similar general concept to most tanks. Likely upgrade to capability but not the revolution to armor balance promised. Final procurement will be interesting.

Edited March 27, 2015 by panzersaurkrautwerfer

[Vanir Ausf B]

It looks like mass production won't begin until 2018 at the earliest.

Amazingly, Borisov then voiced exactly the same conclusion that former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his superior, former Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, had reached five years earlier. "We discovered that we can spend less money to reach the same goal," Borisov said.

"Today we can say that the T-72 tank — thanks to its new onboard equipment, gunner sights, guidance systems, ammunition and active and passive defense capabilities — has a far greater combat effectiveness than previous models. Accordingly, that brings up the principle of 'reasonable sufficiency,'" he said. As for the Armata, he said, "we have no need to rush forward with that project today."

...

Now, UralVagonZavod specialized machinery director Vyacheslav Khalitov has announced that the factory will produce only two dozen or so new tanks. They will make an appearance in the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 and then return to the factory to complete production by year's end.

Thus, the Russian people will see semi-finished tanks fit only for a parade, but that are many months away from any serious use. And even then the tanks will spend three years undergoing operational testing in the military, with mass production slated to begin in 2018

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/opinion/article/putin-can-t-buy-votes-with-tanks-forever/517254.html

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

Thus, the Russian people will see semi-finished tanks fit only for a parade, but that are many months away from any serious use. And even then the tanks will spend three years undergoing operational testing in the military, with mass production slated to begin in 2018

 

This is much more reasonable than the "All will be Armata in 2017" threads we were seeing for a bit.  Again curious to see how many of them actually see service and how they are allocated.

 

Re: Fifty shades of BMP

 

To put in in comparison, the current Russian system would be as if the US kept the M60 in service and updated, and maintained M113 based mechanized infantry units to the modern day.  While the T-90 and T-72 are very similar, if they were just the same damned tank you'd be able to build one upgrade package, or at the least fleetwide compatible upgrade kits.  You wouldn't need T-90AM or T-72B3 etc, you'd just have T-81UMBSKwhatever (split the difference in numbers).  This is especially questionable because neither tank is vastly superior when properly upgraded.  They both have the same weapons system.  They both rely on the same sort of ERA arrays, etc, etc, etc.  It does not make sense to maintain both a T-90 and T-72 line, and then still have T-80s, T-62s in some corners of the Empire, and now the Armata clattering about.  

 

When we dive into APCs and somesuch the question becomes a bit of a why have the variety?  And to that end you have the BMP split, and then the greater question of why so many PCs?  

 

I don't believe the BMD or MTLB need justifying simply because they both have clear niches that cannot be easily filled.  BMDs are the one really airdroppable IFV (the utility of that role is another discussion, however if you want an IFV to drop out of planes, it's pretty much your only choice), MTLBs offer a very good choice in mobility over some very marginal conditions.  

 

But when you get into the realm of BTRs and BMPS you sort of have to ask "why."  The Stryker type motorized vehicles, as much as I do not like them, are designed around being a homogeneous force of  vehicles with similar mobility, logistical, and transportation requirements, that can all be stuffed into airplanes and rapidly deployed.  In theory it does not need augmentation for most missions (in theory.  practice is a very different matter).  The BTR based units make a similar look, but you still have significant "heavy" assets that are traditionally aligned against them.  Which opens a question to the utility of a wheeled, fast transport that is tied to tracked armor logistics and mobility.  A formation is as fast as its slowest piece, as thirsty as its biggest vehicle, etc, etc.  So to that end you lose a lot of the wheeled advantages of the BTR (which is not a bad vehicle at all), while saddling tanks with forces that cannot keep up with them (off road, or in terms of survival).  

 

In terms of the BMP-3 vs BMP-2, it really should be one or the other.  Having two fleets and keeping them both relevant is prohibitive if in broader terms they're the same sort of role.  So either going all in because by god, BMP-3s are the future (I differ there) or committing to a total and complete overhaul of the BMP-2 fleet (more practical, and allows a much easier incrimental upgrade fleetwide) is more sound than having the BMP-3 with a whole host of updates and upgrades that often do not carry over to the BMP-2, while pursuing various BMP-2M designs.  

 

And so forth.  There's needless replication of capabilities and systems, or questionable alignment of tools and assets pretty much across the board.  This also goes fairly well hand in hand with the frankly bipolar Russian defense planning which amounts to an interesting pursuit of NATO's old 1960's "All conflicts threatening our borders automatically are nuclear" while trying to still maintain the sort of force that is designed to go head to head with NATO.  It indicates a lack of mission focus or understanding, no one is going to Barbarossa the border if it means nukes are a popping, which negates the need for the rather large (and to a degree wasteful, which is something even the Russian military recognizes) forces, but on the other end of the stick, Russian forces have no realistic military targets that they cannot handle with a smaller, much more focused force (see Georgia, Ukraine, etc).  A lot of units are frankly redundant and best dissolved with a stronger focus on forces better designed for the missions at hand, with equipment that's fleet standard.

 

Re: prototypes

 

Again, you've got "standard" helicopters like the MI-28, then KA-52s (flying often in the same roles as their cold war stablemates), extended evaluation programs like the AK-12 or whatever, the whole Armata package with extended testing phase for a whole fleet of vehicles, all the various "next generation" Russian fixed wing assets that are currently in service in the 20-30 airframe range, one off things like the BMPT, and all of it being done by state owned assets.  While some of it is certainly replicated by US and other free market agencies, it does deeply tie the R&D cost for programs not pursued significantly more on the overall economy which is again supporting a very large military on a GDP the size of Italy.  Pair this with a slumping economy, and slipping deadlines, and the fact that the Armatas are not even really complete as prototypes, and it starts to raise questions about the practicality of new equipment barring some major changes in Russian defense planning and focus.  

[dan/california]

This is sort of tangential to this thread, but....

 

Shock Force was an argument for Strykers, Black Sea is a brutally effective argument against them. Against a Kornet/T-72B3 level threat, being anywhere on a 4k by 4k map is is suicidal.  If the map gets smaller it just gets worse.

 

Yes I have said that before, but my current PBEM game is driving the point home.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Stryker = halftrack with a roof.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

The argument for Strykers was not "let us go toe to toe with panzers" it was "we can get light infantry anywhere in the world in 24 or so hours, and have no mobility when they hop off the plane, or we can wait four months to get armored forces on location."  They're very much a product of the end of the cold war, and the "new world order" of not-crazy speak that anticipated the need to go anywhere in the world overnight and defeat militia to low capability conventional forces, and be supported via airhead.

 

In a Syrian situation they're not at all a bad tool, and even in complex environments they give you a lot of mobility.  But they straight up die against near peer threats on the offensive or in open terrain*, and every training mission or simulation confirms this.  

 

To this end I've always viewed the SBCT as the "heavy" end of a COIN operation, while it's the "light" option in the full spectrum fight (effectively being a way for infantry heavy formations to keep up with combined armor-mech forces)

 

*All infantry of course, is hard to dig out of complex terrain.

 

 

 

Stryker = halftrack with a roof. 

 

Not unfair. Can still be more useful given precision of direct fire weapons vs flex mount .50's, but they really need to be screened by infantry to not get thrashed.

[dan/california]

The argument for Strykers was not "let us go toe to toe with panzers" it was "we can get light infantry anywhere in the world in 24 or so hours, and have no mobility when they hop off the plane, or we can wait four months to get armored forces on location."  They're very much a product of the end of the cold war, and the "new world order" of not-crazy speak that anticipated the need to go anywhere in the world overnight and defeat militia to low capability conventional forces, and be supported via airhead.

 

In a Syrian situation they're not at all a bad tool, and even in complex environments they give you a lot of mobility.  But they straight up die against near peer threats on the offensive or in open terrain*, and every training mission or simulation confirms this.  

 

To this end I've always viewed the SBCT as the "heavy" end of a COIN operation, while it's the "light" option in the full spectrum fight (effectively being a way for infantry heavy formations to keep up with combined armor-mech forces)

 

*All infantry of course, is hard to dig out of complex terrain.

 

 

Not unfair. Can still be more useful given precision of direct fire weapons vs flex mount .50's, but they really need to be screened by infantry to not get thrashed.

Nice to know the game is aligned with other sims and exercise results.

[ikalugin]

Some answers to the questions panzerkrautwerfer rises:

Moscow times is not the best source of information around (you could see how politicised the article is, not to mention the factual mistakes in it).

The (large scale) serial production of Armata has been decided - UVZ (and a number of other factories) has already been re tooled for the mission. The question however is how fast that serial production would go in 2015-2017, as it depends on the suppliers of various components and sub assemblies to the UVZ (which could make hundreds of Armatas per year).

Hence in my opinion a brigade scale (battalion scale formation is already availiable) operational formation is completely possible by 2017.

The M60 analogy, though not without certain merit, is faulty, as M60 is a derivative of earlier patton tanks in the same way all late Soviet tanks are derivatives of the T64 desighn (the one with the smouth bore 115mm) and not of the WW2 era T44.

Current idea (within GPV2015/2020) is to replace existing fleet of vehicles (such as the BMP2s) with all new ones (such as Kurganets and Bumerang). The upgrades were intended to provide work loads for the factories to keep the workforce busy and ready for serial production of new vehicles.

Wheeled IFVs (Bumerang) are intended to work simmilarly to the Stryker in their wheeled BDEs, however the emphasis is on the operational rather than strategic mobility, as wheeled BDEs would be easier to sustain in such areas as Central Asia.

Edited March 28, 2015 by ikalugin

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Re: Fifty shades of BMP

 

To put in in comparison, the current Russian system would be as if the US kept the M60 in service and updated, and maintained M113 based mechanized infantry units to the modern day.  While the T-90 and T-72 are very similar, if they were just the same damned tank you'd be able to build one upgrade package, or at the least fleetwide compatible upgrade kits.  You wouldn't need T-90AM or T-72B3 etc, you'd just have T-81UMBSKwhatever (split the difference in numbers).  This is especially questionable because neither tank is vastly superior when properly upgraded.  They both have the same weapons system.  They both rely on the same sort of ERA arrays, etc, etc, etc.  It does not make sense to maintain both a T-90 and T-72 line, and then still have T-80s, T-62s in some corners of the Empire, and now the Armata clattering about.

Oh, T-62s incoming again. Did you read what I replied to you?

 

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/118480-armata-soon-to-be-in-service/?p=1597225

 

You also still haven't answered my initial questions - who Russian military needs to be better than, and in what?

 

But when you get into the realm of BTRs and BMPS you sort of have to ask "why."  The Stryker type motorized vehicles, as much as I do not like them, are designed around being a homogeneous force of  vehicles with similar mobility, logistical, and transportation requirements, that can all be stuffed into airplanes and rapidly deployed.  In theory it does not need augmentation for most missions (in theory.  practice is a very different matter).  The BTR based units make a similar look, but you still have significant "heavy" assets that are traditionally aligned against them.  Which opens a question to the utility of a wheeled, fast transport that is tied to tracked armor logistics and mobility.  A formation is as fast as its slowest piece, as thirsty as its biggest vehicle, etc, etc.  So to that end you lose a lot of the wheeled advantages of the BTR (which is not a bad vehicle at all), while saddling tanks with forces that cannot keep up with them (off road, or in terms of survival).

 

It is a very good point, if you can establish the idea of tanks always riding in the same column with BTRs as a solid fact. Which it is not.

 

In terms of the BMP-3 vs BMP-2, it really should be one or the other.  Having two fleets and keeping them both relevant is prohibitive if in broader terms they're the same sort of role.  So either going all in because by god, BMP-3s are the future (I differ there) or committing to a total and complete overhaul of the BMP-2 fleet (more practical, and allows a much easier incrimental upgrade fleetwide) is more sound than having the BMP-3 with a whole host of updates and upgrades that often do not carry over to the BMP-2, while pursuing various BMP-2M designs.

 

Again, I'm having an impression that you did not read my previous answers to you, where I gave you the numbers of BMP-2 and BMP-3 available.

 

And so forth.  There's needless replication of capabilities and systems, or questionable alignment of tools and assets pretty much across the board.  This also goes fairly well hand in hand with the frankly bipolar Russian defense planning which amounts to an interesting pursuit of NATO's old 1960's "All conflicts threatening our borders automatically are nuclear" while trying to still maintain the sort of force that is designed to go head to head with NATO.  It indicates a lack of mission focus or understanding, no one is going to Barbarossa the border if it means nukes are a popping, which negates the need for the rather large (and to a degree wasteful, which is something even the Russian military recognizes) forces, but on the other end of the stick, Russian forces have no realistic military targets that they cannot handle with a smaller, much more focused force (see Georgia, Ukraine, etc).  A lot of units are frankly redundant and best dissolved with a stronger focus on forces better designed for the missions at hand, with equipment that's fleet standard.

 

Aaaand again. That's a wrong statement. First, because, as I've said, Russia is the biggest country in the world, and it needs to cover all it's borders. Second, it's wrong because the size of Russian Armed Forces is shrinking every year, while trading numbers for more quality, in both personnel and equipment.

 

Re: prototypes

 

Again, you've got "standard" helicopters like the MI-28, then KA-52s (flying often in the same roles as their cold war stablemates), extended evaluation programs like the AK-12 or whatever, the whole Armata package with extended testing phase for a whole fleet of vehicles, all the various "next generation" Russian fixed wing assets that are currently in service in the 20-30 airframe range, one off things like the BMPT, and all of it being done by state owned assets.  While some of it is certainly replicated by US and other free market agencies, it does deeply tie the R&D cost for programs not pursued significantly more on the overall economy which is again supporting a very large military on a GDP the size of Italy.  Pair this with a slumping economy, and slipping deadlines, and the fact that the Armatas are not even really complete as prototypes, and it starts to raise questions about the practicality of new equipment barring some major changes in Russian defense planning and focus.

If you're referring to BMPT Terminator, it's a purely export product. And I don't think anything is done by state. All manufacturers are OJSCs, AFAIK, and work both for internal and external markets.

 

I do understand that you're busy IRL, but please, can you read my posts before replying?

Edited March 28, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[L0ckAndL0ad]

To illustrate my point regarding money saving and large borders further, I'll use 60th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade from Eastern Military District, that I've stumbled upon recently, as an example.

 

As it turns out, they still do use BMP-1s in Russian Far East. Obviously, not to invade China, Japan or US/NATO. Who'd want to do that riding on BMP-1? According to wiki, there's around 900 tanks and 1200 BMPs. Most of these are probably mothballed, while smaller numbers are kept for training/maneuvers to keep people familiar with the stuff. So it does not cost pretty much anything to maintain them. At the same time, to replace all of them with shiny new BMP-3s would cost a lot of money. But since there's no immediate threat of local conflicts in the region, Russia is focusing on updating nukes instead.

 

 

http://codename-it.livejournal.com/968668.html

Edited March 28, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[ikalugin]

I think this is more to do with the rearmament cycle. Ie it appears to be South (BMP3-T90A-late T72B models-BTR82 ect)-West (T72B3s, other mods)-East-Center (MD wise).

[L0ckAndL0ad]

The point is that each military district is a country on it's own. And within that, logistic is based on large stockpiles of mothballed ammo and vehicles (== spare parts). Thus does not create any additional cost, or logistical problems.

[ikalugin]

As far as those things are common. Still move to common series (Armata-Kurganets-Bumerang) is a smart one.

[DreDay]

It is a very good point, if you can establish the idea of tanks always riding in the same column with BTRs as a solid fact. Which it is not.

Exactly, while a standard Russian BTR-based Motor-Rifle brigade does in fact include a Tank battalion, there are several Russian Army formations (i.e. 15th Peace-Kepping brigade) that are purely BTR-based and don't have any tanks or heavy artillery in their OOB.

[DreDay]

Yeah, or there's some kinda crawling tunnel BMP-3 style all over again. Hey, what can one sacrifice for 360 degrees protection, huh?

 

The primary reason for BMP-3 and BMD-4/4M "crawling" tunnel is that those vehicles have an engine positioned in the back of the hull which significantly complicates the ergonomics and the rear exit arrangements.  That does not seem to be the case with T-15 (which has a front-facing engine - a la T-14 reversed). That being the case, the rear dismount arrangements are probably more intuitive than those on its predecessors... We will know for sure in a couple of months, but I find it unlikely that the Russian military had commissioned a vehicle with poor rear exit setup - as that was their major gripe with BTR-90 and BMP-3...

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Exactly, while a standard Russian BTR-based Motor-Rifle brigade does in fact include a Tank battalion, there are several Russian Army formations (i.e. 15th Peace-Kepping brigade) that are purely BTR-based and don't have any tanks or heavy artillery in their OOB.

I meant more operational freedom. At the same time, APC formations (BTR and MT-LB based) have additional organic assets like ATGMs and AGLs. But yeah, there are some pure BTR-based formations as well.

 

The primary reason for BMP-3 and BMD-4/4M "crawling" tunnel is that those vehicles have an engine positioned in the back of the hull which significantly complicates the ergonomics and the rear exit arrangements.  That does not seem to be the case with T-15 (which has a front-facing engine - a la T-14 reversed). That being the case, the rear dismount arrangements are probably more intuitive than those on its predecessors... We will know for sure in a couple of months, but I find it unlikely that the Russian military had commissioned a vehicle with poor rear exit setup - as that was their major gripe with BTR-90 and BMP-3...

 

True. But my point is, if they wanted to go for high level 360 security, there might not even be a rear tunnel at all. Might have limited it to existing crew hatches on the top. But yeah, one can only guess. Kinda not fun sitting and waiting, while being teased like that.