What does "Conscript" mean in CM terms?

[JonS]

I just meant to explain how unlikely it was that the "old goats" were safe behind the lines while the soldiers marched and starved.

Yes, but again that's true of any even part-way competent military.

You've heard of WWI. Butchers and bunglers. Lions led by donkeys. Chateau generals. Blah. Blah. Blah. Yet the British lost on average one general every week for the duration of WWI. The Germans must have had a heck of an artillery park to reach all those generals back in their Chateau

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Yes. Exactly. Their failure at Buron, for example.

Hmm the one on June 7 that Reynolds describes as "a Cnadian disaster on P65 Steel Inferno?, By late afternoon Hitler Jugund had retaken Buro ,ovverrun at least two companies of the Novas Scotias and forced the Canadians into retreating to what they describe as a "fortress" around Les Buissons - hardly the language of victors. Certainly Hitler Jugund paid for their victory Terry Copp confirms the Hitler Jugund victory in Fields of Fire as does John Gilbert in Bloody Buron!]. What stopped their attack going further than it did was Allied Naval gunfire and artillery. This was by no means the only tme something like that happened in WW2. There were similar instances at Gela, Salerno and Anzio.

[Rokko]

Well III./25 initially took Buron but they were pushed out again by a Canadian counter-attack supported by massive artillery. The Canadians later retreated out of Buron and the 12SS took it again without. Attack itself was of course a failure considering the original goal was not capturing some little village North of Caen, but driving a deep wedge many kilometres into the Allied beachhead.

Bloody Buron refers to the later battle on July 8th were Buron was finally taken by the Canadians and III./25 was wiped out entirely.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Lucas - I was rather thinking of the 5 year plans and how they were sold to the world and the people. Officers lying is a given in systems where failure is probably a death sentence.

However the info you reveal is good as I am not a grog of the East Front other than the vehicles so it is all interesting.

On the other hand, as Nipesays, if officers make false reports and are found out then they may get a transfer from that cushy staff job to something that is let us say, less comfortable. So the combat reports sent to superiors are likely to be honest. Although it is also likely that junior leaders at platoon or company level sent in false reports about making an attack that was ordeered but not seriously atempted.

As for Rotmistrov we know now he lied about Prokorovka and he had good reason for doing so. But since he had achieved what was asked of 5th GTA and because his version of events was politicallyconvenient his version became the historically accepted one for over 60 years. #only recentl;y, when the Soviet archives were opened and the Geman milita\ry records studied did a differenr=t account begin to emerge.

And that account challenges the traditional view of the Waffen SS Panzer Divisios as military incompetents. A perception that does not fit with the tough resistence to the British in Normandy. So, if Liebstandaarte, Hitler Jugund and the rest were incompetent, how is it they were able to hold up the British around Caen for so long?

nless you want to say that that British, Canadian and US troops in Normandy were even worse soldiers than the Waffen SS? Clearly they were not although many lacked combat experence at all levels. Hitler Jugund on the other hand had some 2000 officers and NCOs transferred from Liebstandarte in late 1943. And that division most certainly had intensive combat experience on the Russian Front so most if not all of those officers andNCOs would have known exactly what they were talking about when they taught the new Hitler Jugunf recruits

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Well III./25 initially took Buron but they were pushed out again by a Canadian counter-attack supported by massive artillery. The Canadians later retreated out of Buron and the 12SS took it again without. Attack itself was of course a failure considering the original goal was not capturing some little village North of Caen, but driving a deep wedge many kilometres into the Allied beachhead.

Bloody Buron refers to the later battle on July 8th were Buron was finally taken by the Canadians and III./25 was wiped out entirely.

Also the title of Gilbert's book covering the June 7 action Certainly Buron was the scene of hard fighting on the 7th The Canadias were defeated on a tactical level and they certainly failed to achieve their missiobn. TheGermans would have liked to advance further but were stopped frm doing so by Allied naval gunfire and, no doubt stiffening Canadian resistence The Canadians most cerainly got nowhere near their 7 June objectives at Capiquet Airport (Steel Inferno P65)and had to falll back at the end of the day's fighting (Steel Inferno P 67. All n alll a succwesful counter attack by the ermans though nt meeting the ideal hopes.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Yes. Exactly. Their failure at Buron, for example.

Do you often find that shifting the goalposts works well for you? Those five operations were all - as far as the Germans were concerned - defensive. You were talking about fit for offensive operations. Offensive is not defensive.

Hardly. The Germans mounted a number of punishing counter attacks after holding the British offensives. Epsom for example saw most of the captured salient abandoned despite the repulse of the German attacks at places like Rauray The Germans still paid for that and were increasingly worn don as the Normandy campaign progressedMeyer's figures for his own division show 13%losses (22% combat strength) in the first ten days (Steel Inferno P141) but, as Reynolds also points out Allied divisons took similar casualties. So, if high losses were par for the course in WW2 we cannot use casualty rates as evidence foor lack of competence. It was hard and bloody combat andthat was that.]

I'll bet that most of us end up with relaively high casualty rates as wll in a Combat Mission scenario, particularly if we play aggressively and.or there are large amouts of artilllery available.

[sburke]

The qoute waa from Meer's book and he was qouting on of the men of his division writing of his own experiences. This isan example of how they saw hemselves. Well trained and highly motivated as recognised by many of their opponents.

Okay one more time, yes I own the book, I own both the books. (I'll admit I got the second one first as I was more interested in the Bulge fighting at the time I was reading it).

I get that there is a quote, I also get that these were young kids indoctrinated in Nazi ideology and their propensity to spout the party line at their faith in their leadership and their cause was absolute.

However I take it as a lot of pure idol worship BS that these young men were spouting right before they had their lives thrown away in a meatgrinder of a battle for probably one of the worst causes to fight for in history.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Certainly Nazism was an evid ideology and certainly political indoctrination was an important part of SS training. Which explains why Meyer and others held the views they had. And we must bear that bias in mind when assessing his writings as a historical source (Soviet historians are also guilty of ideologically motivated bias - I have seen some of their work and it can often be ideologcally slanted rubbish at its very worst. Meyer on the oher hand is recognised as writing a good history of his division though he does tend to gloss over or ignore cerrtain issues such as war crmes and complans much about the treatment of the SS after the war and fails to understand why such treatmment was meted out

But battlefield skills were of great importance as well and, in the most effective units like Das Reich, Liebstandarte, Hitler Jugund and similar divisions that enabled these unts to perform as strong and highly dangerous battlefield opponents.

So, while we all agree these units were nasty, brutal pieces of work they were also highly effective military units on the battlefield. Not all Waffen SS divisions or units were of this calibre. Some were only competent and indeed barely so. Others were only good at slaughtering unarmed civillians and fell apart as soon as they were asked to fight a real battle.

We have to assess the Waffen SS based on actual battlefield performance and, in Normandy this was often very good particularly on the defensive as they usually were but they could moun dangerous attacks as well.

[MikeyD]

I'm not sure we should be overstressing the motivation (or hubris) of particular units. Much of the time battles are simply won by good-old unheroic firepower. Who has more artillery. Panzer Lehr division, despite all its esprit de corps, was annhilated during Cobra. During the Normandy battles German casualties may have passed 400,000. Slaughter on that scale tends to be indiscriminate, taking the good with the bad. We sometimes see that in CM-scale battles. The artillery strike that wipes out an entire Elite unit with the first round, leaving the nearby conscripts untouched. C'est la guerre.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I'm not sure we should be overstressing the motivation (or hubris) of particular units. Much of the time battles are simply won by good-old unheroic firepower. Who has more artillery. Panzer Lehr division, despite all its esprit de corps, was annhilated during Cobra. During the Normandy battles German casualties may have passed 400,000. Slaughter on that scale tends to be indiscriminate, taking the good with the bad. We sometimes see that in CM-scale battles. The artillery strike that wipes out an entire Elite unit with the first round, leaving the nearby conscripts untouched. C'est la guerre.

Much the same happened to most German divisions who fought in Normandy including the Waffen SS. I and II SS Panzer Korps were never the same again after Normandy as Meyer and other divisional historians such as Helmut Tieke admit even if tacitly.

It was Allied firepower that was largely responsible for winning the Battle of Normandy rather more than tactical or even operational skill. Yes, the British tied down the Panzer Divisions around Caen while the US fought through the Bocage and broke out with Operation Cobra. Whether the Germans could have done better with another strategy such as a fighting withdrawl or a more moblie defence inland isd a question that is probably impossible to answer.

[Sublime]

A major part of the problem with the German defense was that it was neither truly a on the beach defense, or a true inland defense. It seems Hitler compromised to satisfy both sides, and then no one won. The fact that his personal ok was needed for the Panzer reserve hurt. In contrast the Allies, for all the bickering, at least had a clear command structure.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Agree with you on that one. There were German counter attack/counter offensive plans drawn up but never implemented. And te Allies certainly expected a slow fighting withdrawl thinking they would only reach the Sene on D Day +90 if I remember what I read once correctly. Potentially lots of alternative history scenario ideas in these.

[JasonC]

First to d/t - touche. The Stalinist era Russians give the Germans a run for the money on the olympic lying event. Some of the lower press hacks after the war, too, with the glorious shock workers smashing the evil fascists and all that.

As for Lucas and his touchingly naive belief that the Germans were more honest, no, not even remotely. The real point is that *own side loss reports* are the only reliable check on *enemy side claims*. Symmetrically. If you want to know what happened to the German force, don't ask the Russians what they shot and hit, nor the German officer commanding opposite - ask the clerk in the German side graves registration division and the German medical corps. If you want to know what happened to the Russians, don't ask the Russian muckety muck who ordered the show, but definitely don't replace that with the report of a German muckety muck about how hard he supposedly thrashed him. Ask a Russian accountant assigning replacements.

Incidentally, the phenomenon of the generals lying and the bookkeepers telling the truth is not limited to totalitarian political systems, though it undoubtedly gets worse in such cases. A Montgomery or Patton will lie about Goodwood or Metz, too. Generals are glory hounds and wage campaigns in public opinion as sustained and violent as any of their military offensives. An extra bit in a case like the Germans is they were systematically lying about the eastern front to their new western allied occupiers, both to excuse themselves and to make the most of the postwar tension between the Russians and the west to rehabilitate themselves.

As for the comments about German offensive action in Normandy, yes they tried it repeatedly, no it was not particularly successful. It was instead very wasteful, particularly of their armor strength. It typically lost between a third and half of the committed armor in a matter of 48 hours or less. It could check Allied "initiative" for the same time period, but that actually doesn't matter in an attrition struggle, which is what Normandy was. The same armor could have inflicted something like 4 times the losses and lasted much longer, in a tactically defensive stance.

Epsom is a good example. It used 9SS, 10SS, and the Panther battalion from 2nd Panzer (Heer), loaned to 10SS. 9SS lost half its organic armor (decline in running strength, that is, some are into the shops) by July 2, 10SS one third of its organic AFVs and 60% of the supporting Panthers from 2nd Panzer, for a combined loss of half their committed armor strength. In all they had 82 Panthers, 75 Panzer IVs, and 70 StuGs operational before the battle, and 40 Panthers, 30 Panzer IVs, and 44 StuGs operational after it, just a few days later.

Panzer Lehr had a similar lack of success when committed offensively on the US front in early July. 21st Panzer saw its runners decline by nearly half by 9 June, after its first attempts to blunt the British drive on Caen. Mortain was no more successful.

The best performances the Germans got from their armor was standing on the defensive, integrated with a PAK front, and sliding in front of allied armor to stop it, in typical "linebacker" fashion. German armor force doctrine was insanely aggressive, however, and they only had half their armor available for such intelligent defensive roles, because every full strength armor unit first got its armor cut in half trying to attack, instead. If it was an armor unit and its tanks were topped up, it attacked, until that was no longer true. Which took a couple of days, tops.

[MikeyD]

There's only two ways to win a defensive war. 1) If the opponent gets bored or runs out of provisions and goes home, leaving you the field (a common outcome, historically). Or 2) if, after you've exhausted the attacker, you can then switch to an offensive strategy and rout them entirely. Germany was on the horns of a dilemma. As good as their defenses were we were never going to pack up and go home. And as formidable as their offensive capability was they were never going to rout us. Let us recall the strategic purpose of the massive bulge offense, to split the allies then bring them to the table to make a seperate peace. Does anyone imagine that would have EVER happened even if the offensive had been a smashing success?

[JonS]

Mike - "Heads I win, tails you lose" isn't much of a dilemma

[JonS]

Looking for something in Steel Inferno book this morning I made an interesting discovery. Reynolds uses the word fail/failed/failure a lot in his book of I SS Pz Korps. According to Reynolds the British, Canadians, and Americans all fail a lot, and 21st Pz seems to have been completely inept, but apparently 12th SS never failed at anything. Make of that what you will.

[JonS]

Max Hastings, Overlord, 'Closing the Lines', p.147:

"The SS showed that they believed that thus far, everybody had been fighting like milkmaids" said Schaaf. He watched the bleak young men of the Hitler Jugend Division riding forward into their attack [on 7th June], and saw some of them return that night, utterly spent, crying tears of frustration for their failure to reach their objective. "It was a very sad chapter for them."

They knew they'd failed, even if 70 years later some folk chose to believe otherwise.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

First to d/t - touche. The Stalinist era Russians give the Germans a run for the money on the olympic lying event. Some of the lower press hacks after the war, too, with the glorious shock workers smashing the evil fascists and all that.

As for Lucas and his touchingly naive belief that the Germans were more honest, no, not even remotely. The real point is that *own side loss reports* are the only reliable check on *enemy side claims*.

Not really. Take Prokorovka for example. For many years all we had on the battle was based on Rotmistrov's report on the battle which was relied upon by pretty much every historian from Carell to Erickson to Clark and Jukes. Nobody appears to have checked the captured German reports held in the US archivesThese historians did nit even get the numbers of German tanks in IISS Panzer Korps right (700 according to Jukes - Blood Steel and Myth P427 In fact the German military records show, again thanks to Nipe's research that II SS Panzer Kops had 352 on the eve of Operation Citadek. They also show I SS Panzer Korps had 232 operational Panzer III, Pamzer IV and Tigerson 11 July Yert Rotm,istrov claimed there were 7oo tanks facing him. Honest Russians?

Rotmistrov also claimed he faced 70 - 100 Tigers n 12 July at Prokorovka, In fact theGerman records show Das eich had one oprational Tiger and Libstandarte with 4 on the evening of 11 July. A far cry crom the 70 to 100 Tigers Rotmistrov claimed he faced on 12 July at Prokorovka. Again, honest Russians

In 1996 Soviet historian Grigoryi Kaltunov stated " I ha\ve committed forgeries, and I have lied. I was ordered to exaggerate German losses and to minimise Red Army casualties far below genuine figures. My works cannot therefore be take seriously" (Blood Steel and Myth P428) At last, Russian honesty about Prokhorovka.

And Caleriy Zamulin in Prokorovka Demolishing the Myth at last gives a more realistic accounting of the battle including the high Sovet losses. Read in conjunction with Nipe's books we at last have a more accuratte account of Prokorovka and can see that what actually happened was this. 5th GTA was ordered to make an almost suicidal attack on the II SS Panzer Korps at Prohorovka. The attack was poorly organised and prebared and involved less than half the number of tanks traditionally believed to have been invoved. German tank losses were far lower than they were according to the traditional account relying asit did on Rotmistrov's report, published, because it was convenient to Communist Party/Sovit state interests,. The Soviets climed that they knocked out over300 German tanks thatday which would have wiped out the whole of II SS Panzer Korps. That is just not plausible seeing as II SS Panzer Korps mounted Operation Roland a couple of days late Meanwhie 5 GTA lost up to 500 tanks. And Zamulin's figures are reasonably close with an estimate of about 200 tanks described as "en route or on 16 July and 240 armoured vehicles classed as "irevocable losses. Quiteclose to German estimates of Soviet tanks counted on the battlefield the day after the Battle of Prokorovka.

By the way, if, as the Soviets claimed they held the battlefield on 13 July how would it have been possible for Huasser to come down and countknocked out on he battlefield. Marking them with chalk crosses no less. Which shows that Prokorovka, far from being the catastrophic defeat for I SS Panzer Korps as claimed by te Soviets was in fact a decive tactical victory for the Germs.

However the I SS Panzer Korps was physically exhausted and incapable of further operatiions without a couple of day's rest. And by this ime the Soviets had moved very large reserves into position which means that 5GTA had done its job despite having to sacrifice itself in the process.

[ASL Veteran]

"The Divisional commander inspected the exercse. Early n the morning we left for comat training with live ammunition. Our platoon deployed fom a village towards cardboard cutout soldiers to the left of a heavy machinegun position whose firing range restricted our attack sector on the right. Bullets were just whistling past us. We crawled into firing range off the cardboard soldiers and fired on them with all we had. This exercise was applauded by Divisional Commander Witt who had just been promoted to Brigade Fuhrer (one star general)After that our platoon sat with mixed feelings before the sand box whicgh was set up in a building next to the castle: we were supposed to demonstrate our tactical knowledgeto the commander. Witt himself, while his calmness and relaxed behaviouur set us at ease, pickwed one of the course participants by putting a kindly hand on the shoulderof our comradeduring his briefing of the situation. Wittexplained themission to himand suggested our comrade think about the best tactical approach outside in the open for five minues.It wrked out well. Contact was quickly established and we answered without hsitation and in an acceptable manner (Meyer P53)

posted by sburke in response

Honestly, change the names and the timing and it sounds like some propaganda from the Chinese Communist party of Mao during the long march. The reality is the old goat was probably assaulting some farmer's daughter and eating all the poor guys food while his soldiers marched and starved.

I don't know what you consider remarkable about that quote above sburke. If you boil it down to it's basics and subtract the live ammunition, most of that was pretty standard training for officers and NCOs throughout the entire German Army. Do a quick web search about German officer training and you should find plenty of information about that. Don't pound the table shouting 'propaganda' without being informed or you are committing the same sin that you are accusing others of. Counter it with sources of your own. I found a decent link on the web for you to check if you are interested

http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2002/1/2010KjoerstadMPhil.pdf

It's easy enough to find that information though so no need to rely on your gut reaction.

[sburke]

Okay fair enough. The writing style just grates on me, what can I say. I have seen enough of it that I can't help the gut reaction. Yes it is purely subjective and isn't contributing much if anything, but when I see stuff like that I tend to pass it off as fluff. Unless of course it is St Crispin's Day, then I can't get enough of it.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

You might not like Meyer because he was SS and a fanatical Nazi. Both true and one should be aware of his bias as a historian, just as one should be aware of any other historian's biases. However the oriinal qoute is clearl one of a conscript in the Hitler Jugund and details one of his training experiences. As a historical account it shows how the SS saw themselves and trained their recruits for the battlefield. It would be interesting to compare this wit similar documents by Allied soldiers and the German regular army to compare and contrst th ordinary recruits experience of traning. And to assess how that affected unit battlefield performance.

We are often biased against the SS due to the Holocaust and their association with t. And it is quite right we should condemn this. But, from a historian's point of view (and I did my degree in History) we musty go beyond persoal views and , within the context of the current discussion regarding troop quality, try to make an objective assesdsment based on the unit's training and battlefield erformance. Which, in the case of the Waffenn SS n Normandy was actually very good. Then we must consider the reasons why this might be the case.

[JonS]

You might not like Meyer because he was SS and a fanatical Nazi. Both true and one should be aware of his bias as a historian

Are you talking about Hubert or Kurt? Hubert was a passable, if boring to read, historian with a penchant for eliding anything that didn't suit his narrative (you will, for example, search in vain for any mention of the many examples of that division killing PW). Kurt Meyer is not a historian at all. He is a self-aggrandizing populist and liar in the same vein as von Luck.

However the original quote is clearly one of a conscript in the Hitler Jugend and details one of his training experiences. As a historical account it shows how the SS saw themselves and trained their recruits for the battlefield.

Your problem is that you seem to have bought into the romanticism, and fail to realise that these sooper special SS training methods were actually rather mundane. Every one was using similar methods, everyone was using live ammo.

Good on the SS for doing that too, but they were not the only ones doing it. Thsat you continue to assert they were is where your 'objectivity' breaks down.

[Sublime]

Mikey makes an interesting point though - I don't see the Bulge's German objectives winning even if they did make it to Antwerp. Maybe I'm being idealistic, but I don't see the British (who didn't throw it in at the worst in 1940) or the US giving in, even despite that disastrous reverse. I also dont see the split armies necessarily causing an Allied West Front collapse - huge problem? Yes. I think they would have tried to supply the Allied 'Courland Pocket' by air and sea.. and I think they would have succeeded.

Only separate peace I see is with the Soviets, and that ONLY maybe in summer 41...

[JasonC]

"Not really."

Yes really. It was Glantz reading Russian actual tank strength accounts that documented the true losses to 5th Tank, just as it was German staff reports that documented German tank strengths. (Although their TWO accounting is a silly basis, abused in some sources - reduction in runners being the relevant variable). I also apparently need to point out that George Nipe is not a German general officer.

German claims for Russians losses are not believable, any more than Russian claims for German losses. Accountant level claims for own side losses are what corrected both - not general officer accounts on either side. Manstein was as misleading about Kursk as Rotmistrov.

As for "decisive tactical victory", that is another round square and misunderstanding, as your own closing admissions show. Was 5th Tank badly misused? Sure. But the fact that the Germans were down to 250 runners by then is already enough to determine the strategic outcome - there was never any prospect whatsoever of that few running tanks breaking through an entire reserve Front. Was Kutuzov more important for the Russian operational victory than anything that happened in front of 1SS Panzer Corps? Absolutely, and Russian general officers directly concerned in the latter lied about it to puff themselves, as general officers routinely do. Guess what? The tactical performance of 1SS Panzer Corps that late, was equally irrelevant to the operational outcome. (Then we get the Germans claiming Sicily mattered more than Kutuzov, an equal distortion of reality).

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Are you talking about Hubert or Kurt? Hubert was a passable, if boring to read, historian with a penchant for eliding anything that didn't suit his narrative (you will, for example, search in vain for any mention of the many examples of that division killing PW). Kurt Meyer is not a historian at all. He is a self-aggrandizing populist and liar in the same vein as von Luck.

Your problem is that you seem to have bought into the romanticism, and fail to realise that these sooper special SS training methods were actually rather mundane. Every one was using similar methods, everyone was using live ammo.

Good on the SS for doing that too, but they were not the only ones doing it. Thsat you continue to assert they were is where your 'objectivity' breaks down.[/QUOT

Hubert Meyer. I made earlier reference to his two volume historywhich, most of us will agree is an accurate enough military history of his division. He does gloss over certain issues and does have biases. But then all hstorians have bias. Take Waterloo for instance. A Britishaccount might state French cavalry "ruthlessly sabered some unfortunate British infantry they caught. Butwhen British cavalry did the same thing to D'Erlon's corps or the gunners of the French Grand Battery it was a"glorius charge" or at worst the cavalry just doing their job.

And there is not just national bias. Divisional historians particcularly forme officers like Meyer and Spater (History of the Gross Deutschland) want to cast their old unit in the best light. Spaeter for exampleblames Decker and von Lauchert for the rather muddy debacle of 10th Panzer Brigade on the first dayof Kursk. Nipe, re-examining the same incident casts a rather different interpretation of the same events.