The_MonkeyKing

Perspective differences here I think. But indeed, no "dictum" is perfect. In the Korean War, the losing side did decide to enter the negotiations. But here I am not so knowledgeable on the details of the end of that war. Gulf War the loser had enough and retreated. Did not continue the war. Accepted the winner's conditions. WW1 Germany got to decide when to call it quits, the entente was absolute in its demands. One of the best examples of the loser choosing when the war ends. The winner sets the conditions and the war continues until the loser accepts these conditions. WW2 Germany did accept as well, just toke a long darn while, allies didn't compromise.

I agree, this might be the West trying to lower expectations. On the other hand, this offensive has become heavily loaded with expectations because it seems to be the only game in town. There are no plans in motion visible to supply Ukraine with a decisive advantage beyond this offensive. A more healthy conversation environment would be to talk about the support following the offensive. The expectations would ease when it would be clear that no matter the way the counter-offensive ends up the war is only going one way, that being Ukrainian victory. I know this side of the argument you are presenting. I also know the "pundits" side of it. Good points on both sides, hard to say what is the right balance to strike here. Another hand there is the "boiling the frog" risk and on the other what you stated here. I am undecided on this matter. Even if Ukraine captures all of its territories back next month, Russia can keep the war up as a cross-border war between two states likely for years. Russia doesn't have to negotiate and is very unlikely to as I see it. It is up to the loser to decide when a war ends.

While transatlantic partners remain supportive of Ukraine, there are questions about the success of the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. Many Western leaders doubt how a protracted war could impact the future of transatlantic support of Ukraine. In this context, how will the Ukrainian counteroffensive shape the future trajectory both of the battlefield and transatlantic unity? Michael Kofman joins Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Jim Townsend to discuss this and more. bullet points of the Mike's comments: On this subject of the Winter Offensive: In the fall, Russia barely managed to stabilize its frontlines but faced difficulties in improving its military force. The mobilization process primarily achieved increasing the number of troops rather than enhancing their capabilities. The loss of experienced leadership, high-quality equipment, and lack of ammunition further hindered the force's overall effectiveness. The Russian forces didn't have the ability to transition from static defense to more dynamic offensive operations. They appeared incapable of executing large-scale operations and were forced to divide efforts into four or five separate axes. In none of these sectors were they able to gain a significant advantage over the Ukrainians in terms of firepower, manpower, or equipment. It's unclear why the Ukrainians hyped up the Russian winter offensive to the degree they did. Interestingly, the media bought into the Ukrainian narrative, and it took them weeks to recognize the actual situation, even after the offensive had already begun. For weeks, the media reported on a non-existent other larger army that was expected to follow up on the initial offensive. This offensive operation showcased the limitations of Russia's offensive capabilities. On the other hand, it revealed little about their defensive capabilities, which may prove more crucial in the summer. On the counter-offensive: The stakes appear to be so high because there doesn't seem to be a Plan B for this operation or any contingencies for its aftermath(from the Western coalition). Most of the Western investment appears to have been made with this specific operation in mind, and there is no indication of a significant follow-up build-up. There may be further developments to address this in the summer, but the extent of these efforts remains to be seen. The appropriate way to view this operation is as a window of opportunity for Ukraine. There is significant support provided to Ukraine for this operation, but this does not provide a sustained advantage for the foreseeable future. It is highly likely that the war will return to a static state after this counteroffensive, regardless of its success. There is no visible strategy or momentum to maintain the advantage for Ukraine after this offensive operation. The potential for a decisive defeat that would drive Russia to the negotiation table is unlikely, and even in the best scenarios, the conflict is likely to continue as a cross-border war with the possibility of future escalations in the far future. Many people make the mistake of equating a long-protracted war to a stalemate. This could not be further from the truth. It is improbable that Russia can sustain this war without a second wave of mobilization, which they are currently planning and also doing everything to avoid, like last year. The losing side decides when the war stops. On the strategic picture: On the three goals of the US: Strategic defeat for Russia, victory for Ukraine, and escalation management. Strategic defeat for Russia has been achieved and the US is balancing between the last two goals. Mike is confused, as even he doesn't understand his own country's plans for the next phase after the counter-offensive. The counter-offensive probably won't be decisive enough to end this war, which is a fair assumption. If the West waits for the results of the spring offensive, it may take another six months to launch a new operation. Mike states he doesn't usually criticize the government and appreciates the difficulties of balancing various factors ext. However, now he's making an exception. Fighting a war with one offensive at a time, separated by six months, is not a great plan, and that is exactly how this war has been going. You cannot wait for the results of the offensives to decide what you will do next. Mike hasn't heard any plans about sustaining Ukraine in a long war. No one has explained the big picture, which is important for setting expectations for the Russians. Currently, the Russians could be counting on winning this war in the year 5 or so. Generally speaking, Russia might be able to sustain it for a couple of years. Russia's ability to produce ammunition and pull equipment out of storage will increase over time. However, the extent of this is uncertain and is still not going to equal demand even close. Then there are unknown factors like China that can change the whole equation. China is likely to adopt a “salami-slicing” the US deterrence policy, providing components and industrial enablers that will have significant effects over time. Regarding economic sustainment, Mike doesn't know much, but the outlook does not generally look good for Russia. However, sustaining the war for a couple of years seems feasible. In summary, Russia can sustain this war for years, but it cannot change its fortunes on the battlefield. In terms of aid, Mike is not focused on any single item, like the F-16, but rather on issues like equipping 9 brigades and providing enough ammunition for offensive operations. Western countries are also starting to accept the fact that this will be a years-long war, but they have not yet specified what this means or how to adapt their approach. For now, they are still operating on a three-month timeline. As for Moscow's perspective on this war: Highly depends on who you ask in Moscow, but generally... Mike thinks they understand the disaster it has been, but they also recognize that they have survived a lot so far. They see a total economic collapse as less likely at this point. Putin's political troubles will likely only begin if the war ends. Russia is transitioning to a war mobilization approach as a nation. At this point, Russian leadership must be cognizant that their military will not be able to capture Ukraine They are considering the possibility of additional mobilizations. They have settled on the idea of a long war, believing they can eventually wear Ukraine down over the years. Belief in their nation's latent power and cherry-picking history has often given great power leaders false confidence. What indicators is Mike watching now (the counter-offensive): A series of operations that will unfold over the coming months. He is not expecting significant territorial changes early on. Territorial changes are often a lagging indicator in war. People tend to focus on territorial changes because they are visible, but the driving forces behind them are more complex. The initial operations are probably not the main effort(s). Mike will be looking closely at sustainment. In the past, the challenge for Ukraine has not been breaking through but sustaining defensive operations. Pushing through the second and third lines, and handing Russian counterattacks. The best time to gauge the effects of the offensive on the war will be late summer, as it will be challenging to determine the operation's impact on the war before that. We have not seen these two militaries face each other before, making it impossible to accurately predict the outcome. Untested, newly-formed Ukrainian units equipped with recently introduced equipment and new tactics will be engaging with Russian-mobilized, untested troops in defenses that have not yet been put to the test.

I couple of quality counterpoints. - If the US/UK had given all they have given now a year ago the coalition would have likely broken partially and US/UK would be blamed in countries like Germany and France for the escalation that now has happened anyway. Also, could China have been "pushed" to give more direct aid by this? - In war, the enemy gets a vote too. RUS would have had to mobilize way sooner. They mobilize only when forced to, and in this case, the need would have been sooner. I see the US lead coalition balancing three goals: RUS strategic defeat, UKR victory, and escalation management. If the last one was not important we would have seen an intervention to achieve the first two. These three goals would have been achieved last year if the RUS would have not mobilized. Now that they did mobilize west adjusted the support plan to match as we saw at the beginning of this year.

He sees Crimea as an island that can be isolated and the Russian position there made untenable over time. He is not betting on air/navy actions, landings and suchs

Thanks! This time the summery was polished by chatGPT4.0 from my initial quick notes.

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28604/expectations-for-ukraines-counteroffensive-and-listener-questions/ Notes on this paywalled episode: Last week(s) was relatively quiet as the Russians shifted to a defensive posture, preparing for the Ukrainian offensive. The offensive is expected to begin by the end of this month or early next month. The only exception is the Battle of Bachmut, where Russia seeks a symbolic victory. The long-term effects of this battle will be the downstream consequences of the material(and human) cost of the battle. Mike refrains from commenting on leaks, stating that there is nothing new to the reports. It is anticipated that a series of Ukrainian offensive operations will occur on multiple fronts over several months. These operations are expected to be bloody, even if they go according to plan. The spring offensive is likely to resemble the battle in Kherson rather than Harkiv, but still with significant differences. Untested forces will be attacking untested forces, using untested equipment. Predicting the outcome of such encounters, where the unknown meets the unknown, is futile. In the past month, Kofman's opinion on the likelihood of Ukrainian success has increased. Mike does not see a major disconnect in the situation picture between the battalion level and strategic leadership of Ukraine. In the Q&A segment: Wagner primarily operates locally, working within the Russian military, and is subordinate to and enabled by the military. The state of the Ukrainian air defense is a top priority. They are eventually going to have to transition to Western systems The latest possible start for the Ukrainian counter-offensive has not been determined, but initiating it too soon would be unwise. Long-range missiles (ATACMS, Storm Shadow) are not considered critical, as their importance is often overstated in the silver bullet thinking, similar to the HIMARS myth. Russia's main issue with armor is attrition compared to the replacement rate, leading to the use of outdated equipment in new formations. Let's think of the counterfactual what if Ukraine's offensive liberates all possible areas? What next? Even in the best-case scenario, a protracted attritional phase is expected to follow the offensive. A successful offensive could lead to a better position for negotiations, but there's no guarantee that Russia will want to negotiate as long as Putin remains in power. In any case, a successful Ukrainian counter-offensive is a good problem to have. Historical comparisons for this war include the Winter War of 1939(this comparison breaks when the West entered the side of Ukraine), conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and India and Pakistan. The Korean War is considered a less likely "happy" scenario. The US has three main goals in this war: achieving a strategic defeat for Russia, securing victory for Ukraine managing escalation. If escalation was not a concern, the US could have intervened more directly to accomplish the first two goals a year ago.

Highly detailed account of the resent intelligence leak from the US https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/12/discord-leaked-documents/ paywall bypass: https://archive.is/2023.04.13-013915/https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/12/discord-leaked-documents/

These territorial units seem to range in equipment all to way to ISIS levels... And I am sure it is the unit's choice to use that equipment. At least in this case, the choice was made to rather have a T-62 than "no tank".

we had a guest here in Finland (podcast)

https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/

Everything depends on the task administration has task given to Pentagon in the Ukraine war. What is the desired end state? This article would mean that the task is not to help Ukraine to clear military victory. Because if such risks exist then something would be done to mitigate them on the US side. Also, the continuing huge Polish investments in UKR capabilities tell a lot. Why are we still seeing Polish equipment going in and not more Bradley/Stryker? I think that Polish and US political goals must differ significantly.

More leaks and way wider in scale than just Ukraine.

do we have any one place with all the papers in readable resolution?

Just the thing I would add with the modified casualty figures. Why would that info even be on such a paper? Also I do think the west has some form of a direct presence in Ukraine but this is not evidence for it

Seems you were correct:

I shall present you with the original version of the song: Finns are very glad to join NATO. Many NATO beers and liqueurs have been and will be popped today! ("OTAN" translates "to drink alcohol" in Finnish) I hope this will materialize in much more support for Ukraine from us. At least all the three biggest parties have stated UKR support has been too little and too late, including from us fins. With the limited packages, the government has always added that the fact we are outside NATO is limiting our support.

"Mike Kofman joins the show yet again. This time, he explains why the debate over the wisdom of the Battle for Bahkmut is so important while still overshadowing other important debates. As Ukrainian forces are being pressed out of the city of Bahkmut, they prepare to go back on the offensive, which will put Russia on the defensive. The critical issue in Mike's view is what happens after the Ukrainian offensive" My bullet points: Starting with Bakhmut because of the big media footprint. In reality, Bakhmut matters very little eighter way at this point the situation is unclear with the UKR information blackout RUS has not "culminated" like many have stated every week for months (eventually going to be correct) the situation has changed RUS is now pushing the city itself(reason for RUS tactic change unclear) Starting to resemble Severodonetsk. Time will tell. RUS is starting to prepare for the UKR offensive sometime this month (for example now units' holidays are being canceled) On both sides, manpower is an issue. Issue not bodies but trained manpower and trained formations. RUS is again like last year doing everything possible to avoid another mobilization wave. Very similar tricks as before the last mobilizations and again unlikely to work out. They are looking at something like 400k. It seems likely RUS is going to have to conduct another mobilization wave in the spring/summer to be able to continue this war The last mobilization wave was consumed by replenishing the force they lost last year. There is no “additional” force. RUS has been following the UKR best-case scenario by conducting this highly attractional winter offensive and the last falls situation might replicate where RUS by exhausting itself gives UKR the opportunity to launch its own offensives The question is how much has RUS exhausted itself? Especially ammo depletion might prove significant Opposed to last year RUS still has territorial and mot-rifle units as reserves, the defense has had depth and overall unit-density is higher. UKR has generally changed its "defense in depth" to "hold everything" possibly because now the expectation is everything given will have to be taken back. Intangibles(like morale) are still intangibles and cannot be taken into account. If they could be they would not be called "intangibles". UKR offensive UKR is going to get a substantial injection of ammo for this from the west These troops have not been committed to the winter fight UKR is going to suffer significant casualties and ammo depletion in any case and recovery and "follow through" are critical What happens after the UKR offensive is critical Supply from the west? Now it looks spring-summer might be the high watermark for the western support. At least in certain critical systems like artillery ammo critical decisions have only now been made to fix the ammo production issues It is very different to be able to provide enough to hold their ground and to provide enough to give UKR enough of a relative advantage for offensive operations Last fall UKR was not capable to press its advantage to the end (even with the very critical condition of the RUS forces). This resulted in an operational pause that we are still seeing today. This might happen again in this year's offensive. Will the west be willing and able to AGAIN provide UKR with sufficient military advantage for future progress after this new operational pause? (Unknown to Mike)

new record on bodies in a single trench for me:

Fuch confirmed?

pol.mp4

Shouldn't we soon see more Stryker/Bradley/Marder/Leopard/ commitments to UKR? The previous equipment has or is soon finishing training.