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Everything posted by Saint_Fuller

  1. I think something like that 3-tone scheme was also used by the US Army for AFVs before the sandbox wars and its descent into Desert Tan Hell started.
  2. I was guessing ICM, because I can't imagine a 70s-80s war scenario where the submunitions aren't being flung around like candy to delete tank formations.
  3. I know I said I was going to peace out, but apparently I'm just a glutton for bashing my head against a wall. Anyway this has, near as I can tell, been your complaint though? "I leave my tanks in a hull down BP long enough that the enemy actually ranges in, and when they start taking hits it immediately knocks out the gun or punches through the glass jaw turret armor" "Therefore hull down is worthless, it's better to hit the gas and roar forward into the open to expose your stronger glacis and put your strongest armor in the center of the sight picture" You claim to understand these principles, yet you ignore the immediately available alternate solution to that problem "The enemy is starting to range in on my hull-down tanks, better pull back and reposition so I don't get hit"
  4. anyway if you can't grasp the basic tactical principles of how to fight tanks and the reasons why tanks engage from hull down in the first place I'm not sure how to get that across when several other people have also tried and failed to explain that but to reiterate: the advantage of a hull down BP engagement is in being harder to spot and then range in on (and subsequently hit), while still being able to engage your enemy unhindered, and to be able to retreat back into cover and pop up back again in another position if you sit in a position long enough to start taking hits and count on your armor to save you, you are failing at the very fundamentals of armored combat and deserve everything about to happen - and trying to cheese the hits by going up into the open (instead of retreating and re-positioning to avoid getting hit in the first place) so you can take hits on your stronger glacis is both an incredibly gamey thing to do, and indicates a failure to understand what the actual mistake is here to begin with your armor is your last, not your first, line of defense - this is such a fundamental tactical principle that I am not sure how to put it any simpler and as I am not in any real mood to bash my head against this particular wall any more, peace out
  5. @slysniper dude there is literally a picture right there of a Panther that sat in the open taking a couple dozen hits even when the Shermans had ranged in the hits are still spread across most of the glacis like I asked the other guy, if that kind of spread is not enough, what exactly are you asking for here Being able to hit somewhat close to center of mass on a stationary target in the open (with a spread of hits still measured in several feet across the glacis) after ranging in with multiple shots =/= video gamey shooting at specific weak points on the tank at a kilometer.
  6. Picture from your very own testing. So. About that 1x1cm square. Yeah, when they have the time to precisely zero in the gun on an immobile target in the open with a great number of rounds, they reliably start hitting close to center mass on the target. It's to be expected. The rounds still have a decent spread across center of mass, as is also to be expected. What are you asking for here, the implementation of some kind of RNG where even after the enemy gunner has accurately dialed in the range and found the target, the shells should just occasionally randomly curve to miss your Wunderpanthers anyway? E: anyway this talk about "I put my tanks in the open to cheese hits by putting the hull armor at center of mass" is not really an issue with the game honestly - yes, a Panther is possibly more survivable in a situation where it sits still in the open because now it can take hits on the strong hull armor and not its glass jaw of a turret, but if you are sitting still and counting on your armor to save you from hits, you have committed major tactical mistakes to begin with the best defense is not getting seen or hit in the first place (your armor is your last, not your first, line of defense), which is why real militaries fight their tanks in hull-down BP engagements using shoot and scoot tactics
  7. Tank gunners aim center mass because that is the only practical option. Aiming for specific parts of the tank is some gamey **** straight out of some arcade tank "sim" game like War Thunder, where distances are compressed hilariously and engagement ranges are consequently stupidly short. This is a modern thermal gunsight. That object at 0:12 that gets shot at? That's a T-55, skylined, in the open, on a hill, under 12x magnification. Good luck finding let alone hitting comparatively tiny "weak spots" when the reticle is the same size as the entire damn target, with your WW2 daylight optics and fire control methods amounting to "estimate the range and then adjust by observing fall of shot".
  8. How long are we going to keep this going? Fact: The Bundeswehr does not have enough money to maintain its equipment. Fact: The Bundeswehr can't do its job, because it can't maintain the equipment it needs to do that. Conclusion: the Bundeswehr needs more money so it can do its job. I've provided the evidence, both the raw data and literal admissions from the German government that the Bundeswehr is not capable of doing its job, to prove my claims. You've yet to provide any at all for the claim that I'm wrong in any capacity, only "no u" denials and odd rambling about how we can't just trust the data because... something something muh unreliable statistics. I must admit I look eagerly forward to whatever sources you have to back your claims up. I do however expect you're going to keep up this dancing around and refusing to provide anything to back up your claims though, so until you shape up, I think we're done here.
  9. The Bundeswehr doesn't have enough money to maintain the equipment it needs to do its job, ergo it's not getting the funding it needs to do its job. Its budget is too small. This surely cannot be that difficult to grasp?
  10. http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-lack-of-military-readiness-dramatic-says-bundeswehr-commissioner/a-42663215 https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article144983577/Muessen-uns-fragen-ob-wir-im-Ernstfall-abwehrfaehig-sind.html http://www.dw.com/en/german-military-short-on-tanks-for-nato-mission/a-42603112 http://www.dw.com/en/1-in-10-german-military-pilots-lost-helicopter-licenses-for-lack-of-flight-time/a-43646369 The statistics agree. So do the various anecdotal stories leaking from the Bundeswehr about the systemic issues plaguing them. Even the German government itself admits there's huge problems: indeed, they have been wringing their hands over the fact that the Bundeswehr is a trainwreck for years. In other words, all the evidence is broadly in agreement: the Bundeswehr is a mess that can't afford to keep its own equipment functional, and it can't train its people properly because it doesn't have enough functional equipment. What evidence do you have to offer to counter this?
  11. How can they be well-trained when the Bundeswehr quite literally can't even afford to keep its vehicles functional or its guns shooting? A few years ago, one of the Germans' highest readiness units literally showed up to a massive joint international training exercise with broomsticks painted black strapped to their vehicles because they didn't have enough machine guns that worked. This is the culmination of German training. Going "bang bang" with broomsticks at a massive pan-European defense exercise because they can't afford real guns. Now, to be honest, going "bang bang" is fine in something like in-unit exercises, even the Americans probably do it to save money. But while the Americans then go to train for real at the NTC with main battle tanks and IFVs and helicopters and fighter jets... the Germans still train with broomsticks at international NATO exercises. Because they can't afford to do better. Because the American battalion is backed by the DOD, which keeps enough money around that when necessary, the Americans can get the spare parts and ammunition and fuel to get all their equipment in action and ready to go. Which is how the National Guard can go from "we drive half our tanks" to "YEE-HAW BOYS LET'S GO" in so many months. The Germans can't even do that with their highest-readiness units. They ran out of money in the spare parts budget, and had to strip the rest of the army for spare parts to rush to PzGrenBtl 371 (the German contribution to NATO's VHRJTF) for NATO exercises a few years back. They still couldn't manage to get the battalion to its paper strength. 180,000 personnel and a budget of 40 billion euros a year, and they can't even manage to field one battalion at full strength despite borrowing equipment from the entire rest of the army. Like @Rinaldi said, the Bundeswehr is an utter mess. Even the SPD acknowledges it, and they're the people who complain about "NATO saber rattling" and see the BW's budget as a piggy bank to be hacked away.
  12. I assume you mean M60 and not M48, since the M48 entered service in 1953 and design work on T95 didn't even begin until 1955? Anyway. Abrams did not and has not ever, to my knowledge, used silica-cored armor. Silica-cored armor is the hottest armor tech of 195X, hence why you find it on things like T95, the prototypes for M60 (but not the production model, due to cost issues), and T-64. By the late 70s, the hot new thing on the block was special armor such as Chobham, and the derived versions that the Germans used for Leopard 2 and the Americans used for Abrams. We know Abrams used special armor, because some of the relevant documents have been declassified and are available online. The main part of the Abrams' special armor array is steel/rubber/steel "sandwich" NERA tiles, and in some places (like the turret side armor, depicted below) behind the sandwiches there are backing plates of steel and some unknown, possibly ceramic, material. This might be silica, but it could just as well be some other ceramic material or even some form of plastic for all we know. I also strongly doubt the idea that PT-76 could frontally defeat Abrams, since it was specifically designed to be proof against 5-inch HEAT warheads and Soviet 115mm APFSDS over the frontal arc: even MBT-70, its predecessor, had been protected against 3-inch HEAT warheads, such as the PT-76's BK-350M. I am incredibly dubious of this claim. The most common APFSDS round for M68-equipped US tanks in Germany is M833, and in M256-armed tanks is M829. Both of those two rounds would be able to reliably penetrate anything the Soviets can bring to bear at any point in 1985. Going two years forward and backward for fun: In 1983, the best round the US has is M774, which can kill anything the Soviets can put on the field, except possibly T-80A with its new turret. But those top-of-the line vehicles that might be able to survive M774 are still very much the minority: the bulk of the Soviet tank fleet remains older T-64s and T-72s, which are vulnerable to M774. In 1987, things are somewhat different: M829 and M833 are still the main two US rounds in service. The new T-80U with Kontakt is basically impregnable to M833, and even M829 will have trouble with the ERA. Hence the development of M900 and M829A1. However, as before, those vehicles are in the minority, and the bulk of the Soviet Army's armored forces are still trucking along in older T-64s and T-72s, which M829 and M833 are still fully adequate for dealing with.
  13. The Iraqis bought T-72Ms from the USSR in the mid-80s. It was parts from this lot that were used to locally assemble the Asad Babils. Some parts were locally sourced, almost certainly, but there's no real reason to believe this included doing something as inane and frankly stupid as replacing the armor with mild steel, or even that they had to use locally-produced armor plating in the first place. And even if they had needed to source armor locally, Iraq kept building ballistic missiles while under heavy UN sanctions specifically intended to keep them from getting such missiles and after suffering massive economic/industrial damage in the Gulf War. If Iraqi industry post-1991 didn't even have the ability to make something as basic as decent armor plating (which the claim that Asad Babil had to use mild steel armor logicaly implies), then it really begs the question how they managed to make far more complicated things such as ballistic missiles.
  14. The myth of mild steel armor on Asad Babil is exactly that, a myth. The Iraqis used the same composition of armor steel as the Soviets themselves, mainly because the "locally produced" Asad Babils were basically just T-72M parts kits bought from the Soviets and put together in Iraqi plants. Asad Babil was functionally the same as other non-WarPac T-72Ms, because it more or less was. The Iraqis had T-72s exactly as good as what their status of getting aid as a non-WarPac nation allowed them to. The various variations of T-72 they had were basically adequate tanks not really any different from the bulk of non-WP T-72s, the main issue with them being less with the tanks themselves, and more with the fact that 1) the Iraqis were terrible tankers and 2) they were issued with decades old obsolete ammunition.
  15. Sorry about the lack of updates, been somewhat busy over the last week, haven't managed to work much on this. So! I don't have an actual content post ready yet, but here's a wide angle view of the battlefield as of the conclusion of the last post. Marked the area where the BTRs were engaged, for reference. This is hopefully helpful in forming a better view of what's going on at the moment, and of my current disposition.
  16. As promised, here's the first actual AAR content, featuring the first five minutes of the match. Bit short, as there's simply not much happening this early in the game, but there was some action I felt were interesting enough to warrant a post. The first minute or so is fairly quiet from my end. However, it does not take long for that to change: unconfirmed AFV contacts are spotted moving north across the fields, in the direction of the river. Potential indication that the enemy is moving to attack along Axis Bravo? Soon after, the shooting begins. One of the unconfirmed contacts from the previous turn is resolved into a BTR. A Bulat quickly engages. The first shot somewhat miraculously fails to kill the BTR, the APFSDS dart only wrecking its wheels. The BTR, its wheels badly damaged, continues to crawl forward at a snail's pace. At least until it is hit and destroyed by a second shot from the Bulat. Its luck did not last long enough to save it from a second shot, evidently. A second BTR is spotted just as the first dies, and it is engaged by the recon platoon's two BMP-2s. It is knocked out in short order. A third BTR is spotted soon after: the BRM-1K that caught sight of it takes the shot, but it goes high. The BTR manages to pull behind some trees and break contact before the BRM can fire a second shot. This more or less concludes the brief engagement. With the direction the BTRs I have spotted were moving, I suspect the enemy may be moving his forces to attack along the river (i.e. axis Bravo). But as the location of the enemy's forces, besides those three BTRs, remains unknown to me at this time, I can't really draw any firm conclusions about the enemy's chosen axis of advance yet.
  17. Inasmuch as storage bins happen to function as spaced armor by virtue of "it's a steel box", yes. They are no substitute for actual special armor, which loops right around to my initial statement that the Type 10 is basically unarmored on the turret sides. On the glacis it's just a steel plate that serves as the outermost "skin" of the hull. You can see the way it's bolted to the hull here, and it's not very thick either based on the edge visible around the headlights. It might provide a little bit of extra protection, but at a guess it's primarily there to keep the composite armor blocks on the glacis in place while permitting easy access (just unbolt the plate and you can take the armor modules out easily when preparing the tank for transport).
  18. I am quite sure that they are in fact storage bins (that do act as spaced armor, granted), yes. Exhibit A. Visible hatches on the storage bins. Exhibit B, a different type of bin without hatches, but with hinges at the top. I expect they open similarly to the Leclerc's bins. Exhibit C, showing the same type of bins from Exhibit B, including the hinges at the top and what I assume are handles at the bottom.
  19. I said yellow boxes, if you want to play the pedantic nitpicking game. Regardless. The parts in yellow represent modules that act as spaced armor, namely storage boxes on the turret side and a steel plate on the glacis. The red parts are the actual special armor modules. If it was all special armor, there'd be no need to separate the modules by color, would there?
  20. Good day everyone. This AAR is based on a PBEM of a quite interesting scenario created by @Rinaldi, "Action at Chervona Hirka", and based on the (quite well-made, I would say) master map by @H1nd. SITUATION AND BRIEFING It's the early hours of June 11th, 2017. I have command of the Ukrainian 15th Mechanized Battalion of the 58th Mechanized Brigade, deployed to hold up the brigade's northern shoulder around the town of Chervona Hirka. My primary objective is to retain control of the town itself, as it sits adjacent to the enemy's MSR and controls access to side roads that could let the Russians bypass Krolevets. This is Objective Aleksej. A roadblock positioned astride the road to the south is a secondary objective, designated Objective Vasilij. It is held by the battalion recon platoon occupying Battle Position 1. I do not expect to hold the position for very long against enemy attack, if it comes to that. However, forcing the enemy to deploy to destroy the roadblock will cost him precious time, and hopefully, the recon platoon will provide me early warning of enemy movement. My third objective is to attrit and delay the enemy as much as possible: inflicting losses and forcing him to deploy a significant amount of forces to overcome my position will cost him time and weaken his ability to continue the thrust. In this case, the priority is to engage and destroy his infantry and their carriers, with armor and logistical vehicles to be engaged as targets of opportunity. At my disposal is the aforementioned 15th Mechanized Battalion, reinforced by a platoon of armor (BM Bulats) from the Brigade and a platoon of MT-12 antitank guns. The enemy force is a BTR-equipped motor rifle unit with armor support, and the incoming attack is likely going to be in battalion strength, though possibly somewhat diminished: a company-sized enemy force was repulsed yesterday, leaving behind several BTRs and T-72s. PLAN There are three probable routes for the enemy to attack down, by my estimation. Map is hopefully legible enough to interpret. My intent is to cover all three probable axes of advance: The field, Axis Alpha, is the fastest and most direct approach to the town. However, it is covered from three sides, forming a fire sack to attrit the enemy as much as possible if they choose to advance there. The Bulats and antitank guns will engage from BP 3, ATGM teams of the battalion antitank platoon are situated in BP 2, and the right flank is covered by infantry with RPGs as well as their BMP-2s, occupying BP 4. Axis Bravo, along the river on my left flank, would potentially allow the enemy to maneuver very close to Objective Aleksej while remaining out of my view. A rifle platoon is deployed on the north side of BP 2 to keep the area under observation. If the enemy chooses to focus his main effort down this axis of advance, that platoon is to act as a delaying obstacle so I can shift my forces accordingly. Axis Charlie, the road on the south, is the third potential route for the enemy to take, and the one I judge to be least likely: it is constricted and forces the enemy to drive straight along a fairly narrow path, directly into any potential ambushes. Nevertheless, if the enemy chooses to move through here, my intent is, much like with Axis Bravo, to delay them with the limited forces I have at BP 6, to buy time for shifting around other forces to BP 9 at the south end of Chervona. The artillery has pre-registered target points on positions on the east edge of the field: these are where I expect the enemy to position support by fire elements in case of an attack along Axis Alpha. Artillery fire on the TRPs will hopefully obscure the vision of and damage/disrupt any SBF elements on these positions. Phase Line Forward is the first position where the enemy is likely to be engaged, by the battalion recon platoon at BP 1. PL Midfield is the forward line of the battalion's main body. PL Stop is the no-pass line. If the enemy attacks along axis Alpha: Forces at BP 2 and BP 4 are to put flanking fire on enemy forces as they move across the field, and then withdraw to contract the line when the enemy approaches PL Midfield: the forces at BP 2 will move to BP 8, and the units at BP 4 to BP 9. Alternatively, units at BP 2 and BP 4 will be kept in place to strike at the enemy's trailing elements, if he chooses to pass them by. Forces in BP 3 just past PL Midfield will be the first to engage the enemy when he breaks into Chervona Hirka from the field, and will if necessary cede the edge of the town and attempt to conduct a fighting withdrawal to BP 12. BP 8, 9, and 12 are the final fighting positions, being directly in front of PL Stop. If the enemy attacks along axis Bravo: Forces at BP 2 will engage the enemy first, and fight to delay the enemy as long as possible. They may attempt to conduct a fighting withdrawal toward BP 10, and then either fight in position there or withdraw a second time to further strengthen BP 3. Units at BP 3 and BP 8 will reorient to face a thrust from the northeast. If they can be safely pulled out of their position, forces from BP 4 will move to BP 12. If necessary, forces at BP 8 will conduct a fighting withdrawal to BP 12. If the enemy attacks along axis Charlie: Forces at BP 6 will be the first to engage the enemy, to delay and attrit them. Units at BP 4 will move south to strike at the enemy's flank where they are strung out along the road, and units at BP 8 will move to BP 9 to receive a thrust from the south. In the event I fail to stop the enemy and lose control of Chervona Hirka, I am counting on inflicting enough losses to leave the enemy unable to effectively take advantage of the ground they have taken. My briefing does not indicate that force preservation is a critical concern, but ideally, I want to keep losses below 30%, to ensure the battalion remains capable of further combat operations. And well, that's it for the opening post. The next update (and first actual AAR content!) should be along fairly soon.
  21. My first thought was T-60, but the hull front doesn't look right for that. So, hrm, after some research (clicking about on Wikipedia)... is it a T-40 amphibious tank?
  22. The more relevant issue is that the barrel change system on MG34 is much better for use in a ball mount than the system MG42 used. With a 34 you just rotate the receiver out of the way and pull the barrel out straight backwards, like so: In an MG42, you pull barrels out like this: There isn't really room to do this were the gun to be mounted into a Kugelblende.
  23. FWIW, PAC-2 had a successful intercept rate in Desert Storm (with solid evidence confirming warhead kills) of around 9%, per the GAO.
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