Chibot Mk IX

What air defenses? ;D
Apperently, there's less and less of them. BBC was pretty quick to report the local (my hometown) events, so you may wanna check that out.
No air raid warnings, no nothing. Nothing is happening, as always. Just bavovna and smoke. Even the announcer at the train station skips the usual "be observant and careful, careful and observant" this morning. How come, I wonder?
 
ps: I'm okay, and the windows are fine, for now.

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I don't think it is Russian intentionally get old tanks blew up first. It's just these T-55 happen to be in a good storage condition. They might have less than dozen engine hours on the training ground before been put into a warehouse.
Soviets built a lot of T-55 until 1981 to use them build up the strength of category C and D divisions in Far East. It's quite ironically these T-55 have low engine hours; good storage condition compares to the worn-out T-80/72s retired from category A divisions (and many of these T-80/72 were put in outside storage).

I don't think it is Russian intentionally get old tanks blew up first. It's just these T-55 happen to be in a good storage condition. They might have less than dozen engine hours on the training ground before been put into a warehouse.
Soviets built a lot of T-55 until 1981 to use them build up the strength of category C and D divisions in Far East. It's quite ironically these T-55 have low engine hours; good storage condition compares to the worn-out T-80/72s retired from category A divisions (and many of these T-80/72 were put in outside storage).

No. Each UKR soldier will tell you, that BTR-70 is a piece of sh...t in comarison with M-113/YPR-765
BTR-60/70/80 have too weak side hull armor, which can't maintain proper protection from 7.62 and often against 5.45 AP from close range, when M113 protects. Inner compartment of BTRs is too narrow for soldiers in modern equipment and body armor, because both and BTR and BMP series were designed in ColdWar era, when soldiers haven't such equipment and in design was put an avarage height of Soviet soldier in 1960-1970 as about 160-165 sm, this is one more answer, why RUS and UKR soldiers ride on the top of armor. Not only because if it hit, all will burn alive (it's enough exaggregation if it not 125 mm HE), but because of full squad of troops will waste value time, trying to disembark from narrow compartment under fire. So, UKR soldiers always ride inside M113 to enemy positions, because it much safer, and disembark time is much shorter, than from inside BTR-70
Enclosed turret of BTRs doesn't give enough protection, but instead strict natural LOS of gunner. M113/HMMMWV guneer can better to observe battlefield, when he gets targeting from comamnder or spot the target himself. 
One guy from "Azov" NG brigade wrote brigade try to get at least several dozens of M113 and he amazed, why it so hard. Even 3rd assault briagade "Azov", using M113/YPR, as he told indeed have very small of them and all M113, which you can see in their videos are the same several APC. 

On the training post: a lot of what is in that story rings true.  The issue, which we have pointed out here before, is that western troops have no frame of reference for this war.  The more I hear descriptions of company operations in this war, the more they sound like a SOF action as far as C4ISR goes.  A GF Comd does pretty much what they are describing as a Company Comds role in this war - pulls back and manages the engagement from a pan C4ISR node.  Conventional military experience does not do this.  Tactical commanders get more feeds but pretty much fill the same roles as they did 30-40 years ago.  The Battalion TOC has changed a lot but the mass use of UAS for ISR is still not at the forefront.
The offensive focus also rings true.  I got into an argument a long while back on modern war and the offensive doctrine of most western militaries.  A lot of doctrine was built during the Cold War and then adapted to the insurgency wars we fought over the last 30 years.  The few times we went conventional, the opponent was so overmatched that we kind of confirmed a false positive - offensive primacy.  This war is showing the holes in that theory.  This is a war of Denial - drones and artillery.  That takes a fundamentally different training approach.
We all “yay’ed” when western troops began training support, and we still add a lot of value in some skill areas.  However, we may very well be teaching  bad lessons.  For example, that well documented and broadcasted failed minefield breach back in Jun. To my eyes it was a textbook western mechanized breach.  It looks like it got stopped by enemy UAS, a couple helicopters, a few ATGM teams and some pretty tepid artillery.  Our minefield breaching doctrine has not been refreshed since the Cold War and it ran headlong into 2023 reality.  Our impulse is to declare “well the UA is doing it wrong,”. Of course this assumes we actually know how to do it right in the first place.
I can only hope the AAR process is firmly in place and is capturing these observations.  However, in most cases the AAR guys are cut from the same corporate cloth as the training delivery guys so there are going to be biases to overcome.  We likely need to adapt the training significantly.  SOF may need to take over infantry tactics training because the reality is closer to their environment than our conventional experience.  However, SOF are pretty low density.  Conventional can focus on equipment (eg “night driving”), it still does this better than anyone else.
I have brought up the point on this war being as much about competitive learning as much as about actual warfare before.  The UA learns very fast, Russians slower…but they do learn.  The question is, “how fast are western militaries learning?”  They are part of this war too, they make up a significant portion of the Ukrainian force generation stream.  As such they should be in a direct feedback loop from the front line. We need to be learning at a better pace than the Russians - “EOD is taboo” (likely because we have framed them as exclusively a COIN thing).  This will mean breaking out of our own boxes, which is a damned hard thing to do at the best of times.  In reality we should be getting then UA to train us on how to train them.

Wake me up when it happens. I'd love to take credit for this idea.  
 
 
 

Wake me up when it happens. I'd love to take credit for this idea.  
 
 
 

Posted footage of the drone that carries AT-mines with 7kg payload some days ago that “DefMon3” reported on. This is claimed to be that same system in action.
Russians left plenty of these buried and Ukrainians will now kindly return them, from above. One has to acknowledge the massive blast that these AT-mines cause in relation to RPG drones and grenades. Just waiting for videos of Russian counterattacks being ambushed by AT-mines falling down all around them.
Longer thread that offers perspectives on the shortcomings, inexperience and lack of situational awareness that 32nd has faced since deployed. Of course extrapolating to other NATO trained units and assuming they all suffer the same problems. As always, it’s good to see perspectives that call out BS before it becomes accepted as truth.
Not suggesting it’s all sunshine and lollipops but well balanced reply to the KI article referenced.
 

Wake me up when it happens. I'd love to take credit for this idea.  
 
 
 

It's gonna happen one day. I can't see KA-52s being close to the front, especially behaving so apparently nonchalantly, so this is a really good illustration of just how deep drones are getting.

Personally, I didn't think the guns were too tight to begin with. There are trade-offs with everything, obviously, and with a gun position you want it to be as dispersed as possible, and no more.
Arguing for wider dispersion is the counter-battery threat, which itself varies by enemy, operational situation, tactical situation, and terrain. In general, the Ukrainians seem to have been following an active CB policy (ie, going after Russian artillery assets whenever they get a chance) over the last ... year? But it is unlikely that policy is consistent across the entire front, due to a lack of ammo, deception measures, and lack of sufficient CB C2 infrastructure everywhere. But as a rule of thumb, I expect the Russians would probably want to be more dispersed than perhaps their doctrine would suggest.
Arguing against wider dispersion are a bunch of factors.
Local defence - I'm not sure how porous the front is, or how often Ukrainian raiding parties are hitting battery positions, but a small tight position is MUCH easier to defend against a ground threat that a dispersed position.
Fire mission command and control - in my experience, each section (2 guns) is managed by a junior officer, and he has to keep shuttling between his guns to ensure they are doing the right things in the right way (bearing and elevation is correct, correct ammo, charge and fuse, etc). If the position becomes too dispersed, either those firing checks have to be reduced or overlooked (with consequent increase in risk), or the pace of fire missions drastically reduced. That's on top of the points @BlackMoria made about limited wire and/or radios. A lot of this can be mitigated with fancy-pants new kit, but these are D-30s. I doubt they are very fancy-pants, and I expect they are using methods and equipment that a gunner from the 1980s would feel intimately familiar with.
Terrain - @BlackMoria has noted that this clearing is quite small, which is true, but FWIW to my eye it doesn't appear to be too small for the number of guns being employed*. It's really hard to eyeball, but it looks to be at least 50m between guns, which is a pretty standard dispersion. Also, the entire clearing isn't available for use due to cresting issues with the surrounding trees - get too close to the trees at the front edge of the clearing and you can't safely depress the barrels enough to engage targets - you'd be firing rounds through the trees just in front of you and, um, that's a really bad idea. That's also why you can't just hide your guns in the forest to begin with.
Edit to add: Terrain part 2 - we can't see the wider area around this position. It could concievably be that this is the only, or one of the few, practical positions for this battery to be. Aside from out in the desert, the battlespace rapidly gets clogged up by all the things you want to be there - ammo and logistics dumps, engineer stores dumps, artillery areas, medical areas, helicopter landing zones, reserve fighting positions, staging areas for units moving forwards and backwards, maintenance area, routes for stuff moving forwards, backwards, and sideways, etc. Given that this area also seems to be heavily wooded and sparsely tracked**, there just mightn't be any other good spots for the guns to be, and the battlespace managers at the higher HQ haven't given this battery commander enough ground to be able to disperse they way he might want to.
 
Interestingly, there seems to be only three guns in this battery. I wonder where the fourth is? I'm guessing it is out of action - either broken, or perhaps destroyed in a previous CB engagement - although it could jut be tucked away somewhere out of sight.
Also, the CB mission as shown seemed focused on the guns themselves, which is fair enough because that's what the unaided eye (or drone cam) can see. But somewhere, not too far away - probably within 100m of the centre gun - is a command post. It's a shame they couldn't identify and target that either instead of one of the guns, or in addition to all of the guns. There is probably also an echelon park nearby - probably not more than 200-500m from the command post - with a bunch of trucks and mechanics and technical equipment and other paraphernalia. Replacing a couple of guns is hard. Replacing a couple of guns AND all that other junk, along with the training of the specialists you find there, is really hard.
 
* although, I suppose you could argue that it really was too small, given that all three guns seem to have been taken out. On the other hand, the Ukrainians seemed to be adjusting between the three guns as if they were three point targets. At that point it wouldn't have mattered if the guns were twice, thrice, or ten times as far apart - once the enemy gunners have the intel and time to accurately adjust between your positions you're screwed, regardless of dispersion. It doesn't matter whether that's a battery of guns or a dug in platoon.
** artillery units need access to good routes - ammo is heavy, and in a sustained battle an artillery unit needs a LOT of trucks coming and going to keep it fed.

There were videos MiG-29 shoot down Orlans with R-73, close analog of AIM-9, so IR missiles quite suitable for this purpose. 

Re: possible insurgency
1. First off, as Steve already said, things can theoretically happen. We're talking about the most likely scenario. Anyone who predicts future with 100% certainty is a fraud.
2. Don't get me wrong, there's a lot of bad blood. Just as you saw a lot of Crimeans genuinely cheering up and supporting the invaders in 2014, the Crimeans saw people on mainland Ukraine cheer powerlines being blown up as 2 million people plunged into darkness, water channel being cut off, the roads being blocked for cargo traffic, with all the little nasty consequences that were actually physically felt here. The reactionary post-2014 policies, laws and rethoric weren't great either. But compared to all the mayhem what's been happening since Feb 2022, this is nothing. And people are TIRED of chaos, flying jets, drones, explosions and death. Those who are currently in the trenches or came from there are tired as well.
3. What would be "the cause" to rally behind? They can't even formulate victory conditions for the current war. Nor can they achieve anything significant, with all their men and equipment in the field. Rallying (who, civilians?) to do something a huge army can't do? That requires guts and there's none. Only stupidity and hubris. They are unable to say NO when told to do something stupid or illegal. Saying no requires guts.
4. You need to understand the reality on the ground. Pretty much all Crimeans who haven't left have Russian passports. What, 1.5-2 million people? Myself included. Because living here without one is practically impossible. Hell, I know Crimeans who left and are currently on mainland Ukraine that also have Russian passports, issued in Crimea in 2014 (illegaly, obviously). For Ukrainian government to take back control, they'll have to deal with it somehow. And bunch of other documents. There's already been laws and decrees passed aimed to make the transition back as painless as possible. There's a whole ministry that's dealing with issues like these. Refer to Ministry of Reintegration sources for more information.
5. That being said, it's been nine years, and nobody can pretict how much more time will pass before that. It can happen in two months, or in two years, or in ten. And with every single day, people are growing more tired. They are trying as hard as they can not to notice what's happening now. And there's no land warfare close by yet. When it comes, they'll have much more incentive to make it stop ASAP.
 
Re: how am I doing?
My life isn't as horrible as for some others out there. But things can change literally any minute, as for everybody else in the region. So I am trying to live in the moment while I can.
For those who don't know, I tried to get to Estonia via St.Petersburg back in September. Before Feb 2022, it was illegal (by Ukrainian laws) thing to do. I managed to contact some Ukrainian officials and learned that it is okay during the war, if your purpose is to leave the occupied areas/Russia.
But, as I also have Russian passport (issued locally after 2014, and almost impossible to get rid of without being put into danger), Russia views me as Russian citizen first, and by their laws, I had to get foreign travel passport in order to leave. I did that, and it took time. I also had to prepare money and other affairs. Thus I managed to get to the Estonian border only in September. My thinking was that it would be safer to deal with Russian documents after I cross the border, not before.
I knew that Russian passports issued in Crimea are not recognized by the EU. My Ukrainian foreign travel passport was outdated by that point. The rules are: you can apply for asylum if you have no valid travel documents. But when I got to the border, Estonian police and border guard told me that everything is fine with my Russian passport (the travel document I had to use to leave the Russian side of the border, because Russian laws) and thus I cannot ask for an asylum.
I told them many things about myself, and that I would be in danger if I return, but they did not care. They were angry and not cooperative, unwilling to listen. They blamed me for not coming sooner and for other things I had no control over. That night at the border is something that still haunts me to this day. Being rejected by the people who you considered to be good and being sent back to modern day neo-USSR. And there are things that I am not telling you here, because it is dangerous...
Anyway.. I came to St.Petersburg. Got seriously ill. Still, I got tickets to Vladikavkaz in order to try crossing into Georgia. But soon I found a lot of info online that told me the same story would happen there as well. There were no other good alternatives that came to my mind. Going somewhere else eastward wasn't looking like a good idea either, legally, logistically and for other reasons.
At that time, my little sister was still in Crimea. I've decided to come back here and deal with whatever happens to all of us together. Since then, there was a harsh winter without work. Serious depression, from which I barely managed to recover on my own, without meds or therapist. The dangers that are lurking out there are real. But I know who I am and what I stand for, and where my allegiance is.
Most importantly, I know that the bastards have already lost. I knew that back in Feb 2022. They will not succeed, no matter what happens to me personally. They can't do anything good in this world, and there's no "winning" for them in any shape or form.
I've stopped working on my Unity dev career for now. I tried to find some remote work, but failed and had to return back to working in a store. I do see a future where things go at least a little bit better. But for that to happen, a lot of people have to put in a lot of effort. There's nothing free, and freedom itself is not free. We all have to work for it.
Alright, I've already said much more than I should've. Over and out.

Interesting read. I'm not certain if these "tree lines" remind CM players of the bocage. 

A while ago, there was a discussion on a Chinese forum where people spoke pessimistically about Ukraine's offensive. One guy listed the difficulties of the terrain. He mentioned that fighting in these tree lines is akin to fighting in the bocage. A small yet determined defender could delay the attacking force for a significant amount of time. In Normandy, under the cover of bocage walls, the German forces maneuvered into the flank of the Allied forces, using panzerschreck and LMG to harass them. In Ukraine, the open fields between the tree lines are much larger than the bocage terrain (ranging from 1km x 1km to 1km x 2km). However, with modern ATGMs' range, the defender's firepower can easily reach the other side. The good news for Ukraine is that the Russian LMGs and HMGs cannot effectively engage at long distances. Therefore, the advancing Ukrainian force will not face fire from a diagonal direction. Nevertheless, this could be bad news for the overwatching Ukrainian soldiers too, as they would be unable to assist if their comrades get bogged down by fire from the other side of the treeline.
 
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This is a highly interesting claim; however, it lacks substantial evidence. While some of Ukraine's video clips record their AFV and infantry firing into the treeline, not many Russian videos depict how they fight on the ground. Some video clips give people the impression that Russians are reluctant to move outside their prepared fighting positions. Therefore, fighting like the Germans, who sent a small detachment to harass the Allied flank, doesn't align with the Russian way of fighting.
The comment above isn't meant to downplay the difficulty of fighting in treelines but rather to argue that it might not be as challenging as fighting in the bocage.
 

Interesting read. I'm not certain if these "tree lines" remind CM players of the bocage. 

A while ago, there was a discussion on a Chinese forum where people spoke pessimistically about Ukraine's offensive. One guy listed the difficulties of the terrain. He mentioned that fighting in these tree lines is akin to fighting in the bocage. A small yet determined defender could delay the attacking force for a significant amount of time. In Normandy, under the cover of bocage walls, the German forces maneuvered into the flank of the Allied forces, using panzerschreck and LMG to harass them. In Ukraine, the open fields between the tree lines are much larger than the bocage terrain (ranging from 1km x 1km to 1km x 2km). However, with modern ATGMs' range, the defender's firepower can easily reach the other side. The good news for Ukraine is that the Russian LMGs and HMGs cannot effectively engage at long distances. Therefore, the advancing Ukrainian force will not face fire from a diagonal direction. Nevertheless, this could be bad news for the overwatching Ukrainian soldiers too, as they would be unable to assist if their comrades get bogged down by fire from the other side of the treeline.
 
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This is a highly interesting claim; however, it lacks substantial evidence. While some of Ukraine's video clips record their AFV and infantry firing into the treeline, not many Russian videos depict how they fight on the ground. Some video clips give people the impression that Russians are reluctant to move outside their prepared fighting positions. Therefore, fighting like the Germans, who sent a small detachment to harass the Allied flank, doesn't align with the Russian way of fighting.
The comment above isn't meant to downplay the difficulty of fighting in treelines but rather to argue that it might not be as challenging as fighting in the bocage.
 

Guess they got to widen the flanks first. The breach is too narrow to support a direct push into the village. 

Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, while on a visit in France, told a story, how small group of 31 fighters maintained success in Robotyne, after weeks of unsuccessful assaults

...One Ukrainian unit had been conducting continuous assaults in this area of the front, and due to exhaustion and losses, at some point, this unit lost the ability to continue the offensive. And then "radical decisions" were made: the unit's leadership was changed.
New commander asked to assemble soldiers who were motivated and ready to perform combat missions. A combined group of 31 soldiers was created, a third of whom had no combat experience, but all of whom had the knowledge and will to win.
Thanks to the leadership of the commanders and sergeants, this group established "horizontal links" with neighbouring units and started working on the contact line. For 18 hours, they crawled literally on their stomachs through kilometres of minefields, where the Russians had placed six mines per square metre.
Finally, the unit reached a strip of trees dividing farmers' fields. Everyone in Ukraine knows this word - "posadka" ("tree-plant, tree-line"). It’s in these plantations, invisible on maps, that the greatest tragedies and heroism of the war take place. So, our unit drove the Russians out of there and held the position for two days until reinforcements arrived. Subsequently, this group walked another 10 kilometres with backpacks weighing 35-40 kilograms through minefields. They only had time to catch their breath briefly and immediately stormed the fortified Russian positions, drove the enemy out and held out until the main forces arrived.
In total, this unit conducted six assaults and two reconnaissance missions in 40 days. A group of 31 men did the work of an entire battalion, which should have consisted of about 400 men. The losses amounted to seven wounded, including only one seriously injured after stepping on a mine.
In fact, the work of this group made it possible for an entire brigade to attack Robotyne and liberate it after weeks of assaults.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/30/7417687/