This is interesting

[JonS]

Hot off the wire from Bletchley Park:

XL 9188, dated 05 SEP 44

XL 9245, dated 06 SEP 44

[Seedorf81]

O dear.

Hope that battlefront doesn't read this, they might cancel MARKET GARDEN after all..

[db_zero]

Maybe this time the British will bring radios that work and the correct crystals.

Amazing how the simplest of minor details can swing a battle.

[JonS]

Maybe this time the British will bring radios that work and the correct crystals.

Mmm. That's kind of a myth. 1st A/B knew their radios were fragile, and they knew that comms were highly likely to break down as soon as they got on the ground.

The reasons for that failure continue to be debated, but never more trenchantly than in the new edition of William F. Buckingham's book [Arnhem 1944], which has been added to the Battles and Campaigns series under the editorial direction of Hew Strachan. It eschews the simplistic solutions of Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far. As every fan of that book (and film) knows, Ryan laid a great deal of blame on the faulty radios the British airborne carried, a deficiency that came as a shock to the troopers on the ground. As Buckingham shows convincingly, the extremely short-range airborne radios had failed in every previous British drop, and no one was surprised when they failed this time, too.

link

[kipanderson]

Jon,

That is a good find...

Thanks,

All the best,

Kip.

[db_zero]

That is very interesting to know. Now I wonder if American radios were more rugged and reliable and why if the British knew they had such fragile radios they didn't try to do something about it.

[JonS]

That I don't know, although I suspect Buckingham's book might be a good - and easily accessible - place to start.

His thesis, The establishment and initial development of a British airborne force, June 1940-January 1942 might be useful, although given that it ends in early '42 maybe not.

[John Kettler]

JonS,

I'll say it's interesting. If real (have encountered a faked MAGIC decrypt), it's incontrovertible proof that, at least at the highest levels, we knew the Germans had real combat forces in the drop zone and nearby. Since I find it all but inconceivable Monty wasn't cleared for ULTRA, the claim of ignorance regarding presence of heavily armed hostiles opposing the paras is shown to be a blatant falsehood.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ASL Veteran]

Just because a report says that a panzer division is located somewhere doesn't mean that the panzer division has any tanks in it. It would be perfectly valid for a commander to read that report and still make the assumption that there weren't any strong enemy forces located in the area since only a few weeks ago many of those formations were annihiliated at Falais.

When the Soviets surrounded the German forces in the Cherkassy pocket they thought they had bagged an entire army group based upon what units were supposedly present. Of course, most the "divisions" they bagged were the size of battalions so ....

[JonS]

Just because a report says that a panzer division is located somewhere doesn't mean that the panzer division has any tanks in it. It would be perfectly valid for a commander to read that report and still make the assumption that there weren't any strong enemy forces located in the area since only a few weeks ago many of those formations were annihilated at Falais.

Just so.

It's interesting, nonetheless, to see exactly what the responsible Allied commanders were seeing at the time that planning for Op MARKET was just getting underway. It's also interesting since it's a bit more substantial than a couple of ambiguous aerial photos.

[Michael Emrys]

Just because a report says that a panzer division is located somewhere doesn't mean that the panzer division has any tanks in it. It would be perfectly valid for a commander to read that report and still make the assumption that there weren't any strong enemy forces located in the area since only a few weeks ago many of those formations were annihiliated at Falais.

Indeed. In fact, the Allied command at almost all levels above corps were deliriously believing that the German army in the West was shattered and it really didn't matter what forces were in the planned attack area. They had convinced themselves that the Germans simply were not at the moment capable of putting up a stout defense in front of them. Just as three months later they convinced themselves that there was no way the Germans could launch a major offensive.

Michael

[Blackcat]

"... airborne radios had failed in every previous British drop, and no one was surprised when they failed this time, too."

That pretty much sums up the UK Army's attitude to comms. Nobody is surprised when they don't work but bash on regardless.

Nothing much changes. Clansman was an unreliable crock of **** and Bowman (developed at the cost of billions and over decades don't seem much better). In Bosnia in the 1990s there were numerous instance of units relying on the civvie mobile phones because it was more reliable and more secure than their own radios. In Iraq (2003 - 2006) there were multiple comms failures - at one point a company in action, and deep ****, had to use a satellite phone to call the MoD in London and ask to be patched through to their own battalion HQ a few miles up the road. As for Afghanistan, read any book written from the infantry end, even the Apaches, and you'll find numerous instances where the radios just failed to work.

Bad/unworkable communications for the British army is just normal. Its a bit like the regimental system - it should mean the whole thing breaks down, but somehow it works and works very well, nobody knows how.

[John Kettler]

ASL Veteran,

While I take your point and am aware of instances on the Eastern Front in which a PD's entire strength (January 42?) consisted of three KV-1 tanks, given the forces involved on the German side (and note the term "battleworthy" in the decrypt) dropping lightly armed (especially vs tanks) and poorly sustained logistically paras into such a force concentration strikes me as being an extremely bad idea, as James Cooke argues independently.

http://www.jamescookecoaching.com/content/understanding-leaders/drivers/military-blunders-arnhem/

(Fair Use)

"Hence it came as something of a jolt when SHAEF received reports from the Dutch underground that two SS Panzer divisions which had mysteriously "disappeared" some time previously had now reappeared almost alongside the dropping zone.

This information, passed on to Montgomery, received support from British aerial photography of German tanks in the Arnhem area. Meanwhile forward troops of British Second Army reported a build-up of German forces along their intended line of advance.

This was the moment to reassess the risks involved. But since these ugly facts did not accord with what had been planned, they fell upon a succession of deaf ears. Taking a lead from Montgomery, who had described the SHAEF report as ridiculous, British Second Army Headquarters were quick to discount it also. When one of his intelligence officers showed him the aerial photographs of German armour, General Browning, at First British Airborne HQ, retorted: "I wouldn't trouble myself about these if I were you – they″re probably not serviceable at any rate." The Intelligence Officer was then visited by the Corps Intelligence Officer, a British Lieutenant–Colonel, decided there was no direct evidence that the Arnhem area contained "much more than the considerable flak defences already known to exist." As Ryan puts it: "Throughout all the Allied line of command the evaluation of intelligence on the Panzers in the Arnhem area was magnificently bungled."

Finally, just in case there were any residual doubts, the intelligence staff of Second Army came up with the reassuring opinion that any German forces in the Arnhem area were "weak, demoralised, and likely to collapse entirely if confronted with a large airborne attack." "Market–Garden" went ahead – but not quite as planned. Instead of encountering a few old men who collapsed or ran away, First Airborne Division fell upon a hornets″ nest of German armour. Far from being demoralised, the enemy fought like tigers to defend the gateway to their homeland."

(Fair Use)

Viewing the "what went in" list for 1st AB at Arnhem is most illuminating. Someone with far greater CW force familiarity than I have can extract the numbers from here, but to a first approximation, not only isn't it much in terms of ATGs, but there are also the related issues of guns lost in crashes/shootdowns, lack of tow vehicles and limited ammunition supplies, none of which is addressed at the link.

http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/order_1st.htm

By contrast, here are what the Germans in the Arnhem area brought to the party. We see both what JasonC calls full tanks, plus several varieties of assault guns, SPAT and even Mobelwagen!

http://www.marketgarden.com/2010/UK/statistics/statis8.html

Much fuller and richer detail on how the "Panzers are there" intel was either ignored outright, downplayed or even not adjusted for because of alliance harmony reasons (Ike could've sent two AB divs to Arnhem but didn't want to brown off Monty), are detailed here, in work done by a man who's spent 40 years doing the research. A scathing and well deserved indictment, to be sure. Note particularly British AB doctrine when it comes to tanks and how it was violated wholesale here.

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html

Nor did it help that the German AFVs there could be surprisingly tough. Late model StuG III took 8 6-pdr hits to kill!

http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Stugloss1.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[BletchleyGeek]

It's interesting, nonetheless, to see exactly what the responsible Allied commanders were seeing at the time that planning for Op MARKET was just getting underway. It's also interesting since it's a bit more substantial than a couple of ambiguous aerial photos.

Very nice find Jon. It might be nice to link these in the Wikipedia article of Market Garden, in this particular paragraph:

A number of reports about German troop movements reached Allied high command, including details about the identity and location of German armoured formations. Station X at Bletchley Park monitored and decrypted German Ultra intelligence reports and sent them to senior Allied commanders but they only reached army headquarters level and were not passed down any lower.[87] On 6 September ULTRA decrypts revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery on 10 September; however, Montgomery dismissed Smith's concerns and refused to alter the plans for the landing of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.[93]

(I corrected a typo regarding the date of the ULTRA decrypt).

This strikes me as a possible and quite logical chain of events

1) Monty gets the ULTRA report on the 6th, gets concerned

2) Monty checks with Browning, Horrocks and the rest of the crew

3) Browning, Horrocks or both assure Monty that a) the Paras can totally handle two SS Panzer divisions in badly need of refit, 82nd and 101st Airborne won't have a problem keeping the roads open and securing Son and Nijmegen bridges within 24 hours of the drop, and c) the XXX Corps can totally race all the way from Neerpelt to Arnhem in less than two days

4) Monty, the optimist, says 'allright, nothing to worry about'

5) Eisenhower wonders about Monty's lack of reaction and sends Bedell-Smith to check with Monty on the 10th

[Ithikial_AU]

Some of the research I was doing for a possible 'Joe's Bridge' scenario suggests members of the Guards Division started to have doubts and noticed Germans defenses stiffen in the first week of September as they entered northern Belgium and approached the Dutch border. The fighting to take and hold Joe's Bridge was tight and dogged resistance south in Heerpelt was evidence of this.

Enough concern to pass it along up the chain of command to Horrocks and above, probably not, but doubtful the Guards Division themselves expected the drive to Arnhem to be a simple affair.

[JonS]

Very nice find Jon. It might be nice to link these in the Wikipedia article of Market Garden

Cheers. I got them from The National Archives website (they're in DEFE 3/221, if you want your own copy. The book that pointed me at them erroneously referred to DEFE 3/127 and DEFE 3/128. It's otherwise an excellent book though), and I don't know what TNA's policy on that kind of re-use is.