panzersaurkrautwerfer

In NATO circles, Germany is especially noted for being in poor shape.  If I had to summarize:

1. The German Government's lack of will to do anything military means that if Germans show up to a NATO deployment, it's going to be either very small, a support element, or it's going to have ROE that involves not being within the line of fire.

2. Germany's military equipment readiness is notably poor.
3. Culturally the German military is not a good spot, it has a problem attracting talent, and also attracting the sorts of Germans we might find objectionable from time to time.

Basically if there's a nadir to NATO's large partners, it's present in the Germans.

There's some question to if this is changing however.   The Russian threat has caused some reversals in course and provided a realistic reason for the German military to have a conventional mission.  There's a lot of institutional inertia, and the German Government's official policy is just short of openly being "American blood for German soil" in the event of external threats (to be fair, this is partly something America signed up to with the Truman doctrine, and there's a number of other nation's conventional warplans that are literally "our military exists long enough to hold on for the Americans to show up, and then to support them once they've shown up").

With that said, we're missing the forest for the trees in a lot of ways.  We have a bit of a bias for conventional force on force given the game we play/tanks and bombs are likely more our area of interest.

In talking about the value of NATO it's to impose sufficient cost or risk to an aggressor's actions as to make hostile action against NATO states unfeasible.  The Russians would really like to have the Baltic states back because for a variety of reasons they do not recognize the people's of those countries as having a right to their own independence (as history shows on a few tragic occasions).  NATO's mission in the Baltic countries could be best described as:

1. Prevent a "green man" invasion.  Continued NATO presence, and the fact the Baltic states now know what "Russian Aid Convoys" are, and awareness of Russian info warfare tactics means there'd be no practical deniability to using "green men."   I mean, it was blatantly, stupidly obvious the first time,  but there's no longer the ambiguous legal nature to it,  it's simply an unprovoked Russian invasion in need of proper military response. 

2. Prevent conventional Russian invasion.  In this regard it may not be possible to hold the Baltic states on a short notice (or sufficient time to deploy significant NATO ground forces to the region).  However, by demonstrating NATO commitment to the Baltic states, that forces will be deployed, all demonstrate that while taking Estonia might happen, it might be at an unacceptable cost going in, and holding it might be beyond Russian resolve, resources, or capabilities.

3. Given sufficient warning, defeat Russian forces in open battle without loss of terrain.  This would require some advanced notice, but once you start talking about US ABCTs, MEBS, and other BCTs, French, UK, Polish and other major forces, rounded out with the lower tier NATO forces, you're not going to get into the Baltic states without resorting to CBRN type assets, and that imposes a cost well beyond what anyone is willing to pay.  

None of these hinge on German readiness.  It'd be nice if they lived up to their commitments considering how many thousands of NATO soldiers put their lives on the line to protect West Germany 1945 (I know, pre-NATO, but same players)-1990 though.

In NATO circles, Germany is especially noted for being in poor shape.  If I had to summarize:

1. The German Government's lack of will to do anything military means that if Germans show up to a NATO deployment, it's going to be either very small, a support element, or it's going to have ROE that involves not being within the line of fire.

2. Germany's military equipment readiness is notably poor.
3. Culturally the German military is not a good spot, it has a problem attracting talent, and also attracting the sorts of Germans we might find objectionable from time to time.

Basically if there's a nadir to NATO's large partners, it's present in the Germans.

There's some question to if this is changing however.   The Russian threat has caused some reversals in course and provided a realistic reason for the German military to have a conventional mission.  There's a lot of institutional inertia, and the German Government's official policy is just short of openly being "American blood for German soil" in the event of external threats (to be fair, this is partly something America signed up to with the Truman doctrine, and there's a number of other nation's conventional warplans that are literally "our military exists long enough to hold on for the Americans to show up, and then to support them once they've shown up").

With that said, we're missing the forest for the trees in a lot of ways.  We have a bit of a bias for conventional force on force given the game we play/tanks and bombs are likely more our area of interest.

In talking about the value of NATO it's to impose sufficient cost or risk to an aggressor's actions as to make hostile action against NATO states unfeasible.  The Russians would really like to have the Baltic states back because for a variety of reasons they do not recognize the people's of those countries as having a right to their own independence (as history shows on a few tragic occasions).  NATO's mission in the Baltic countries could be best described as:

1. Prevent a "green man" invasion.  Continued NATO presence, and the fact the Baltic states now know what "Russian Aid Convoys" are, and awareness of Russian info warfare tactics means there'd be no practical deniability to using "green men."   I mean, it was blatantly, stupidly obvious the first time,  but there's no longer the ambiguous legal nature to it,  it's simply an unprovoked Russian invasion in need of proper military response. 

2. Prevent conventional Russian invasion.  In this regard it may not be possible to hold the Baltic states on a short notice (or sufficient time to deploy significant NATO ground forces to the region).  However, by demonstrating NATO commitment to the Baltic states, that forces will be deployed, all demonstrate that while taking Estonia might happen, it might be at an unacceptable cost going in, and holding it might be beyond Russian resolve, resources, or capabilities.

3. Given sufficient warning, defeat Russian forces in open battle without loss of terrain.  This would require some advanced notice, but once you start talking about US ABCTs, MEBS, and other BCTs, French, UK, Polish and other major forces, rounded out with the lower tier NATO forces, you're not going to get into the Baltic states without resorting to CBRN type assets, and that imposes a cost well beyond what anyone is willing to pay.  

None of these hinge on German readiness.  It'd be nice if they lived up to their commitments considering how many thousands of NATO soldiers put their lives on the line to protect West Germany 1945 (I know, pre-NATO, but same players)-1990 though.

Generally as a tanker:

1. We don't like infantry close by.  If something happens and I need to move the tank, I don't want to think about if I'm going to run over friendly forces.  Moving close was also something we avoided, as infantry was safer in the terrain, while we were often safer where we could maneuver (like not open, but think rolling terrain that you can get some hull down on).  Generally we practiced the push-pull method, whoever could best handle the terrain went first, and "pulled" the other unit behind them.  So like infantry would move into the village and clear a path for friendly armor, if the armor needed to come forward, the infantry protected and guided the tank to a position to support them, vs the tank literally moving with the infantry, while tanks moving across open desert would set up in a support by fire to allow the infantry advance into a small village.

Supporting doesn't have to mean close, just so long as we can still put fire on similar targets.

2. In terms of infantry close, it does happen sometimes.  our rule of thumb was third road wheel back was "safe.  for main gun operations.  I feel this was likely conservative, but noone likes bleeding from their eardrums so that's pretty okay.  Behind the tank, to include literally standing behind the tank, or head out when the gun was in action from the TC's hatch had no adverse affects.  

So yeah, space is helpful, and lets you get things.  You don't want your infantry hugging you because it slows you down and makes your life difficult.  When operating close additional coordination is also usually required in as far as making sure friendly locations are known (by markings or things like phase lines). 

Generally as a tanker:

1. We don't like infantry close by.  If something happens and I need to move the tank, I don't want to think about if I'm going to run over friendly forces.  Moving close was also something we avoided, as infantry was safer in the terrain, while we were often safer where we could maneuver (like not open, but think rolling terrain that you can get some hull down on).  Generally we practiced the push-pull method, whoever could best handle the terrain went first, and "pulled" the other unit behind them.  So like infantry would move into the village and clear a path for friendly armor, if the armor needed to come forward, the infantry protected and guided the tank to a position to support them, vs the tank literally moving with the infantry, while tanks moving across open desert would set up in a support by fire to allow the infantry advance into a small village.

Supporting doesn't have to mean close, just so long as we can still put fire on similar targets.

2. In terms of infantry close, it does happen sometimes.  our rule of thumb was third road wheel back was "safe.  for main gun operations.  I feel this was likely conservative, but noone likes bleeding from their eardrums so that's pretty okay.  Behind the tank, to include literally standing behind the tank, or head out when the gun was in action from the TC's hatch had no adverse affects.  

So yeah, space is helpful, and lets you get things.  You don't want your infantry hugging you because it slows you down and makes your life difficult.  When operating close additional coordination is also usually required in as far as making sure friendly locations are known (by markings or things like phase lines). 

Generally as a tanker:

1. We don't like infantry close by.  If something happens and I need to move the tank, I don't want to think about if I'm going to run over friendly forces.  Moving close was also something we avoided, as infantry was safer in the terrain, while we were often safer where we could maneuver (like not open, but think rolling terrain that you can get some hull down on).  Generally we practiced the push-pull method, whoever could best handle the terrain went first, and "pulled" the other unit behind them.  So like infantry would move into the village and clear a path for friendly armor, if the armor needed to come forward, the infantry protected and guided the tank to a position to support them, vs the tank literally moving with the infantry, while tanks moving across open desert would set up in a support by fire to allow the infantry advance into a small village.

Supporting doesn't have to mean close, just so long as we can still put fire on similar targets.

2. In terms of infantry close, it does happen sometimes.  our rule of thumb was third road wheel back was "safe.  for main gun operations.  I feel this was likely conservative, but noone likes bleeding from their eardrums so that's pretty okay.  Behind the tank, to include literally standing behind the tank, or head out when the gun was in action from the TC's hatch had no adverse affects.  

So yeah, space is helpful, and lets you get things.  You don't want your infantry hugging you because it slows you down and makes your life difficult.  When operating close additional coordination is also usually required in as far as making sure friendly locations are known (by markings or things like phase lines). 

Generally as a tanker:

1. We don't like infantry close by.  If something happens and I need to move the tank, I don't want to think about if I'm going to run over friendly forces.  Moving close was also something we avoided, as infantry was safer in the terrain, while we were often safer where we could maneuver (like not open, but think rolling terrain that you can get some hull down on).  Generally we practiced the push-pull method, whoever could best handle the terrain went first, and "pulled" the other unit behind them.  So like infantry would move into the village and clear a path for friendly armor, if the armor needed to come forward, the infantry protected and guided the tank to a position to support them, vs the tank literally moving with the infantry, while tanks moving across open desert would set up in a support by fire to allow the infantry advance into a small village.

Supporting doesn't have to mean close, just so long as we can still put fire on similar targets.

2. In terms of infantry close, it does happen sometimes.  our rule of thumb was third road wheel back was "safe.  for main gun operations.  I feel this was likely conservative, but noone likes bleeding from their eardrums so that's pretty okay.  Behind the tank, to include literally standing behind the tank, or head out when the gun was in action from the TC's hatch had no adverse affects.  

So yeah, space is helpful, and lets you get things.  You don't want your infantry hugging you because it slows you down and makes your life difficult.  When operating close additional coordination is also usually required in as far as making sure friendly locations are known (by markings or things like phase lines). 

On Iraqi T-72s:

The Iraqis operated the following types of T-72s:

T-72M
T-72M1
T-72A

The M and M1 models were both Polish sourced and otherwise identical to vehicles in service with both the Poles and other Warsaw Pact users of Polish production (inclusive the silly little fan the constituted the entire turret cooling system).  The T-72As were much the same, identical to T-72As of that 80's vintage from the Soviets.  

Basically the Soviets supplied some tanks out of the box (60ish T-72As if I recall correctly), then decided they wanted to pursue the Iranian market, so chose to pass the Iraqis as a client off onto the Poles (the remainder, T-72M and T-72M1).  Some of the T-72s from Poland were provided as "knockdown" kits which basically were plug and play assembly (by East German technicians) and did not use Iraqi components.

The "IraqI" variant T-72 myth comes from:

The Iraqis showcased a T-72 of some origin claiming it to have been indigenous production.  For a time the Iraqis certainly did explore the idea of being able to build their own tanks, but likely correctly figured out they neither could afford, or likely sustain such an operation

Some of these T-72s were modified with various indigenous or non-Soviet hardware.  Chinese EO jammers, exhaust diverters, etc all made appearances, which lead to the impression that they might be Iraqi production models vs modified Polish tanks given the earlier showcase display.  

The frankly disastrous display of T-72s during the conflict was at odds with the impression the tank was reasonably good. That these weren't "real" T-72s seemed to jive well with the earlier analysis.  

Tying into the previous comment, the re were still people trying to market and sell T-72Ms after 1991, and to be able to pretend that was all the result of some terrible not-actually-T-72s made by those Stupid Iraqis was helpful in sales pitches.

As to defeating a T-72 with 25MM, I've heard a fair enough of anecdotes enough to say I wouldn't feel confident doing it, but I've met people claiming to have:

1. Engaged T-72 Frontally from 1000 Meters with 25 MM HE (was attempting to suppressing tank while breaking contact).  Tank was unable to acquire Bradley in time to engage, wing Bradley fired TOW and destroyed target (1991).

2. Engaged T-62 frontally 800 meterish, claimed penetration and vehicle kill.  I asked him to confirm because I didn't hear him right.  Resulting conversation with other cav scouts sitting around brought up some vaguer stories about killing Iraqi tanks with 25 MM fire.  

Basically it seems like concentrated 25 MM has an effect on Soviet tanks of a certain generation, but at the same time I wouldn't feel supremely comfortable banking on the anecdotal stuff, and we were always told to hit tanks with TOWs from Bradleys.  

If I somehow were back in the Bradleyworld, I would initiate fires with a TOW if it was reasonable (or better, with a dismounted Javelin, then TOWs at the non-Javelin targets, mo' missile's mo' problems if you will*).  I wouldn't engage with 25 MM unless I was seen, or it was mission critical (basically it makes sense to seek the sure kill than it does to chase the 10% p/ks unless you have to).  

*What you really want to do is "mass" fires, in that your TOWs to their tanks are followed by 25 MM to the IFV/PC targets in the same formation once the missiles are on target.

Basically if you play the max range game (going by the book, using the "safe" book and 80% p/k answers vs what the system is capable of), you're putting out TOWs at the 4 KMish mark,  tank main guns and Javelin at 2.5 KM, then 25 MM around 1.5-2KM, followed by infantry small arms around .5-.8 KM.

This sounds cool, but the first eight (say it's a mech heavy combined arms team, so 8 BFVs, 4 tanks) TOWs accomplish kills....but the survivors now know what's up and are moving to not get wacked.  This makes everyone else's job a lot harder now.

What you really want is something closer to a 2-2.5 KM point to open fire, as then instead of 8 TOWs heading towards this formation....you've got 8 TOWs, 8 Javelins, and 4-8 tank rounds (first and second shots are likely going to be out before the enemy realizes what's up).  Assuming the 80% p/k at 2 KM, someone is now down about two companies of AFVs  in a few seconds.  25 MM and follow on tank shots work on anyone who's still got the fight in them, artillery comes in on pre-plots at the 2 KMish line (which also gives the team time to displace to follow on fighting positions).

Anyway.  Lengthy ramble, but there's a video gamism to seek kills that do not make a lot of sense in real life (or the value of a lost asset isn't well reflected in game, nor the "long game" of losing battles but winning the war sometimes.  

On Iraqi T-72s:

The Iraqis operated the following types of T-72s:

T-72M
T-72M1
T-72A

The M and M1 models were both Polish sourced and otherwise identical to vehicles in service with both the Poles and other Warsaw Pact users of Polish production (inclusive the silly little fan the constituted the entire turret cooling system).  The T-72As were much the same, identical to T-72As of that 80's vintage from the Soviets.  

Basically the Soviets supplied some tanks out of the box (60ish T-72As if I recall correctly), then decided they wanted to pursue the Iranian market, so chose to pass the Iraqis as a client off onto the Poles (the remainder, T-72M and T-72M1).  Some of the T-72s from Poland were provided as "knockdown" kits which basically were plug and play assembly (by East German technicians) and did not use Iraqi components.

The "IraqI" variant T-72 myth comes from:

The Iraqis showcased a T-72 of some origin claiming it to have been indigenous production.  For a time the Iraqis certainly did explore the idea of being able to build their own tanks, but likely correctly figured out they neither could afford, or likely sustain such an operation

Some of these T-72s were modified with various indigenous or non-Soviet hardware.  Chinese EO jammers, exhaust diverters, etc all made appearances, which lead to the impression that they might be Iraqi production models vs modified Polish tanks given the earlier showcase display.  

The frankly disastrous display of T-72s during the conflict was at odds with the impression the tank was reasonably good. That these weren't "real" T-72s seemed to jive well with the earlier analysis.  

Tying into the previous comment, the re were still people trying to market and sell T-72Ms after 1991, and to be able to pretend that was all the result of some terrible not-actually-T-72s made by those Stupid Iraqis was helpful in sales pitches.

As to defeating a T-72 with 25MM, I've heard a fair enough of anecdotes enough to say I wouldn't feel confident doing it, but I've met people claiming to have:

1. Engaged T-72 Frontally from 1000 Meters with 25 MM HE (was attempting to suppressing tank while breaking contact).  Tank was unable to acquire Bradley in time to engage, wing Bradley fired TOW and destroyed target (1991).

2. Engaged T-62 frontally 800 meterish, claimed penetration and vehicle kill.  I asked him to confirm because I didn't hear him right.  Resulting conversation with other cav scouts sitting around brought up some vaguer stories about killing Iraqi tanks with 25 MM fire.  

Basically it seems like concentrated 25 MM has an effect on Soviet tanks of a certain generation, but at the same time I wouldn't feel supremely comfortable banking on the anecdotal stuff, and we were always told to hit tanks with TOWs from Bradleys.  

If I somehow were back in the Bradleyworld, I would initiate fires with a TOW if it was reasonable (or better, with a dismounted Javelin, then TOWs at the non-Javelin targets, mo' missile's mo' problems if you will*).  I wouldn't engage with 25 MM unless I was seen, or it was mission critical (basically it makes sense to seek the sure kill than it does to chase the 10% p/ks unless you have to).  

*What you really want to do is "mass" fires, in that your TOWs to their tanks are followed by 25 MM to the IFV/PC targets in the same formation once the missiles are on target.

Basically if you play the max range game (going by the book, using the "safe" book and 80% p/k answers vs what the system is capable of), you're putting out TOWs at the 4 KMish mark,  tank main guns and Javelin at 2.5 KM, then 25 MM around 1.5-2KM, followed by infantry small arms around .5-.8 KM.

This sounds cool, but the first eight (say it's a mech heavy combined arms team, so 8 BFVs, 4 tanks) TOWs accomplish kills....but the survivors now know what's up and are moving to not get wacked.  This makes everyone else's job a lot harder now.

What you really want is something closer to a 2-2.5 KM point to open fire, as then instead of 8 TOWs heading towards this formation....you've got 8 TOWs, 8 Javelins, and 4-8 tank rounds (first and second shots are likely going to be out before the enemy realizes what's up).  Assuming the 80% p/k at 2 KM, someone is now down about two companies of AFVs  in a few seconds.  25 MM and follow on tank shots work on anyone who's still got the fight in them, artillery comes in on pre-plots at the 2 KMish line (which also gives the team time to displace to follow on fighting positions).

Anyway.  Lengthy ramble, but there's a video gamism to seek kills that do not make a lot of sense in real life (or the value of a lost asset isn't well reflected in game, nor the "long game" of losing battles but winning the war sometimes.  

Generally as a tanker:

1. We don't like infantry close by.  If something happens and I need to move the tank, I don't want to think about if I'm going to run over friendly forces.  Moving close was also something we avoided, as infantry was safer in the terrain, while we were often safer where we could maneuver (like not open, but think rolling terrain that you can get some hull down on).  Generally we practiced the push-pull method, whoever could best handle the terrain went first, and "pulled" the other unit behind them.  So like infantry would move into the village and clear a path for friendly armor, if the armor needed to come forward, the infantry protected and guided the tank to a position to support them, vs the tank literally moving with the infantry, while tanks moving across open desert would set up in a support by fire to allow the infantry advance into a small village.

Supporting doesn't have to mean close, just so long as we can still put fire on similar targets.

2. In terms of infantry close, it does happen sometimes.  our rule of thumb was third road wheel back was "safe.  for main gun operations.  I feel this was likely conservative, but noone likes bleeding from their eardrums so that's pretty okay.  Behind the tank, to include literally standing behind the tank, or head out when the gun was in action from the TC's hatch had no adverse affects.  

So yeah, space is helpful, and lets you get things.  You don't want your infantry hugging you because it slows you down and makes your life difficult.  When operating close additional coordination is also usually required in as far as making sure friendly locations are known (by markings or things like phase lines). 

On Iraqi T-72s:

The Iraqis operated the following types of T-72s:

T-72M
T-72M1
T-72A

The M and M1 models were both Polish sourced and otherwise identical to vehicles in service with both the Poles and other Warsaw Pact users of Polish production (inclusive the silly little fan the constituted the entire turret cooling system).  The T-72As were much the same, identical to T-72As of that 80's vintage from the Soviets.  

Basically the Soviets supplied some tanks out of the box (60ish T-72As if I recall correctly), then decided they wanted to pursue the Iranian market, so chose to pass the Iraqis as a client off onto the Poles (the remainder, T-72M and T-72M1).  Some of the T-72s from Poland were provided as "knockdown" kits which basically were plug and play assembly (by East German technicians) and did not use Iraqi components.

The "IraqI" variant T-72 myth comes from:

The Iraqis showcased a T-72 of some origin claiming it to have been indigenous production.  For a time the Iraqis certainly did explore the idea of being able to build their own tanks, but likely correctly figured out they neither could afford, or likely sustain such an operation

Some of these T-72s were modified with various indigenous or non-Soviet hardware.  Chinese EO jammers, exhaust diverters, etc all made appearances, which lead to the impression that they might be Iraqi production models vs modified Polish tanks given the earlier showcase display.  

The frankly disastrous display of T-72s during the conflict was at odds with the impression the tank was reasonably good. That these weren't "real" T-72s seemed to jive well with the earlier analysis.  

Tying into the previous comment, the re were still people trying to market and sell T-72Ms after 1991, and to be able to pretend that was all the result of some terrible not-actually-T-72s made by those Stupid Iraqis was helpful in sales pitches.

As to defeating a T-72 with 25MM, I've heard a fair enough of anecdotes enough to say I wouldn't feel confident doing it, but I've met people claiming to have:

1. Engaged T-72 Frontally from 1000 Meters with 25 MM HE (was attempting to suppressing tank while breaking contact).  Tank was unable to acquire Bradley in time to engage, wing Bradley fired TOW and destroyed target (1991).

2. Engaged T-62 frontally 800 meterish, claimed penetration and vehicle kill.  I asked him to confirm because I didn't hear him right.  Resulting conversation with other cav scouts sitting around brought up some vaguer stories about killing Iraqi tanks with 25 MM fire.  

Basically it seems like concentrated 25 MM has an effect on Soviet tanks of a certain generation, but at the same time I wouldn't feel supremely comfortable banking on the anecdotal stuff, and we were always told to hit tanks with TOWs from Bradleys.  

If I somehow were back in the Bradleyworld, I would initiate fires with a TOW if it was reasonable (or better, with a dismounted Javelin, then TOWs at the non-Javelin targets, mo' missile's mo' problems if you will*).  I wouldn't engage with 25 MM unless I was seen, or it was mission critical (basically it makes sense to seek the sure kill than it does to chase the 10% p/ks unless you have to).  

*What you really want to do is "mass" fires, in that your TOWs to their tanks are followed by 25 MM to the IFV/PC targets in the same formation once the missiles are on target.

Basically if you play the max range game (going by the book, using the "safe" book and 80% p/k answers vs what the system is capable of), you're putting out TOWs at the 4 KMish mark,  tank main guns and Javelin at 2.5 KM, then 25 MM around 1.5-2KM, followed by infantry small arms around .5-.8 KM.

This sounds cool, but the first eight (say it's a mech heavy combined arms team, so 8 BFVs, 4 tanks) TOWs accomplish kills....but the survivors now know what's up and are moving to not get wacked.  This makes everyone else's job a lot harder now.

What you really want is something closer to a 2-2.5 KM point to open fire, as then instead of 8 TOWs heading towards this formation....you've got 8 TOWs, 8 Javelins, and 4-8 tank rounds (first and second shots are likely going to be out before the enemy realizes what's up).  Assuming the 80% p/k at 2 KM, someone is now down about two companies of AFVs  in a few seconds.  25 MM and follow on tank shots work on anyone who's still got the fight in them, artillery comes in on pre-plots at the 2 KMish line (which also gives the team time to displace to follow on fighting positions).

Anyway.  Lengthy ramble, but there's a video gamism to seek kills that do not make a lot of sense in real life (or the value of a lost asset isn't well reflected in game, nor the "long game" of losing battles but winning the war sometimes.  

FFS just quit.  This has nothing to do with anything in this thread except for positively D grade "Whataboutism"
 
Russia Today makes Fox News look like completely unbridled sober truth.  In terms of images presented, those sure are likely to be Aleppo, but the context needs way more verification before we give it too much credence.  

 
 
It's actually getting back to the Russian infowar perspective (not "inforwars" mind).  Coming out of the Soviet experience, reporting falsehood/expecting resonance of Soviet world view  in settings with freedom of information failed and failed horribly because simply put anyone with half a brain, and a radio could see how incorrect the Soviet narrative was.

The Russian modification to Soviet active controls isn't to present an alternate, and frankly poor substitute for the truth it's to throw out as much garbage as possible so that the "Truth" is buried in a mix of signals designed to variously enrage or validate existing biases.  It's much easier to degrade information fidelity to the point where most observers reach "no one cares" state, or where we're simply equating the effects of 18 odd howtizers in action with supporting a country that's literally dropping sarin on civilian targets in the name of keeping a hereditary dictatorship in place.  

Sigh.

My contention is this:

We throw a wild party for Battlefront, and all of us are in attendance.  We all get positively rip-roaring drunk, do stupid things.  At the height of the party I'm demonstrating armor maneuver by going full sprint through the office swinging my arm wildly to indicate turret direction while screaming "Death before dismount." I certainly 100% do damage.

However it's hard to separate the next morning what specifically was damaged by my "Thunder Run" vs what other parties did too.  Sure there's my tanker boot treads all over the shattered remains of someone's desk...but I "ran" it over after someone else already kicked it down screaming "THIS IS SPACE LOBSTER COUNTRY!" I contributed my share to the massive pile of bottles yes....but I wasn't even the one who drank the most.

Within the context of both fights, US artillery and aviation certainly did destroy things.  This is a known variable.  However pointing to the rubble of Mosul and chittering how it was all those damned Americans and their bombs, or Raqqah and placing all the blame on 18 heavily abused 155 MM howitzers is a bit disingenuous.  

ISIS vigorously practices scorched earth type tactics.  Our "Friendly" and friendly forces all practice firepower warfare vs manuever (or they're going to shoot the objective with every weapon they have for an hour, THEN move to a closer firing position to repeat the same tactic, and then maybe five hours later, short on ammo move onto the objective).

Both of those cities felt the full weight of a 3rd World conventional military attack, a suicidal bomb happy defender, and then some Western precision fires.  Between those three, those fires certainly did their part in damaging those cities.  But again the contention that basically, without those fires the attacks would have left either of those cities pretty much intact is very much a falsehood.  Aleppo for instance serves as a really good example of what happens without the US precision fires, and with the opposition not being generally ISIS tier individuals.

So.  Again not denying there's collateral damage, but it's just idiotic to lay the preponderance of the damage at the feet of 18 howitzers while ignoring the effects of thousands of ground combatants, tanks, conventional artillery from both parties, IEDs in all guises all duking it out in close quarters.

FFS just quit.  This has nothing to do with anything in this thread except for positively D grade "Whataboutism"
 
Russia Today makes Fox News look like completely unbridled sober truth.  In terms of images presented, those sure are likely to be Aleppo, but the context needs way more verification before we give it too much credence.  

 
 
It's actually getting back to the Russian infowar perspective (not "inforwars" mind).  Coming out of the Soviet experience, reporting falsehood/expecting resonance of Soviet world view  in settings with freedom of information failed and failed horribly because simply put anyone with half a brain, and a radio could see how incorrect the Soviet narrative was.

The Russian modification to Soviet active controls isn't to present an alternate, and frankly poor substitute for the truth it's to throw out as much garbage as possible so that the "Truth" is buried in a mix of signals designed to variously enrage or validate existing biases.  It's much easier to degrade information fidelity to the point where most observers reach "no one cares" state, or where we're simply equating the effects of 18 odd howtizers in action with supporting a country that's literally dropping sarin on civilian targets in the name of keeping a hereditary dictatorship in place.  

Mostly because I find this somewhat interesting in the wild/it's important to counter some narratives.  Basically we're dealing with one of those fun rhetoric games to try to level the "moral" playing field in that 18 howitzers shooting a whole lot somehow equates to more or less the rampant clusterbombing of residential blocks carried out by some folks that I'll just imply are actors here.  

I wouldn't call it "Whataboutism" because the point isn't to distract from the argument, as much as it is to narrow everything to the same gray-ish moral area in which it's really okay the Syrian government uses chemical weapons on civilians because it's like strategic bombing in World War Two, gotta kill them headchoppers amIrightguys?

As to the on topic, precision artillery has taken a fairly interesting role in that it provides the same sort of fires that used to be the domain of fixed wing or rotary wing assets, only with a persistence measured in ammunition stocks vs flight time.  This is sort of a big deal in that it open a whole new can of worms in terms of striking targets/makes the concealment/counter-recon element of the fight much more profound.  As it was, with only 18 guns tied into a fairly comprehensive sensor network it became very hard to go anywhere within the range of those guns without incurring great risk of artillery fire.

Into the future it will be intesting seeing this interact with EW/cyber assets that will make the ISR element a lot less durable, and certainly counter-battery will play a part.  Also as we increasingly see open architecture software and applications grow, it might be possible to see an insurgent group cobble together some manner of precision fires (in as far as digitally computing fire missions vs the "allah akbar?" we used to see). 

Of course seeing what the Russians did with similar applications against the Ukrainians also indicates this might become more of a conduit for doing bad things to bad people in addition to it's role as a red-enabler (And at that, opens some interesting ideas as far as employing applications nominally to "help" our brave patriotic whatevers that are actually enemy malware) 

Sigh.

My contention is this:

We throw a wild party for Battlefront, and all of us are in attendance.  We all get positively rip-roaring drunk, do stupid things.  At the height of the party I'm demonstrating armor maneuver by going full sprint through the office swinging my arm wildly to indicate turret direction while screaming "Death before dismount." I certainly 100% do damage.

However it's hard to separate the next morning what specifically was damaged by my "Thunder Run" vs what other parties did too.  Sure there's my tanker boot treads all over the shattered remains of someone's desk...but I "ran" it over after someone else already kicked it down screaming "THIS IS SPACE LOBSTER COUNTRY!" I contributed my share to the massive pile of bottles yes....but I wasn't even the one who drank the most.

Within the context of both fights, US artillery and aviation certainly did destroy things.  This is a known variable.  However pointing to the rubble of Mosul and chittering how it was all those damned Americans and their bombs, or Raqqah and placing all the blame on 18 heavily abused 155 MM howitzers is a bit disingenuous.  

ISIS vigorously practices scorched earth type tactics.  Our "Friendly" and friendly forces all practice firepower warfare vs manuever (or they're going to shoot the objective with every weapon they have for an hour, THEN move to a closer firing position to repeat the same tactic, and then maybe five hours later, short on ammo move onto the objective).

Both of those cities felt the full weight of a 3rd World conventional military attack, a suicidal bomb happy defender, and then some Western precision fires.  Between those three, those fires certainly did their part in damaging those cities.  But again the contention that basically, without those fires the attacks would have left either of those cities pretty much intact is very much a falsehood.  Aleppo for instance serves as a really good example of what happens without the US precision fires, and with the opposition not being generally ISIS tier individuals.

So.  Again not denying there's collateral damage, but it's just idiotic to lay the preponderance of the damage at the feet of 18 howitzers while ignoring the effects of thousands of ground combatants, tanks, conventional artillery from both parties, IEDs in all guises all duking it out in close quarters.

The US has a distinct advantage in fires integration, targeting and precision.  

The greater question for artillery in the next few years is being able to achieve effects in the face of frankly terrifying counter-battery capabilities.  The idea a M777 battery is going to be able to fire off more than 1-2 rounds before having to displace or face total destruction is certainly sinking in.  The traditional massed and persistent Russian fires are basically inviting ruin on the firing batteries.  

From that fires and effects are going to have to be able to answer the question of how to achieve the same effects, with less time/rounds to do so.  Precision will certainly play a role  although the current laser/GPS guidance trend will be challenged by EW (while the laser itself is not subject to jamming, the spotting element's communications, let alone if it's a drone are), as will advances in non-kinetic ADA (or whatever we care to call lasers or similar hard kill non-bullet options) observation. 

One thing that will be interesting is the historic fires integration piece taken to a more refined output, in that it may be still possible to put dozens of rounds on a target while still only doing so from a small number of guns by coordinating and allocating fires across a wider collection of units, or as far as several batteries firing very small missions, but sequenced and coordinating digitally (Battery A shoots 1 round per gun, displaces while Battery B fires 1 salvo then displaces, then BN mortars drop 3 rounds before displacing then Battery A opens up again).  

Or to visualize, artillery will spend more time in motion than firing, and each firing opportunity will need to mean more, and each target will need to be more relevant (or the historical US/and to an even larger degree RU ability to simply dump fires on anything that's being troublesome will be deeply challenged).

Basically it's going to matter a lot less about the gun, or how the gun is loaded, and more about how the round gets where it needs to go, and how we accomplish effects while someone tries to kill the gun.  The Russians especially historically have counted on massed non-precision fires, which may be lethal but again it won't take too many "missed" displacements to start to reach parity in numbers and greater effects disparity in terms of fires.

As far as "Alas Babylon"

It would be a mistake to attribute too much of the damage to US fires, or to at the least, indicate somehow they were responsible for causing more damage that would have occurred anyway.  Both Mosul and Raqqa were subject to lots of dumb artillery and direct fire weapons from the non-US elements rolling in (some of whom conduct "recon by fire" and little else), and ISIS rather relies on booby traps or other scorched earth type techniques.  

Basically several bulls went through the China shop.  The US precision (either in guided or digitally aided) fires certainly did some damage, but it's a bit obtuse to pretend they made it especially bad after looking at the other actors and factors at play.  

FFS just quit.  This has nothing to do with anything in this thread except for positively D grade "Whataboutism"
 
Russia Today makes Fox News look like completely unbridled sober truth.  In terms of images presented, those sure are likely to be Aleppo, but the context needs way more verification before we give it too much credence.  

 
 
It's actually getting back to the Russian infowar perspective (not "inforwars" mind).  Coming out of the Soviet experience, reporting falsehood/expecting resonance of Soviet world view  in settings with freedom of information failed and failed horribly because simply put anyone with half a brain, and a radio could see how incorrect the Soviet narrative was.

The Russian modification to Soviet active controls isn't to present an alternate, and frankly poor substitute for the truth it's to throw out as much garbage as possible so that the "Truth" is buried in a mix of signals designed to variously enrage or validate existing biases.  It's much easier to degrade information fidelity to the point where most observers reach "no one cares" state, or where we're simply equating the effects of 18 odd howtizers in action with supporting a country that's literally dropping sarin on civilian targets in the name of keeping a hereditary dictatorship in place.  

FFS just quit.  This has nothing to do with anything in this thread except for positively D grade "Whataboutism"
 
Russia Today makes Fox News look like completely unbridled sober truth.  In terms of images presented, those sure are likely to be Aleppo, but the context needs way more verification before we give it too much credence.  

 
 
It's actually getting back to the Russian infowar perspective (not "inforwars" mind).  Coming out of the Soviet experience, reporting falsehood/expecting resonance of Soviet world view  in settings with freedom of information failed and failed horribly because simply put anyone with half a brain, and a radio could see how incorrect the Soviet narrative was.

The Russian modification to Soviet active controls isn't to present an alternate, and frankly poor substitute for the truth it's to throw out as much garbage as possible so that the "Truth" is buried in a mix of signals designed to variously enrage or validate existing biases.  It's much easier to degrade information fidelity to the point where most observers reach "no one cares" state, or where we're simply equating the effects of 18 odd howtizers in action with supporting a country that's literally dropping sarin on civilian targets in the name of keeping a hereditary dictatorship in place.  

Mostly because I find this somewhat interesting in the wild/it's important to counter some narratives.  Basically we're dealing with one of those fun rhetoric games to try to level the "moral" playing field in that 18 howitzers shooting a whole lot somehow equates to more or less the rampant clusterbombing of residential blocks carried out by some folks that I'll just imply are actors here.  

I wouldn't call it "Whataboutism" because the point isn't to distract from the argument, as much as it is to narrow everything to the same gray-ish moral area in which it's really okay the Syrian government uses chemical weapons on civilians because it's like strategic bombing in World War Two, gotta kill them headchoppers amIrightguys?

As to the on topic, precision artillery has taken a fairly interesting role in that it provides the same sort of fires that used to be the domain of fixed wing or rotary wing assets, only with a persistence measured in ammunition stocks vs flight time.  This is sort of a big deal in that it open a whole new can of worms in terms of striking targets/makes the concealment/counter-recon element of the fight much more profound.  As it was, with only 18 guns tied into a fairly comprehensive sensor network it became very hard to go anywhere within the range of those guns without incurring great risk of artillery fire.

Into the future it will be intesting seeing this interact with EW/cyber assets that will make the ISR element a lot less durable, and certainly counter-battery will play a part.  Also as we increasingly see open architecture software and applications grow, it might be possible to see an insurgent group cobble together some manner of precision fires (in as far as digitally computing fire missions vs the "allah akbar?" we used to see). 

Of course seeing what the Russians did with similar applications against the Ukrainians also indicates this might become more of a conduit for doing bad things to bad people in addition to it's role as a red-enabler (And at that, opens some interesting ideas as far as employing applications nominally to "help" our brave patriotic whatevers that are actually enemy malware) 

Mostly because I find this somewhat interesting in the wild/it's important to counter some narratives.  Basically we're dealing with one of those fun rhetoric games to try to level the "moral" playing field in that 18 howitzers shooting a whole lot somehow equates to more or less the rampant clusterbombing of residential blocks carried out by some folks that I'll just imply are actors here.  

I wouldn't call it "Whataboutism" because the point isn't to distract from the argument, as much as it is to narrow everything to the same gray-ish moral area in which it's really okay the Syrian government uses chemical weapons on civilians because it's like strategic bombing in World War Two, gotta kill them headchoppers amIrightguys?

As to the on topic, precision artillery has taken a fairly interesting role in that it provides the same sort of fires that used to be the domain of fixed wing or rotary wing assets, only with a persistence measured in ammunition stocks vs flight time.  This is sort of a big deal in that it open a whole new can of worms in terms of striking targets/makes the concealment/counter-recon element of the fight much more profound.  As it was, with only 18 guns tied into a fairly comprehensive sensor network it became very hard to go anywhere within the range of those guns without incurring great risk of artillery fire.

Into the future it will be intesting seeing this interact with EW/cyber assets that will make the ISR element a lot less durable, and certainly counter-battery will play a part.  Also as we increasingly see open architecture software and applications grow, it might be possible to see an insurgent group cobble together some manner of precision fires (in as far as digitally computing fire missions vs the "allah akbar?" we used to see). 

Of course seeing what the Russians did with similar applications against the Ukrainians also indicates this might become more of a conduit for doing bad things to bad people in addition to it's role as a red-enabler (And at that, opens some interesting ideas as far as employing applications nominally to "help" our brave patriotic whatevers that are actually enemy malware) 

Sigh.

My contention is this:

We throw a wild party for Battlefront, and all of us are in attendance.  We all get positively rip-roaring drunk, do stupid things.  At the height of the party I'm demonstrating armor maneuver by going full sprint through the office swinging my arm wildly to indicate turret direction while screaming "Death before dismount." I certainly 100% do damage.

However it's hard to separate the next morning what specifically was damaged by my "Thunder Run" vs what other parties did too.  Sure there's my tanker boot treads all over the shattered remains of someone's desk...but I "ran" it over after someone else already kicked it down screaming "THIS IS SPACE LOBSTER COUNTRY!" I contributed my share to the massive pile of bottles yes....but I wasn't even the one who drank the most.

Within the context of both fights, US artillery and aviation certainly did destroy things.  This is a known variable.  However pointing to the rubble of Mosul and chittering how it was all those damned Americans and their bombs, or Raqqah and placing all the blame on 18 heavily abused 155 MM howitzers is a bit disingenuous.  

ISIS vigorously practices scorched earth type tactics.  Our "Friendly" and friendly forces all practice firepower warfare vs manuever (or they're going to shoot the objective with every weapon they have for an hour, THEN move to a closer firing position to repeat the same tactic, and then maybe five hours later, short on ammo move onto the objective).

Both of those cities felt the full weight of a 3rd World conventional military attack, a suicidal bomb happy defender, and then some Western precision fires.  Between those three, those fires certainly did their part in damaging those cities.  But again the contention that basically, without those fires the attacks would have left either of those cities pretty much intact is very much a falsehood.  Aleppo for instance serves as a really good example of what happens without the US precision fires, and with the opposition not being generally ISIS tier individuals.

So.  Again not denying there's collateral damage, but it's just idiotic to lay the preponderance of the damage at the feet of 18 howitzers while ignoring the effects of thousands of ground combatants, tanks, conventional artillery from both parties, IEDs in all guises all duking it out in close quarters.

Sigh.

My contention is this:

We throw a wild party for Battlefront, and all of us are in attendance.  We all get positively rip-roaring drunk, do stupid things.  At the height of the party I'm demonstrating armor maneuver by going full sprint through the office swinging my arm wildly to indicate turret direction while screaming "Death before dismount." I certainly 100% do damage.

However it's hard to separate the next morning what specifically was damaged by my "Thunder Run" vs what other parties did too.  Sure there's my tanker boot treads all over the shattered remains of someone's desk...but I "ran" it over after someone else already kicked it down screaming "THIS IS SPACE LOBSTER COUNTRY!" I contributed my share to the massive pile of bottles yes....but I wasn't even the one who drank the most.

Within the context of both fights, US artillery and aviation certainly did destroy things.  This is a known variable.  However pointing to the rubble of Mosul and chittering how it was all those damned Americans and their bombs, or Raqqah and placing all the blame on 18 heavily abused 155 MM howitzers is a bit disingenuous.  

ISIS vigorously practices scorched earth type tactics.  Our "Friendly" and friendly forces all practice firepower warfare vs manuever (or they're going to shoot the objective with every weapon they have for an hour, THEN move to a closer firing position to repeat the same tactic, and then maybe five hours later, short on ammo move onto the objective).

Both of those cities felt the full weight of a 3rd World conventional military attack, a suicidal bomb happy defender, and then some Western precision fires.  Between those three, those fires certainly did their part in damaging those cities.  But again the contention that basically, without those fires the attacks would have left either of those cities pretty much intact is very much a falsehood.  Aleppo for instance serves as a really good example of what happens without the US precision fires, and with the opposition not being generally ISIS tier individuals.

So.  Again not denying there's collateral damage, but it's just idiotic to lay the preponderance of the damage at the feet of 18 howitzers while ignoring the effects of thousands of ground combatants, tanks, conventional artillery from both parties, IEDs in all guises all duking it out in close quarters.

Sigh.

My contention is this:

We throw a wild party for Battlefront, and all of us are in attendance.  We all get positively rip-roaring drunk, do stupid things.  At the height of the party I'm demonstrating armor maneuver by going full sprint through the office swinging my arm wildly to indicate turret direction while screaming "Death before dismount." I certainly 100% do damage.

However it's hard to separate the next morning what specifically was damaged by my "Thunder Run" vs what other parties did too.  Sure there's my tanker boot treads all over the shattered remains of someone's desk...but I "ran" it over after someone else already kicked it down screaming "THIS IS SPACE LOBSTER COUNTRY!" I contributed my share to the massive pile of bottles yes....but I wasn't even the one who drank the most.

Within the context of both fights, US artillery and aviation certainly did destroy things.  This is a known variable.  However pointing to the rubble of Mosul and chittering how it was all those damned Americans and their bombs, or Raqqah and placing all the blame on 18 heavily abused 155 MM howitzers is a bit disingenuous.  

ISIS vigorously practices scorched earth type tactics.  Our "Friendly" and friendly forces all practice firepower warfare vs manuever (or they're going to shoot the objective with every weapon they have for an hour, THEN move to a closer firing position to repeat the same tactic, and then maybe five hours later, short on ammo move onto the objective).

Both of those cities felt the full weight of a 3rd World conventional military attack, a suicidal bomb happy defender, and then some Western precision fires.  Between those three, those fires certainly did their part in damaging those cities.  But again the contention that basically, without those fires the attacks would have left either of those cities pretty much intact is very much a falsehood.  Aleppo for instance serves as a really good example of what happens without the US precision fires, and with the opposition not being generally ISIS tier individuals.

So.  Again not denying there's collateral damage, but it's just idiotic to lay the preponderance of the damage at the feet of 18 howitzers while ignoring the effects of thousands of ground combatants, tanks, conventional artillery from both parties, IEDs in all guises all duking it out in close quarters.

Sigh.

My contention is this:

We throw a wild party for Battlefront, and all of us are in attendance.  We all get positively rip-roaring drunk, do stupid things.  At the height of the party I'm demonstrating armor maneuver by going full sprint through the office swinging my arm wildly to indicate turret direction while screaming "Death before dismount." I certainly 100% do damage.

However it's hard to separate the next morning what specifically was damaged by my "Thunder Run" vs what other parties did too.  Sure there's my tanker boot treads all over the shattered remains of someone's desk...but I "ran" it over after someone else already kicked it down screaming "THIS IS SPACE LOBSTER COUNTRY!" I contributed my share to the massive pile of bottles yes....but I wasn't even the one who drank the most.

Within the context of both fights, US artillery and aviation certainly did destroy things.  This is a known variable.  However pointing to the rubble of Mosul and chittering how it was all those damned Americans and their bombs, or Raqqah and placing all the blame on 18 heavily abused 155 MM howitzers is a bit disingenuous.  

ISIS vigorously practices scorched earth type tactics.  Our "Friendly" and friendly forces all practice firepower warfare vs manuever (or they're going to shoot the objective with every weapon they have for an hour, THEN move to a closer firing position to repeat the same tactic, and then maybe five hours later, short on ammo move onto the objective).

Both of those cities felt the full weight of a 3rd World conventional military attack, a suicidal bomb happy defender, and then some Western precision fires.  Between those three, those fires certainly did their part in damaging those cities.  But again the contention that basically, without those fires the attacks would have left either of those cities pretty much intact is very much a falsehood.  Aleppo for instance serves as a really good example of what happens without the US precision fires, and with the opposition not being generally ISIS tier individuals.

So.  Again not denying there's collateral damage, but it's just idiotic to lay the preponderance of the damage at the feet of 18 howitzers while ignoring the effects of thousands of ground combatants, tanks, conventional artillery from both parties, IEDs in all guises all duking it out in close quarters.

Sigh.

My contention is this:

We throw a wild party for Battlefront, and all of us are in attendance.  We all get positively rip-roaring drunk, do stupid things.  At the height of the party I'm demonstrating armor maneuver by going full sprint through the office swinging my arm wildly to indicate turret direction while screaming "Death before dismount." I certainly 100% do damage.

However it's hard to separate the next morning what specifically was damaged by my "Thunder Run" vs what other parties did too.  Sure there's my tanker boot treads all over the shattered remains of someone's desk...but I "ran" it over after someone else already kicked it down screaming "THIS IS SPACE LOBSTER COUNTRY!" I contributed my share to the massive pile of bottles yes....but I wasn't even the one who drank the most.

Within the context of both fights, US artillery and aviation certainly did destroy things.  This is a known variable.  However pointing to the rubble of Mosul and chittering how it was all those damned Americans and their bombs, or Raqqah and placing all the blame on 18 heavily abused 155 MM howitzers is a bit disingenuous.  

ISIS vigorously practices scorched earth type tactics.  Our "Friendly" and friendly forces all practice firepower warfare vs manuever (or they're going to shoot the objective with every weapon they have for an hour, THEN move to a closer firing position to repeat the same tactic, and then maybe five hours later, short on ammo move onto the objective).

Both of those cities felt the full weight of a 3rd World conventional military attack, a suicidal bomb happy defender, and then some Western precision fires.  Between those three, those fires certainly did their part in damaging those cities.  But again the contention that basically, without those fires the attacks would have left either of those cities pretty much intact is very much a falsehood.  Aleppo for instance serves as a really good example of what happens without the US precision fires, and with the opposition not being generally ISIS tier individuals.

So.  Again not denying there's collateral damage, but it's just idiotic to lay the preponderance of the damage at the feet of 18 howitzers while ignoring the effects of thousands of ground combatants, tanks, conventional artillery from both parties, IEDs in all guises all duking it out in close quarters.