BeondTheGrave

Given the situation in Venezuela (its oil infrastructure remains, in effect, crippled thanks to a lack of western and domestic investment), and the US's long term failure to solve the Iran situation, the only two major sources which could cover the oil gap would surely be either North America (US & Canada) or the Saudis. IDK how much surplus unused productions the Saudis are currently sitting on, if it would be enough to get Europe over the short term bump in prices. But IMO the Saudis would have a lot to gain by opening up the floodgates and keeping global prices relatively low. If not prices will rise. As I recall the biggest impediment to North American production is its locked up in shale deposits which are expensive to explore and establish, most oil companies wont do it unless oil is over a certain price per bbl. If the Saudis cant, then global prices will rise to the point where North American producers can turn a profit and stabilize the market. The only alternatives for the EU would either be to back down on a big oil sanction, or turn to another unsavory regime (say, Syria) for an easement. The EU has before been very skeptical of US sanctions on Iran, with the collapse of the JCPOA I could see some horse trading behind the scenes for the EU, "Sanctions on Russian oil or Iranian. Your choice." I don't know the numbers off the top of my head, but I bet that Iranian oil could pretty much replace Russian in Europe at not much different a cost. 
Regarding Russian strategy, I tend to agree with @CHEqTRO and others who say that Putin is now paying a MAJOR cost for just occupying two republics who were, in effect, already his. At the minimum I dont see how he can avoid pushing forward to securing their aspirational borders. Even then that would be a major price to pay for a cost that seems pretty heavy. Were there any rumblings that the breakaway republics might negotiate with Kiev or abandon Russia? If all this had happened in the course of a few weeks I think the calculus would be different, but now the US has had months to organize and denounce Putin. I dont think a limited invasion makes the US look like warmongers or weak, rather it would make Putin look like he backed down under western pressure. And I wonder if Ukraine is going to be so willing to retreat from its long established defenses to let the Russians have more territory. A war of positions would, IMO, be much more beneficial to them especially if the hammer of troops on the other borders never comes for the Anvil of the breakaway republics. Better than to fight for every hamlet and trench, where Ukrainian troops already know the positions and the ranges, then open up a war of movement with a bigger enemy. All thats to say I think the stage is set for a much bigger rumble coming up. Putin needs to make this into a win, the US needs to prove to the world this isn't Suez, and needs to prove to China that it will face the same punishment in a Taiwan crisis. 
Meanwhile the people on the streets of Kiev are the ones who suffer. 

Given the situation in Venezuela (its oil infrastructure remains, in effect, crippled thanks to a lack of western and domestic investment), and the US's long term failure to solve the Iran situation, the only two major sources which could cover the oil gap would surely be either North America (US & Canada) or the Saudis. IDK how much surplus unused productions the Saudis are currently sitting on, if it would be enough to get Europe over the short term bump in prices. But IMO the Saudis would have a lot to gain by opening up the floodgates and keeping global prices relatively low. If not prices will rise. As I recall the biggest impediment to North American production is its locked up in shale deposits which are expensive to explore and establish, most oil companies wont do it unless oil is over a certain price per bbl. If the Saudis cant, then global prices will rise to the point where North American producers can turn a profit and stabilize the market. The only alternatives for the EU would either be to back down on a big oil sanction, or turn to another unsavory regime (say, Syria) for an easement. The EU has before been very skeptical of US sanctions on Iran, with the collapse of the JCPOA I could see some horse trading behind the scenes for the EU, "Sanctions on Russian oil or Iranian. Your choice." I don't know the numbers off the top of my head, but I bet that Iranian oil could pretty much replace Russian in Europe at not much different a cost. 
Regarding Russian strategy, I tend to agree with @CHEqTRO and others who say that Putin is now paying a MAJOR cost for just occupying two republics who were, in effect, already his. At the minimum I dont see how he can avoid pushing forward to securing their aspirational borders. Even then that would be a major price to pay for a cost that seems pretty heavy. Were there any rumblings that the breakaway republics might negotiate with Kiev or abandon Russia? If all this had happened in the course of a few weeks I think the calculus would be different, but now the US has had months to organize and denounce Putin. I dont think a limited invasion makes the US look like warmongers or weak, rather it would make Putin look like he backed down under western pressure. And I wonder if Ukraine is going to be so willing to retreat from its long established defenses to let the Russians have more territory. A war of positions would, IMO, be much more beneficial to them especially if the hammer of troops on the other borders never comes for the Anvil of the breakaway republics. Better than to fight for every hamlet and trench, where Ukrainian troops already know the positions and the ranges, then open up a war of movement with a bigger enemy. All thats to say I think the stage is set for a much bigger rumble coming up. Putin needs to make this into a win, the US needs to prove to the world this isn't Suez, and needs to prove to China that it will face the same punishment in a Taiwan crisis. 
Meanwhile the people on the streets of Kiev are the ones who suffer. 

Here is a streetview look at the ambush sight from the north, looking south to the bridge

And here is my version:

Pretty close. Youll notice that I had to make a few changes. First, for Aesthetics sake I had to widen the road bed. So the berm doesn't loom over the road as much as it does IRL. I think this actually plays to UA's advantage as its harder for the RA to shoot into the far ditch. But its still very possible, so I made the lefthand (eastern) ditch a bit deeper in this area. Now a pixeltruppen can stand up fully and their head will not poke up over the road surface. But because the RA on the right (western side) is elevated, they can still mostly shoot into the ditch anyway. It is what it is. 
Here is a street view from roughly the UA spawn:

And here is the same view in engine:

Again, the berm doesn't dominate. And of course I had to set my level in June because only summer textures are available in CMBS. But from a gameplay perspective I think you will find that it plays as you expect, given the engine limitations. 
 
 

The Battle for Highway E97
Size: Small
400m x 1000m
https://www.mediafire.com/file/at4xaiw54kjqeqs/Battle_for_E97_v1.zip/file
THIS MAP WAS MADE WITH CMBS ALL IN ONE MOD ASSETS 
Hello All,
A few days ago I saw a video of a Russian element, perhaps platoon sized, ambushing two UA BRDM-2s and dismounts. The video can be found here if youre interested. I had thought that the are looked interesting, the Ukrainian commander was confronted by an exception circumstance, and it appeared a sharp firefight resulted from the contact. To me these all seem like the ingredients for an interesting CM map, so thats what I made. In testing though I found that there isn't actually much to it. The firefight is intense, but short. Either the RA crushes the convoy before the BRDMs return fire, or they get suppressed and picked apart. The scenario exists as an interesting 'test' of the TACAI in a real world inspired situation, but ultimately it was my conclusion that TACAI on both sides often overperformed what the video suggests that actual results were. Looking at what I was making I think the map and the tactical situation lends itself to an interesting CM fight if I was willing to deviate a bit from the footage I was referencing. Therefore in the .zip file you will find 3 scenarios, two serious and one for fun, all based on this real world engagement. 
Scen 1- As it Happened (AIH): This scenario is based on the video footage as seen, as well as some normal mapmaking tools like Google Earth. It is possible to play either the RA or UA side, both are recommended. I find it is easiest to replicate the simulated engagement with the RA side. My suggestion is to wait until the BRDMs move into the kill zone and then push your forward to the crest of the berm. DO NOT SET TARGET ARCS OR MANUAL TARGETS. Either gives your forces a big advantage, especially against the BRDMs. In most of my testing what happens next conforms, more or less, to what happened in the video. For the UA, if you wish the pursue the historical plan, Set up a path of 'FAST' movement orders through the arcing portion of the highway. On the first action square of the 'straightaway' set your BRDMs to either 'quick' or 'move' (I prefer quick). Once the Russians start hammering you, dismount and engage. I find that from the UA perspective, results tend to skew towards either extreme. Either you get wiped out in a turn, or your BRDMs turn around and open fire, pinning the Russians. Really I find this scenario to be an interesting test of TACAI against a real world scenario. Its a case study of just one, so its results dont really mean anything, but I found that both the Russians and the Ukrainians tend to be more lethal, shoot more accurately, than what we saw in the video. This is doubly true if the player interacts even a little bit with their forces, as the Russians its not hard to wipe out the BRDMs if you want to do that. 
A couple notes regarding scenario design: First, there is no right or wrong way to play it, but there is an intended way. The intention is to give you an encounter like is seen in the video. You can try multiple approaches if you'd like, but if you diverge too much from the premise you can quite easily break the AI and produce unusual results. Second, the force composition may look a bit....odd... for both sides. For the RA, I wanted scout teams that had no RPGs. None appear in the video and obviously at the ranges were talking about RPGs would be murderous. But I would have to drop the ammo levels to 'severe' to do it and found that had a negative impact on the Russian's ability to ambush the BRDMs. But I realized that if I swapped scout squads for 1 FO and 1LMG squad each, I maintained the same weight of fire without either bringing RPGs. For the UA the problem is a bit different and relates to the BRDM's modeled carrying capacity. BRDMs are modeled with a crew of 2 and a carry capacity of 4 dismounts. I have no idea where this info comes from, but I generally think BFG's modeling is pretty reliable. The video claims a UA strength of 14+ which, to me, just seems way to high. Unless they were also riding Desant, but I dont think the video establishes that. The issue for the UA force in the scenario is that it doesn't all fit onto the BRDMs. The TOE force would be a six man recon squad plus a two man HQ. But the recon squad splits into three and three, meaning it doesnt fit into the BRDM with the HQ team. So either I deleted the HQ to fit in the squad, or I developed a different option. Ultimately I made a decision to make the scenario a bit more interesting, but a little less like the video. I kept the HQ platoon mounted in the BRDM and added an attached LMG squad, increasingly slightly the firepower for the recon squad. The leftover three man team I put into a building marked 'Survivors!' The objective ultimately is to extract the survivor team. The survivor team CAN interfere with the if put on the 2nd level or roof. If you want to keep them out of the action, put them on the 1st floor, restricted target arc, and on hide. 
Scen 2- Enhanced (E):  The second included Scenario is called 'Enhanced' and tries to make a traditional CM mission out of what footage we saw. The objectives are the same, though point values have been rebalanced. Scout the convoy route and extract survivors for the UA, destroy follow on forces for the RA. But the forces have been increased to roughly Platoon vs. Coy (-). The Russians have received two more scout platoons, complete with RPGs, as well as some light armored vehicle support. The UA received the support of a 'Quick Reaction Force' made up of the leftover squad from the 2nd recon platoon as well as the entirety of the 1st recon platoon. These are mounted mostly in BTR-70s, though one BTR-4E has also been included for heavy lifting. The QRF also comes with an MT-LB for the player to use extracting the survivors, which have also increased in number. Both sides get mortar support. Ultimately the UA has an advantage here in mobility and vehicle support, but the RA has infantry numbers and the stronger position. This scenario is best played either HTH or Blue vs AI. It has both Red and Blue AI plans, but I spent way more time working on the Red AI than the Blue. TBH I just dont think any blue AI would be capable of doing what I want them to do, the survivors would be sitting ducks in an extraction to any human with half a brain. I do think though that this scenario would be really interesting for HTH play, it could be worth a try. So I did make sure every scenario contained an equivalent red briefing. 
The VPs have also been rebalanced here to reflect the new forces. Mostly the UA is working to deny the RA VPs. They gain points by touching the recon objectives and by hitting the listed casualty threshold. The RA gains points by killing UA soldiers via unit objectives. Survivor squads are worth the most, then squads in the BRDM platoon, then the lowest value is the QRF force. As the UA player, you want to risk your QRF troops while your Survivors the least. OTOH the RA is going to want to squeeze the survivor's position BEFORE the QRF can relieve them. 
Scen 3-UA is OP plz Nerf (UAOP): This is a joke scenario but I thought some might like a little catharsis. If you just want to blow the hell out of some Russians this is for you. It uses Scen 2 as a base but further modifies the UA force. The QRF has been reinforced to two platoons mounted in BTR-4Es. Two tanks from the commanders reserve have also been included as immobile bunkers. They have excellent FOV and can smash everything the Russians throw up. Oh and the Mortars have been upgraded to 122mm arty. And a little surprise from the UAF. 
If you keep the .zip around, you can just drop the single scenario you want to play into your scenario folder. No mess, no clutter!
I will follow this thread up with a thread of screenshots, stay tuned! 

Just tried, can you reload ammo in the editor or is this a first turn thing the player has to do? I dont see the acquire command in the editor. 
The wrinkle is this is something the AI has to do for itself. Might be that I just have to accept the ammo borging. Its a short engagement anyway, more important that OPFOR doesn't have RPGs than it can fight forever. 
Edit, FO teams have one less man, but no RPGs. LMG+2FO teams would replace the 2 scout sections I was looking to use in terms of firepower, but no RPGs. Probably the solution. Thanks for the advice!

The Battle for Highway E97
Size: Small
400m x 1000m
https://www.mediafire.com/file/at4xaiw54kjqeqs/Battle_for_E97_v1.zip/file
THIS MAP WAS MADE WITH CMBS ALL IN ONE MOD ASSETS 
Hello All,
A few days ago I saw a video of a Russian element, perhaps platoon sized, ambushing two UA BRDM-2s and dismounts. The video can be found here if youre interested. I had thought that the are looked interesting, the Ukrainian commander was confronted by an exception circumstance, and it appeared a sharp firefight resulted from the contact. To me these all seem like the ingredients for an interesting CM map, so thats what I made. In testing though I found that there isn't actually much to it. The firefight is intense, but short. Either the RA crushes the convoy before the BRDMs return fire, or they get suppressed and picked apart. The scenario exists as an interesting 'test' of the TACAI in a real world inspired situation, but ultimately it was my conclusion that TACAI on both sides often overperformed what the video suggests that actual results were. Looking at what I was making I think the map and the tactical situation lends itself to an interesting CM fight if I was willing to deviate a bit from the footage I was referencing. Therefore in the .zip file you will find 3 scenarios, two serious and one for fun, all based on this real world engagement. 
Scen 1- As it Happened (AIH): This scenario is based on the video footage as seen, as well as some normal mapmaking tools like Google Earth. It is possible to play either the RA or UA side, both are recommended. I find it is easiest to replicate the simulated engagement with the RA side. My suggestion is to wait until the BRDMs move into the kill zone and then push your forward to the crest of the berm. DO NOT SET TARGET ARCS OR MANUAL TARGETS. Either gives your forces a big advantage, especially against the BRDMs. In most of my testing what happens next conforms, more or less, to what happened in the video. For the UA, if you wish the pursue the historical plan, Set up a path of 'FAST' movement orders through the arcing portion of the highway. On the first action square of the 'straightaway' set your BRDMs to either 'quick' or 'move' (I prefer quick). Once the Russians start hammering you, dismount and engage. I find that from the UA perspective, results tend to skew towards either extreme. Either you get wiped out in a turn, or your BRDMs turn around and open fire, pinning the Russians. Really I find this scenario to be an interesting test of TACAI against a real world scenario. Its a case study of just one, so its results dont really mean anything, but I found that both the Russians and the Ukrainians tend to be more lethal, shoot more accurately, than what we saw in the video. This is doubly true if the player interacts even a little bit with their forces, as the Russians its not hard to wipe out the BRDMs if you want to do that. 
A couple notes regarding scenario design: First, there is no right or wrong way to play it, but there is an intended way. The intention is to give you an encounter like is seen in the video. You can try multiple approaches if you'd like, but if you diverge too much from the premise you can quite easily break the AI and produce unusual results. Second, the force composition may look a bit....odd... for both sides. For the RA, I wanted scout teams that had no RPGs. None appear in the video and obviously at the ranges were talking about RPGs would be murderous. But I would have to drop the ammo levels to 'severe' to do it and found that had a negative impact on the Russian's ability to ambush the BRDMs. But I realized that if I swapped scout squads for 1 FO and 1LMG squad each, I maintained the same weight of fire without either bringing RPGs. For the UA the problem is a bit different and relates to the BRDM's modeled carrying capacity. BRDMs are modeled with a crew of 2 and a carry capacity of 4 dismounts. I have no idea where this info comes from, but I generally think BFG's modeling is pretty reliable. The video claims a UA strength of 14+ which, to me, just seems way to high. Unless they were also riding Desant, but I dont think the video establishes that. The issue for the UA force in the scenario is that it doesn't all fit onto the BRDMs. The TOE force would be a six man recon squad plus a two man HQ. But the recon squad splits into three and three, meaning it doesnt fit into the BRDM with the HQ team. So either I deleted the HQ to fit in the squad, or I developed a different option. Ultimately I made a decision to make the scenario a bit more interesting, but a little less like the video. I kept the HQ platoon mounted in the BRDM and added an attached LMG squad, increasingly slightly the firepower for the recon squad. The leftover three man team I put into a building marked 'Survivors!' The objective ultimately is to extract the survivor team. The survivor team CAN interfere with the if put on the 2nd level or roof. If you want to keep them out of the action, put them on the 1st floor, restricted target arc, and on hide. 
Scen 2- Enhanced (E):  The second included Scenario is called 'Enhanced' and tries to make a traditional CM mission out of what footage we saw. The objectives are the same, though point values have been rebalanced. Scout the convoy route and extract survivors for the UA, destroy follow on forces for the RA. But the forces have been increased to roughly Platoon vs. Coy (-). The Russians have received two more scout platoons, complete with RPGs, as well as some light armored vehicle support. The UA received the support of a 'Quick Reaction Force' made up of the leftover squad from the 2nd recon platoon as well as the entirety of the 1st recon platoon. These are mounted mostly in BTR-70s, though one BTR-4E has also been included for heavy lifting. The QRF also comes with an MT-LB for the player to use extracting the survivors, which have also increased in number. Both sides get mortar support. Ultimately the UA has an advantage here in mobility and vehicle support, but the RA has infantry numbers and the stronger position. This scenario is best played either HTH or Blue vs AI. It has both Red and Blue AI plans, but I spent way more time working on the Red AI than the Blue. TBH I just dont think any blue AI would be capable of doing what I want them to do, the survivors would be sitting ducks in an extraction to any human with half a brain. I do think though that this scenario would be really interesting for HTH play, it could be worth a try. So I did make sure every scenario contained an equivalent red briefing. 
The VPs have also been rebalanced here to reflect the new forces. Mostly the UA is working to deny the RA VPs. They gain points by touching the recon objectives and by hitting the listed casualty threshold. The RA gains points by killing UA soldiers via unit objectives. Survivor squads are worth the most, then squads in the BRDM platoon, then the lowest value is the QRF force. As the UA player, you want to risk your QRF troops while your Survivors the least. OTOH the RA is going to want to squeeze the survivor's position BEFORE the QRF can relieve them. 
Scen 3-UA is OP plz Nerf (UAOP): This is a joke scenario but I thought some might like a little catharsis. If you just want to blow the hell out of some Russians this is for you. It uses Scen 2 as a base but further modifies the UA force. The QRF has been reinforced to two platoons mounted in BTR-4Es. Two tanks from the commanders reserve have also been included as immobile bunkers. They have excellent FOV and can smash everything the Russians throw up. Oh and the Mortars have been upgraded to 122mm arty. And a little surprise from the UAF. 
If you keep the .zip around, you can just drop the single scenario you want to play into your scenario folder. No mess, no clutter!
I will follow this thread up with a thread of screenshots, stay tuned! 

It's not fact, and it's not propaganda. It's a best (good and credible) effort to log a highly confusing and foggy event.
Edit: afaict, oryx estimate is deliberately conservative. Ie, the real total is definitely higher

I can speak only about Germany in this regard. This article is a lot of conjecture. Germany is not wavering in its support for Ukraine. The public isn't and I haven't heard from any serious politician anything in this direction.
About the ceasefire from Scholz - please remember that this whole war thing is pretty new for Germany. Sounds crazy but it is. Public talking about weapon systems would have put anyone in the right wing nut job category in January. Now it is becoming a normal discussion point.
But there is still a significant amount of pacifists who had fought in the 70s & 80s for peace and against weapons. Scholz is also their chancellor and those words are meant for them.
There has been a local election on Sunday and I won't get into the details. But the winners had both a pro-Ukrainian / pro weapons delivery stand.
The public support is there and what has been said about Ukraine being the one to decide how and when it ends is still true.

Agreed, as long as US and Poland retain the unwavering support to the UA cause, the rest of Europe is really (technically) redundant. The only card the "Old Europe" really holds is that they can be real dicks regarding rebuilding Ukraine after the war, and it's EU accession. Still, seeing the rift between Eastern/Northern and Western Europe is really sad, and it put's EU's future under a question mark, albeit small at the moment.
What's more worrisome is that that really leaves the course of events for US to decide, it all again rests on USA's shoulders. Hopefully Biden has enough vision (and health!) to see this whole war through to it's most optimal conclusion, even against wishes of some European partners.

Usual reservists gathering, I think. Without official declaration of war, they havn't juridiacal right to mobilize anyone at the war. All what they can do - to call reservists and brainwosh them about "enemy at rhe gate! We must fight with nazi, puppets of US" and offer big salary for participation. Of course they can find people, which will agree to sign contracts or even to go at war as volunteers in composition of some units, which sponsored by different oligarchs like Maloffev or around-Kremlin patriotic organizations.

I disagree.  People on the ground have their role, as eyes and ears and to communicate the facts and feeling on the ground.  They also capture small bits and pieces of info that are useful to people like us who are interested in the nuts and bolts.  And you might want them writing the copy, not being very familiar with the field I don't really know the pro's and con's of that.
But journalism (not entertainment news) is about explaining what is going on.  And for that you need a guy behind a desk, and a big map.  And a bit of time.  With digital TV it should be easier than ever to get in-depth context via a second channel for those that want it. 
What we have however, for the most part, is singed teddy-bear hunting, and the latest emotional event done to death.  'War reporter voice', and in general 'reporter on the scene voice' is something I can't stand for the last number of years (honourable mention goes to 'pre-offended police officer voice').  24hr news may be good for something (over-worked people getting updated whenever they have the time to turn on the TV as opposed to 'The News at 10' for example), but I wouldn't be surprised if has contributed to emotional desensitisation to the subject from over-reporting, and of things that happened, instead of 'why'.
I think we have it about right here.  This is journalism of sort, we have sources, we have experts, we have discussion, interviews, talks etc. all filtered by the fact we are trying to understand what is going on.  A distilled version of that is what I'd like to see mainstream news move back towards, but I wonder if the incentives in the other direction are too much.  Leaving the war aside for a moment, and I understand there is some call for news to stand as a record of events, but why do I need to hear about shooting after shooting when I switch on the TV or radio.  Just tell me how many there are in a year and tell me what people are doing or not doing to change that.
Back on the war I have been following it since day one... every day, and I wonder if I am too hooked into it.  It does affect us (we are in interesting times indeed), but it's like we are all a little bit at war with the stress that goes along with that.  The old Bill Hicks line about crickets outside the window comes to mind.  A bit of self-discipline is perhaps what is needed, but it's addictive, as the spectre of nuclear war tends to be.  Of course the people directly involved need the support of the world around them, I just wonder where the line is in this age of being in touch with the whole world.
Anyway I recommend the series 'Newswipe' for a look at modern news, this rambling post brought it to mind.
 

Would you rather pay a few trillion taking on Russia directly when they decide to have a go  in another decade  or two  ?
 

Not to bring up the subject of Biolabs again but there is a good article in march rolling stone about the effort to get rid of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. It is a good example of the work the threat organization does and the complexity in eliminating these weapons.   They had a copy in the waiting room while I was getting my second booster. 😀

Another video of Bilohorivka bridge (some distinguish from other similar) from 58th mot.inf. brigade. Looks like they and elements of 17th tank brigade engaged Russians here
 

https://news.sky.com/story/as-boris-johnson-heads-to-finland-what-will-it-mean-if-the-finns-join-nato-12610045
Finland's prime minister and president have said the historically neutral country, which fought the Soviets in WWII and lost, must seek membership of the defensive pact. 
 
Let me be the first to congratulate Vlad Putin on rescuing NATO from the dustbin of history.  Actions, meet consequences.  I expect Sweden to follow soon.

Added to previous post zomed image of penetrated pontoons

Now Bofors L40/60 in service %)

I maintain very fiercely that one cannot use math to describe human behavior, which is illogical and anarchic in even regimented institutions. And so the push to 'model all the things' ultimately leads to an intellectual dead end and the wrong kind of solutions. Math, data, modeling is good for examining how to make small changes to systems (what weapons should we send to Ukraine, what will produce the most effect in the shortest time). But it cannot lead in a strategic sense (how does Ukraine protect its independence) because you cant properly factor every variable. Take Afghanistan. You can do all the wonderful calculations you want about how to win the war. Except what does winning look like? How do you even describe the word? Is it democracy? If so what kind, one led by elites in Kabul or one that works for every community at the expense of the center? One that we can control or one that may make its own choices? Or is just killing the Taliban and keeping China and Russia out? All of this reflects the uncertainty, variability, and contingency of our own thinking but the same is also true of the other side, who always gets a vote and is constantly reevaluating their vote. You can count things, bodycount, ammunition expenditure, relative strengths. But ultimately even Clausewitz himself dismisses this mathematical approach to war. Because at its heart the Soviets were wrong and the Germans were right: war is an art first, not a science first. Math and numbers sing you a siren's song of certainty, but war is uncertain because humans are in turn noble, courageous, inventive, stupid, cowardly, and lazy. And so the whole affair is more like a sports match or a game of poker than it is like running a Walmart or manipulating the stock market. 
All this is to say that this line of thinking, at least in the US, predates powerpoint and really goes back to the 60s. But I find its durability in the defense system quite disheartening. There is the constant pressure to manage war and the DoD like a business, when really it should be run like a military (duh!) But making change is next to impossible thanks to a whole host of factors not worth digging into. 

I maintain very fiercely that one cannot use math to describe human behavior, which is illogical and anarchic in even regimented institutions. And so the push to 'model all the things' ultimately leads to an intellectual dead end and the wrong kind of solutions. Math, data, modeling is good for examining how to make small changes to systems (what weapons should we send to Ukraine, what will produce the most effect in the shortest time). But it cannot lead in a strategic sense (how does Ukraine protect its independence) because you cant properly factor every variable. Take Afghanistan. You can do all the wonderful calculations you want about how to win the war. Except what does winning look like? How do you even describe the word? Is it democracy? If so what kind, one led by elites in Kabul or one that works for every community at the expense of the center? One that we can control or one that may make its own choices? Or is just killing the Taliban and keeping China and Russia out? All of this reflects the uncertainty, variability, and contingency of our own thinking but the same is also true of the other side, who always gets a vote and is constantly reevaluating their vote. You can count things, bodycount, ammunition expenditure, relative strengths. But ultimately even Clausewitz himself dismisses this mathematical approach to war. Because at its heart the Soviets were wrong and the Germans were right: war is an art first, not a science first. Math and numbers sing you a siren's song of certainty, but war is uncertain because humans are in turn noble, courageous, inventive, stupid, cowardly, and lazy. And so the whole affair is more like a sports match or a game of poker than it is like running a Walmart or manipulating the stock market. 
All this is to say that this line of thinking, at least in the US, predates powerpoint and really goes back to the 60s. But I find its durability in the defense system quite disheartening. There is the constant pressure to manage war and the DoD like a business, when really it should be run like a military (duh!) But making change is next to impossible thanks to a whole host of factors not worth digging into. 

One of the reasons (besides absolutely refusing to do it) that I didn't progress up the management chain at "The Firm" (yes they do talk like that) was my unwillingness to learn the MCK way of PowerPoint.  You must always have 3 bullet point options... so I asked, what if you are discussing an on/off switch?  That earned me a very sour look.
Then I put this up in my workspace.

Hi all, I am a new account on this forum, but I have been reading this thread every day for the past couple months after getting referred to it from elsewhere. This thread, the daily ISW reports and Perun's videos are my primary sources for keeping track of what's going on in this war and why. Thank you everyone for the great contributions.
My account took a couple days to get approved, so this comment is out-of-date relative to the comment I wanted to respond to, but there have been several times the topic of China came up so I thought it would be worth posting anyway. I hope it's still interesting to someone. If not, please scroll past, I don't want to distract too much from the excellent analysis you all are sharing.
This is an area where I have a personal interest and some first-hand experience, having lived in China for several years.
I don't think it is very helpful to describe China (or any authoritarian country) as merely left wing or right wing, in particular when that statement comes from partisans in a democratic country. All too often there is a cynical incentive to try to associate the policies of the authoritarian regime with opposing political factions in the democratic system. I think it's better to assess the policies on their own.
Xi has overseen several socially conservative policies - for example broadcast restrictions on media featuring tattoos, piercings, effeminate men, same-sex relations and so on. But this is only part of a larger scale censorship effort that has also seen arrests of local citizen reporters and foreign media not only blocked at the Great Firewall but also pushed out of reporting from inside the country at all. He also spearheaded a popular anti-corruption campaign that coincidentally targeted all the senior party officials that might stand against him. And, of course, he removed term limits and will likely get a third term in the upcoming national congress. These are suspiciously autocratic moves, which is worrying in a country that since Deng has at least made a pretense of winding back the power of figureheads and trying to build more of a loyalty to the party as an abstract entity.
Xi has also allowed a populist rise of nationalism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, and he has put a strong emphasis on increasing national security and modernizing the military. One aspect of this was a revision to the national defense law that expanded the justifications for military actions, and placed more power into a military commission headed up by Xi.
On the other hand, in the past few years the party has also strengthened government controls over business. Notably it halted the IPO of Ant Financial, often portrayed overseas as a punishment for Jack Ma (co-founder of Alibaba) commenting on excessive regulation, but more likely just because the party wasn't happy that some of these tech giants are a threat to its power. Since then it has also been using anti-monopoly guidelines and other means to regulate major players in industries such as finance, tech and education. It's also hit several high-profile individuals for tax evasion, and for a brief period the official messaging seemed to be that speculation on real estate and the pursuit of excessive wealth was inappropriate, although that seems to have been tempered somewhat due to the COVID-related economic slowdown.
But a key point running through all of these policies is this: 党政军民学，东西南北中，党是领导一切的 - government, military, society and education - east, west, south, north and center - the party leads everything. And who leads the party? Recently the phrase "with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core" has become more common in the state media. This political structure isn't comparable to democratic countries where there is no singular authority and it's normal to have spirited and open debates on the issues.
I think the main thing to take away from Chinese politics under Xi is not to figure out if he represents a version of the left or the right in a democratic country, but to understand that his primary motivation is to ensure that the party retains control over every aspect of society. All policies are designed with that goal in mind. In my opinion Xi does have generally nationalist and socially conservative views, but I think he is also mindful that wealth inequality can lead to unrest and the downfall of the party, and that would be the ultimate sin.
TLDR: what Steve said
On how this affects the war in Ukraine - both the state media apparatus and the prevailing chatter on social media (which is ultimately shaped by what the state chooses not to censor) is solidly in the camp of this war somehow being a result of NATO expansion and American hegemony. I don't think there is an easy way for the party to publicly roll back its support for Putin. The issue will probably just remain in the current limbo, with the party simply claiming to remain neutral or impartial.
On what it portends for Taiwan - it's definitely useful for the party to study and learn from this war, but I don't think it will have an impact on its timeline for taking Taiwan. The party has enough problems with zero-COVID and a teetering economy right now - I don't think it is in a position to fast-track any actions. I suspect we might see some more signaling after Xi is confirmed for a third term (second half of this year) and then after the 2024 presidential election in Taiwan, which is likely to be the first where 18-20 year olds can vote (referendum on that later this year). Either way, it's interesting to see how the party has built up the mythology of Taiwan as a wayward little brother who is temporarily misguided and will someday return to the fold. That has benefits in that it creates popular support for "unification", but it might also make a full-blown invasion unpopular. Annexation is surely off the table now, after the PR disaster of Hong Kong 2019. A naval blockade is often suggested as a way to strangle the island, but that might only strengthen its people's resolve. I think if the party is to succeed in its designs on Taiwan, it will need Putin's failed "take the capital in 3 days" strategy to actually work. I would be very interested in a wargame that tackles this scenario.
Anyway, back to my lurking hole, and thanks again for the fantastic thread.

Looks like direct hits of arty shell and detonation. Hull down position in caponiers doesn't help against indirect fire. Kharkiv oblast

About month ago there was information we have in morgues about 8600 bodies of Russian soldiers (or even pointed the total weight of bodies and body fragments), whih Russian side doesn't want to take back. Even in present time locals and police continie to find bodies. Some part of Russians were burried in temporary graves after the combat actions in March - first half of April, when there is no firm frontline and situation was too changeable. 
But on the other hand we also have many missed soldiers, especially in Volnovakha and Popasna. Theese towns, like and Rubizhne and Izium suffered much more devastation than Mariupol. 

So it has been a awhile, time for another assessment signpost I think.
So as I have gone on about, I am a fan of Options Based Warfare, particularly as a tool at the strategic level; however, it links closely to the Operational level as well - although operational level is more obsessed with "decision", and tactical will always be about capability and effects.  These are inter-link concepts, another way to think about it:

Or another way to think of it - in the linear model (of which I am not a fan):

An options based view takes the position that historically the side that can sustain or expand its effective strategic options while compressing those of an opponent will likely win the war.  I challenge people to find a counter-example to this and I have yet to hear one.  We have plenty examples of desperate tactical actions where the victor was down to that last one option and somehow pulls it off (e.g. Chamberlain's charge at Little Round Top), which makes for great movies; however, real warfare is a brutal and grinding business that cares little for human drama.  The harsh reality is that if you are in a war where your effective options are collapsing while your opponents are not, you need to re-assess cause the news "ain't good".
So what of this war?  Well, we have steadily watch Ukraine sustain and expand their options-sets which appear to include:
- Offensives around Kharkiv.
- Increased pressure on Kherson.
- Increased attacks and pressure at Russian SLOCs, even in Russia itself.
- Continued denial swaths of the Black Sea.
- Rapidly expanding strategic sustainment and support options from the West.
I am sure I have forgotten some.  Ukraine, has got a lot of effective strategic options right now.  Operationally they have significant freedom of manoeuvre and are attacking along the Russian positions with pretty much impunity as Russia has still failed to establish operational pre-conditions.  Strategically, they are ready to fight long or short.  They can continue to hit targets within Russia and they are getting more and more capability everyday.  Even the UAF appears to have made a resurgence in the last few days.
Russia: news not so good.  My assessment is that Russia is basically down to two "effective" options left - withdraw, reload and try again later OR, push as much dumb mass at the current lines and try for the long defensive and hope attrition impacts Ukrainian will. All other options Russia had on 23 Feb, have collapsed to these two "best of bad".  My point being is that I suspect Russia is rapidly coming to the point, or are already there, where strategic or operational offensive action is off the table. These tepid strained pushes from Izyum and around Lyman are doing pretty much as well as expected - uncoordinated, costly and slow.  Once Ukraine masses enough c-artillery and logistics (operational deep strike) capability, this whole Russian offensive will be over and the best they can do is stuff the front line with scared kids, poorly equipped, worse trained and with next to zero unit cohesion.  
In order to turn this around Russia needs strategic options, and it basically spent them all.  For example, a major offensive out of Belarus towards Lviv to effectively cut off western support was an option on 23 Feb, it is no longer viable in the least.  The lesson here is that options are built entirely on opportunity power, and once you have spent that...well time to start learning to live with defeat.  And I do not care if Russia can muster another 200k troops to push into the Donbas, the days of dismounted unsupported infantry being able to create options is also pretty much over.  The critical path will be UA ammunition to kill them all and I am pretty sure the west has got that one covered.
Finally, "what about tac nukes?".  Well it has been discussed a lot here and elsewhere.  The question to my mind is "are tac nukes an effective option".  We always have ineffective options, or terrible ones - in universe built on chaos we will always have an infinite amount of "bad options".  Tactical nuclear weapons are tailor made for this situation: when you are all outta other options.  
I frankly do not know what the Russian calculus is on the use of WMDs at the operational level right now.  They are way past doctrine and legality, so this will come likely come down to, "will it work?"  Most tactical nuclear weapons can do a lot of damage to a few kilometers but these are pretty big frontages we are talking about, so Russia would need to use a lot of them, to have a very good idea exactly where to hit the UA.  It is not like Russia can simply fire off 2 or 3 and declare victory.
Then Russia has to be concerned about more direct western intervention in Ukraine as a result.  The release of tactical nuclear weapons could see a western response that removes what is left of the Black Sea Fleet in an afternoon, NATO troops securing western Ukraine and Kyiv, freeing up every UA member down South and East - and what Putin likely fears most, western airpower.
Anyway, I still do not think WMDs are a likely option but that may come down to "will they wont' they, and will we?" in the end.  Regardless, if phase 2 of this war was "posturing for endgame", I suspect we may be coming to "endgame" shortly, unless something very unexpected happens.  My bet is that the endgame will be Russian's trying to dig in and hold what they have, while the Ukrainian military figures out what offence looks like - given the successes around Kharkiv, I am thinking they already have a pretty good idea.  
 
 

BINGO!



I didn't see Gerasimov, but could easily be that I just didn't recognise him