The_MonkeyKing

Footage of the Bradley battle UKR POV: rapidsavecom-same-battler-from-0806-from-afu-bradley-pow-pd734k9uz25b1_aPibKr1V.mp4 source (I cropped it): https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/145l0wp/same_battler_from_0806_from_afu_bradley_pow/

Seems the equipment was lost to Russian territory (at least for the duration of the photo op). To me, this makes it less likely any neighboring breaches were successful and the equipment would have been left under Ukrainian control to recover later on.

Cannot solve the helicopter problem within contested or mutually denied airspace. Those things scoot and fire >10km away from "hull down" positions. This is one way NATO would have handled large Soviet formations with extensive AA. Fortunately these are not even close to the threat and volume of us army rotatory wing.

I don't think people are shocked of the losses, but the way those losses happened. The biggest unknowns where how these yet to meet forces would perform. Yearly indicators now point to somewhat competent Russians and struggling Ukrainians.

One Finnish officer's speculation: "Well, those 3 Bradleys have driven into the minefield without clearance help. Later, a trench was cleared for that mine band that was detected in this way with a clearing wagon, but the opening was affected by artillery or PST and the opening was blocked by damaging/destroying the other two wagons" source: https://twitter.com/MMaenpaa1/status/1667161427059130372

Interesting perspective. Quite a contrarian opinion to many, for example, Finnish officer commentators.

Exactly. Losses are expected. These sort of losses should never happen

This is not looking good at all. In any way.

but still I am worried

ISW

Napkin math says the missile was launched over >10km away. Not much to do than take the hit while in contested airspace and on the offensive in that terrain.

This geoconfirmed map is quite good. Large volume of timestamped and linked footage geolocated https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine

My summary of some more interesting points of the episode: We are now beyond shaping operations or probes. This is the main operation, but the main effort is still unknown. We are seeing multiple brigade lever operations in the south Operations are likely to develop over weeks or even months We are seeing some of the main new formations being committed Directions other than the south are likely just being conducted by local formations and so are unlikely to amount to much in the big picture. The "land bridge" connecting Crimea to Russia is not as important as often talked about. Especially in terms of military operations. Most forces resupplied directly from Russia or Crimea. There is not a lot of traffic across this "land bridge". We must remember there was 2014-2017 when Russia had Ukraine and didn't have the Bridge yet. Long-range fires (storm shadow) It remains to be seen what is the actual impact of this capability. With some time we are going to be getting an answer on how much giving the ATACMS would have had or not had effect. The problem is not comparable to just giving Ukraine a "longer stick" as often stated. Russia has done a lot more than just move its stockpiles and CC out of the GMLRS range. Russia is hardening potential targets and decentralization its systems. Already clear we are not seeing the "HIMARS effect" from last year. Meaning huge stockpile explosions. The effect of longer-range fires is likely going to be lots of downstream effects. Like Russia being unable to mass fires like it has before. GLSDB ammo combined with Ukraine reaching Crimea will be interesting Mike is more optimistic than before for Ukrainian success Russia again has a chronic manpower problem The only fix, mobilization seems to be politically off the table. Russia suffered big losses in the winter Ukraine has waited for more equipment, training, and weather and rushed things too soon. Ukraine has gotten new capabilities as well

I have noted the same. Footage coming out from Russians this week has mostly been Ukrainian troops driving to mines under sparse indirect fire. Same case for most footage coming from Ukrainian offensives around Bakhmut in the recent weeks. No significant indirect fires. Also, analysts from War on the Rocks and ISW say most defensive positions are covered by 120mm mortar fires. Bigger guns are in reserves.

Difficult situation for a Ukrainian force. It is probably a light infantry force equipped only with MRAP vehicles, lacking any demining capacity not to even mention protected mobile demining capacity. Lack of skills and experience in offensive operations makes the situation even worse. Then this force is given an attack mission in that terrain against fortified positions. An offensive operation like this from the western respective should never be conducted with that force.

Ukrainians seem to be as eager to drive into mines as were the Russians in the winter. Yes I know, all the regular caveats apply, but still hurts my hopium-filled brain to see this from the Ukrainians.

For the aid mission "intervention" it is also irrelevant who or what blew the dam.

Time to start a humanitarian aid operation secured by a significant military operation. Park US Navy offshore and secure the airspace.

Interview with former CIA Intelligence Officer Marc Polymeropoulos, some interesting points on the US support especially. An extremely frustrating situation for him. AI-generated summary: Key insights "The Russians...have been managed to do is bleed...in a staggering...military operation." - The Ukrainians have been successful in bleeding the Russians in a military operation, despite initial skepticism about their strategy. The U.S intelligence community assesses that the Russians have lost a total of a hundred thousand casualties, which is an order of magnitude not seen since the fight in the Pacific. The loss of Wagner Fighters is a catastrophic loss for the Russian side in Ukraine, and bleeding the Russians dry is the strategy for the Ukrainians to mount their own counteroffensive. There are elements at the National Security Council level that don't want to give Ukraine the tools to completely defeat Russia, for fear of catastrophic collapse of the Russian military and potential use of tactical nukes or strategic weapons. The idea of keeping Putin in power for stability is crazy and immoral, even if some analysts compare it to keeping Saddam in power after the first Gulf War. The US government's aid to Ukraine is not just about supporting democracy, but also about protecting American interests in the region. The idea of giving just enough help to get to the negotiating table in Ukraine is immoral and frustrating for those on the ground who have lost loved ones. The decisions made at high levels of government have real consequences for the lives of people in Ukraine. full summary with timestamps:

More time for me to play around with other AI tools... The tool is great. Still doesn't match doing it partially manually and just AI-aided to raise points that are particularly interesting to this forum's audience and past discussions.

and summarily brought to you by Eightify: Youtube Summary with ChatGPT INSIGHTS: Military Strategy and Tactics in the War in Ukraine There is still a tremendous amount we don't know about the war in Ukraine and we have to revise the story time and time again. The Russian military invasion of Ukraine was structured to marry up with an intelligence operation, drawing inspiration from historical Soviet operations and borrowing aspects from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, but ultimately failed due to incorrect assumptions and lack of preparation for sustained war. The Ukrainian military was more capable than the Russian forces given credit for and had a strong will to fight, with critical support from Ukrainian civil society and volunteers who stalled the Russian advance at critical points. Russian military pursues a war of attrition due to a deficit of manpower and a lack of good replacements for their initial losses, leveraging their advantage in firepower to bleed out Ukrainian forces. Despite exhaustion and casualties, Ukrainian forces have done well in stabilizing their lines and building out reserves, making the Russian military vulnerable heading into winter. The state of the war in Ukraine is at an inflection point, with wars proceeding in phases and having operational pauses. Despite the daunting task of facing Russian entrenchments and fortifications, the Russian military has created the best conditions for the Ukraine offensive. The Ukrainian military has taken significant losses and expanded their force mobilization, while the Russian military has taken even greater losses and also substantially refilled their force mobilization, leading to uncertainty about how these forces will match up in the upcoming fight. The biggest challenge in the war in Ukraine is not the current offensive, but what follows it, as history shows that conventional wars between states tend to last for several years. "Generally large conventional Wars. Like this can't be explained by any one small specific Factor." The definition of victory in the Ukrainian conflict is complex and goes beyond just territorial liberation, with the real war aims being to return to pre-2014 borders. Political and Diplomatic Challenges in the War in Ukraine The challenge for the West is to determine which countries and political establishments are truly invested in attaining a military victory for Ukraine versus those who only support offensive operations for negotiation purposes. "We forget there's a whole other planet out there and actually most of the people live in the rest of that world and the rest of that world is actually very economically significant right and those people have views and we don't check in with them nearly as often as we should." FULL TIMESTAMPED SUMMARY:

I hope the big countries like the USA, France, and Germany are starting to get some pressure to match the pre capita commitments of many small/medium European countries.

pretty clear DPICM to me