ArmouredTopHat

I think its a bit unfair to say we have zero ideas on the subject. We have plenty of PD technology that works against a variety of missile threats, its really not that far out to assume we can design and build a small turret that can track and engage drone threats. Weaponry is a no brainer as well, presumably some sort of shotgun type weapon that would be light and reloadable. At that point you have something that can fit on pretty much any vehicle, UGV or otherwise firing literally some of the cheapest munitions available.

https://www.twz.com/tank-active-protection-systems-could-be-used-shoot-down-drones

I did some digging after the recent discussions and it certainly seems that at least with the Americans there is some serious thought about developing such systems. The linked article is honestly really informative. 




Interesting to note that the Ukrainians make it clear that conventional killers on the battlefield are still heavily prevalent as well. 
 

There is clearly a lot of talk about modifying existing current RWS systems as well. 
 
The article even mentions the idea of APS detection systems being slaved to RWS mountings for drone defence like I mentioned earlier, so clearly some level of thought is being considered to this.

I think its a bit unfair to say we have zero ideas on the subject. We have plenty of PD technology that works against a variety of missile threats, its really not that far out to assume we can design and build a small turret that can track and engage drone threats. Weaponry is a no brainer as well, presumably some sort of shotgun type weapon that would be light and reloadable. At that point you have something that can fit on pretty much any vehicle, UGV or otherwise firing literally some of the cheapest munitions available.

https://www.twz.com/tank-active-protection-systems-could-be-used-shoot-down-drones

I did some digging after the recent discussions and it certainly seems that at least with the Americans there is some serious thought about developing such systems. The linked article is honestly really informative. 




Interesting to note that the Ukrainians make it clear that conventional killers on the battlefield are still heavily prevalent as well. 
 

There is clearly a lot of talk about modifying existing current RWS systems as well. 
 
The article even mentions the idea of APS detection systems being slaved to RWS mountings for drone defence like I mentioned earlier, so clearly some level of thought is being considered to this.

Provided you have the information and can make pragmatic assessments based on reasoning and evidence, even armchair generals can make pretty accurate assessments / conclusions on military operations. We can be overwhelmingly pro Ukraine and still make such balanced assessments regarding both sides military operations provided we scrutinise the AFU in the same we do to the Russians (The Ukrainians can and do make mistakes that have received plenty of criticisms here and elsewhere)  

Saying that something 'failed dismally' without much of anything to back it up is both crude and in this case flies in the face of reality, at least from the information that we have access to.

The fact that the Israelis are able to employ mass armour effectively in a tight, urban environment against opposition that has a fair bit of AT capability (Both home grown and imported) with minimal losses is clearly something significant, especially when we know that traditionally this is an environment that tanks have normally suffered horribly in. (Grozy comes to mind, same level of insurgency against mass armour) How are the systems Hamas use any different from the systems the Russians have when it comes to ATGMs and RPGs?

If we saw masses of burned out Merkava's I would be less certain, but its clear they have pretty dominant so far. 

My argument would be if APS was of dubious value then Israel would not be actively clamouring for as many as they can get their hands on. A decade of them going 'this works well and we want more' seems to be pretty compelling to me and is anything but short term. I seem to recall they were pretty cautious with the system at first. Now they want to equip -every- vehicle with it. All evidence shows that the system has been working and has undoubtedly saved far more in terms of monetary value of potential lost vehicles to the cost of the system as a whole. 

I am not saying its a silver bullet system, but its just another step down the road of a very complex and continuous war between protection and firepower and seems pretty obviously of value. 

Thank you, it honestly means a lot. I for one am enjoying the different perspectives here, even if I have my reservations or disagreements and concerns with some of them. No one is making bad or poorly structured points and I honestly find it refreshing. 

Thank you, it honestly means a lot. I for one am enjoying the different perspectives here, even if I have my reservations or disagreements and concerns with some of them. No one is making bad or poorly structured points and I honestly find it refreshing. 

This is not quite accurate, at least according to official armoured force doctrine of 1942:
Medium tanks.-(a) The primary mission of medium tank units is to assist the attack of the light tank units, chiefly by neutralizing or destroying the hostile antitank weapons. When organized resistance is encountered, especially antitank guns, medium tank units will usually precede the light tank units for this purpose. The use of one or more platoons of medium tanks following the attack of light tank units for supporting fire will frequently be desirable. Tanks so employed, for short periods, should assume turret defilade positions from which they can bring direct fire to bear on hostile antitank weapons as they are found.
(b) Medium tanks also protect the light tanks against the attack of hostile tanks. When the enemy is composed of mechanized troops, a large medium tank component, if available, is held in the reserve.

Tank destroyers meanwhile:
 
Missions.-(a) The mission of the tank destroyer with the armored division is to assist either by offensive or defensive action in the protection of the division against hostile mechanized forces.
(b) The battalion may be used to-
1. Protect a bivouac, assembly area, or rallying point.
2. Guard an exposed flank.
3. Protect the rear of the division.
(c) The battalion may be used as a unit or companies may be attached to armored regiments or combat commands. Except when actually emplaced to protect a bivouac, assembly area, or rallying point, tank destroyer units should be held in mobile reserve, prepared to move promptly to any threatened area.

Straight from armoured force: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM17-10.PDF

It is probably more accurate to say that tank destroyers battalions were designed to  counter large, concentrated armour actions, while the tanks were designed and required to pretty much fight everything they encountered if needed, but had particular focus on the neutralisation of anti tank assets in turn. 

I really did believe he was going to do something of the sort, just abruptly declare victory in his SMO and push for withdrawal / ceasefire after it was clear things were not exactly going ideally. It would of at least given him a reasonable off ramp he could get to stick domestically while preserving his military. Instead he doubled down and annexed four more Oblasts without even actually controlling any of them fully, including one of the four -capitals- of the oblast itself (which was soon joined by a second with Kherson liberated) 

Any fleeting notion to me that Putin was playing some strange form of 4D chess well and truly died by that point. He really is just riding this sorry train ride until it reaches the wrecked bridge at the end of the railroad. 

Hamas has both domestically produced tandem RPGs and stuff imported, they are by no means defenceless, especially in a city environment with extensive tunnel systems. They even received some Kornets somehow:

 https://www.thecipherbrief.com/a-look-inside-hamass-weapons-arsenal

Hezbollah also have plenty of AT weaponry and the Trophy equipped tanks have gone up against them as well just fine. I am not suggesting that the disparity is anything equal here (its not) as I said before this is very reminiscent of Grozy where poorly armed Chechens went up against entire tank units. They typically had little more than basic RPGs yet were able to devastate tank units. Here the Israelis are clearly enjoying more success. 

From the footage we have, we clearly see Hamas are trying to ambush Merkevas with multiple RPGs. Seeing everything from Rpg-7 to 29s. This is not the most poorly armed group of people I have seen. Some source even state they have some North Korean ATGMs. Its a truly crazy variety of kit but its still dangerous in a city environment. 

You joked about them having an RND department...but actually...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yasin_(RPG)

Poignant, graphic and horrific at the same time. Apologies if already posted.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/03/world/europe/ukraine-destruction.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
(may be pay-walled)

The Thing is Russia could have declared victory, and gotten a pretty good deal in March of 2022. Recognition of Crimea as part of Russia and bunch of small and medium sized stuff. Putin simply did not have the sense to settle for a small win, so he has ground the Russian military to rotting meat paste and rusting scrap metal instead.

I am starting to think that Ukraine almost has everything it needs to start pushing back the Russians. The F16s will arrive in a few months, assuming they can locally push back the russian air force, and more mobilised troops as well (I am assuming they continue to have adequate ammunition).
But in my opinion we are still missing a final piece of the puzzle, which would probably not suprise anyone here: an effective way to counter Russian observation drones. I think Russia relies on them more than ever due to the loss of trained forward observers and they are undeniably effective. If Ukraine can nullify them locally, that would allow them to do a bit of old-fashioned maneuver warfare and potentially take back territory (or at least aggressively corrode the Russians until they counter the counter). 
If they can't eliminate these drones then russian artillery stays in the fight, and even if Ukrainian counter battery is effective the Russians can still throw a lot of tubes and crews into the meat grinder...
 

Just to point out just how much russian troops suck
This engagement has been posted already but just a basic look at where the losses come from and how it failed
03:40 - 04:30
         tanks move around obstacle on path, 1st mtlb stopps before it, second one runns up behind it, first one reverses              over second one, both seem to be immobilized, one fpv hit no bda
         infantry dismounts and is destroyed by arty and drones, mtlb burns not clear if arty or fpv
05:43
        mine hit on mine rollers, no effect
07:00 - 07:12
       pfv hit leaking fuel (same tank is hit at 16:00)
09:01 -
         tanks retreat, no use of smoke or supression fires, gets kod by rpg finished by arty
10:30
        fpv miss
13:52
     tank gets stuck trying to cross anti tank ditch in road
14:35
     tank stuck in mud same axis as first stuck tank
16:00 - 16:08
     another fpv hit no visible effect
16:40 - 16:57
     tank drives into ditch and fpv hit another (immobilized tank in the same ditch possibly from previous engagements)        they call as kod
17:29 - 17:40
    same tank hit with fpv again already burning so possibly another one not filmed
22:50 - 23:15
    fpv hit mtlb cought fire
So russians attack with 2 columns of 2 tanks + 4 mtlb
3 of the 4 tanks get bogged, 1 forgets to use smoke and gets an rpg while turning 2 mtlb run over each other and get immobilized. So before we even consider any actually connecting ukrainian hits the russian drivers alone managed a 40% loss rate.
If we add the rpg hit to the tally because not using smoke made that even possible were looking at a 50% attrition rate for vehicles just from bad training. Add the infantry platoon that had to dismount early as a result and gut mauled were also looking at 50% of the infantry strength.
And i dont want to downplay the ukrainian contribution since the drones were what secured those kills spotting for arty and fpv finishing off vehicles. But if this ****show of an attack is in any way usual id consider assigning the vast majority of the current situation to russian incompetence.

I really did believe he was going to do something of the sort, just abruptly declare victory in his SMO and push for withdrawal / ceasefire after it was clear things were not exactly going ideally. It would of at least given him a reasonable off ramp he could get to stick domestically while preserving his military. Instead he doubled down and annexed four more Oblasts without even actually controlling any of them fully, including one of the four -capitals- of the oblast itself (which was soon joined by a second with Kherson liberated) 

Any fleeting notion to me that Putin was playing some strange form of 4D chess well and truly died by that point. He really is just riding this sorry train ride until it reaches the wrecked bridge at the end of the railroad. 

My take on things is that #1 and #2 were initially far more of consequence in the first year of conflict, especially in the first few months. As things stand now? Its clearly more weighted towards #3, though I would argue there is still plenty of evidence for the Russians doing a lot of questionable things and that Ukraine is still largely outperforming prior expectations in its ability to resist. 

The fact of the matter is, everyone expected Russia to launch its own version of desert storm, at least when it came to ground based capability and to see otherwise was a profound surprise. This stage of the conflict featured limited amount of NATO weaponry for Ukraine (especially high end stuff) while the Russians were entirely fresh with their new BTGs and clearly had at least some well equipped and trained units (VDV for instance) Drones for recon were certainly a thing but it was still very much adhoc, and of course there was nothing close to grenade dropping drones, or FPVs at all. In essence this phase of the war was about as conventionally 'traditional' as any other conflict prior outside of scale.

The Ukrainians were taken by surprise (At least in some areas) which allowed the Russians to make a pretty large scale attack on numerous fronts within the first twenty four hours.

Yet the Russians almost immediately suffered tonnes of horrendous reverses and were making a lot of questionable choices, while the Ukrainians clearly showed a resolve that -no one- was expecting even if it was not all going their own way in some areas. Things like  not having your AD network turned on properly to allow TB-2s to strike your air defence assets as one example of many is clear incompetence and it cannot be framed in another other way. Expecting your opposition to not fight back properly is another good example of how arrogance is a horrible trait for the battlefield and it was punished accordingly. 

As the weeks went by it was clear that something was deeply wrong as initial gains withered, supply columns measured in the dozens of miles were spotted from orbit and dozens upon dozens of videos of destroyed Russian columns appeared. This was a war that Russia should have been perfectly capable of fighting and yet it was not. We got snippets of what was going on as time went on, from Russian unit coordination between BTGs being shockingly poor, to the claim that most soldiers were not even aware they are in Ukraine until they were being shot at. I still remember the pictures showing Russians were relying on cheap Chinese radios instead of the fancy Akveduk systems they were supposed to have. You cannot tell me that Russian incompetence / lack of preparation was not key when Russian officers were struggling to contact their soldiers and having to resort to unsecured mobile phones to do so.

A lot of it I suppose was the propaganda bubble bursting, that the image of the Russian army with its modernisation efforts like Ratnik would be a credible peer adversary to NATO. Certainly the Russians seemed to think so. In reality of course, its clear that severe corruption has been a cancer to a lot of these efforts, and the results were clear just from 2022 how bad it had debilitated the entire force. These corruption issues are not things that go away easily. As Perun said quite well. It is a feature, not a bug. 
 

As a note to FPV usage in general, this is the first conflict that has truly demonstrated the value and potency of such system in widescale use. Against inventories of vehicles designed largely in the cold war its no surprise in many respects that FPV's have been so deadly. No one has really had to sit down and look at the reality as it stands on the battlefield to this degree before. 

I challenge the drone supremacy thinkers among us to think on this. What happens when the shoe is on the other foot? Historically new weapons or systems tend to be countered in some form of another, and we are only just at the starting point for weaponised drones. Is it not possible to consider that systems  could or will be designed in the future that heavily curtail drones? We already see plenty of systems in areas like EWAR that inflict pretty heavy losses on drone platforms, to me it feels a little strange to think that said systems will not evolve and be complimented by others, even as drones evolve themselves. I feel like the only certainty here is that there will be a race of sorts to be acted out, or just an extension of the rivalry between offensive and defensive systems that we have seen on vehicles since the first world war. 

Consider the following scenario. One nation goes all out on drones and unmanned systems while largely discarding manned vehicles, while another goes heavy on APS / drone killing technology on their own vehicles. Of course this is all entirely theoretical (I dont think anyone really can predict the future of warfare with any certainty) but just hear me out.

What happens if it turns out that a mass of new gen vehicles operating APS / drone countering systems are able to effectively deal with drones. Suddenly the other nation might be regretting getting rid of its tanks or manned mobile elements when its getting overrun by its enemy without a proper means to deal with them. 

I suppose the point I am trying (and likely failing) to make is that I am very wary of singular systems turning the whole system on its head, or assuming that other systems are going to remain exactly the same. Its obvious drones are going to be a very real and massive element on the battlefield, but I cant help but feel like systems currently in use will simply adapt like they do when any new fangled technology reaches the battlefield. 

I do apologise for the rambling. 
 

The fact that the Israelis are able to employ mass armour effectively in a tight, urban environment against opposition that has a fair bit of AT capability (Both home grown and imported) with minimal losses is clearly something significant, especially when we know that traditionally this is an environment that tanks have normally suffered horribly in. (Grozy comes to mind, same level of insurgency against mass armour) How are the systems Hamas use any different from the systems the Russians have when it comes to ATGMs and RPGs?

If we saw masses of burned out Merkava's I would be less certain, but its clear they have pretty dominant so far. 

My argument would be if APS was of dubious value then Israel would not be actively clamouring for as many as they can get their hands on. A decade of them going 'this works well and we want more' seems to be pretty compelling to me and is anything but short term. I seem to recall they were pretty cautious with the system at first. Now they want to equip -every- vehicle with it. All evidence shows that the system has been working and has undoubtedly saved far more in terms of monetary value of potential lost vehicles to the cost of the system as a whole. 

I am not saying its a silver bullet system, but its just another step down the road of a very complex and continuous war between protection and firepower and seems pretty obviously of value. 

I really did believe he was going to do something of the sort, just abruptly declare victory in his SMO and push for withdrawal / ceasefire after it was clear things were not exactly going ideally. It would of at least given him a reasonable off ramp he could get to stick domestically while preserving his military. Instead he doubled down and annexed four more Oblasts without even actually controlling any of them fully, including one of the four -capitals- of the oblast itself (which was soon joined by a second with Kherson liberated) 

Any fleeting notion to me that Putin was playing some strange form of 4D chess well and truly died by that point. He really is just riding this sorry train ride until it reaches the wrecked bridge at the end of the railroad. 

Give this as read:
https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf
Especially from about page 14 on.  Weirdly the Russians had a far more detailed plan for occupation than they did for the initial invasion - they basically made a bunch of assumptions, that let to more assumptions, that became “facts” over time.  But for the occupation they had put in a lot of effort.  Their plans were brutal, as demonstrated on how they have been managing the occupied territories.   They had no intention of pulling back after making a point.  This was a full on grab, smother and control job from the get go.
There is a part 2 for this but I have not read it yet:
https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Unconventional-Weapons-final-web.pdf

As a note to FPV usage in general, this is the first conflict that has truly demonstrated the value and potency of such system in widescale use. Against inventories of vehicles designed largely in the cold war its no surprise in many respects that FPV's have been so deadly. No one has really had to sit down and look at the reality as it stands on the battlefield to this degree before. 

I challenge the drone supremacy thinkers among us to think on this. What happens when the shoe is on the other foot? Historically new weapons or systems tend to be countered in some form of another, and we are only just at the starting point for weaponised drones. Is it not possible to consider that systems  could or will be designed in the future that heavily curtail drones? We already see plenty of systems in areas like EWAR that inflict pretty heavy losses on drone platforms, to me it feels a little strange to think that said systems will not evolve and be complimented by others, even as drones evolve themselves. I feel like the only certainty here is that there will be a race of sorts to be acted out, or just an extension of the rivalry between offensive and defensive systems that we have seen on vehicles since the first world war. 

Consider the following scenario. One nation goes all out on drones and unmanned systems while largely discarding manned vehicles, while another goes heavy on APS / drone killing technology on their own vehicles. Of course this is all entirely theoretical (I dont think anyone really can predict the future of warfare with any certainty) but just hear me out.

What happens if it turns out that a mass of new gen vehicles operating APS / drone countering systems are able to effectively deal with drones. Suddenly the other nation might be regretting getting rid of its tanks or manned mobile elements when its getting overrun by its enemy without a proper means to deal with them. 

I suppose the point I am trying (and likely failing) to make is that I am very wary of singular systems turning the whole system on its head, or assuming that other systems are going to remain exactly the same. Its obvious drones are going to be a very real and massive element on the battlefield, but I cant help but feel like systems currently in use will simply adapt like they do when any new fangled technology reaches the battlefield. 

I do apologise for the rambling. 
 

We have seen soldiers using shotguns to some effect against drones on the battlefield. Its really not a far cry to assume that a mounting for a shotgun type weapon that uses Trophy's detection system can do a decent job of defeating drones coming at it. 

I am sure we will see quite a bit of testing for such systems in the next few years given how prevalent FPVs are. 

This one took a bit of digging but also appears to show the Kornet interception during combat. The technology has matured a lot since 2014 as well. 

My take on things is that #1 and #2 were initially far more of consequence in the first year of conflict, especially in the first few months. As things stand now? Its clearly more weighted towards #3, though I would argue there is still plenty of evidence for the Russians doing a lot of questionable things and that Ukraine is still largely outperforming prior expectations in its ability to resist. 

The fact of the matter is, everyone expected Russia to launch its own version of desert storm, at least when it came to ground based capability and to see otherwise was a profound surprise. This stage of the conflict featured limited amount of NATO weaponry for Ukraine (especially high end stuff) while the Russians were entirely fresh with their new BTGs and clearly had at least some well equipped and trained units (VDV for instance) Drones for recon were certainly a thing but it was still very much adhoc, and of course there was nothing close to grenade dropping drones, or FPVs at all. In essence this phase of the war was about as conventionally 'traditional' as any other conflict prior outside of scale.

The Ukrainians were taken by surprise (At least in some areas) which allowed the Russians to make a pretty large scale attack on numerous fronts within the first twenty four hours.

Yet the Russians almost immediately suffered tonnes of horrendous reverses and were making a lot of questionable choices, while the Ukrainians clearly showed a resolve that -no one- was expecting even if it was not all going their own way in some areas. Things like  not having your AD network turned on properly to allow TB-2s to strike your air defence assets as one example of many is clear incompetence and it cannot be framed in another other way. Expecting your opposition to not fight back properly is another good example of how arrogance is a horrible trait for the battlefield and it was punished accordingly. 

As the weeks went by it was clear that something was deeply wrong as initial gains withered, supply columns measured in the dozens of miles were spotted from orbit and dozens upon dozens of videos of destroyed Russian columns appeared. This was a war that Russia should have been perfectly capable of fighting and yet it was not. We got snippets of what was going on as time went on, from Russian unit coordination between BTGs being shockingly poor, to the claim that most soldiers were not even aware they are in Ukraine until they were being shot at. I still remember the pictures showing Russians were relying on cheap Chinese radios instead of the fancy Akveduk systems they were supposed to have. You cannot tell me that Russian incompetence / lack of preparation was not key when Russian officers were struggling to contact their soldiers and having to resort to unsecured mobile phones to do so.

A lot of it I suppose was the propaganda bubble bursting, that the image of the Russian army with its modernisation efforts like Ratnik would be a credible peer adversary to NATO. Certainly the Russians seemed to think so. In reality of course, its clear that severe corruption has been a cancer to a lot of these efforts, and the results were clear just from 2022 how bad it had debilitated the entire force. These corruption issues are not things that go away easily. As Perun said quite well. It is a feature, not a bug. 
 

Israel has been making excellent use of Trophy on a wide scale and seem pretty damn satisfied with its performance. Plenty of footage around showing them intercepting all manner of projectiles pretty consistently. Its been reported to have intercepted relatively good ATGM systems such as Kornet as well, all the way back in 2014. The fact that numerous countries are planning to introduce the system seems to tell me that its capable enough for widespread service.
 


As for the Russians....well they claimed to have Arena working but the complete lack of any showing of the system tells me they were probably very much fibbing about that. Only hardkill APS we have seen in Ukraine is the freak T-80UM-2 that was destroyed a while back using the old Drozd system and I dont think it was even working. 

To me, it seems obvious that APS can be readily adjusted to deal with loitering munitions as well. If its capable of intercepting fast projectiles its more than capable of assessing and deleting a drone flying in as well. Could even see systems that include a lightweight 'shotgun' type weapon reserved for drone threats while the main system deals with rockets / missiles. 

I feel like this is where larger UGVS might see some real mass use first. Using them for logistics frees up a lot of manpower and EWAR is less of an issue further behind the lines. Less need to protect them to the same degree as manned systems means a cheaper force overall that does not have to deal with many of the downsides of unmanned systems that currently exist. 
 
This seems a strange attitude to have when first generation APS systems have more than proven their value in combat. Next gen APS systems actually integrated with the vehicle from the start instead of being an add-on will only get better and cheaper, especially if armies are sensible enough to make them reloadable in the field. 

The cost is literally negligible when you consider an APS can save a vehicle that would otherwise be destroyed. The notion that the majority of missile threats can be somewhat reliably prevented from striking a vehicle is value enough, factor in potential dual role of FPV / loitering munition interception and you massively increase the value of a vehicle for a fraction of its cost. 

Whenever you believe in tanks or not, there -will- be manned systems of some sort on the field of battle for a long time yet, and they need every bit of protection possible. APS is literally a no brainer to not only saving vehicles and their cost but also the lives of the people crewing them. 
 
With the correspondingly wide array of varying results...not to mention some truly...questionable practises.