Duckman

The Arab-Israeli Wars are a perfect fit for the game system but I don't think the developers are interested. Same goes for the Indo-Pakistani Wars which actually saw a lot of tank combat.
As for earlier wars, tactical early and mid WWI is notoriously difficult to simulate but anything from 1918 onwards should work fine. 

Not only is it huge (18 meters by 4 m), with a whopping 160 vessels, but the diorama is tied to a touch screen interactive system in which attendees can learn all about any vessel (name, function, where headed or came from, manning, armament if applicable, and more. Wish I had a whole photo series to post. The Roads of Texel constituted the hub of Dutch naval and mercantile power in the 16th Century.

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=7213523672021863&set=gm.2540328239434798
Regards,

John Kettler
 

The book's full of little gems:
Storr suggests that, because of range safety rules at BATUS that made it awkward to push past notional enemy units, British small unit leaders acquired the habit of attacking hostile positions rather than bypassing. A chapter about armor compares major MBTs by diagraming their protection, firepower, and mobility in a triangle. The Panther tank is represented as an equilateral triangle, as a baseline, and it appears on every tank's diagram as a reference. The Chieftain's heavy weight toward firepower is clear in an instant; the T-34's mobility but limited protection and firepower is equally stark. Storr examines readiness and deployment times in considerable detail, tallying up the number of formations that would have been available to mount an attack or to resist a Warsaw Pact advance. (Maybe Brigade! might have been a more appropriate title?)  

Just received my copy and skimmed the whole thing. A few initial impressions, with the caveat that this isn't my field and I'm not really in the best position to evaluate the correctness of facts or strength of arguments:
It's well written, approachable but serious. There is a clear influence of operations research. Storr points toward different countries' OR work, and the text itself leans on calculations of quantities like platoon/company frontages, weights of fire, and tons of ammunition. The book relies heavily on a relatively small number of sources, particularly US and UK field manuals, and reports from 1980s exercises and simulations. That said, the author's own experience in the field, along with those of correspondents, informs his interpretation of evidence on paper. I have a criticism of the chapter on reconnaissance. One of Storr's sources is McGrath's Scouts Out! Neither Storr nor McGrath addresses the doctrinal and cultural differences between reconnaissance and cavalry in the US Army.  For a book titled Battlegroup!, there's little discussion of the organization of battlegroups. Total quantities of TOWs and Milan firing posts, sure, but nothing that would tell you how a battlegroup operates. This comes back to the operations research perspective: Storr talks glibly about how it might be more efficient to organize a company in 10 sections rather than 9, without discussing the administrative and leadership issues that such an organization would raise. Having skimmed the book, I know no more about the organization of any battalion-size unit than I did 24 hours ago. There is good attention to human issues, like the unique amount of operational experience that British Army personnel had because of service in Northern Ireland. Everything in the book reflects the perspective of an officer who served in the era he's writing about, with input from a rich array of correspondents. Storr is skeptical of Soviet capabilities, and especially of Soviet forces' ability to function in a real operational environment. Much of the analysis of the Soviet side follows from WWII sources. The book focuses on British, US, and West German forces, with shorter passages about the French, Canadian, and Belgian armies. It does not look at the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces at the same level of detail. Storr holds that the West German army was the most capable of the NATO allies, through training, tactics, and equipment choices, largely ones that built on and continued the lessons of WWII. Given that this is a semi-scholarly book, Storr spends a really bizarre amount of time talking about wargames that he and his brother played out. Those wargames drive more of his conclusions than I'm comfortable with, and the results get mixed with other sources of evidence. (Storr and his brother, both army officers, ran their own tabletop wargames for 32 years, apparently under rules systems of their own design.) If I were a journal reviewer in my own field, I would not endorse this book for publication without serious edits. I'm shocked that an editor let Storr get away with this. That said, I've quite enjoyed the book so far and have found it immensely illuminating. I'd recommend it for purchase.

Super interesting article, thanks.
In a WWII context i guess it validates the sometimes criticized German choice of a fairly accurate (low shot dispersal) machinegun and the tactic of firing (fairly) aimed bursts with it, even if they may have made those choices for other reasons. The Garand should also fit the bill. I know the general thesis is that theoretical weapon accuracy is the least important parameter, but he also specifically noted the difference in efficiency between the Minimi and SA80 LMG.

I've noticed over the years that there is often a disconnect between the things discussed by wargamers and the things discussed in manuals and memoirs. Wargamers (and history buffs in general) often turn tactical discussions into technical ones that focus on gun size, armour thickness, etc whereas tactical instructions stress things like speed, surprise, coordination, and violence of action. On defence the main things points are usually fire discipline before opening fire and volume of fire after opening fire. 
One of the many good things about CM is that the increased fog of war compared to most wargames (both board and computer) can lead to a more realistic mentality in my opinion. More overall planning and less micromanagement, if you will. I quite like real/continuous time for this reason.

I've noticed over the years that there is often a disconnect between the things discussed by wargamers and the things discussed in manuals and memoirs. Wargamers (and history buffs in general) often turn tactical discussions into technical ones that focus on gun size, armour thickness, etc whereas tactical instructions stress things like speed, surprise, coordination, and violence of action. On defence the main things points are usually fire discipline before opening fire and volume of fire after opening fire. 
One of the many good things about CM is that the increased fog of war compared to most wargames (both board and computer) can lead to a more realistic mentality in my opinion. More overall planning and less micromanagement, if you will. I quite like real/continuous time for this reason.

I've noticed over the years that there is often a disconnect between the things discussed by wargamers and the things discussed in manuals and memoirs. Wargamers (and history buffs in general) often turn tactical discussions into technical ones that focus on gun size, armour thickness, etc whereas tactical instructions stress things like speed, surprise, coordination, and violence of action. On defence the main things points are usually fire discipline before opening fire and volume of fire after opening fire. 
One of the many good things about CM is that the increased fog of war compared to most wargames (both board and computer) can lead to a more realistic mentality in my opinion. More overall planning and less micromanagement, if you will. I quite like real/continuous time for this reason.

I've noticed over the years that there is often a disconnect between the things discussed by wargamers and the things discussed in manuals and memoirs. Wargamers (and history buffs in general) often turn tactical discussions into technical ones that focus on gun size, armour thickness, etc whereas tactical instructions stress things like speed, surprise, coordination, and violence of action. On defence the main things points are usually fire discipline before opening fire and volume of fire after opening fire. 
One of the many good things about CM is that the increased fog of war compared to most wargames (both board and computer) can lead to a more realistic mentality in my opinion. More overall planning and less micromanagement, if you will. I quite like real/continuous time for this reason.

Ditto on formations, it would make larger battles more manageable. 
My main wish would be more work on cover and concealment. I'd love good looking foxholes of different types, camouflaged AT guns, tanks in haystacks.....that kind of stuff.

Time for a broom mod? 
 
Zaloga is excellent, as always. A proper historian, using a proper historian's tools, putting the Panzer Myth in perspective. A lot of it really comes down to who writes books and not.

Good posts. The German fall in quality from Normandy to the Bulge was pronounced, caused by the replacement machine finally not being able to keep up after the double blows of Summer 44.
 
When you read accounts from Normandy German small unit tactics are widely praised, and often seen as superior (this was of course exacerbated by Allied inexperience in quite a few cases). However in the Bulge there seems to be a general consensus that German small unit tactics were generally poor (frontal assault instead of infiltration, etc), which is quite the opposite to Normandy were good small unit performance could often save poor tactical and even operational situations (e.g. Caen).
 
Allied units had also picked up more automatic weapons, some via TOE and others unofficially, which helped close the infantry firepower gap you sometimes get in Normandy accounts. Ideally this will show in the game, with veteran units having more stuff.

1945 has one huge advantage in that it hasn't been done to death, unlike Normandy and the Bulge (admit it!). 
 
Agree about the matchups. Wunderwaffe like the Sturmgewehr always get top billing, but the Allies were no slouches and their units beefed up on automatic weapons as well (e.g. 30 Cals and more BARs at squad level). They also get some terrific new equipment, like the Comet and Pershing, even if the latter was a bit of a white elephant. However the ubiquitousness of the potent-enough 76-mm Sherman was quite enough to tip the balance, especially given rapidly declining German tanker training. Then there's the Birth of Night Vision of course, but I don't know how much of that we'll see in the game.

1945 has one huge advantage in that it hasn't been done to death, unlike Normandy and the Bulge (admit it!). 
 
Agree about the matchups. Wunderwaffe like the Sturmgewehr always get top billing, but the Allies were no slouches and their units beefed up on automatic weapons as well (e.g. 30 Cals and more BARs at squad level). They also get some terrific new equipment, like the Comet and Pershing, even if the latter was a bit of a white elephant. However the ubiquitousness of the potent-enough 76-mm Sherman was quite enough to tip the balance, especially given rapidly declining German tanker training. Then there's the Birth of Night Vision of course, but I don't know how much of that we'll see in the game.

In fairness to BA it does some things really well for a game of its type, like fog of war and suppression. Overall it reminds me of the later Close Combat games, ie basically realistic but with Borg spotting and some silly over the top units like onboard rocket artillery.

If CM is a no-compromises indie film then BA is a one of the better Hollywood war movies, you could say.

I think the fact they did the Italians is a pretty sure hint North Africa is coming at some point. Reuse is the name of the game.

Poland's strategic situation was more or less hopeless with the country surrounded, but the quickness of the German victory was still somewhat unexpected with unusually good autumn weather ("Hitler weather") playing a part, as well as the Russian stab in the back and German terror bombing. So while the French and British weren't exactly on top of things, it wasn't totally unreasonable to expect the Polish campaign to last into spring 1940. If the weather factor had gone the other way it might have.

Apart from the hopeless strategic situation the Poles were hampered by poor mobility, which allowed the Germans to run rings around them operationally even if the tactical situation was a lot more even. German air superiority
also turned retreats into routs, similar to what happened in France and Russia the following years.

Like others have said, it was a lot more even tactically than operationally or strategically (not unlike Normandy or Bagration in 1944, you might say).

Recent research, summarised by Steven Zaloga in his Osprey books, paints a somewhat better picture of the French army. The French armoured cavalry divisions fought a successful delaying action against the panzers in Belgium, for example.

However it has somewhat understandably been overshadowed by the cataclysmic defeat at Sedan (which pitted Germany's best against French reserve troops) and the events that followed. The BEF had some tactical successes too, although it didn't matter in the end of course.

First of all it was not going to happen since everyone was tired of war, there was still Japan (with the a-bomb an unknown), and the Russians were still the heroes of Stalingrad to most of the Western public and politicians.

Militarily the Soviets were pretty much scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel. So were the Brits of course, but the Americans and French (who were remilitarising rapidly) still had plenty left. Western logitics and air power were vastly superior. With ground forces it's probably a tossup, with the edge going to the West because of better artillery as well as the abovementioned logistical and aerial advantages which are huge force multipliers (cf what happened to the Wehrmacht).

Consequently the Soviet spearheads would find themselves at the end of a very long logistical chain that the West could cut fairly easily. A bit like the Wehrmacht in France or Africa, you could say. In that situation things like armour thickness don't matter much.

(To the above you can also add factors like the, eh, somewhat unwilling liberated peoples in the Soviet rear.)

After looking at a video of one of the Grad strikes I'd say "danger close" may include most of the map. Aren't they more for interdiction and counter battery stuff than battlefield support?