Degsy

It's just been officcially confirmed that Britain will be sending "about a dozen" Challenger 2's to Ukraine.       BBC News
"The UK's prime minister has confirmed the UK will provide Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine in a call with President Zelensky
Rishi Sunak says the tanks will help Ukraine's forces "push Russian troops back"
President Zelensky has thanked the UK for making decisions that "will not only strengthen us on the battlefield, but also send the right signal to other partners"

It's just been officcially confirmed that Britain will be sending "about a dozen" Challenger 2's to Ukraine.       BBC News
"The UK's prime minister has confirmed the UK will provide Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine in a call with President Zelensky
Rishi Sunak says the tanks will help Ukraine's forces "push Russian troops back"
President Zelensky has thanked the UK for making decisions that "will not only strengthen us on the battlefield, but also send the right signal to other partners"

It's just been officcially confirmed that Britain will be sending "about a dozen" Challenger 2's to Ukraine.       BBC News
"The UK's prime minister has confirmed the UK will provide Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine in a call with President Zelensky
Rishi Sunak says the tanks will help Ukraine's forces "push Russian troops back"
President Zelensky has thanked the UK for making decisions that "will not only strengthen us on the battlefield, but also send the right signal to other partners"

And it looks like I am back to skipping pages of comments at a time. Again. 

An interesting but very long interview with the famous wargame designer Mark Herman, on Nov 3, 2022, a bout a week before Russian withdrew from Kherson.
The discussion jumps between wargame design, his works at Pentagon, Ukraine and Taiwan, etc..  Here are the bits related to Ukraine, but I am sure I missed some.
27:45 about munition based warfare
55:35 about battle at the Antonov airport, suggesting he is working on a game about it
57:45 about his initial opinion about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Ukraine-Russia historical tie
1:02:00 about where Ukraine war is heading
1:07:45 about infowar and cyberwar
1:12:00 about cooperations between state and non-state actors with varying levels of capabilities and interests
1:23:00 about Russian mobilization
1:25:00 about possbility of an army coup in Russia
1:27:40 about whether nuclear-armed Russia can lose
1:51:00 about possbility of Ukraine war, potential Taiwan war, Korea situation to connect into a global conflict
1:53:40 about recurrence of bad leaders like Putin Xi Hitler
2:19:10 about strategic surprise and nuclear weapons

I do want to remind everyone that opinions in this thread are not determining whether Ukraine gets more or less support. Unless half the forum members are actually prime ministers and presidents and have kept mum about that for all these years. The discussion about what countries are/are not doing should be a whole lot more detached for that reason. No one here is pulling any strings and regardless of what we say this forum isn't changing the facts on the ground.

So maybe we should all step back from this sniping and recalibrate the discussion.

An interview today with British Defence Minister Ben Wallace about continuing British support for Ukraine generally and about the British, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian joint fund of 600m Euros to buy eqpt or ammo. He's cagey about what weapons we're going to supply, "Russia would love to know what weapons we may or may not put into Ukraine", but unequivocal about the continuing support. And about Russian threats   - "...Russia can be angry all it likes but I've got friends and they haven't..."
Times Radio interview - Ben Wallace

An interview today with British Defence Minister Ben Wallace about continuing British support for Ukraine generally and about the British, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian joint fund of 600m Euros to buy eqpt or ammo. He's cagey about what weapons we're going to supply, "Russia would love to know what weapons we may or may not put into Ukraine", but unequivocal about the continuing support. And about Russian threats   - "...Russia can be angry all it likes but I've got friends and they haven't..."
Times Radio interview - Ben Wallace

Sorry for not being present for some time (had, and actually still have, issues in IRL).
The execution video is an LDPR fake. It's an LDPR-style execution - these morons have no idea how actual Soviet-based militaries carry out any types of executions, so they imitate their own mob-like executions.
Apart from that - due to vastly enhanced UKR anti-drone defenses, actual RU drone operators stopped flying like this in August. But here RU operator literally flying over UKR heads for some time, risking extremely valuable asset, just to watch bunch of unimportant UKR troops doing some unimportant stuff. 
Go home, Ivan, you are too drunk to make believable fakes. 
Bakhmut's situation is gradually deteriorating, but it is far from grave. It's the standard RU bragging that we're all used to hearing.
In the north, after months of battering Yakovlivka village (northeast of Soledar), RU eventually flattened it, and it appears UKR defenders abandoned it. It means the Northen pincer is now sort of free and moving. Except that it does not give RU much - without Soledar, they are still a long way from surrounding Bukhmut.
After loss at the Industrial Zone, RU decided to shift the axis of assault to Pidhorne village on the outskirts of Bukhmut (northern outskirts of Bukhmut, between Bukhmut and Soledar). Important village, but aside from several talkes, I have yet to come across credible information, implying that things are not going well for RU there.
The Southern pincer is the most alarming. There are no significant UKR defenses there, so RU is gradually grinding toward Ivanivka. They're probing Klishiivka, the last settlement before Ivanivka. That's bad, but the first part of the Battle of the Bulge was also bad. Essentially, we are waiting a UKR counter-attack aimed at destroying the Southern pincer. Question is how far UKR will let RU penetrate. 
Bukhmut itself is not in grave danger, and there is no threat of it collapsing (yet). Fighting is taking place at the outer defenses, and it is not yet dangerous.

Another short Channel 4 report, this time focussing on artillery and front line medical support.          On the frontline of Ukraine's artillery war.

Link to a 30+ minute podcast interview with Rob Lee - The Naked Pravda podcast - Ukraine
 
Timestamps for this episode:
(2:38) What’s so special about HIMARS, or High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems? (10:22) What other advanced weapons could give Ukraine new advantages in the war? (14:57) What’s the military impact of Russia’s airstrikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure? (18:57) How far might Ukraine’s counteroffensive reach into occupied territory? Will Russian defenses hold at some point? (25:19) Is the Russian military regrouping or on the verge of collapse? (27:41) What happened with the missile(s) that recently killed two civilians in Poland? (30:26) Is Russia going to run out of rockets or ammunition?

Understood and you are correct. Suitably chastened, I humbly apologize for inappropriate material. Weakness in a moment of joyful over-exuberance in an otherwise unhappy time while watching over declining family member. Not to mention the rest of world grimness.

There are forums for that stuff. This is a thread tracking a genocidal war against the Ukrainian people. 
Personally  I've zero interest in the Phillies or anything sports spamming up this thread. 

Stupid... The Russians learned nothing from the bombings of Germany, the Blitz or the Vergeltungswaffen.... It has no impact on the population other than increasing the nation's resolve to go all the way. You could say it's for internal opinion but there would be no need to send such intensive attacks (they waste their weapons).

Our best thoughts to our Ukrainian friends Haiduk, Kraze, Zeleban and all

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:
1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

Hi, 
Another guy from Poland, have on forum for years, usually only Reading, been following the thread since around March, usually few pages behind. 
Best place to get current info, reasonable opinions, experts on details etc. 
Helped me calm down in stressful beginning of this war and pass hope to some friends. 
First time I managed to find something of interest, some of you may have seen it but I think it was not posted. 
 
The second video shows explosion in slow motion.
 

We should all be clear about what the potential collapse in Kherson means. This isn't a fight on the fringes of Lugansk and Donetsk. This will take a large swale of strategically vital territory away from Russia with possibly 10's of thousands of casualties. It's also coming just days after Putin threw down the gauntlet on nuclear weapons and with a rising chorus of Russian nationalists descrying the war effort. That puts us right into the scenario in which use of a tactical nuke will be contemplated. What happens next will tell us quite a bit.

Extract from an article (paywalled unfortunately) in the Spectator, based on operational data from the Ukrainian military. The whole article is here:
Article - Why didn't Ukraine fall.
..."However, the operational data reveals that 90 per cent of Ukrainian UAVs flown before July were lost, mainly to electronic warfare. The average life expectancy of a quadcopter was three flights. The average life expectancy of a fixed wing UAV was six flights. Surviving a flight does not mean a successful mission; electronic warfare can disrupt command links, navigation and sensors, which can cause the UAV to fail to fix a target. Contrary to the narrative, Russian EW has been successful on the battlefield. Instead, what has proved decisive is the sheer number of drones that Ukraine has been able to deploy. The most useful UAVs, according to the data, are cheap fixed wing models. This is not because they are difficult to defeat but because they are inefficient to target, flying too high for short-range air defences while being too inexpensive to engage with medium or long-range systems."

Extract from an article (paywalled unfortunately) in the Spectator, based on operational data from the Ukrainian military. The whole article is here:
Article - Why didn't Ukraine fall.
..."However, the operational data reveals that 90 per cent of Ukrainian UAVs flown before July were lost, mainly to electronic warfare. The average life expectancy of a quadcopter was three flights. The average life expectancy of a fixed wing UAV was six flights. Surviving a flight does not mean a successful mission; electronic warfare can disrupt command links, navigation and sensors, which can cause the UAV to fail to fix a target. Contrary to the narrative, Russian EW has been successful on the battlefield. Instead, what has proved decisive is the sheer number of drones that Ukraine has been able to deploy. The most useful UAVs, according to the data, are cheap fixed wing models. This is not because they are difficult to defeat but because they are inefficient to target, flying too high for short-range air defences while being too inexpensive to engage with medium or long-range systems."

Extract from an article (paywalled unfortunately) in the Spectator, based on operational data from the Ukrainian military. The whole article is here:
Article - Why didn't Ukraine fall.
..."However, the operational data reveals that 90 per cent of Ukrainian UAVs flown before July were lost, mainly to electronic warfare. The average life expectancy of a quadcopter was three flights. The average life expectancy of a fixed wing UAV was six flights. Surviving a flight does not mean a successful mission; electronic warfare can disrupt command links, navigation and sensors, which can cause the UAV to fail to fix a target. Contrary to the narrative, Russian EW has been successful on the battlefield. Instead, what has proved decisive is the sheer number of drones that Ukraine has been able to deploy. The most useful UAVs, according to the data, are cheap fixed wing models. This is not because they are difficult to defeat but because they are inefficient to target, flying too high for short-range air defences while being too inexpensive to engage with medium or long-range systems."

20 minute report from the Kherson front. Again with hromadske they show the human experience of the Ukrainian soldier. Lost of interviews.
Subtitled. 

Gents Steve might be asleep but he did give folk a warning a few pages back. 😉 

"Inside the Ukrainian resistance"
"...Last week saw more mass “filtrations” ... in reality (it) means that occupying forces violently interrogated locals and then deported many to Russia. It’s a system designed for both simplicity and cruelty: cars and trucks and troops arrive in the villages, and then either take locals to a special “facility” or dig a large hole and stuff them in it. The goal is always the same: to turn them into collaborators...yet at the same time, the Russians also try to ingratiate themselves. Key to their efforts is the concept of what they call “swift justice”. The principle is simple: justice through the courts can take forever, so why not let them deliver it instead? Of course, it’s also a way of legitimising violence. Soldiers now accept “complaints” from locals and when they break into houses and administer more beatings, they can say they are merely responding to citizen requests."
The Russians still have some way to go understanding the whole 'Hearts and Minds' concept.

What westerners, most of whom are very conscious people (hence why you don't live in totalitarian states, no matter how much smoothie-sipping leftists like to whine about it), fail to understand about people living in totalitarian states they themselves built - is their thought process and why they say things they say.
(also the sole fact that these interviews happen is just another proof Russia isn't a place where you get insta-executed for asking questions or answering them - and not because there's some kind of "freedom of expression").
You see - when a person in a totalitarian state says "I'm apolitical" - it literally translates to "I'm more than happy with and fully endorse current politics - thus they don't bother me, hence I have nothing more to add". And that's why when asked further, more precise questions - they suddenly become very "political" and you learn about Murica Bad, West Evil, Zpecial operation Good.
And when somebody they elected* and/or highly support - cocks up royally - they reply with "we have no say in it". What it literally means "we thought that guy will do what we want right, but he effed up, so it's his responsibility, not ours, we hoped he will finish Ukraine in 3 days, why should we pay for his mistakes?".
*Because, again, living in the West it's hard to understand how totalitarian states work. Totalitarian state isn't when some single guy decides how things should be and everyone follows blindly (even if it may seem so to a people who is used to democracy and personal freedoms from outside) - totalitarian state is when people in their vast, absolute majority, almost unanimously give a single person so much power and support - that it seems like a single person is running the show.
What really happens is that dictator, for having the privilege of getting every luxury he desires, has to follow the wishes of his people to a letter - otherwise he will seem weak and get dethroned. It's why putin hasn't mobilized yet - if there was the "movie dictatorship with poor people who are afraid of one guy" - what would he be worried about?
Democratic leaders require 51% support to stay in power. Dictators require 95%.

And the warmongers will be the winners of any power struggle. They have too much power to be overthrown and their argument ("if only they had listened to us, we'd be having this conversation in Kiev") is far more compelling until the Russian capacity for continuing is exhausted.