Support (Armor or Infantry) and C2.

[gunnersman]

When I play a QB I make it a point to try to add individual armor units in support of my infantry units under the command chain of my infantry units whether its Company level, Platoon or otherwise. That way the armor units can benefit from the infantry's ability to spot, because there are so many of them and they are in radio contact with each other...or at least benefit from C2.

When playing individual scenarios I notice that all armor support units are under their own chain of command outside of the infantry they are supporting. The armor cannot benefit from the infantry's better spotting ability. I know it is not possible to add whole armor formations under the chain of command of a infantry company, platoon or battalion for that matter, in CMBN.

My question is, is it realistic to have whole armor formations in support of infantry units outside of the C2 chain of the units they are supporting? That would seem to hamstring a valuable asset.

[Boche]

Well, since those armour units are organically from another unit well...

[gunnersman]

Well, since those armour units are organically from another unit well...

That goes without saying. But I dont know these things. I thought maybe a grog would have a better idea.

I would think there is some way to tie the comms into the net. I know info does not flow as easily then as it does now. It just makes me wonder.

[Boche]

even today, US units in Irak had to use hand signals or voice to direct Tank fire, of if they where lucky the Tank had a phone in the back where they could speak to the tank commander.

[Rocky Balboa]

Infantry could communicate with armor in several ways:

By radio if the infantry had them and by hand signal.

The Sherman also had a phone box on the back deck that allowed someone on the ground to communicate with the TC ... Not sure if the German tanks had anything like this or not.

[akd]

Infantry could communicate with armor in several ways:

By radio if the infantry had them

On the allied side, tank and infantry radios were not interoperable. They generally could not communicate by radio. There are examples of tanks carrying infantry radios in addition to their standard radio sets to get around this, but that was a field improvisation dependent on the availability of extra radios, and would probably happen at the tank company HQ level.

The Sherman also had a phone box on the back deck that allowed someone on the ground to communicate with the TC ... Not sure if the German tanks had anything like this or not.

These were not added until later in the campaign, and were a response to the major problems of infantry not being able to communicate with tanks well during action. AFAIK, it was a field mod, not a factory addition. This was also improvised in some cases by simply running a field telephone line out of the turret hatch.

[wokelly]

The US units in Normandy did not originally have phones on their tanks that connected to the commander. That came around a few months later and some independent armor battalions did not get them until 1945. Phone communication was more common in Italy where combat experience and experimentation had occurred for awhile before but these lessons did not make their way to the ETO and the US tankers learned from trial and error in Europe (I get the impression the Allies failed more often then not to take lessons from Italy and distribute them to the troops embarked for the invasion of France).

In short it is a bit of a crap shoot. I have read a lot more about the communications aspect on US tanks due to Harry Yeide's excellent work (Infantry's Armor) on the subject of separate tank battalions, as well as Michael D. Doubler's work (Closing with the enemy) which detailed it in some depth. It was irregular at best. No US unit (Armored Div or Independent Battalion) had phones on their tanks at the start of Overlord, a good number had them by the end of Normandy (in August), and most had them by 1945 but still not all. Even then not all tanks had them, often the Troop (British term) or platoon (equivalent US term I think) commander (leader of 3-4 tank groups) got them first. Data could be relayed to them from the outside, then passed to the individual tank able to best deal with it. Some units were pretty well equipped with almost every tank having one.

There are no good works on the British that cover this that I have found. I get the impression they were not as quick as the American's in adding these phones. The author of the Irish Horse Regiment Churchill unit in Italy said he remembers this system only showing up on his units Churchills in 1945 in time for the Spring offensive. The Americans for example were beginning to retrofit these to their units in Italy as early as late 1943 (though not all units did this at the same time). I believe later marks of the Churchill came built with phones on the back (I remember Fetcher's book on the Churchill showed the Mark VII with a phone on the back in a manual drawing), but how the retrofitting of existing tanks occurred I have found nothing, especially with Cromwells and Lend Lease Sherman's.

As far as the Germans, I don't believe they ever thought of adding phones. In general they had better combined arms training prior to first combat (for most of the war) so maybe never saw the need for phones. From what I read even Allied tank units (with no phones) that had trained together in Britain with infantry units (not common but did happen), when paired with them in action, often worked well together. Also it is entirely possible the Germans had the foresight to had infantry radios that could communicate with their respective tanks (I have no idea if they did). In the Allied case the infantry radios could not communicate with the tanks, and even the US tank destroyer's radios could not communicate with Shermans via Radio (which caused all kinds of problems).

I know quite a bit on the US in regards to these phones, a bit on the Brits (all on Churchills) and nothing about the Germans.

[gunnersman]

On the allied side, tank and infantry radios were not interoperable. They generally could not communicate by radio...

This is what I was wondering about.

All good stuff though.

Thanks guys!

[JonS]

There are no good works on the British that cover this that I have found.

There are a number of good memoirs along this line. "Flamethrower" by Wilson, and "By Tank Into Normandy" by Hills are both written by troop commanders of units whose primary role was infantry support.

At a higher level, 'British Armour in the Normandy Campaign' by Buckley, backed up by "Military Training in the British Army" by Harrison-Place and "Raising Churchill's Army" by French would set you up pretty well.

The author of the Irish Horse Regiment Churchill unit in Italy said he remembers this system only showing up on his units Churchills in 1945 in time for the Spring offensive.

NIH didn't show up in Italy until quite late in the piece. After the campaign in NWA they had about a year off, swanning about in the Levant. Leaving aside the lessons-learned cross-polination (which did happen, under the aegies of the regularly produced 'Notes From The Theatres of War', but seems to have been somewhat haphazard in it's uptake), they didn't really have much time in theatre to learn these things for themselves before the 1945 Spring offensive.

From what I read even Allied tank units (with no phones) that had trained together in Britain with infantry units (not common but did happen), when paired with them in action, often worked well together.

Yes. The pairing of 15th Scottish Division with 6th Guards Tank Brigade is often held up as a good example of this in practice. They'd trained together extensively in the UK (indeed, 6 GTB was an organic bde within 15 S Div for a time), and performed togehter excellently during Op BLUECOAT. Conversely 15 S Div had earlier performed poorly when paired with another TB (34th?) during Op EPSOM.

[wokelly]

There are a number of good memoirs along this line. "Flamethrower" by Wilson, and "By Tank Into Normandy" by Hills are both written by troop commanders of units whose primary role was infantry support.

At a higher level, 'British Armour in the Normandy Campaign' by Buckley, backed up by "Military Training in the British Army" by Harrison-Place and "Raising Churchill's Army" by French would set you up pretty well.

I own all those books but one (flanethrower, but it is on my list to get), I do not recall seeing any info on phone boxes on British tanks, the prevalence of them or when units adopted them. I can find lots of stuff on US tanks in this regard, but little on the British.

[George MC]

What I have found is keep the infantry platoon HQ (who is in C2 with their sections)close to the armour troop/zug commander who is unbuttoned. You'll find that info is shared faster (so it seems to me anyways) with other takns in that platoon. The whole C2 is very powerful in game play once you get the hang of it

[stikkypixie]

What I have found is keep the infantry platoon HQ (who is in C2 with their sections)close to the armour troop/zug commander who is unbuttoned. You'll find that info is shared faster (so it seems to me anyways) with other takns in that platoon. The whole C2 is very powerful in game play once you get the hang of it

Troops, no matter what formation they belong, share information with each other if they are close enough (think sharing ammo range).

[Sergei]

Why didn't the infantry just SMS the tankers? :confused:

[stikkypixie]

Why didn't the infantry just SMS the tankers? :confused:

Texting and driving is very dangerous.

[Hister]

I'm very glad this part of the game works as it was back then. Brilliant!

[Lt Belenko]

...... if they where lucky the Tank had a phone in the back where they could speak to the tank commander.

I remember reading somewhere (decades ago) that these phones were added during the Normandy hedgerow battles. They were part of field modification similar to the rhino mod.

[dieseltaylor]

SOme info here

Infantry-Tank Communications

Between the Leaders "Because the infantry squad leader furnishes information which directs the fire and movement of his support tank, communication between him and the tank commanders must he continuous and reliable," states a XIV Corps training memorandum.

"Many means of communication were tried, but the one which worked best under fire was the EE8A telephone adapted for infantry-tank employment. An EE8A telephone is placed inside the tank turret. Also in the turret. at a place easily visible to the tank commander, is strapped a regulation flashlight. A 20-foot length of four-strand electric cable is laid from the telephone box inside the turret and extended down in rear of the tank. An EE8A telephone handset is connected to the end of the cable. The butterfly switch on the handset is modified so that when pressed it completes a circuit through one channel of the cable, lights the flashlight, and attracts the attention of the tank commander. Telephone conversation is then held over another channel of the cable, the telephones being wired for that effect. With this telephone setup, the squad leader has only to carry the handset to be able to communicate readily with the tank commander. The telephone must not he strapped to the rear of the tank, for enemy fire will destroy it."

By Modified Radio Reported by the Executive Officer, 330th Infantry, 3d Battalion: "Satisfactory infantry-tank communication was achieved by modifying and installing SCR-536's in the tanks. Removal of a bolt from the top of the turret provided a hole for the antenna. A short piece of rubber hose was placed around the aerial to keep it from grounding out. The radio sets were modified so that the tank commander could use a throat microphone and could operate the switch with an improvised extension."

-Prearranged Signal From a British Infantry source: "When cooperating with tanks, we devise visual signals easily understood by the tankers. Tin hats raised on rifles indicate our positions when tanks are approaching from the rear to join us. A single soldier approaching a tank with his headgear or other distinctive item on a weapon indicates: "Stop, I want to talk to you." A red Very light indicates the presence of antitank guns, and the direction in which it is fired indicates their location. A green Very light fired in the direction of an enemy machine gun indicates its location, and also serves as a request to the tank to knock it out. A white Very light fired at the tank signals: "Cease Fire."

[gunnersman]

Improvisation at it's finest.