Centurian52

probably not ... BUT ... while we're here ...

Fortunately, the charging one has been solved now that we've all standardized on mini-USB. Or is it micro-USB? ****.

Has anyone else noticed that while russian tank losses have decreased from about 10 a day to about 3 a day, their artillery losses have increased from 2-3 a day to about 9 a day? This has happened over the last 2 weeks or so from memory.
Im not sure what it means but it seems to be a good thing - fewer tank targets and more effective UA CB fire? Or maybe the pressure is off a bit and UA artillery has more time to hunt russian guns?

Good thread by Chris Dougherty:
I was reviewing #ukraine maps by@TheStudyofWar, @JominiW, et al yesterday to prepare for this radio interview with @TheWorld and I wondered why the war in eastern Ukraine is an attritional slugfest and not a battle of sweeping maneuver? Many folks thought that the war would feature more armored maneuver as operations shifted east to Donetsk & Luhansk, (& as the weather changed). This makes sense, as it's more open terrain. As @gianpgentile noted in the @WarOnTheRocks podcast below, the area around eastern Ukraine was the sight of some of the largest battles in history, incl. Manstein's "backhand blow" & a bit north in Russia, the massive battle of Kursk. From 1941-43, forces in this area pushed front lines 100s of miles in a battle. As noted by @RitaKonaev
below, today's fight looks more like WWI's Western Front, Mosul 2016-17, or late-stage Korean War: heavy casualties w/o much gained or lost. 3 factors account for this change. 1) the size & makeup of Ukr. & Rus. forces can't support large-scale maneuver. The German 6th Army that fought heavily in Ukraine & Stalingrad was roughly the same size as today's Russian army, & it was 1 of many armies in the Wehrmacht. Red Army forces were even larger. Both sides had hordes of armored vehicles & infantry needed to cover huge distances while securing flanks & supply lines. Such large forces could suffer horrendous losses & keep moving. Today's forces aren't big enough or designed for large-scale combined-arms maneuver. As @KofmanMichael & @RALee85 note in this superb @WarOnTheRocks
piece on Russian force design. Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, are designed for territorial defense. The 2nd factor is the amount of ISR in the theater. Western intel support, along w/ Bayraktars & other drones, gives Ukraine a great picture of Russian forces. Per @DanMichaelsWSJ, this makes maneuvers like river crossings even more dangerous. W/o surprise, maneuver requires overwhelming w/mass, fires, or both. But neither side has the mass to create & exploit a breakthrough. So we get massed fires (w/o much maneuver) instead The 3rd factor is changes in terrain since 1943. I haven't done a terrain walk in Ukraine, but it's a safe bet that it's more urbanized than it was 80 years ago. Russian forces have been road/rail-bound, & the roads, rails, & bridges run through cities like Severodonetsk. These factors mean we likely won't see major breakthroughs on either side. Terrain may change hands--the Severodonetsk salient worries me--but neither side has the mass to exploit minor gains. The war now likely becomes a test of endurance.  
 

The biggest similarity between 1905 and now is the shocking nature of Russia's military failure. Both Japan and Ukraine were supposed to be short victorious wars against third rate opposition. In both cases they declined to follow the script. In 1905 the regime survived sort of, but from 1906 to 1917 all the regime did was try to put out internal fires and generally stagnate. Its confidence, international standing, finances, and military reputation were all deeply damaged. Furthermore in 1905 Teddy Roosevelt got the Czar a much better peace deal than he deserved. It remains to be seen if Scholz and Macron can manage that for Putin. Also 1905 did not involve anything like the financial and trade pressure Russia is under now. 
I agree the internal situation in Russia is very different. But in 1905 the Czar was in good health, had an heir whose health problems were not common knowledge, and several hundred years of tradition to prop it up. Neither Putins health, the theoretical certainty of his successor, or the regimes historical legitimacy are remotely similar. While the initial impetus too invade Ukraine was entirely Putin's, I really think much of this stage of the war is a contest between factions of the Russian regime for position in the post Putin "discussion". Who lost Ukraine? is going to be a blood sport when the time comes.

The contract Ukraine just signed with Poland makes it pretty clear that is going to be their SPG going forward. That will give them ~80 of them total. I assume the will be happy to equip all their towed units with 777s eventually.
All of this is a classic case of doing something in a very great hurry because their just isn't any other choice. Things will break that wouldn't have if we had started equipping Ukraine three years ago in a rational way. People are DYING who wouldn't be if we had started equipping Ukraine three years ago in a rational way. We didn't all we can do is accept that doing it now this way is unavoidably inefficient, and just keep sending them everything they can physically use, as fast as it can be moved.
We can also get the bleep over idiotic fine distinctions in what we send. They need MLRS yesterday, they need better AA yesterday. They need those bleeping Marders YESTERDAY. Brave people are dying, and a fair chunk of the third world is getting very hungry while we worry about distinctions that just don't make any sense. The Russians would attack the supply bases in Poland if they thought they could, and still have an army three days later. They haven't, they aren't going to because the only two scenarios are they lose in days instead of months, or civilization gets an unpleasant reset, and even the Russians are not that stupid.

Oh, I am not so sure, the generals have all the guns.  The "spirited resistance of Kyiv" is making mainstream news now [I am noticing that mainstream news is about 6-12 hours behind the live feeds].  We will know this is really over when the NATO has to get assurances that Ukraine will not counter-attack into Russia.
Of course a completely upside down Russia is not great either.

Out of curiosity I got back to the beginning of this magnificent thread to see what was being said about this war when it was just unfolding. Out of many great (one could say almost prophetic) predictions then made , this one caught my eye. Arguably we have already crossed that line around week ago when Ukrainians promised not to attack Russia's proper with the new MLRS they are about to receive.

And from the strategic to the tactical- if anyone wanted to see how drones can supplement basic soldiering skills:



Apparently Russian SF vs a Ukrainian patrol. Short sharp ambush, followed by snatching a wounded prisoner. Footage is here- NSFW.
https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/v6yjpr/pov_of_russian_sso_ambush_against_ukrainian/

Obviously it's interesting to see a small scale tactical action from this perspective, but I think it's important to see that the impact of the drone here isn't revolutionary. It certainly might make certain elements easier (we don't know how long they've been waiting there- it could be a snap ambush thrown on at a moment's notice because they spotted the incoming patrol via the drone) but the drone isn't doing the basics for them, it's complementing existing skills.

This is sort of drones writ large: they don't exactly bring any new capabilities to the table as a whole (drones aren't doing any missions that didn't get done in WW1 by biplanes (except any EW stuff)), but they do extend existing capabilities- more people at the table get the ability to carry out and benefit from those missions.

For example, aerial reconaissance is a thing- but there's a world of difference between trying to get an aircraft to fly over, take some photos and then somehow get them to a rifle platoon in a timely manner vs the platoon drone operator chucking a Raven in the air and getting a live feed a couple of seconds later. How to operate in an environment where everyone has airpower at their fingertips is the hard part.

I am trying very hard to catch up on this thread, but for now I'm still responding to points that were raised several days ago (I'm sure I'll catch up eventually).
My own 2 cents on the "how willing are countries to sustain casualties" issue is that, as far as I know, it is pretty normal to be shocked by the high casualty rates at the start of a major war. The recurring narrative I keep hearing about the opening stages of WW1 always includes a certain degree of shock by the public at the immense casualty lists, ditto with the American Civil War. But shock can only last so long. If the casualty rate remains constant, people become used to it. Shock can be sustained if each battle is exponentially bloodier than the last. But once it levels out, people become used to it again.
What is unthinkable now can become very thinkable later (one of the tragedies of human psychology). We are used to <10 casualties per day now because that was the casualty rate of the low intensity conflicts of the last 20 years. But if it came down to a major war with China, I think we would find ourselves more willing to endure hundreds of casualties per day than we might think right now. I do not want to discount the importance of context/stakes of course. The willingness to endure high casualties is clearly much greater when the stakes are higher than when the stakes are lower (if the stakes are existential we may be willing to endure any casualty rate, even thousands a day, to avoid annihilation, whereas any casualties at all may be too much if there is no tangible benefit to our interests). And duration seems to matter as well, though perhaps only because the stakes themselves change over time (what seemed important five years ago may no longer be important, so while the casualty rate may no longer be as shocking, it may nevertheless be less worth enduring), and/or because other costs to the society increase over time (being on a full war footing for several years is not great for an economy, so the standard of living of a population may visibly decrease over the course of a war, decreasing their willingness to tolerate the war).
The Dictator's Handbook (fantastic book if you are interested in politics) even argues that democratic countries are actually far more willing to endure long wars than autocratic countries, due to the differences in the incentive structures of democratic regimes as opposed to autocratic regimes (which is another point in favor of Ukraine winning a long war, on top of the economic considerations, and difference in stakes (existential for Ukraine, non-existential for Russia)). They are more casualty averse in the sense that they put a greater amount of effort into keeping casualties down, but not in the sense that high casualties are more likely to make them quit the fight. Both democratic and autocratic leaders are primarily interested in holding on to power. The difference is that autocratic leaders need money to maintain power (to pay off their key supporters), and wars cost a lot of money. Whereas democratic leaders need popularity to maintain power (to win elections), and conceding defeat in a war is usually very unpopular.

I am trying very hard to catch up on this thread, but for now I'm still responding to points that were raised several days ago (I'm sure I'll catch up eventually).
My own 2 cents on the "how willing are countries to sustain casualties" issue is that, as far as I know, it is pretty normal to be shocked by the high casualty rates at the start of a major war. The recurring narrative I keep hearing about the opening stages of WW1 always includes a certain degree of shock by the public at the immense casualty lists, ditto with the American Civil War. But shock can only last so long. If the casualty rate remains constant, people become used to it. Shock can be sustained if each battle is exponentially bloodier than the last. But once it levels out, people become used to it again.
What is unthinkable now can become very thinkable later (one of the tragedies of human psychology). We are used to <10 casualties per day now because that was the casualty rate of the low intensity conflicts of the last 20 years. But if it came down to a major war with China, I think we would find ourselves more willing to endure hundreds of casualties per day than we might think right now. I do not want to discount the importance of context/stakes of course. The willingness to endure high casualties is clearly much greater when the stakes are higher than when the stakes are lower (if the stakes are existential we may be willing to endure any casualty rate, even thousands a day, to avoid annihilation, whereas any casualties at all may be too much if there is no tangible benefit to our interests). And duration seems to matter as well, though perhaps only because the stakes themselves change over time (what seemed important five years ago may no longer be important, so while the casualty rate may no longer be as shocking, it may nevertheless be less worth enduring), and/or because other costs to the society increase over time (being on a full war footing for several years is not great for an economy, so the standard of living of a population may visibly decrease over the course of a war, decreasing their willingness to tolerate the war).
The Dictator's Handbook (fantastic book if you are interested in politics) even argues that democratic countries are actually far more willing to endure long wars than autocratic countries, due to the differences in the incentive structures of democratic regimes as opposed to autocratic regimes (which is another point in favor of Ukraine winning a long war, on top of the economic considerations, and difference in stakes (existential for Ukraine, non-existential for Russia)). They are more casualty averse in the sense that they put a greater amount of effort into keeping casualties down, but not in the sense that high casualties are more likely to make them quit the fight. Both democratic and autocratic leaders are primarily interested in holding on to power. The difference is that autocratic leaders need money to maintain power (to pay off their key supporters), and wars cost a lot of money. Whereas democratic leaders need popularity to maintain power (to win elections), and conceding defeat in a war is usually very unpopular.

I am trying very hard to catch up on this thread, but for now I'm still responding to points that were raised several days ago (I'm sure I'll catch up eventually).
My own 2 cents on the "how willing are countries to sustain casualties" issue is that, as far as I know, it is pretty normal to be shocked by the high casualty rates at the start of a major war. The recurring narrative I keep hearing about the opening stages of WW1 always includes a certain degree of shock by the public at the immense casualty lists, ditto with the American Civil War. But shock can only last so long. If the casualty rate remains constant, people become used to it. Shock can be sustained if each battle is exponentially bloodier than the last. But once it levels out, people become used to it again.
What is unthinkable now can become very thinkable later (one of the tragedies of human psychology). We are used to <10 casualties per day now because that was the casualty rate of the low intensity conflicts of the last 20 years. But if it came down to a major war with China, I think we would find ourselves more willing to endure hundreds of casualties per day than we might think right now. I do not want to discount the importance of context/stakes of course. The willingness to endure high casualties is clearly much greater when the stakes are higher than when the stakes are lower (if the stakes are existential we may be willing to endure any casualty rate, even thousands a day, to avoid annihilation, whereas any casualties at all may be too much if there is no tangible benefit to our interests). And duration seems to matter as well, though perhaps only because the stakes themselves change over time (what seemed important five years ago may no longer be important, so while the casualty rate may no longer be as shocking, it may nevertheless be less worth enduring), and/or because other costs to the society increase over time (being on a full war footing for several years is not great for an economy, so the standard of living of a population may visibly decrease over the course of a war, decreasing their willingness to tolerate the war).
The Dictator's Handbook (fantastic book if you are interested in politics) even argues that democratic countries are actually far more willing to endure long wars than autocratic countries, due to the differences in the incentive structures of democratic regimes as opposed to autocratic regimes (which is another point in favor of Ukraine winning a long war, on top of the economic considerations, and difference in stakes (existential for Ukraine, non-existential for Russia)). They are more casualty averse in the sense that they put a greater amount of effort into keeping casualties down, but not in the sense that high casualties are more likely to make them quit the fight. Both democratic and autocratic leaders are primarily interested in holding on to power. The difference is that autocratic leaders need money to maintain power (to pay off their key supporters), and wars cost a lot of money. Whereas democratic leaders need popularity to maintain power (to win elections), and conceding defeat in a war is usually very unpopular.

I am trying very hard to catch up on this thread, but for now I'm still responding to points that were raised several days ago (I'm sure I'll catch up eventually).
My own 2 cents on the "how willing are countries to sustain casualties" issue is that, as far as I know, it is pretty normal to be shocked by the high casualty rates at the start of a major war. The recurring narrative I keep hearing about the opening stages of WW1 always includes a certain degree of shock by the public at the immense casualty lists, ditto with the American Civil War. But shock can only last so long. If the casualty rate remains constant, people become used to it. Shock can be sustained if each battle is exponentially bloodier than the last. But once it levels out, people become used to it again.
What is unthinkable now can become very thinkable later (one of the tragedies of human psychology). We are used to <10 casualties per day now because that was the casualty rate of the low intensity conflicts of the last 20 years. But if it came down to a major war with China, I think we would find ourselves more willing to endure hundreds of casualties per day than we might think right now. I do not want to discount the importance of context/stakes of course. The willingness to endure high casualties is clearly much greater when the stakes are higher than when the stakes are lower (if the stakes are existential we may be willing to endure any casualty rate, even thousands a day, to avoid annihilation, whereas any casualties at all may be too much if there is no tangible benefit to our interests). And duration seems to matter as well, though perhaps only because the stakes themselves change over time (what seemed important five years ago may no longer be important, so while the casualty rate may no longer be as shocking, it may nevertheless be less worth enduring), and/or because other costs to the society increase over time (being on a full war footing for several years is not great for an economy, so the standard of living of a population may visibly decrease over the course of a war, decreasing their willingness to tolerate the war).
The Dictator's Handbook (fantastic book if you are interested in politics) even argues that democratic countries are actually far more willing to endure long wars than autocratic countries, due to the differences in the incentive structures of democratic regimes as opposed to autocratic regimes (which is another point in favor of Ukraine winning a long war, on top of the economic considerations, and difference in stakes (existential for Ukraine, non-existential for Russia)). They are more casualty averse in the sense that they put a greater amount of effort into keeping casualties down, but not in the sense that high casualties are more likely to make them quit the fight. Both democratic and autocratic leaders are primarily interested in holding on to power. The difference is that autocratic leaders need money to maintain power (to pay off their key supporters), and wars cost a lot of money. Whereas democratic leaders need popularity to maintain power (to win elections), and conceding defeat in a war is usually very unpopular.

Ouch! That's a really good point. Russian kit looked like **** after the Gulf War, and back then there was the excuse that everything the Iraqis had was old export stuff, not the latest and greatest domestic stuff. But this isn't export Russian equipment getting trashed. This is the actual Russian army, with its own latest and greatest domestic kit, getting trashed, in a full-scale, no-excuses, this-really-is-the-best-they-can-do context. Even if the Russians still have the industry to build new tanks to sell after this war (which I think is doubtful), I wonder how many buyers there will be for them?

Ouch! That's a really good point. Russian kit looked like **** after the Gulf War, and back then there was the excuse that everything the Iraqis had was old export stuff, not the latest and greatest domestic stuff. But this isn't export Russian equipment getting trashed. This is the actual Russian army, with its own latest and greatest domestic kit, getting trashed, in a full-scale, no-excuses, this-really-is-the-best-they-can-do context. Even if the Russians still have the industry to build new tanks to sell after this war (which I think is doubtful), I wonder how many buyers there will be for them?

Not wrong, but not entirely correct either.  Ukrainian defence was brilliant in the opening phase of this war.  We don't know much and likely will not get the full story for some time, however, the plan for the Phase I defence was decisive in itself.  If the UA had tried to fight the same way as the RA and sought decisive battle, it could have gone poorly.  Instead what we saw was a hybrid warfare campaign for the history books.
First Ukraine had (and still has) information superiority.  They are on their home ground and were also being fed western intel from before the war started.  This mean that in places like Hostemel, they could concentrate and defeat the RA initial moves in detail.  I think Hostomel is also a battle for the history books and was decisive in this war.  The RA tried to use SOF and Light in concentration and failed enormously, once again underlying that when misemployed SOF and Light are extremely vulnerable [aside: it is odd on all the talk of the "death of the tank" but we have not seen a lot on the "death of airborne/heliborne].  Russia made that airfield snap central to their main effort, it was their Plan A, and it collapsed in a couple days.
Second, Ukraine set up what I can only describe as an unconventional warfare defensive campaign.  This was hybrid in nature (a mix of conventional and unconventional forces) and looks a lot like what the Norwegians have set up in their Northern districts - for obvious reasons.  Basically, we had TD and irregular forces defending their local regions, backed up - and very importantly linked by UA SOF.  These forces were already in location along that very long initial front line and armed with next-gen smart-ATGMs, UAVs and comms.  Those comms linked them back to UA artillery creating an entirely distributed defence network - or at least that is my working theory.  The Russians sticking to road networks, lit up by ISR of all sorts were then hammered all along their own system - F ech, A ech, B ech and all the way back to SLOC nodes.  All that Russian armor/mech, the ready-force of the RA was cut to pieces in the first month of this war by that system; this wasn't "war amongst the people" this was war of the people. 
Third, Ukraine's political level, assisted by a massive social media effort allowed Ukraine to win the strategic narrative, even before the war crimes.  We all started to cheer for the little guy and realized that this war was an political and strategic opportunity.  All that money and aid, essentially the military industrial complex of Ukraine, was riding on getting this part right...and the Ukrainians did it very right.
I am not like Steve to be honest.  I had no idea how this war was going to go before it started.  It wasn't until about 72 hours in that it became very apparent that something was happening that no one in the business predicted.  That is when the sickness symptoms of the Russian system began to appear. 
Could Russia have won? Of course, no war is pre-determined.  Ukraine could have split or simply failed to resist - they could have ignored western intel, Zelenskyy could have run and/or capitulated.  Or the Russians could have had a much better plan - why they did not make the capture of Lyviv and disruption of all western support the main effort is beyond me.  But they did not, and now they really cannot.  No matter how this little dance in the Donbas goes, Russia has lost this war already.  There is no renormalization after this.  Sweden and Finland are not going to change their minds, those sanctions are going to stick as economies re-wire.  Ukraine is not going to "de-militarize" nor is it going to go quietly back into Russia's sphere with a friendly government.  Russian hard power is empty, to the point that I would not be surprised to see more disruptions in it near-abroad- Russia as a state might already be dead, it just does not know it yet.

Ok, this article is worth it for gems like this:
Antiauthoritarian platoon is combined with anarchists of different backgrounds, antifascists and football hooligans. It is not a secret that relations between different constituents of this body were not always easy.
https://www.militantwire.com/p/defensive-war-as-an-act-of-popular?s=w
...I'll be deeply disappointed if they don't  have moustachios and fling round bombs 💣
 
Splitters!
 

Many pages past I saw comments about modern societies not prepared for high combat losses, and I would push back some. Many societies in history are not prepared for high losses, but can push through when the time comes.

United Kingdom lost only 85,000 war losses in 113 years of empire. Biggest loss is 22,000 in Cirmean War. Why would U.K. be prepared for for 900,000 deaths in World War 1? Is similar when look at U.S. why would nation be prepared for 1,00,000 losses in Civil War when before only maybe 100,000 losses in last 90 years?

I think some comments of people being prepared for losses leans too much on an idea of modern decadence, but I wonder if any British citizen would have been prepared in 1910 for the casualties rolls of 1916.
 
 

I get the distinct impression that Combat Mission is only going to get better and better

Uuu, time for a Sunday beer indeed! For more reading oriented ppl, I ran across an interesting thread by Gen. Mark Hertling:
 

I get the distinct impression that Combat Mission is only going to get better and better

The Swiss and the Germans are in a competition to be the least helpful.
Above is a German aid delivery, the Swiss are still evaluating if the snail is slow enough.

It has been combined and upscaled, but neither side can really put the package complete package together and keep it that way. In particular we seem to have overlapping incomplete ISR bubbles from each side more than we we have an actual clash of bubbles leading to ISR and fires superiority for one side of the other.
The Ukrainians can't take full advantage of their superior information flows because the just don't have the weight of fire to take advantage.  Beyond 155 range their options have been extremely limited so far. And their air forces sole job is to keep enough airframes operational to present a threat in being to Russian air operations
The Russians seem to have far less information, and a ridiculously slow and rigid system for taking advantage of the information they do have. That is not the least of the reasons  why they decided to restrict their entire offensive effort to  a five mile wide front in a zone with limited maneuver options. It appears to be at least possible that they STILL got out maneuvered if the latest reporting fro Sverodontesk is true. They appear to have little to no real time targeting past say a 100 miles in depth, if that. And to add insult to injury their PGMs don't seem to be very precise, or very reliable. Their air operations have been an embarrassment at best.
We haven't seen anything like this
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/28-drone-swarm-just-led-the-way-for-a-simulated-air-assault-mission/ar-AAXFZ1t
or this
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gorgon_Stare
Certainly not this
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/05/17/stryker-laser-mortars-drones/
Never mind the USAF leading a thousand sortie opening night with a highly classified number of drones, followed 200 cruise missiles that actually hit what they are aimed at. Or the Chinese equivalent in SRBMs, although the later has never been tested in actual combat.
We get flashes of how it should all work, and at very high volume, but for very different reasons neither side can keep the symphony going.

1.  Fair points: technology will advance, the question is will we see a disruptive shock?  Answer is likely yes, but we are seeing the tips of it right now in Ukraine.  RMAs don't just happen, they build up over time.  We act all surprised when they land but in reality (and hindsight) the damn thing was right there all along.  Further RMAs are not single year phenomenon, we have likely been living inside one since the late 90s.  The impacts we are seeing are finally landing as what was revolutionary goes "mainstream".  AI and ML, here I am in the conservative camp.  If a roomful of pointdexters gave us mature next gen AI/ML it would likely take us 5-10 years just to figure out what to do with it, hell it would take us that long to get a grip on our data alone.  However, if you take the philosophy of "the future is unknowable, because technology" it leads not only to cynicism but also lazy passive thinking: "Since we can't know the future, then no point in even trying.  So we keep doing what we are doing and figure it out on the day."  That is a weak easy-exit I have seen used far too many times, especially when impacts are obvious and it puts us in a strategic planning reactive posture when that technology does hit us in the face.
2.  I think the full impact of this war will take longer to feel in Russia but when it hits the shock could be nation breaking...it was a contributor to this last time.  I also think this is a lot more than bodycounts and blown buildings in Russia.  One thing that has struck me about the narratives coming out of Russia is this illusion that they are still in control.  Warning NATO nations of consequences, warning Finland/Sweden of consequences and acting like they are still a great power.  The reality is that beyond the nuclear dead-end, they have no influence left to offer.  Economically and resource wise, we are pretty much there in living without whatever Russia has to threaten with, militarily they are a hot burning mess - I would love to see how long those T62 survive in Finland.  Some of the most horrific realizations a person or group of persons can have is when they suddenly realize that they are not who they thought they were and Russia is heading towards an identity crisis for the history books - again. 
3.  I agree that the small wars have been one sided, not so sure about the larger ones.  Korea was not one-sided, nor was Vietnam or Afghanistan for the Russians, at least not when we are talking about Will.  The Cold War was definitely not one sided.  To my mind this war is a bit like the Crimean War, Boer War or the Franco-Prussian War, or even the US Civil War - it is a trailer for what a large fully symmetrical conflict would look like - assuming we could find the right context to have one, that did not escalate.  This is a high-intensity peer conflict at the tactical/operational level - with plenty of strategic LL's.  This is not full spectrum strategic or total war...I am not sure we could even have one of those and not destroy ourselves to be honest.  This one is frankly as close as I would want to get if we have to go this route.
The only reason I am even close to making firm calls - and as I noted there is some distance to go here - is that what we have seen in this war has been aligned to a set of consistent trends stretching back at least to Iraq '03 and maybe Gulf '91.