What does "Conscript" mean in CM terms?

[JonS]

Training was, and this is important, conducted under conditions as close as possible to combat conditions. Sport was used to improve physical fitness (this would also develop team work) and marksmanship training was undertaken in the countryside, not in barracks. The recruits got to know the officers and NCOs who would lead them into battle (Steel Inferno Michael Reynolds)

Yes yes yes.

Do a spot of research on 'battledrill' and take a look at Balkoski's "Beyond the Beachhead" for examples of what the Allies were up to with their training regimes.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

"no matter how repetive or realitic t

Yes yes yes.

Do a spot of research on 'battledrill' and take a look at Balkoski's "Beyond the Beachhead" for examples of what the Allies were up to with their training regimes.

But that's the point. Allied training methods and German training methods particularly those employed by the Waffen SS were very different.

Balkosi on the 29th Infantry Division

"No Matter how repetitive or realistic the 29th Division#s tactical exercises were , the 29ers knew theywould have to learn te subtlties of combat the had way, on the battlefield. In combat however it took a few weeks for thesquad leaders to graspthe significant differences between war and 'war by the book' and by then many of thm were dead. Effective rifle squad leadership in the29th Division during its firrst weeks in combt was hazardous for the men discovered that he infantry tactics they had been taught were in urgent need of modification. Unfortuneatly for the GI's German tactics, having been refned over five years of war needed little revision" Beyond the Beachhead P87)

Hubert Meyer on the other hand regarded the Hitler Jugund as fit for offensive action on 1 June 1944 (The 12th SSThe Historyof the Hitler Youuth Panzer Division P24 Volume 1

"The Divisional commander inspected the exercse. Early n the morning we left for comat training with live ammunition. Our platoon deployed fom a village towards cardboard cutout soldiers to the left of a heavy machinegun position whose firing range restricted our attack sector on the right. Bullets were just whistling past us. We crawled into firing range off the cardboard soldiers and fired on them with all we had. This exercise was applauded by Divisional Commander Witt who had just been promoted to Brigade Fuhrer (one star general)After that our platoon sat with mixed feelings before the sand box whicgh was set up in a building next to the castle: we were supposed to demonstrate our tactical knowledgeto the commander. Witt himself, while his calmness and relaxed behaviouur set us at ease, pickwed one of the course participants by putting a kindly hand on the shoulderof our comradeduring his briefing of the situation. Wittexplained themission to himand suggested our comrade think about the best tactical approach outside in the open for five minues.It wrked out well. Contact was quickly established and we answered without hsitation and in an acceptable manner (Meyer P53)

""The leasdership and troops fully realised that difficult and, at the same time decisiveattles lay ahead. After nine months of intensive combat training they trusted their own abilities . All in all , they were well equipped and armed. They were looking at the coming action with confidence" (Meyer P54

The Allies regarded the HJ as the "Baby Milk" Division but

"We knew we were quick, agile and confident. We trusted our officers and non-coms who had been hardened in battle. We had known them since the beginning of training. During combat training with live ammunition we had enjoyed seeing hem in the mud together with us, with steel helmet and submachine gun (Jochn Leykauff (Meyer P54)

[sburke]

"The Divisional commander inspected the exercse. Early n the morning we left for comat training with live ammunition. Our platoon deployed fom a village towards cardboard cutout soldiers to the left of a heavy machinegun position whose firing range restricted our attack sector on the right. Bullets were just whistling past us. We crawled into firing range off the cardboard soldiers and fired on them with all we had. This exercise was applauded by Divisional Commander Witt who had just been promoted to Brigade Fuhrer (one star general)After that our platoon sat with mixed feelings before the sand box whicgh was set up in a building next to the castle: we were supposed to demonstrate our tactical knowledgeto the commander. Witt himself, while his calmness and relaxed behaviouur set us at ease, pickwed one of the course participants by putting a kindly hand on the shoulderof our comradeduring his briefing of the situation. Wittexplained themission to himand suggested our comrade think about the best tactical approach outside in the open for five minues.It wrked out well. Contact was quickly established and we answered without hsitation and in an acceptable manner (Meyer P53)

Honestly, change the names and the timing and it sounds like some propaganda from the Chinese Communist party of Mao during the long march. The reality is the old goat was probably assaulting some farmer's daughter and eating all the poor guys food while his soldiers marched and starved.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Honestly, change the names and the timing and it sounds like some propaganda from the Chinese Communist party of Mao during the long march. The reality is the old goat was probably assaulting some farmer's daughter and eating all the poor guys food while his soldiers marched and starved.

General Michael Renolds (you have presumeably read his books) also grades the Waffen SS divisions thatfought in Normandy as very high quality trooops. If they were not how is t they were able to hold up the Allied armies for two months n some of the bitterest fighting of the war? It was the Waffen SS who stopped Operations Perch, Epsom, Charnwood, Goodwood, Atlantic, Spring and others.

Though the Waffen SS certainly committd war crimes and are onsidered guilty by association with the Algameine SS for the Holocauastthey were also, in the case of the premier divisions such as Liebstandaret, Hitler Jugund, Das Reich, Totenkopf, Frundsburg, Hohnstauffen and others, highly skilled and brave (to the point of fanaticism) soldiers. They were also thugs who committesd serious war crimes. Allied soldiers too dd commit war crimmes execuing POWs in cold blood though they did not massacre civillians as the Waffen SSsometimes did.

But if we are going to seriously studt WW2 on the Western and Eastern Frnts we must get over the erroneous view that the Waffen SS were all murderous thugs only good at slaughtering civillins. That is not the case though there were ndeed SS units who were only good at that and came apart as soon as they were asked to fight a professional oponent

I have no liking for the Waffen SS bt it is important we get the history right.

[Rokko]

Honestly, change the names and the timing and it sounds like some propaganda from the Chinese Communist party of Mao during the long march. The reality is the old goat was probably assaulting some farmer's daughter and eating all the poor guys food while his soldiers marched and starved.

In case of the 12th SS that is definately NOT true. Witt in particular was actually killed only 7 days after D-Day (in an artillery strike on divisional HQ behind the front though). Waffen-SS officers in general were known for leading from the front and the high officer casualties testify to that.

If you happen to own the two volumes of the divisional history, there is an overview of the division's OOB and all the leading officers (down to company level) in the second volume.

12th SS suffered 2 divisional commanders (1 KIA 1 POW), 1 Regimental commander (POW), at least 6 batallion commanders (5 KIA, 1 POW) and at least 14 company commanders (11 KIA, 3 WIA), most likely more, I'm not through with my research entirely, at least 4 more that must have become casualties but the history gives no record to it.

Also, relatively few WIA because the wounded officers often stayed at the front I believe.

[JasonC]

Oh dear. I really didn't want a lecture on how the Hitler Youth ate their wheaties.

Green formations are those that have never "seen the elephant" before. Nothing prepares men for actual combat, except combat. The reactions of young men to watching human beings around them blown to smithereens in an industrial murder exercise is not a propaganda movie or a group sing along, and it is not predictable ahead of time. Some green formations perform well in their first actions, others break and run away, or cower in place. Some green formations - with either initial reaction - fight well later, after that seasoning. Others are commanded by braindead tailkissers or martinets who can't find their tactical backsides with both hands, and rack up high casualties accomplishing little. There is variation, because we are talking about human beings and death, not propaganda movies or group sing alongs.

17SS was green, and in their first action against US airborne and an armored task force counterattack outside Caretan, large numbers of them broke and ran. 12SS was green, and in their first action against the Canadians outside Caen, they fought effectively until their armor was stopped. Very similar manpower and training, very different results. 17SS was sound later, not outstanding but fought like regulars in later actions; the Americans opposite never really had any idea how green they were.

Some VG divisions at the westwall fought poorly, with literal application of instant counterattack doctrine leading to high losses for little impact. Others were quite tough, fighting intelligently in heavy terrain and making full use of night, etc. Both green, very different results.

There is variation. Embrace it.

[JonS]

Hubert Meyer on the other hand regarded the Hitler Jugund as fit for offensive action on 1 June 1944

Well, presumably someone thought 29 ID was 'fit for offensive action' in June 1944 too And unlike 12th SS - who failed in every offensive task given them - the 29 ID actually was 'fit for offensive action.'

[JonS]

Waffen-SS officers in general were known for leading from the front and the high officer casualties testify to that.

High leader casualties are a fact of life in all decent armies. Because the stats are handy, the British in Afghanistan have had 444 fatal cas, of which 44 (10%) have been officers and 56 NCOs. Officers make up less than 10% of the military. Officers and NCOs together don't make up 1:4 of the military. I have no doubt that the US stats from Iraq and Afghanistan would show exactly the same trend - being a leader is disproportionately dangerous.

The SS were also know for high casualties at all levels, which as a combat-indicator suggests that perhaps their training wasn't really all that great. Their motivation was through the roof, but that's not the same as competence.

[Vinnart]

What does "Conscript" mean in CM terms?

It usually means he will be on point as cannon fodder for recon by death tactics.

In a side note I just found out my pops has a Hitler youth knife that one of his uncles brought back from the war. He was watching “Saving Pvt. Ryan” and recognized it as the same knife so he never knew what exactly the type of military knife it is. The scene is when they are mopping up on the beach, and Vin Deisal hands it to his Jewish Ranger buddy. Unfortunately, it is missing the swastika from the hilt and is in rough shape, but still VERY sharp. I thought that was rather cool finding my family had a little piece of history I never knew of before.

[sburke]

General Michael Renolds (you have presumeably read his books) also grades the Waffen SS divisions thatfought in Normandy as very high quality trooops. If they were not how is t they were able to hold up the Allied armies for two months n some of the bitterest fighting of the war? It was the Waffen SS who stopped Operations Perch, Epsom, Charnwood, Goodwood, Atlantic, Spring and others.

Though the Waffen SS certainly committd war crimes and are onsidered guilty by association with the Algameine SS for the Holocauastthey were also, in the case of the premier divisions such as Liebstandaret, Hitler Jugund, Das Reich, Totenkopf, Frundsburg, Hohnstauffen and others, highly skilled and brave (to the point of fanaticism) soldiers. They were also thugs who committesd serious war crimes. Allied soldiers too dd commit war crimmes execuing POWs in cold blood though they did not massacre civillians as the Waffen SSsometimes did.

But if we are going to seriously studt WW2 on the Western and Eastern Frnts we must get over the erroneous view that the Waffen SS were all murderous thugs only good at slaughtering civillins. That is not the case though there were ndeed SS units who were only good at that and came apart as soon as they were asked to fight a professional oponent

I have no liking for the Waffen SS bt it is important we get the history right.

Actually yes, I do have a decent library, but wouldn't really consider myself a grog.

I was reacting more to the actual quote not so much as to whether it really reflected on the unit itself. It just comes off as this superficial "we are all comrades" that you get in a lot of "party" publications. I've read enough stuff of similar tone that I have a hard time swallowing it.

[Rokko]

High leader casualties are a fact of life in all decent armies. Because the stats are handy, the British in Afghanistan have had 444 fatal cas, of which 44 (10%) have been officers and 56 NCOs. Officers make up less than 10% of the military. Officers and NCOs together don't make up 1:4 of the military. I have no doubt that the US stats from Iraq and Afghanistan would show exactly the same trend - being a leader is disproportionately dangerous.

The SS were also know for high casualties at all levels, which as a combat-indicator suggests that perhaps their training wasn't really all that great. Their motivation was through the roof, but that's not the same as competence.

I just meant to explain how unlikely it was that the "old goats" were safe behind the lines while the soldiers marched and starved

Wether 12SS or W-SS officers had exceptionally high casualties compared with other armies I can not say.

I cannot say anything about the British in Afghanistan either, don't know enough about their OOB and the combat situations they face. Though intuitively I would assume that many or most casualties come frome indiscriminate IEDs (true for Iraq I believe, not sure about Afghanistan).

Also, while I have often read that Waffen-SS in general suffered exceptionally high casualties I haven't been able to find confirmation for this. It is most likely true for the early years when their leadership was very incompetent (think 1940 Totenkopf Div. and the "butcher" Eicke), but the comparative casualty figures I have found said otherwise in general. I believe 33% casualties (or maybe even dead) for the entire Wehrmacht and 34% for the Waffen-SS are the numbers I once found, though that did supprise me quite a bit actually, considering like a quarter of all W-SS units were Panzer or Panzergrenadier divisions so higher casualties would be natural. Also, in Normandy the W-SS Panzer divisions didn't suffer more casualties than Wehrmacht Panzer divisions or even some Allied divisions.

Besides, your comparision of 12SS and 29ID strikes me as a little off considering the vastly different conditions under which the two had to attack.

29th ID's casualties weren't exactly slight either, you probably know that saying how Gerhardt was actually a Corps commander, having one division in the field, one in the hospital and one in the grave.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Well, presumably someone thought 29 ID was 'fit for offensive action' in June 1944 too And unlike 12th SS - who failed in every offensive task given them - the 29 ID actually was 'fit for offensive action.'

Hmm their counter attack against the Canadians at Buron for example? And in many cases, not just in Normandy, Germancounter attacks foundered against Allied naval gunfire and artillery .support

And if Htler Jugund and the other divisions of 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Korps were so incompetent perhps you would like to explain Operations Perrch, Charnwood, Epsom, Goodwood and Spring to me. Were the Allied troops who ailed against the SS incompetent? Noo, they were not. They faced a tough, highly motivated and resourceful enemy highly capable in defence and with strong abilities to launch punishing counter attacks even in the face of US and British firepower.

And if SS Panzer/Panzergrenadier divisions were so incompent perhaps you would like to explain Prokorovka, 3rd and 4th Kharkov to me (just fr starters) in the light of the research published in the last decade or so by George Nipe and Valeriy Zamullin who, having examined sources such as the official German reports and records (and for that matter the Soviet archives) tell a very differnt account from the one we were told since WW2.

[womble]

Green formations are those that have never "seen the elephant" before. Nothing prepares men for actual combat, except combat.

Given that parameter, what soft factors would you use to distinguish between a "Regular Army" unit that had been in existence for several peaceful years, in "full time training", but had never actually experienced combat with the enemy? I know examples would be hard to pick out around D-Day, since even fresh formations might have a salting of veterans from previous phases of the war, but an example from the beginning of the war might be the BEF with a mix of Regulars who'd possibly not seen any actual combat and freshly-trained volunteers and Territorials (one of which was my Grandfather).

The way "experience" levels are described in the manual would suggest that the Regulars would be Regular, and the fresh-faces and Terriers/Reservists would be Green, and their reaction to first casualties would be determined by their motivation and leadership levels. I can't dispute people who say Green pTruppen of the same motivation tend to react less well to adversity than Regulars do, though. It's a reflection of the complexity of the model perhaps that we can't say that "High morale Greens react to casualties the same as Normal morale Regulars", because I don't think that's necessarily true.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I just meant to explain how unlikely it was that the "old goats" were safe behind the lines while the soldiers marched and starved

Wether 12SS or W-SS officers had exceptionally high casualties compared with other armies I can not say.

I cannot say anything about the British in Afghanistan either, don't know enough about their OOB and the combat situations they face. Though intuitively I would assume that many or most casualties come frome indiscriminate IEDs (true for Iraq I believe, not sure about Afghanistan).

Also, while I have often read that Waffen-SS in general suffered exceptionally high casualties I haven't been able to find confirmation for this. It is most likely true for the early years when their leadership was very incompetent (think 1940 Totenkopf Div. and the "butcher" Eicke), but the comparative casualty figures I have found said otherwise in general. I believe 33% casualties (or maybe even dead) for the entire Wehrmacht and 34% for the Waffen-SS are the numbers I once found, though that did supprise me quite a bit actually, considering like a quarter of all W-SS units were Panzer or Panzergrenadier divisions so higher casualties would be natural. Also, in Normandy the W-SS Panzer divisions didn't suffer more casualties than Wehrmacht Panzer divisions or even some Allied divisions.

Besides, your comparision of 12SS and 29ID strikes me as a little off considering the vastly different conditions under which the two had to attack.

29th ID's casualties weren't exactly slight either, you probably know that saying how Gerhardt was actually a Corps commander, having one division in the field, one in the hospital and one in the grave.

Point is the Waffen SS wre often abler to keep going dspite the very high losses. Meyer records that, in Normandy his division lost

Officers 128 wounded,55 killed, 56 missing/captured, 7 dead other causes

NCOs 613 wounded, 229 killed, 192 missing/captured, 18 dead other causes

Men 3684wounded, 1548killed, 2012 missing/captured, 96 dead other cause

And we know that after Normandy Hiter Jugund's performance declined significantlydespit several months out of th line. Even Meyer's owown account, read between the lines, confirms this.

The only area where the German histories written by former officers are significanly dishonest is on the matter of war crimes. On occasion where there were failures thatreflect badly on a unt where the writer was a former officer of the dvision even when nt directly involved himself. Spaeter's account f the 10th Panzer Brigade attachedto Gross Deutschland on the first day of Kursk for example.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I just meant to explain how unlikely it was that the "old goats" were safe behind the lines while the soldiers marched and starved

Wether 12SS or W-SS officers had exceptionally high casualties compared with other armies I can not say.

I cannot say anything about the British in Afghanistan either, don't know enough about their OOB and the combat situations they face. Though intuitively I would assume that many or most casualties come frome indiscriminate IEDs (true for Iraq I believe, not sure about Afghanistan).

Also, while I have often read that Waffen-SS in general suffered exceptionally high casualties I haven't been able to find confirmation for this. It is most likely true for the early years when their leadership was very incompetent (think 1940 Totenkopf Div. and the "butcher" Eicke), but the comparative casualty figures I have found said otherwise in general. I believe 33% casualties (or maybe even dead) for the entire Wehrmacht and 34% for the Waffen-SS are the numbers I once found, though that did supprise me quite a bit actually, considering like a quarter of all W-SS units were Panzer or Panzergrenadier divisions so higher casualties would be natural. Also, in Normandy the W-SS Panzer divisions didn't suffer more casualties than Wehrmacht Panzer divisions or even some Allied divisions.

Besides, your comparision of 12SS and 29ID strikes me as a little off considering the vastly different conditions under which the two had to attack.

29th ID's casualties weren't exactly slight either, you probably know that saying how Gerhardt was actually a Corps commander, having one division in the field, one in the hospital and one in the grave.

Some US veterans in the Hurtgen Forest hung back while the conscripts were sent forward to get killed. Then we have Desert Veteran British units in Normandy lke 7th Armoured Division. These were units who were veteran but had seen too much and were being asked to fight in terrain ofa type they were not used to. So, while these are veterans and should be rated as such they should also have relatively low (just below average) morale in Normandy plus most leaders should be rated at average (0) to make this unit twend to be somewhat "sticky"

[dieseltaylor]

29th ID's casualties weren't exactly slight either, you probably know that saying how Gerhardt was actually a Corps commander, having one division in the field, one in the hospital and one in the grave.

Oh very pithy. Perhaps Corpse commander? : )

[JasonC]

"The only area where the German histories written by former officers are significanly dishonest is on the matter of war crimes."

Horsefeathers. Famous German generals lie on every page. They lie to blame others, they lie to excuse themselves, they lie to exaggerate their own brilliance, to exaggerate the combat performance of their units, to underrate their opponents, to cherry pick successes and gloss over failures. Sometimes they lie simply by repeating fish stories they read in Signal magazine - any piece of errant nonsense peddled during the war can be found again later in the memoirs of generals nowhere near the incidents in question.

To believe their accounts, you have to think the Germans took on 1 to 2 odds, inflicted 10 to 15 to 1 losses on their opponents, and only lost afterward by being swamped at 10 or 20 to 1. None of which is mathematically even possible.

I did a study once of German tank kill claims by source. They killed the entire Allied armor fleet, including US tanks back in the states that never made it to the theater of operations, about 5 times over. German staff officers routinely discounted their own side claims by 50% when estimating enemy unit strengths.

There has never been a system or party as comprehensively based on systematic lying as Nazi period Germany, emphatically including its entire armed forces, and the officers most of all.

[dieseltaylor]

Whilst the thread is interesting for what it uncovers in terms of performance I am left wondering if this navel gazing will actually add much to the game for most players.

For recreation of a particular battle I can imagine much tweaking may take place so the result looks right but against the coarser background including the 8 metre AS it does seem an overly sensitive.

I am not decrying those who wish to fight re-enactment level but for most players just having a fun game is good enough. I would hate to have learn all the subtleties of conscript, green, regular matrixed against motivation against leadership to appreciate which troops are fragile despite being a higher level/better commanded.

Given a finite time on earth when I play I want it reasonably simple.

[dieseltaylor]

There has never been a system or party as comprehensively based on systematic lying as Nazi period Germany, emphatically including its entire armed forces, and the officers most of all.

I think you are insulting Russia here : )

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Actually yes, I do have a decent library, but wouldn't really consider myself a grog.

I was reacting more to the actual quote not so much as to whether it really reflected on the unit itself. It just comes off as this superficial "we are all comrades" that you get in a lot of "party" publications. I've read enough stuff of similar tone that I have a hard time swallowing it.

The qoute waa from Meer's book and he was qouting on of the men of his division writing of his own experiences. This isan example of how they saw hemselves. Well trained and highly motivated as recognised by many of their opponents. Also they could be and often were a bunch of thugs. They certainly killed POWs though there are instances of Allied troops dong the same thing The German policy of dealing with "saboteurs" (resistance fighters) is of course a different matter but not reallyne relevant to the task of assessing a unit's combat capabilities.

So, distasteful as it is we have to put certain issues and feelings aside for a moment whil we assess the question of combaat capabilities. Faliure to do so risks clouding the historial judgement with personal bias. At tyhe same time we also need to bear in minfd that Meyer, as a former commande of Hitler Jugund has his own bias and wants to cast his unit in the bestlight possiblle. However, how they saw themselves is still important historical evidence

Reynolds, writing 60 years after the event is a more neutral source than #meyer acknowledging both the German War crimes and the harsh post war treatment of former SS incuding mock trials and mock executions which in themselves might be regarded as war crimes. Much as one dislikes the Waffen SS the accounts of this are difficult and sometimes harrowing reading.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I think you are insulting Russia here : )

No. Read George Nipe's bookas. And, from the Russian side, Zamulin. What we now know is that much of what was written about Prokorovka over the last 60 years was based on a Soviet era lie. Rotmistrov had to xplain to Staln how 5th Guards Tank Army suffered such high losses. He claimed II SS Panzer Korps had up to 70 Tigers (in fact they had about a dozen Tigers that were "runnerrs on July 12. and maybe 60 tanks in the area where the main action was fought Yet 5th GTA lost 300 to 400 tanks depending on whose account you read. Rotmistrov had to explain what happened to Stalin who would have been well within his rights to remve Rotmistrov from command and even have him shot.

However, Rotmistrov had achieved what he was supposed to do, namely preven a further significant advance by II SS Panzer Korps and his claims were believed by his superiors. And so a convenient "official version" was produced. It could not be challenged in the 1960s because Kruschev was a senio Commissar with Voronezh Front whic gave 5th GTA its orders (responsibility even by association would be very mbarassing for Khruschev) And even after Khruschev wwas removed from power it would have been politically embarrassing to the Kremlin to admit that they had been lying about te battle for oover 20 years.

Western hstorians, being unable to access the German documents being transcribed onto microfilm in the US had to rely on the official Soviet account whic ewxaggerated the German strength and claimed that the couragous Soviet tankers charged to close range of the German tanks and destroyed them at cloe range.

We now know that this is not what happened. Certainly the Soviet tankers charged bravely and they certainly did stop the Germans (at least by gaining a critical day for the Soviets to brng up massive reserves and to exhaust the II SS in a physical sense) Bu the 5GTA almost immolated itself in achieving this. Prokorovka was certainly a tactical German victorywith hndreds of destroye Soviet tanks keft on the field but it was an operationl abnd strategic defeat within the context of an offensive that had already failed,

[dieseltaylor]

Lucas - I was rather thinking of the 5 year plans and how they were sold to the world and the people. Officers lying is a given in systems where failure is probably a death sentence.

However the info you reveal is good as I am not a grog of the East Front other than the vehicles so it is all interesting.

[JonS]

Hmm their counter attack against the Canadians at Buron for example?

Yes. Exactly. Their failure at Buron, for example.

And if Hitler Jugend and the other divisions of 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Korps were so incompetent perhaps you would like to explain Operations Perch, Charnwood, Epsom, Goodwood and Spring to me.

Do you often find that shifting the goalposts works well for you? Those five operations were all - as far as the Germans were concerned - defensive. You were talking about fit for offensive operations. Offensive is not defensive.

[JonS]

"The only area where the German histories written by former officers are significantly dishonest is on the matter of war crimes."

Horsefeathers. Famous German generals lie on every page. They lie to blame others, they lie to excuse themselves, they lie to exaggerate their own brilliance, to exaggerate the combat performance of their units, to underrate their opponents, to cherry pick successes and gloss over failures.

Quoted. For. Truth.

[Michael Emrys]

Offensive is not defensive.

"A good offense is the best defense." I don't know who said that, but it's been quoted often enough. I'd guess that it depends on the circumstances, just like nearly everything else in warfare.

Michael