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Saint_Fuller last won the day on April 2 2018

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  1. I think something like that 3-tone scheme was also used by the US Army for AFVs before the sandbox wars and its descent into Desert Tan Hell started.
  2. I was guessing ICM, because I can't imagine a 70s-80s war scenario where the submunitions aren't being flung around like candy to delete tank formations.
  3. I know I said I was going to peace out, but apparently I'm just a glutton for bashing my head against a wall. Anyway this has, near as I can tell, been your complaint though? "I leave my tanks in a hull down BP long enough that the enemy actually ranges in, and when they start taking hits it immediately knocks out the gun or punches through the glass jaw turret armor" "Therefore hull down is worthless, it's better to hit the gas and roar forward into the open to expose your stronger glacis and put your strongest armor in the center of the sight picture" You claim to understand these principles, yet you ignore the immediately available alternate solution to that problem "The enemy is starting to range in on my hull-down tanks, better pull back and reposition so I don't get hit"
  4. anyway if you can't grasp the basic tactical principles of how to fight tanks and the reasons why tanks engage from hull down in the first place I'm not sure how to get that across when several other people have also tried and failed to explain that but to reiterate: the advantage of a hull down BP engagement is in being harder to spot and then range in on (and subsequently hit), while still being able to engage your enemy unhindered, and to be able to retreat back into cover and pop up back again in another position if you sit in a position long enough to start taking hits and count on your armor to save you, you are failing at the very fundamentals of armored combat and deserve everything about to happen - and trying to cheese the hits by going up into the open (instead of retreating and re-positioning to avoid getting hit in the first place) so you can take hits on your stronger glacis is both an incredibly gamey thing to do, and indicates a failure to understand what the actual mistake is here to begin with your armor is your last, not your first, line of defense - this is such a fundamental tactical principle that I am not sure how to put it any simpler and as I am not in any real mood to bash my head against this particular wall any more, peace out
  5. @slysniper dude there is literally a picture right there of a Panther that sat in the open taking a couple dozen hits even when the Shermans had ranged in the hits are still spread across most of the glacis like I asked the other guy, if that kind of spread is not enough, what exactly are you asking for here Being able to hit somewhat close to center of mass on a stationary target in the open (with a spread of hits still measured in several feet across the glacis) after ranging in with multiple shots =/= video gamey shooting at specific weak points on the tank at a kilometer.
  6. Picture from your very own testing. So. About that 1x1cm square. Yeah, when they have the time to precisely zero in the gun on an immobile target in the open with a great number of rounds, they reliably start hitting close to center mass on the target. It's to be expected. The rounds still have a decent spread across center of mass, as is also to be expected. What are you asking for here, the implementation of some kind of RNG where even after the enemy gunner has accurately dialed in the range and found the target, the shells should just occasionally randomly curve to miss your Wunderpanthers anyway? E: anyway this talk about "I put my tanks in the open to cheese hits by putting the hull armor at center of mass" is not really an issue with the game honestly - yes, a Panther is possibly more survivable in a situation where it sits still in the open because now it can take hits on the strong hull armor and not its glass jaw of a turret, but if you are sitting still and counting on your armor to save you from hits, you have committed major tactical mistakes to begin with the best defense is not getting seen or hit in the first place (your armor is your last, not your first, line of defense), which is why real militaries fight their tanks in hull-down BP engagements using shoot and scoot tactics
  7. Tank gunners aim center mass because that is the only practical option. Aiming for specific parts of the tank is some gamey **** straight out of some arcade tank "sim" game like War Thunder, where distances are compressed hilariously and engagement ranges are consequently stupidly short. This is a modern thermal gunsight. That object at 0:12 that gets shot at? That's a T-55, skylined, in the open, on a hill, under 12x magnification. Good luck finding let alone hitting comparatively tiny "weak spots" when the reticle is the same size as the entire damn target, with your WW2 daylight optics and fire control methods amounting to "estimate the range and then adjust by observing fall of shot".
  8. How long are we going to keep this going? Fact: The Bundeswehr does not have enough money to maintain its equipment. Fact: The Bundeswehr can't do its job, because it can't maintain the equipment it needs to do that. Conclusion: the Bundeswehr needs more money so it can do its job. I've provided the evidence, both the raw data and literal admissions from the German government that the Bundeswehr is not capable of doing its job, to prove my claims. You've yet to provide any at all for the claim that I'm wrong in any capacity, only "no u" denials and odd rambling about how we can't just trust the data because... something something muh unreliable statistics. I must admit I look eagerly forward to whatever sources you have to back your claims up. I do however expect you're going to keep up this dancing around and refusing to provide anything to back up your claims though, so until you shape up, I think we're done here.
  9. The Bundeswehr doesn't have enough money to maintain the equipment it needs to do its job, ergo it's not getting the funding it needs to do its job. Its budget is too small. This surely cannot be that difficult to grasp?
  10. http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-lack-of-military-readiness-dramatic-says-bundeswehr-commissioner/a-42663215 https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article144983577/Muessen-uns-fragen-ob-wir-im-Ernstfall-abwehrfaehig-sind.html http://www.dw.com/en/german-military-short-on-tanks-for-nato-mission/a-42603112 http://www.dw.com/en/1-in-10-german-military-pilots-lost-helicopter-licenses-for-lack-of-flight-time/a-43646369 The statistics agree. So do the various anecdotal stories leaking from the Bundeswehr about the systemic issues plaguing them. Even the German government itself admits there's huge problems: indeed, they have been wringing their hands over the fact that the Bundeswehr is a trainwreck for years. In other words, all the evidence is broadly in agreement: the Bundeswehr is a mess that can't afford to keep its own equipment functional, and it can't train its people properly because it doesn't have enough functional equipment. What evidence do you have to offer to counter this?
  11. How can they be well-trained when the Bundeswehr quite literally can't even afford to keep its vehicles functional or its guns shooting? A few years ago, one of the Germans' highest readiness units literally showed up to a massive joint international training exercise with broomsticks painted black strapped to their vehicles because they didn't have enough machine guns that worked. This is the culmination of German training. Going "bang bang" with broomsticks at a massive pan-European defense exercise because they can't afford real guns. Now, to be honest, going "bang bang" is fine in something like in-unit exercises, even the Americans probably do it to save money. But while the Americans then go to train for real at the NTC with main battle tanks and IFVs and helicopters and fighter jets... the Germans still train with broomsticks at international NATO exercises. Because they can't afford to do better. Because the American battalion is backed by the DOD, which keeps enough money around that when necessary, the Americans can get the spare parts and ammunition and fuel to get all their equipment in action and ready to go. Which is how the National Guard can go from "we drive half our tanks" to "YEE-HAW BOYS LET'S GO" in so many months. The Germans can't even do that with their highest-readiness units. They ran out of money in the spare parts budget, and had to strip the rest of the army for spare parts to rush to PzGrenBtl 371 (the German contribution to NATO's VHRJTF) for NATO exercises a few years back. They still couldn't manage to get the battalion to its paper strength. 180,000 personnel and a budget of 40 billion euros a year, and they can't even manage to field one battalion at full strength despite borrowing equipment from the entire rest of the army. Like @Rinaldi said, the Bundeswehr is an utter mess. Even the SPD acknowledges it, and they're the people who complain about "NATO saber rattling" and see the BW's budget as a piggy bank to be hacked away.
  12. I assume you mean M60 and not M48, since the M48 entered service in 1953 and design work on T95 didn't even begin until 1955? Anyway. Abrams did not and has not ever, to my knowledge, used silica-cored armor. Silica-cored armor is the hottest armor tech of 195X, hence why you find it on things like T95, the prototypes for M60 (but not the production model, due to cost issues), and T-64. By the late 70s, the hot new thing on the block was special armor such as Chobham, and the derived versions that the Germans used for Leopard 2 and the Americans used for Abrams. We know Abrams used special armor, because some of the relevant documents have been declassified and are available online. The main part of the Abrams' special armor array is steel/rubber/steel "sandwich" NERA tiles, and in some places (like the turret side armor, depicted below) behind the sandwiches there are backing plates of steel and some unknown, possibly ceramic, material. This might be silica, but it could just as well be some other ceramic material or even some form of plastic for all we know. I also strongly doubt the idea that PT-76 could frontally defeat Abrams, since it was specifically designed to be proof against 5-inch HEAT warheads and Soviet 115mm APFSDS over the frontal arc: even MBT-70, its predecessor, had been protected against 3-inch HEAT warheads, such as the PT-76's BK-350M. I am incredibly dubious of this claim. The most common APFSDS round for M68-equipped US tanks in Germany is M833, and in M256-armed tanks is M829. Both of those two rounds would be able to reliably penetrate anything the Soviets can bring to bear at any point in 1985. Going two years forward and backward for fun: In 1983, the best round the US has is M774, which can kill anything the Soviets can put on the field, except possibly T-80A with its new turret. But those top-of-the line vehicles that might be able to survive M774 are still very much the minority: the bulk of the Soviet tank fleet remains older T-64s and T-72s, which are vulnerable to M774. In 1987, things are somewhat different: M829 and M833 are still the main two US rounds in service. The new T-80U with Kontakt is basically impregnable to M833, and even M829 will have trouble with the ERA. Hence the development of M900 and M829A1. However, as before, those vehicles are in the minority, and the bulk of the Soviet Army's armored forces are still trucking along in older T-64s and T-72s, which M829 and M833 are still fully adequate for dealing with.
  13. The Iraqis bought T-72Ms from the USSR in the mid-80s. It was parts from this lot that were used to locally assemble the Asad Babils. Some parts were locally sourced, almost certainly, but there's no real reason to believe this included doing something as inane and frankly stupid as replacing the armor with mild steel, or even that they had to use locally-produced armor plating in the first place. And even if they had needed to source armor locally, Iraq kept building ballistic missiles while under heavy UN sanctions specifically intended to keep them from getting such missiles and after suffering massive economic/industrial damage in the Gulf War. If Iraqi industry post-1991 didn't even have the ability to make something as basic as decent armor plating (which the claim that Asad Babil had to use mild steel armor logicaly implies), then it really begs the question how they managed to make far more complicated things such as ballistic missiles.
  14. The myth of mild steel armor on Asad Babil is exactly that, a myth. The Iraqis used the same composition of armor steel as the Soviets themselves, mainly because the "locally produced" Asad Babils were basically just T-72M parts kits bought from the Soviets and put together in Iraqi plants. Asad Babil was functionally the same as other non-WarPac T-72Ms, because it more or less was. The Iraqis had T-72s exactly as good as what their status of getting aid as a non-WarPac nation allowed them to. The various variations of T-72 they had were basically adequate tanks not really any different from the bulk of non-WP T-72s, the main issue with them being less with the tanks themselves, and more with the fact that 1) the Iraqis were terrible tankers and 2) they were issued with decades old obsolete ammunition.
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