Infantry tactics - covering fire with BAR or skirmish line?

[altipueri]

I was reading that although the US training and text book approach was using BAR and the Garands for squads to give cover, in practice it was found a wide slowly advancing skirmish line was better.

Any views?

[Sublime]

An interesting question especially with the BAR. Very relevant also when you have Ranger troops in FI with the option of the 1919 or BAR.

In the Ranger case I try for platoons with both, and try to use the riflemen from each squad, and the Browning platoons 30 cals for suppressive fire (minus assault teams) with the BAR platoons going into the actual assault. In the assault with BAR teams the BAR guys and other men for suppression fire will advance much closer in than the Browning platoon (except for its assault elements) but will still let the last 40 meters to the assault teams themselves.

US infantry gives much better general cover fire than other nationalities with the bolt action rifles - no doubt about that. Airborne squads seem to be much more effective with their light browning .30 cal over a BAR.. I've noticed the BAR is awful in the hands of poorer quality troops, though it can shine in the hands of veterans. The problem is the 20 round clip, which leads to a lot of reloads. Because of this I always try to include other supporting weapons to cover - MMGs, HMGs, mortars, tanks, etc. But I also will use groups of US infantry to give covering fire - more often just for suppression than other nationalities. It's still nowhere near having MGs on a target but several Garands definitely makes an impression, and more of one than LEs or Kar98s.

[Pak40]

I see the BAR a versatile weapon. It provides an elevated firepower than your rifle but is just as accurate in most cases. It's got range and mobility. It does all of these things reasonably well but does not master any of them.

It's become my favorite weapon in Rising Storm because I can alter my tactics based on the situation. If I find myself in long range situations, I can switch to the low rpm mode to so I don't have to constantly reload and it lets me squeeze off accurate 1 round shots for sniping. In close quarters I can keep it in normal firing mode to ensure the rounds hit moving targets. In both modes I can provide effective covering fire. It's least desirable indoors because of it's size but I can make due with that.

[Bil Hardenberger]

I was reading that although the US training and text book approach was using BAR and the Garands for squads to give cover, in practice it was found a wide slowly advancing skirmish line was better.

Any views?

The simple answer is this: if the team containing the BAR can suppress the enemy unit (keeping their heads down with little to no return fire) by itself, then use only the BAR team... if it cannot then use some rifles as well.

Basically the idea is for the team in contact (hopefully containing the automatic weapon) to provide suppression while the other team(s) maneuver against the enemy and assault it from a covered direction.

This can escalate... so if a squad is in contact and the lead team cannot suppress the enemy unit, then the entire squad goes on line to provide suppression fire... if that works then another squad(s) assaults the enemy.. if even that doesn't work (the suppression bit), then break contact and rethink your options before escalating and adding even more troops to the attack.

Try not to assault an enemy position unless the defenders are suppressed and do it one bite at a time.. there is rarely a need to carry an entire Platoon or Company strongpoint in one single attack.

[YankeeDog]

I guess it all depends on what is meant by a "wide slowly advancing skirmish line"... it's a rather ambiguous term and details matter.

In CMx2, I will sometimes execute what I think of as a "bounding assault." In the case of U.S. rifle Squads, this generally means all three teams of a squad advancing towards the objective, each in a separate lane, in successive 4-6 action spot bounds staggered so that at least one team is always stationary and able to fire on the enemy.

Basically, squad-level bounding overwatch. It's an improved, micromanaged version of what the "Assault" command does. The problem with the Assault command is that each team in the squad bounds to the *same* action spot, and this is bad especially for large U.S. squads because it causes bunching at the bound stops.

But I suppose you could also see this kind of tactic as a "wide, slowly advancing skirmish line". So sure; IME this works well in CMx2, and seems a reasonable facsimile of RL tactics as well.

I usually use this tactic when assaulting across open ground where is no good cover in which to place a covering fire team. If there is a nice piece of cover in which to locate the fire team, then I'm more likely to just leave the fire team(s) in one location, while the maneuver team(s) close to finish.

One thing to keep in mind is that it generally takes much more fire to gain fire superiority, than it does to "maintain the pin" on an enemy that is already suppressed and "heads down". At the squad level for U.S. forces, this means that it is often a good idea to put then entire squad "on the line" for the initial exchange of fire, and then disengage with one team or more teams to close and finish, while the rest of the squad keeps up fire.

[altipueri]

Thanks for your replies.

I didn't really mean how to use overwatch and bounding overwatch in CMx2 what I meant was what did US troops actually do in autumn and winter 1944?

If a skirmish line - which sounds OKish in time of muskets - was what happened then I guess that's we should use. Sounds like suicide or at least a recipe for one between the eyes to me.

Actually, now I'm writing this does anyone have a copy of "Those Devils in Baggy Pants" by Ross S. Carter? I seem to remember towards the end it is just around Christmas and they are sent to advance and their tank support hasn't turned up so they set off in a line and get chewed up. Finklestein caught on the wire with his grenades exploding. Anyway, if anyone has a copy could they look it up.

For others, it is a good read about 82nd Airborne by one who was in it.

[YankeeDog]

If a skirmish line - which sounds OKish in time of muskets - was what happened then I guess that's we should use. Sounds like suicide or at least a recipe for one between the eyes to me.

Historically, a "skirmish line" usually referred to a rough line composed small teams of sharpshooters put out in front of the main battle line, to harass the enemy, not the main battle line of musketeers.

As to what was actually done in 1944/45, I have read accounts of U.S. infantry using a loose, line abreast formation on the advance, but usually in advance-to-contact or sweep-and-clear situations, not in straight-up assaults on known enemy resistance points.

[Broadsword56]

Also, the US textbook doctrines of fire superiority and fire-and-movement quickly came to grief in the Normandy bocage.

The whole idea of the M1 + BAR as a base of fire fell apart once US troops came up against the MG34 and MG42. Not only were their rates of fire far superior to anything the US had, but there were so many more of these weapons per unit. There was no hope of a US platoon gaining fire superiority vs. a German platoon on a purely infantry vs. infantry basis.

That's why -- after many GIs died to prove the point -- the US evolved a combined-arms approach that relied much more on standoff HE weapons (mortars, artillery) and airpower.

For the definitive story about this failure of doctrine, read pp. 88-90 in Chapter 5, "Men and Guns," in Joseph Balkoski's Beyond the Beachhead.

Bottom line, as Balkoski writes: "Instead of forcing the Germans to keep their heads down with large volumes of M1 and BAR fire, as the American manuals demanded, it was usually the Yanks who got pinned."

So in CMBN as in the real thing, beware of anything you read in WWII training manuals!

[Michael Emrys]

+1 to what YD says in his first post. It's exactly what I do in the same situation, except I may use shorter bounds of 2-4 AS and have my troops spending a little more time observing and providing fire. The shorter bounds also mean they spend less time exposed to return fire.

Michael

[YankeeDog]

Also, the US textbook doctrines of fire superiority and fire-and-movement quickly came to grief in the Normandy bocage.

The whole idea of the M1 + BAR as a base of fire fell apart once US troops came up against the MG34 and MG42. Not only were their rates of fire far superior to anything the US had, but there were so many more of these weapons per unit. There was no hope of a US platoon gaining fire superiority vs. a German platoon on a purely infantry vs. infantry basis.

That's why -- after many GIs died to prove the point -- the US evolved a combined-arms approach that relied much more on standoff HE weapons (mortars, artillery) and airpower...

I’ll agree there was something a failure of doctrine in Normandy, and that a more refined “combined arms approach” was, at least in part, the solution. But I think focusing on deficiencies in U.S. firearms technology and small-unit doctrine misses the essential nature of the Bocage problem.

It's certainly true that German MGs provided a technological advantage at the small-unit level, but this advantage was incremental, not a game-changer. At the end of the day, MG42s still shoot bullets just like BARs and Garands do, and if were simply a matter of spitting out the most lead, the U.S. Army certainly had the manpower and logistics advantage to add more BARs and Garands until fire superiority was achieved.

Further, by 1944, U.S. small-unit fire & maneuver doctrine was substantially the same as the Germans' and everybody else. There were minor differences in detail, but the basics were the same: One group shoots, while another group moves. Switch roles. Rinse and repeat. So I don't think the statement that U.S. “Doctrines of fire superiority and fire-and-movement quickly came to grief in the Normandy bocage” is really the most accurate way of describing what happened in June and July of 1944. The U.S. army did “come to grief” in the bocage (at least for a while), but I don’t think U.S. fire & maneuver doctrine as such was really the problem.

I actually don't think it would have mattered much if the Americans and Germans had exactly reversed their small-arms equipment and doctrine in Normandy, with GIs carrying MG42s attacking across the bocage against Landsers dug in with BARs and Garands. Perhaps a few less dead Americans, perhaps they get out of the bocage a few days earlier, but not a big difference.

Rather, I think the “failure” of U.S. doctrine in the Normandy bocage was a failure to properly consider and come up with a combined arms plan for how to deal with the force-multiplying effect of good defensive terrain. And bocage was really good defensive terrain, good enough to be a “trump card” at the small-unit level. In defensive terrain this good, no level of small arms fire superiority (whether via technological edge or sheer numbers) was going to be effective against a prepared, persistent defense.

For attacking into a prepared defense in good terrain, some sort of “Big HE” fire support is a must. This is the most important lesson from the bocage, not that BARs suck and MG42s rock. Unfortunately, this is a lesson the U.S. military has had to re-learn the hard way on occasion (see, e.g., the attack on the Citadel in Hue in 1968), but it’s still applicable to infantry tactics today.

[MikeyD]

The interesting thing is how in recent conflicts the US has felt compelled to 'reinvent' the BAR, or its tactical equivalent. A long/heavy-barrel sustained fire, accurate squad rifle. Sometimes with a big bullet, sometimes 5.56. Marines are replacing their SAWs with M29 IARs. Old M14s have been pulled out of mothballs in record number, thoroughly refurbished and handed out to Army units in Afghanistan. Its enough to cause Steve headaches, whether or not to bring these 'theater-specific' specialty weapons into a modern war TO&E set in wherever 'Black Sea' is being set.

[YankeeDog]

I'm not sure I'd call the current crop of full rifle-caliber small arms the "tactical equivalent" of the BAR. To my mind, the the M14 is the terminal evolution of the Battle Rifle and therefore in the same family as the Garand. It has always been a weapon best used semi-auto. The BAR was designed as a man-portable full-auto weapon from the start. The BAR is a lot more stable and easier to shoot accurately on full auto than the M14, but it's also a lot heavier. Nearly twice as heavy, actually, which is why it was never seriously considered as a general-issue firearm. One or two BARs per squad was OK, but it would just take up too much of the squad's carrying capacity to give everyone a BAR.

Anyway, I think a lot of the reason for the "M14 revival" lies in the nature of current conflicts. Given the U.S. advantages in long-range firepower and intel, Extended long-range small arms engagements with large groups of insurgents are comparatively rare, but engagements with small groups and single shooters are another matter. So having one or two guys in the platoon as "Designated Marksmen" carrying a semi-auto weapon that can shoot accurately out to 500m+ is very useful.

Training is also a part of it. No matter how good the firearm, shooting at long range under combat conditions requires a lot of training. Present U.S. infantrymen have far more training than their 1940s & 1950s ancestors, and therefore a higher proportion of today's GIs are able to effectively leverage the capabilities of a scoped "marksman's rifle" than could 60 years ago.

[MikeyD]

Remember BAR was fielded when the average infantryman carried a big-bullet M1 Garand. M14 and M29 are being fielded while the infantryman carries M4 carbine. So we're judging weapon merits on a bit of a sliding scale. When talking about adding M14 or M29 to a squad they do seem to use terminology vaguely analogous to BAR when describing their use. About shooting out to 500m, just last night I was reading about the French army at Agincourt. The author stated that an army fighting a defensive battle with only close combat weapons is at a disadvantage.

[YankeeDog]

Remember BAR was fielded when the average infantryman carried a big-bullet M1 Garand. M14 and M29 are being fielded while the infantryman carries M4 carbine. So we're judging weapon merits on a bit of a sliding scale. When talking about adding M14 or M29 to a squad they do seem to use terminology vaguely analogous to BAR when describing their use. About shooting out to 500m, just last night I was reading about the French army at Agincourt. The author stated that an army fighting a defensive battle with only close combat weapons is at a disadvantage.

Not sure what the Agincourt reference has to do with anything. If you're suggesting that modern U.S. infantry lack long-range small arms firepower due to the use of the M4 carbine as the primary infantry firearm, bear in mind that every squad usually carries at least one M249, often two, and the M249 is considered effective out to 800m, roughly the same effective range as the BAR. At the platoon level there's also usually a couple of M240s, which can reach quite a bit further than that. What adding an M14/M29 or whatever adds to this toolkit is the option for precision long-range fire, which I think is probably a particularly useful thing to have in COIN ops, where combatants and civilians are often intermingled.

Sure, the M14 is vaguely analogous to the BAR, but it's more analogous to the Garand. A duck is vaguely like a penguin, but it's a lot more similar to a goose. Which do you think is the more useful comparison?

The only really significant differences between the Garand and the M14 are mag size and loading technique. They're about the same weight, they both shoot a similar power cartridge, and are both accurate to ranges over 500m, but only on semi-auto. The M14 can do full-auto, but controlling the M14 under full-auto is very difficult because it's so light; the full-auto setting is really only useful at very close range. In Vietnam, many M14s were actually modified in the field so that they could only shoot semi-auto.

In contrast, the BAR was known to be quite controllable on full-auto out to considerable range. Especially when shot from the bipod, tight bursts at 500m on full auto are not a problem. Its limitations as a base-of-fire weapon when compared e.g. to the MG42 are related to the limited mag capacity and lack of a QCB, not full-auto accuracy.

Of course, there's a trade-off for that long-range accuracy -- the BAR is nearly twice the weight of the Garand or M14 (and about 3 times the weight of of an M4 carbine). This is why the whole Automatic Rifle class of weapons is now considered obsolete: They're too heavy to be a general issue battle rifle, but lack the sustained firepower to be effective as a base-of-fire weapon. It's a weapon that's so-so at a lot of roles, but not truly effective in any role; they're the spork of small arms.

When the M14 was being developed, the Army actually did want it to be a weapon that could replace both the Garand and the BAR in order to create a homogeneous rifle squad armament, but after the M14 was deployed the Army concluded that it was even less effective in the base-of-fire role than the older BAR (which was already considered insufficient), and this is why the Army eventually began to look to other designs like the M60, and eventually the M249 and M240, to fill the SAW role.

[altipueri]

BAR would have been useful at Agincourt, but we had the longbow, which was pretty much the rapid fire weapon of choice for the time.

[Erwin]

The longbow was the long range inf weapon of the time but required a lot of skill (to be rapid and accurate). The shorter ranged crossbow was invented for untrained conscripts.

[Michael Emrys]

Remember BAR was fielded when the average infantryman carried a big-bullet M1 Garand. M14 and M29 are being fielded while the infantryman carries M4 carbine.

Not to quibble, but when the BAR was fielded the average infantryman carried a Springfield bolt action. The BAR was introduced so that the squad would have an automatic weapon portable enough to make it across no man's land into the opposite trenches. For that time and purpose, it was an excellent design.

Michael

[db_zero]

Another little sidenote the BAR was the favorite of many gangsters back in the day. Many think of the Tommy gun, but the BAR was often used to great effect. You could order a Tommy Gun iirc from the Sears catalog. Don't know if they also offered BAR!

[JasonC]

(not sure why or that you'd call) "the current crop of full rifle-caliber small arms the "tactical equivalent" of the BAR"

20 round detachable box magazine firing a full rifle round fully automatic - the reason the comparison is made is obvious. Yes the BAR weighed 20 lbs - half a century of progress in firearms design and materials let that be cut in half. No that doesn't make an M14 just like an M1 - fully auto capable with 20 round mags are a bigger deal tactically than that.

[db_zero]

I've never fired a M-14, just a Springfield Armory M1A1. I've heard the M-14 on full auto is a real beast and very few can really master it in full auto. IMO of 90% of the population you're better off just firing an M-14 in semi auto-even if full auto is an option. Most of the M-14 I've seen carried today have variable high magnification scopes mounted on them so they look to be used in a DMR/sniper role and with the type of scope mounted I doubt you could use it and be effective in full auto fire-if that hasn't been disabled. I would also have to wonder if used in full auto mode that wouldn't eventually cause havoc with the zeroing on the scopes mounted on the rifle.

The BAR fired a 30-06, while the M-14 is 7.62 NATO. The M1 Grand also fired a 30-06. Two really different rounds.

The 30-06 fired from the BAR has far more penetrating power than the 5.56. It also weighs more and kicks more than the 5.56. As some lawmen facing Bonnie and Clyde found out the hard way hiding behind cover was not much good when facing a BAR.

I don't think you can really compare today's assault weapons with the BAR. One of the biggest difference is optics. The type of CQB/reflex sights and other optics mounted on weapons really changes the game and the smaller calibers which don't kick as much are quite effective. There are other training advantages to the smaller caliber rounds used today. Give someone who's never fired a gun a rifle a 30-06 and you will likely have to spend a lot of time and rounds before that person stops flinching, slapping the trigger, anticipating the shot and other things that really affect accuracy.

Some of the newer designs that fire caseless ammo should be interesting. The HK416 is also interesting. I wouldn't mind owning one.

[JasonC]

The 30-06 and 7.62 NATO are not "really different" rounds. They are both full power rifle rounds with comparable range, accurary, penetration, etc. The 30-06 is slightly more MV, but the BCs on most of the rounds mean that doesn't make any appreciable difference at combat ranges.

As for scoped M14s, those not even M14s, they are M21s.

As for controllability, the current standard for a full auto 7.62 is the SCAR-H, and it is fine at it. Is there still solid reason to fire semi auto aimed shots? Often yes, always no - sometimes you just need to suppress the heck out of the whole target area, or chew a mud hut into fine powder.

The previous poster's comment, it case it wasn't obvious, is that contemporary field experience is moving away from all 5.56, that the need for a full power round at the squad level is still there. Doesn't have to be everybody, but the squad needs the ability to e.g. fire with accuracy to 800 meters, or to penetrate mud huts, etc.

BTW, 308s don't kick much with modern rifles. The M-1, besides firing 30-06, also had no recoil management whatever. Even with nothing but a rubber stock pad, the .308 is manageable, and with an actual recoil buffer spring, there is no issue whatever.

[LukeFF]

As for scoped M14s, those not even M14s, they are M21s.

Not always: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Marine_Corps_Designated_Marksman_Rifle

[altipueri]

What happened to my skirmish line?

[JasonC]

It got hung up on the wire...

Seriously, to address the original question instead of the side discussions, why did people use a skirmish line of all weapons in practice? Two main reasons - keeping the LOS picture of the men close, and discovering and naturally flanking isolated, outpost type positions.

When a BAR team and some riflemen stay behind and try to cover a few scouts advancing, the first problem then encounter is the enemy being in a spot that can see the scouts but that the overwatching BAR team cannot see. The Germans use keyholes with crossing pencils of fire-lanes that cut up the ground, rather than wide open "up" positions that can see the entire field. When the scouts cross such a pencil, the Germans can see the scouts and the scouts can see where the Germans are (if not eating dirt), but the BAR team 100 yards back can't see diddly. So it can't help.

The BAR team then finds it needs to maneuver, itself, to establish LOS to the shooter. Which either means running into the fire zone (not heavily recommended) or trying to get to some other spot they think might see where they think the fire is coming from, based on the sound of the firing and the wild gesticulations of the scouts, but no direct vision. And then, like as not, as they maneuver forward looking for such a spot, they cross a different thin pencil fire lane of some *other* German shooter.

Net result - each piece of the formation either engaged piecemeal or trying to win the firefight along its own thin pencil against the Germans shooting at them, personally. Which is what the Germans planned on, and they planned on it because they have the cover advantage and everything else along each of those pencils. Badness ensues.

All of that results from the Germans being mostly in "back" positions - meaning positions *without* wide LOS to the whole US side of the field - that mutually prevent approach to any of them with crisscrossing but thin lines of sight and fire lanes along them. Individually these German positions don't cover much ground, together the network has somebody or other covering every open ground approach the US has to cross to reach any of their (the Germans') positions.

OK, so assume the defense is set that way and now approach with a wide skirmish line, instead. Some people will step into the pencil fire lanes, take fire, and go to ground, to be sure. They will be firing back at their own personal persecutors, as before. But first off, this is likely to happen in several such fire lanes not just one. More of the US firepower will be immediately in position to reply.

But in addition, everyone that *isn't* taking fire will be between those pencils, but also up with the leaders, on line with them. The line of who is taking fire and who isn't will "describe", layout, trace, the German fire scheme. Everyone not taking fire is in a dead ground pocket between those fire lanes, and as such free to maneuver. They can see from who went to ground where the danger lines are, and guess how far forward they can press themselves before establishing LOS to those shooters.

Then they can pick - overload fire lane A or fire lane B, or try to press close to shooter A or B through ground "dead" to that shooter. They can cover fire heavily vs shooter A and then spring across his fire lane, and thus get to locations that can approach B "blind", with no one able to see them until very close range. They can "disarticulate" the German fire scheme, basically, lap around the easy parts, hold up in front of the hard ones. Back away from the MG-42 and take on the K98s; only go for the MG-42 after his flank protection has been taken down. And the like.

It is an adaptation to a particular kind of defensive fire scheme, in other words.

I hope that helps.

[Broadsword56]

That sounds great -- but if all the "pencils" of defensive fire lanes are properly interlocking, then wouldn't that skirmish line just run into the other pencils as soon as it tries to maneuver and return fire on line with the scouts?