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The_MonkeyKing

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Everything posted by The_MonkeyKing

  1. And here is Ukrainan officer response: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1695867428247396359.html And dufman:
  2. Here interestingly US seems to have been thinking of reaching azov sea as a possibility.
  3. Much needed clarification on the different "defense lines": https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1695463241235734632.html Some pickings:
  4. Some interesting behind the curtains stuff coming out
  5. Good reading to refresh: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1655584386601951238.html Ukraine is now reaching zone3 "Zone 4: Prepared main defensive line. Massive multilayered trench lines with anti-tank ditches and dragons’ teeth obstacles. Extensive minefields are likely. These fortifications form nearly uniformly continuous defensive belt across the front. Built 3-4km deep."
  6. https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1686076915952599044.html
  7. Seems another serious attempt to get the ball rolling is underway
  8. The Chieftain's comments and some slides from "the conference on armored vehicle design" he attended. Some big hitters presenting surprisingly interesting and informative video. Also on Ukraine-related matters: some top-pick screenshots (Especially Ukraine related): Ukrainian colonel presentation (some comment picks): - Ukraine replacing lots of donated equipment antennas with anti-jam variants - Old tanks like T-55 ext. have their place and are effective at what they do - Ukraine battle management system is a combination of "Delta" a browser-based battle management system similar to US systems in combination with Discord servers.
  9. Attriting Russian Airborne in Bakhmut.mp3 "Episode Notes: On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike and Rob continue their conversation about their recent research trip to Ukraine. This conversation focused on the battle for Bakhmut, the level of attrition Russian forces have faced holding the city, and talked about the need to provide Ukraine with more man-portable systems. The Russia Contingency is a bi-weekly podcast featuring an in-depth analysis of Russia's military power and the war in Ukraine."
  10. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1682435379935182848?s=20
  11. The full episode now out (last week they released the first 30min): "When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, one of its first targets was the city of Mariupol. Despite being outnumbered by—and less well equipped than—their adversaries, Ukrainian defenders held out for three months. As the Russian siege of the city intensified, Ukrainian forces defended a shrinking perimeter with a command post in the Azovstal steel plant. One of those Ukrainian defenders was Sergeant Arseniy Fedosiuk. He joins John Spencer on this episode, relaying his experience in Mariupol, exploring the unique challenges of defending urban terrain against a superior enemy, and describing what happened at the end of the three-month battle, when he was taken prisoner by Russian forces." https://mwi.westpoint.edu/defending-mariupol/
  12. Yeah, and this type of attack is so slow that Russians will expand their minefields and fortifications at least the same rate as Ukraine is advancing. Leading to never ending loop without breakthrough and exploitation. At least until force attrition breaks the cycle.
  13. Well put. What the US air supremacy is, it is mass precision at its finest.
  14. some pointers: At the start of the southern offensive, we saw the employment of multiples of single companies, not brigades Ukraine is limited in its ability in embodying larger formations in an integrated way. Limited by enablers, operational environment, and experience. Was to the idea of establishing new "western" brigades proven/disproven? another way to go would have been to reinforce the existing experienced units with new battalions. a lot of the progress in the south was made by the older experienced units jury is still out but already merits questioning was this the way to go? Eighter way it was worth trying Was the idea of trying to make Ukraine to fight like "us" proven? Ukraine's way of war has been attritional, using fires decisively that then enables moment. Most actions have been platoon/company level where Ukraine has excelled compared to Russians. The argument has been the west does not have the ability to sustain this type of war. The question is does the west then have the ability to train and sustain Ukraine in the western way of war? This would mean the enablers the western way of war requires, starting with air supremacy. The answer seems to be no. might be better to improve Ukraine's ability to fight the way it is already fighting Ukraine uses tanks in almost the complete opposite way than the west in Ukraine's experience driving a company of tanks over a ridge is a sure way of losing a tank co. Tanks are used in infantry support or indirect fire roles. Mainly in pairs. Same on the Russian side at this point AT role is mainly done with ATGM infantry This is what Ukraine has learned and thinks what works for them Now: New brigades have been bloodied and are going through some changes. This is good Ukraine is adapting The fight is now mainly an attritional fight with platoon/company-level infantry attacks problem is this is unlikely to achieve breakthrough and exploitation Mine clearing capacities are in high demand like Nammo APOBS. Now main ways are bangalores or grappling hooks. These are slow and create tiny lanes and do not enable vehicle moment. Now ongoing attritional counter-battery fight seems interesting and promising for Ukraine. Still hard to judge from the outside Russia is saving most capabilities and ammo for large vehicle formations. This rationing is often confused with Russia lacking artillery.
  15. here is the second part: Ukraine Struggles to Scale Offensive Combat Operations, Part 2.mp3
  16. A couple of recent related podcast episodes: John Spencer is joined by retired Maj. Gen. Yom Tov Tamir. He served a long career in the Israel Defense Forces as an armor officer holding positions from tank commander to division commander. In 1973, he was an armor battalion commander during the Yom Kippur War. In part one of the conversations, he reflects on his career as an armor officer from a secret trip to Germany in 1964 to learn about American tanks, through his service in the 1967 Six-Day War, to the Yom Kippur War. The discussion lays the foundation for part two, which covers the role of tanks in urban warfare, including drawing lessons from the 1973 Battle of Suez City.
  17. How US is employing MQ-1C Gray Eagle (division level asset)
  18. One growing season is not long. But semantics. Grain is only a portion of the whole Ukraine sea cargo and that even that part was further constrained by the Russians. Ukraine has been in total sea blockade except grain shipping that was "just" constrained.
  19. As far I have understood Ukraine has been under total naval blockade since the start of the invasion. Russian approved and inspected grain shipments were the short lived exception to this. Nothing new
  20. 240kg payload (that British drone) is around three GMLRS rockets worth. Remember GMLRS effects on Kherson bridge? Or effect of three Malka 203mm rounds on something concrete. With the latest Crimea bridge strike we are in a whole different ballpark than 240kg. Very well might be 10x less than the truck bomb öast year but also has to be 10x larger than that British drone with 240kg payload.
  21. Not "pointless" when you compare the aftermath of the latest strike. No matter the placing, it is going to take multiple tons of explosives to get those results. It would be a different story if there were just pillars blowing up ext
  22. Yeah, indeed This war is becoming less exciting to follow by the day. Especially in daily/weekly bases. Strong trends are forming and the uncertainties are disappearing, leaving mostly "known unknowns". This is a good sign.
  23. Great general wrap-up of the situation according to Rob Lee, Michael Kofman, Konrad Muzyka "crew" unroll the tweet(s): https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html
  24. (the tweeter is a Ukrainian officer) This recent Luhansk scare has as little to do with reality as the winter scare of "new 500k Russian army" starting a major reinvasion at the beginning of this year had. I am just going to say, a couple of months ago Ukraine did its damnedest to get Russia to commit forces up north.
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