ArmouredTopHat

Stick to your (obsolete and doomed, DOOMED!!!! do you hear me?) guns, @ArmouredTopHat. 
Our Capt's bark is worse than his bite, and we all learn a lot from the ongoing discussion. Cheers!

I take issue with this a little, numerous countries invested and experimented with carriers, including the premier naval powers of the world at the time which all had proponents of carrier warfare. It was not a uniform opposition else said ships would have never seen service, yet they did pretty quickly. Navies could easily see the value of carriers as scouts at the very least, and in the space of literally a couple of decades they rose to prominence in the strike capability. In an era of ships taking years to build I think that's pretty damn fast adjustment of thinking. The only 'opposition' to carriers that I really see is simply the fact that people were not entirely sure how to use them to full potential and that if they would replace battleships or compliment them. The doctrine was new and required development. Cunningham for example was quite the 'old fashioned' type of admiral famous for using battleships near point blank against the Italians in the Med yet he saw Carriers as a very valuable asset, even in the confined waters of of his command. 

I feel like were using the power of hindsight a little too much here. Its easy to reflect on the past and see that Battleships were clearly becoming obsolete, its much less clear for the people at the time. Aircraft were still a very 'fresh' invention even in the 20s, the pace of technological development was truly shocking. I think we can forgive people for at least being cautious. Did opposition / battleship adherents exist contrary to the growing evidence of carrier power? Absolutely. But it was far from uniform, not when the main blue water fleets all introduced carriers within the same space of time. (USA, UK, Japan) In fact navies were quite used to pretty radical changes and innovations in that time period, considering the blisteringly fast speed of battleship development for instance. Doctrinal changes are usually always slower than technological, if only because humans usually need some time to figure out the shiny new thing and how to use it to full potential. Just look at the wacky tank / mobile warfare concepts and theories in the 20s and 30s that came up before mechanised warfare settled into place. 

Much as we see today, we are seeing some major innovations but we cannot guess the full consequences of how they are going to pan out. Its evident that tanks and perhaps even mechanised warfare are going to change in some key ways, but its far less easy to determine how exactly things are going to look like or what that will ultimately result in terms of a force structure. For all we know the technology pendulum might swing hard in the other direction and suddenly drones have it rough on the battlefield for whatever reason. We are very early into this radical shift of military operation, if it is indeed coming. 

It makes sense to me that modern militaries are investing into both drone solutions and experimentation while also looking to upgrade / replace / develop new vehicles and platforms better able to survive a drone heavy environment. Its an understandable level of covering your bets so to speak. I simply caution that we might be arm chairing a little too much here and might be deriding procurement industries a little too hard. Most countries are -very- interested in drones and their growing prominence in warfare. They are also interested in making sure their vehicles can operate in said environment as clearly all militaries still want a mechanised force of some sort. Until doctrine adjusts or there is sufficient momentum to change technology wise (Which is an if) we are unlikely to see countries going 'all in' on major changes until they know for certain that they do in fact offer wholescale improvements. 

My question you Capt would be this, I agree on a variety of points you made back in one of your posts about what the future priorities might be and the emphasis on ranged firepower and ISR, but how would this look like in a typical military unit. Has anyone actually developed a tactical unit in line with your ideas? I am genuinely curious. What would a brigade look like in terms of composition? I personally feel like were going to see more gradual changes, new generations of vehicles, proliferation of drones on the platoon / squad level and gradual integration of UGV to current units for instance. Do you envision something more radical in terms of changes?

I would argue we have more evidence of it working than it not working.

 
 
You say this as if its not being applied to everyone else. We are actively seeing just how badly the Russian approach to things has gone in Ukraine. This is the same approach China has in a lot of respects. If the west way of thinking has been challenged by this war, then does not that apply to everyone else in an even more severe fashion?
 
The nature of warfare in the last 100 years had changed so rapidly that I think its a little unfair to have an expectation for human beings to be able to not just keep up but outright predict future changes perfectly and ahead of time in an era of rapid technological progression. I dont disagree that we need to be better, but we should also have realistic expectations here. We as a species are kind of infamous for being capable of blistering change but also conservative sluggishness and we should bear that mind mind for any planning of this nature. I would argue that simply keeping ahead of the curve compared to others is 'good enough' and a far more realistic outcome to expect. I do agree that timing could be better though, but is that just a feature of our species that we need to factor in?

My example was simply a case where a nation that really did have better things to spend on after the scars of WW1 still innovated in a measure that had not been done before, despite not being at war. (more referring to the spending budget pre 1934 here)

I again feel this is a little unfair to say, even with todays breakneck pace of technological development Militaries can and are innovating on a near daily basis. Plenty of notes have already been made with Ukraine (Which is a literal live conflict) and even prior there was a lot of consideration to the systems now so heavily used now:

https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-magazine/edm22singleweb.pdf

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/innovation-military

Could innovation be improved upon? Sure, certainly when it comes to procurement contracts. Claiming Western institutions as monolithic entities with little capacity to change is a little silly though. There is a reason why they are at the head of the curve in pretty much all respects of warfare. We are already seeing active consideration from the Ukraine war with regards to future procurement, this is only going to get stronger in the next few years.
 
An interesting example that is quite antithesis to your argument. The UK literally fully motorised its army in the 30s despite its lengthy cavalry heritage and in an environment of a tight budget and no conflict pressure. Cavalry units were entirely converted as well, going from horses to either motorised units or armoured cars. They recognised after the first world war that steel over flesh was the way to go and managed to significantly change the makeup of the armed forces despite some truly horrendous budget constraints. This was achieved in just over a decade following some experimental mechanised force usage in the 20s. In short, just one example of a military being quite capable of innovation that was later perfected by the Americans. I figured the experimental exercises most militaries do should be a good example of that in todays environment. 

The above is the introduction to an article about the British armies adoption of machine guns before WW1. It highlights many of the same issues we are discussing about drones now. It isn't just an issue of money (although money was certainly an issue), but organization, doctrine, reliability, and so on. Thus the British Army started WW1 with two machine guns per battalion. They eventually figure out that not quite enough. But there was a whole lot of dying before the adapting got under way. The Russians seem to demonstrate daily in Ukraine that dying is necessary but not sufficient.
.The trick is make as many correct predictions as possible, and thus do as little dying as possible while the adapting is underway. I would argue that the U.S. Navy carrier force in WW2 was a success in this regard. Despite a continued belief the battleship, and battleship tactics, the USN had done enough with carriers that it didn't have to start the campaign in the Pacific by retaking Hawaii. Indeed it Won at Midway with ships built before the outbreak of the war. The the goal should be to get closer to the USN in 1941, than to the British Army in 1914.
 

I take issue with this a little, numerous countries invested and experimented with carriers, including the premier naval powers of the world at the time which all had proponents of carrier warfare. It was not a uniform opposition else said ships would have never seen service, yet they did pretty quickly. Navies could easily see the value of carriers as scouts at the very least, and in the space of literally a couple of decades they rose to prominence in the strike capability. In an era of ships taking years to build I think that's pretty damn fast adjustment of thinking. The only 'opposition' to carriers that I really see is simply the fact that people were not entirely sure how to use them to full potential and that if they would replace battleships or compliment them. The doctrine was new and required development. Cunningham for example was quite the 'old fashioned' type of admiral famous for using battleships near point blank against the Italians in the Med yet he saw Carriers as a very valuable asset, even in the confined waters of of his command. 

I feel like were using the power of hindsight a little too much here. Its easy to reflect on the past and see that Battleships were clearly becoming obsolete, its much less clear for the people at the time. Aircraft were still a very 'fresh' invention even in the 20s, the pace of technological development was truly shocking. I think we can forgive people for at least being cautious. Did opposition / battleship adherents exist contrary to the growing evidence of carrier power? Absolutely. But it was far from uniform, not when the main blue water fleets all introduced carriers within the same space of time. (USA, UK, Japan) In fact navies were quite used to pretty radical changes and innovations in that time period, considering the blisteringly fast speed of battleship development for instance. Doctrinal changes are usually always slower than technological, if only because humans usually need some time to figure out the shiny new thing and how to use it to full potential. Just look at the wacky tank / mobile warfare concepts and theories in the 20s and 30s that came up before mechanised warfare settled into place. 

Much as we see today, we are seeing some major innovations but we cannot guess the full consequences of how they are going to pan out. Its evident that tanks and perhaps even mechanised warfare are going to change in some key ways, but its far less easy to determine how exactly things are going to look like or what that will ultimately result in terms of a force structure. For all we know the technology pendulum might swing hard in the other direction and suddenly drones have it rough on the battlefield for whatever reason. We are very early into this radical shift of military operation, if it is indeed coming. 

It makes sense to me that modern militaries are investing into both drone solutions and experimentation while also looking to upgrade / replace / develop new vehicles and platforms better able to survive a drone heavy environment. Its an understandable level of covering your bets so to speak. I simply caution that we might be arm chairing a little too much here and might be deriding procurement industries a little too hard. Most countries are -very- interested in drones and their growing prominence in warfare. They are also interested in making sure their vehicles can operate in said environment as clearly all militaries still want a mechanised force of some sort. Until doctrine adjusts or there is sufficient momentum to change technology wise (Which is an if) we are unlikely to see countries going 'all in' on major changes until they know for certain that they do in fact offer wholescale improvements. 

My question you Capt would be this, I agree on a variety of points you made back in one of your posts about what the future priorities might be and the emphasis on ranged firepower and ISR, but how would this look like in a typical military unit. Has anyone actually developed a tactical unit in line with your ideas? I am genuinely curious. What would a brigade look like in terms of composition? I personally feel like were going to see more gradual changes, new generations of vehicles, proliferation of drones on the platoon / squad level and gradual integration of UGV to current units for instance. Do you envision something more radical in terms of changes?

I take issue with this a little, numerous countries invested and experimented with carriers, including the premier naval powers of the world at the time which all had proponents of carrier warfare. It was not a uniform opposition else said ships would have never seen service, yet they did pretty quickly. Navies could easily see the value of carriers as scouts at the very least, and in the space of literally a couple of decades they rose to prominence in the strike capability. In an era of ships taking years to build I think that's pretty damn fast adjustment of thinking. The only 'opposition' to carriers that I really see is simply the fact that people were not entirely sure how to use them to full potential and that if they would replace battleships or compliment them. The doctrine was new and required development. Cunningham for example was quite the 'old fashioned' type of admiral famous for using battleships near point blank against the Italians in the Med yet he saw Carriers as a very valuable asset, even in the confined waters of of his command. 

I feel like were using the power of hindsight a little too much here. Its easy to reflect on the past and see that Battleships were clearly becoming obsolete, its much less clear for the people at the time. Aircraft were still a very 'fresh' invention even in the 20s, the pace of technological development was truly shocking. I think we can forgive people for at least being cautious. Did opposition / battleship adherents exist contrary to the growing evidence of carrier power? Absolutely. But it was far from uniform, not when the main blue water fleets all introduced carriers within the same space of time. (USA, UK, Japan) In fact navies were quite used to pretty radical changes and innovations in that time period, considering the blisteringly fast speed of battleship development for instance. Doctrinal changes are usually always slower than technological, if only because humans usually need some time to figure out the shiny new thing and how to use it to full potential. Just look at the wacky tank / mobile warfare concepts and theories in the 20s and 30s that came up before mechanised warfare settled into place. 

Much as we see today, we are seeing some major innovations but we cannot guess the full consequences of how they are going to pan out. Its evident that tanks and perhaps even mechanised warfare are going to change in some key ways, but its far less easy to determine how exactly things are going to look like or what that will ultimately result in terms of a force structure. For all we know the technology pendulum might swing hard in the other direction and suddenly drones have it rough on the battlefield for whatever reason. We are very early into this radical shift of military operation, if it is indeed coming. 

It makes sense to me that modern militaries are investing into both drone solutions and experimentation while also looking to upgrade / replace / develop new vehicles and platforms better able to survive a drone heavy environment. Its an understandable level of covering your bets so to speak. I simply caution that we might be arm chairing a little too much here and might be deriding procurement industries a little too hard. Most countries are -very- interested in drones and their growing prominence in warfare. They are also interested in making sure their vehicles can operate in said environment as clearly all militaries still want a mechanised force of some sort. Until doctrine adjusts or there is sufficient momentum to change technology wise (Which is an if) we are unlikely to see countries going 'all in' on major changes until they know for certain that they do in fact offer wholescale improvements. 

My question you Capt would be this, I agree on a variety of points you made back in one of your posts about what the future priorities might be and the emphasis on ranged firepower and ISR, but how would this look like in a typical military unit. Has anyone actually developed a tactical unit in line with your ideas? I am genuinely curious. What would a brigade look like in terms of composition? I personally feel like were going to see more gradual changes, new generations of vehicles, proliferation of drones on the platoon / squad level and gradual integration of UGV to current units for instance. Do you envision something more radical in terms of changes?

Apologies - this got long as I mused over your analogy. The shorter point is that it's not the machines, it's the theory of battle that the machines fit into. Whoever can shake loose of *that* fastest wins.
The transition from battleships to carriers is definitely a "slowly, then all at once" phenomenon, with inflection points at Taranto, the sinking of the Repulse, the creation of the Kido Butai, Coral Sea, and finally the creation and devastating use of TF38/58. Respectively, you've got proof that carrier borne aviation can sink capital ships at port, that (land based) aviation can sink capital ships at sea, that carrier based aviation can act as the primary power projection asset in a fleet, that naval battles need not involve ships firing at one another, and that carrier aviation can suppress and assault islands (which was previously deeply contrary to doctrine; the theory was that you can't sink islands). All of those seemed risky before they seemed inevitable.
I think the relevant think to think about is how each nation's *theory of battle* changed in the inter- and early war period. The Germans, British, French, and Italians did not have a coherent theory of naval battle, except that the Germans thought that commerce raiding was the way to go, either with submarines or with battleships. They envisioned their ships emerging from the fog or night, wailing on a convoy, and slipping away again. And that sort of worked for a while until the sheer productive power of the allies made it futile.
The Americans and Japanese, ironically, had the same picture of naval battle before Pearl Harbor: both battle lines would meet somewhere in the Phillipine Sea and slug it out in one decisive battle. Carriers would scout, and smaller ships and aviation would nibble around the edges until the battle lines could engage.
What made Pearl Harbor so shocking was that it was totally contrary to Japanese naval doctrine. And, weirdly, they never repeated its success, because they were *still committed to the pre-war vision of naval combat as two battle lines mauling each other*. Even in 1945! Both the Phillipine Sea and Leyte were totally misguided attempts to deliver a decisive battle.
The United States, on the other hand, quickly gave up on the idea of decisive battle and adopted something much more like corrosive warfare. Relatively few Japanese capital ships were sunk in things that an observer from 1915 would recognize as a "battle". It was submarines and airstrikes mercilessly attriting the Japanese fleet.
What does a land "battle" look like now that it's so distributed? I don't know. But it doesn't look like a heavy mechanized breach exploited by mechanized infantry supported by close air support. Whoever figures out a new theory of battle first is going to be in really good shape.
edit: To your point about old ideas dying hard, Halsely was still lured by decisive battle long after Spruance appears to have switched to a new paradigm, despite Spruance being a black shoe admiral.

Speed of response and better accuracy on target due to direct fire. Given the UA saying that Excalibur is not working well due to jamming and even considering the accuracy of 155 NATO, it still takes time and a few shots on target to strike accurately. Arty is also a valuable asset that as you say has its own issues of dealing with counter bat and loitering munitions. Artillery might be a 'safer' option but its not one that can be available all the time. You cant support infantry in their trench directly with an artillery piece either. There is clearly still value with direct fire even if indirect is increasingly supreme.

Think of it in a combat mission format: It takes time to coordinate and get the artillery on target and that might require correction, whereas a tank can simply be radioed into position and handle the problem from a respectable range. 

From the footage, it looks like the tank is cleaning up a failed assault, or some sort of target up in the open. This is quite literally a perfect role for the tank that can pull up quickly, move while under fire while striking the targets on the move and then leaving unscathed, whilst also surviving munitions sent to kill it. (You see what looks like a grad or other rocket strike land very near as well, something that would have shredded anything lighter) 

Bradley chaingun vs Russian drone.

Curious how they are not even bothering with applying ERA to the hull front but instead covering spots  more likely to be hit by FPVs and the like

Very interesting to see a volunteers perspective on how things have changed since 2022 to 2024. His comments about vehicles are very interesting and really do highlight how poorly suited old gen vehicles are in an environment filled with drones. Certainly explains why vehicles never usually stick around on the front. 

I also find the comment about better Russian soldiers on the front curious as well. I view it as the Russians running low on the storm Z units and actually having to use their 'proper' troops to man the front now, at least more overall. 

I do try to be pragmatic about these things. I am happy to concede that tanks originally built in the cold war period are no longer entirely fit for purpose as we see, at least in this sort of environment. In the same way a tank from 1939 was no longer fit for the battlefield in 1945. I do not think tanks as a concept are dead, but its clear major design changes are required. 

There needs to be a long hard think about vehicle protection and countermeasures overall for future design to any vehicle operating within the battlespace where FPV drones are prevalent. 
 
I expect to see a major shift towards these things being on the battlefield in far greater numbers. 

Oh man you have no idea. I had to read a lot of North Korean stuff when I was at DLI learning Korean. Some of the stuff we read was on the Juche philosophy espoused by Kim Il Sung. The English translations don't do it justice to how bats**t crazy it is. It's a weird mish-mash of Marxism-Leninism, old timey Korean feudalism, and Nazi-like race science. Even the PRC is like "dude, we don't really want anything to do with you but we'll prop you up because it pisses off the Americans and we don't want a failed state on our borders."

Damn, I think we have @ArmouredTopHat half convinced that tanks really are dead.

I wouldn't say lack of Western training support is "at fault", more like NATO knows how to train and maintain a modern fighting force vs whatever Russia does and what Ukraine does, and Ukrainians are aware of what works and what doesn't.
As the article I linked notes, Ukrainian commanders are reporting lack of basic training, including familiarity with weapons, firing, many not having fired any ammo in training.
A training instructor at a center reported only 20 bullets per trainee and no grenades or grenade launchers.
One of the links you posted, the Congressional report, notes
So sure the West has trained 122k in some form but the Ukrainian military went from its pre-invasion strength of 200k in total to a million today. We can definitely do more training and expansion in Europe to meet demand.

I was wondering when they would do this and its really good to see. Combining NATO training with instructors from the front in relation to the reality of the battlefield and drones is something I had hoped to see for a while now. Hopefully it happens in the UK and other locations. 

I was wondering when they would do this and its really good to see. Combining NATO training with instructors from the front in relation to the reality of the battlefield and drones is something I had hoped to see for a while now. Hopefully it happens in the UK and other locations. 

I was wondering when they would do this and its really good to see. Combining NATO training with instructors from the front in relation to the reality of the battlefield and drones is something I had hoped to see for a while now. Hopefully it happens in the UK and other locations. 

I recall those same sources indicating / complaining that Russian FPVs were susceptible to jamming quite a bit more than Ukrainian drones due to all being on a similar control frequency. Its possible loss rate was much higher as a result hence the rapid burning through stockpiles. Saw frequent Russian complaints about the quality of the drones as well.

I suspect the primary issue is the corrupt bureaucracy in Russia, as Perun states its a feature, not a bug and very much strangles these sorts of independent initiatives to the point of being stillborn. Ukraine has clearly done a far better job despite the resource mismatch.

I'll give FPV drones one thing that I perhaps did not consider before, the Russians can do literally diddly squat about hitting the production lines to any significant degree in Ukraine either, its so widely dispersed across the country that Russia would need to raze the entire country to the country before actually hampering its production. (They do seem to be trying that though) As long as Ukraine gets the money and components, its people can build FPVs in literal sheds.

Fascinating look at a turtle tank example captured recently by Ukraine. This one is an especially sorry example. 

Russia propagandists claim these are a sign of evolution against drone threats, I see them as little more than desperation attempts to make old vehicles have some sort of spearhead role. This particular example is clearly an attempt to make something otherwise useless useful. I wonder what the point of even keeping the turret / gun is if neither were functional.