Rokko

Does anybody else find this infuriating?
Setting aside the possibility that these are just the usual anonymous blabbermouths with their own agenda talking or that this is deliberate disinformation, but wasn't NATO (or the US or whoever) pressuring Ukraine just a couple of weeks ago to abandon their "casualty aversity" and throw everything at Tokmak to achieve a breakthrough? And now Ukraine should be thrown under the bus because they are running out of men? That being said, it does make me uneasy that Ukraine was apparently forced to send a brigade that was heavily involved in the Southern offensive (the 47th) straight into Avdiivka to plug gaps. This does not seem to indicate an abundance of fresh available reserves.
 
 
And to pile on to the pessimism of these days some more, here's Tatarigami_UA criticizing General Syrski for his conduct around Bakhmut, both for holding it during the winter and for trying to retake it during the Summer.

First person POV of a DPICM strike. What surprised me was the relatively long time before the bomblets went off.

https://militaryland.net/news/the-situation-in-magura-brigade-is-far-from-perfect/
This article claims, the 47th Mech is basically a spent force and has to resort to sending specialists into assaults.
Reports like this and the recent renewed Russian assaults make me think, that maybe going on the offensive this year was premature, although probably (unfortunately) politically necessary. It seems, the Russians are more than happy to continue grinding themselves down against the most heavily fortified positions in Donbas over and over again. Had the Ukrainians stayed on the defensive and projected caution and weakness, rather than exuberant optimism and confidence, the Russians would have likely resumed their attacks much earlier. I believe there even was an allegation by Mashovets a couple of weeks before the "counter-offensive" kicked off that the Russian command was split on whether they should prepare for the coming blows or go on the offensive themselves (believing the counter-offensive talk to be basically a PsyOp).
I think it's quite possible that RU forces in Ukraine could have been attritted more efficiently that way, instead of grinding down multiple UKR brigades while carving out a tiny salient near Tokmak, thereby laying the ground work for 2024. Of course, hindsight is 20/20 and, as I said, it was probably necessary for political reasons, both domestic and international.

I think, this is a fairly safe assumption, otherwise these early failed breach/breakthrough attempts would not have been made. It was also probably the right choice to make these attempts, given the extremely high upside potential in case the RU forces had in fact been as brittle as everyone seemed to expect, which probably was quite a reasonable assumption given their showing during the previous winter and, in fact, the entire war up to that point for that matter.
I am just doubtful about the sense of proceeding with the slow grinding "Kherson style" approach.
I mean, I get that you are mostly not referring to personnel losses here, but the entire support structure, which is obviously many times smaller than what the Soviet Union had in WW2. But in terms of manpower losses, the Russian casualty figures for the entire war are roughly equivalent to a good (as in "not too bloddy") month during 1941/1942.

If the Russians had any sense they wouldn't be attacking, at all. But common sense is evidently not the primary guiding factor in their decision making process, so I think it is pretty much a given that the same senseless meat assaults would have gone on earlier and at higher intensity than what we are seeing now. There is a major and fairly obvious downside to basing your strategic planning on the assumption of your enemy's stupidity, since at any point the might get the memo and just cease it. At least by attacking UKR can force attrition upon the Russians on their own terms, but much less efficiently.
Disruption of defensive preparation would have had merit, I think, if the offensive had managed to achieve notable gains. But as it stands now the main line basically holds and there are just to little bumps in a vast defensive network, which the Russians will probably easily be able to "buff out" over the fall/winter again. They did attrit the Russian forces holding this line, but not as efficiently as staying on the defensive would have achieved, is what I am arguing. Killing Russians is easier while they are on suicidal assaults than when you have to root them out from minefields and trenches.
What personally worries me and what maybe explains why I perhaps obsess a bit about the, let's say efficiency of attrition, so much, are the long term prospects of continued supply of arms. Even if the Western countries maintain their political will to supply UKR, most of the stuff that is required is extremely finite and has abysmal yearly production rates. Denmark can only send their entire fleet of motorized artillery so often (once, to be precise), Leopard 2 tanks are produced at a rate of I think a couple of dozen each year and Western countries seem more focused on back-filling their own arsenals for the near future. The only thing to be optimistic about seems to be the production of 155mm shells, which does appear to be slowly ramping up, but I have yet to see evidence for increased production of all the other stuff. Last time I checked, I think Oryx listed 1/3 of all M777s ever delivered as destroyed or damaged, mostly by Lancets, and I don't think I've seen announcements of further pieces since last summer, to give another example.
To summarize, UKR mostly lacks the capabilities to produce their own armaments and the current rate of attrition appears to be too high to sustain given what the West is physically able to replace without digging deeper into its own arsenals, against which there appears to be a very strong political aversion. Therefore, the attritional battle UKR intends to fight would have to be as optimized/efficient as possible to work out.

I think, this is a fairly safe assumption, otherwise these early failed breach/breakthrough attempts would not have been made. It was also probably the right choice to make these attempts, given the extremely high upside potential in case the RU forces had in fact been as brittle as everyone seemed to expect, which probably was quite a reasonable assumption given their showing during the previous winter and, in fact, the entire war up to that point for that matter.
I am just doubtful about the sense of proceeding with the slow grinding "Kherson style" approach.
I mean, I get that you are mostly not referring to personnel losses here, but the entire support structure, which is obviously many times smaller than what the Soviet Union had in WW2. But in terms of manpower losses, the Russian casualty figures for the entire war are roughly equivalent to a good (as in "not too bloddy") month during 1941/1942.

Hello,
I haven't touched CM in ages, having mostly lost interest in it, but today I had an itch and looked at the code I had written for the uncam tool and somehow ended up rewriting the entire thing in one setting. I fixed some issues and it should be possible to unpack CMCW campaigns as well as potentially campaigns of yet unreleased games, as long as BF does not muck with the file format. Anyways, I don't have CMCW so I can't test and there are no campaign files in the scenario depot. If it doesn't work, send me the campaign file (or a download link) and I can take a look at it. I don't even have a Windows PC anymore, so I couldn't test the Windows version either, so please report any issues.
Best regards
PS: If anyone wants the source code, feel free to ask but I didn't include it this time in the archive.
uncam-0.10.zip

Completely mysterious video - Russian drone attacks UKR Dolhintseve airfield (5 km east from Kryvyi Rih) and damaged MiG-29 (or it decoy). This airfield located just in 67 km from closest Russian-held territory.

You can read active discussion in comments with wide spectre of opinions from this is cool CGI to this was real attack. 
First of all, we have to throw out arguments about satellite maps show abandoned airfield. This is 2018 year,  later Dolhintese was reсonstructed

But quality of picture really looks like 3D render, though it can be just compression artifacts.  
What more questionable - a difference of angles of attack from drone "eyes" and from controling UAV


Maybe later some UKR unofficial source will tell more what was it, but no matter was this real MiG-29 or decoy (I doubt Air Force command kept value combat planes on airfield in range of Smerch or Tornado-S salvo). now we can suppose next:
1. Russians now have Lancet-type drone, capable to fly over 70 km
2. Or this was some experimental aerial Lancet-carrier (Orion for example)
3. Or this was diversion group sneaked on UKR territory (90 % fantastic, but...)
4. Or this is old video of 2022, when Russian really were very close to Kryvyi Rih (about 40 km), but then anyway it would be suicidal to keep aircraft on this airfield.

I've been wondering this myself for a long time, but for me personally this seems to be the most likely explanation:
These cases of extreme disfunctionality within certain Russian units seem to be confined to a sizable, but ultimately not overwhelming, minority of the Russian forces in the field. They are apparently especially prevalent among Storm-Z (literal cannon fodder) units as well as those run by the L/DNR (de-facto cannon fodder), whose units are by all accounts more run like criminal gangs than military outfits. As of late, the latter also affect mobiks from Russia proper sent to L/DNR units as reparations for killing off most of the male Donbas population.
So let's say there are 10-15% of all Russian forces that are in a truly abysmal state like the one in the cited example. This number appears to be relatively stable though, or it does not grow quickly enough. The other issue seems to be the "silent majority" of all other Russian forces, who don't produce these goofy appeal videos and whose relatives do not complain online that their husbands and sons are left to rot in Ukrainian fields. This "other" Russian army seems to be moderately competent (at least on the defense) motivated and able to coordinate with supporting arms, we just don't really hear from them and this warps our perception of the actual state of the Russian army.
I don't really see how the "achievements" of the Russians could be otherwise explained, as underwhelming as they are. But if these incidents were affecting the majority of Russian forces, I can not see how they could still be holding on. I still remember being confused by this already in the Spring of 2022, when they were still advancing! Anybody else remember the reports by that RU volunteer who fought around Popasna for a couple of months, Viktor Shaiga or something? I distinctly remember having trouble to match his reports with the fact that the Russians were making any progress at all, even then.

I've been wondering this myself for a long time, but for me personally this seems to be the most likely explanation:
These cases of extreme disfunctionality within certain Russian units seem to be confined to a sizable, but ultimately not overwhelming, minority of the Russian forces in the field. They are apparently especially prevalent among Storm-Z (literal cannon fodder) units as well as those run by the L/DNR (de-facto cannon fodder), whose units are by all accounts more run like criminal gangs than military outfits. As of late, the latter also affect mobiks from Russia proper sent to L/DNR units as reparations for killing off most of the male Donbas population.
So let's say there are 10-15% of all Russian forces that are in a truly abysmal state like the one in the cited example. This number appears to be relatively stable though, or it does not grow quickly enough. The other issue seems to be the "silent majority" of all other Russian forces, who don't produce these goofy appeal videos and whose relatives do not complain online that their husbands and sons are left to rot in Ukrainian fields. This "other" Russian army seems to be moderately competent (at least on the defense) motivated and able to coordinate with supporting arms, we just don't really hear from them and this warps our perception of the actual state of the Russian army.
I don't really see how the "achievements" of the Russians could be otherwise explained, as underwhelming as they are. But if these incidents were affecting the majority of Russian forces, I can not see how they could still be holding on. I still remember being confused by this already in the Spring of 2022, when they were still advancing! Anybody else remember the reports by that RU volunteer who fought around Popasna for a couple of months, Viktor Shaiga or something? I distinctly remember having trouble to match his reports with the fact that the Russians were making any progress at all, even then.

I've been wondering this myself for a long time, but for me personally this seems to be the most likely explanation:
These cases of extreme disfunctionality within certain Russian units seem to be confined to a sizable, but ultimately not overwhelming, minority of the Russian forces in the field. They are apparently especially prevalent among Storm-Z (literal cannon fodder) units as well as those run by the L/DNR (de-facto cannon fodder), whose units are by all accounts more run like criminal gangs than military outfits. As of late, the latter also affect mobiks from Russia proper sent to L/DNR units as reparations for killing off most of the male Donbas population.
So let's say there are 10-15% of all Russian forces that are in a truly abysmal state like the one in the cited example. This number appears to be relatively stable though, or it does not grow quickly enough. The other issue seems to be the "silent majority" of all other Russian forces, who don't produce these goofy appeal videos and whose relatives do not complain online that their husbands and sons are left to rot in Ukrainian fields. This "other" Russian army seems to be moderately competent (at least on the defense) motivated and able to coordinate with supporting arms, we just don't really hear from them and this warps our perception of the actual state of the Russian army.
I don't really see how the "achievements" of the Russians could be otherwise explained, as underwhelming as they are. But if these incidents were affecting the majority of Russian forces, I can not see how they could still be holding on. I still remember being confused by this already in the Spring of 2022, when they were still advancing! Anybody else remember the reports by that RU volunteer who fought around Popasna for a couple of months, Viktor Shaiga or something? I distinctly remember having trouble to match his reports with the fact that the Russians were making any progress at all, even then.

I've been wondering this myself for a long time, but for me personally this seems to be the most likely explanation:
These cases of extreme disfunctionality within certain Russian units seem to be confined to a sizable, but ultimately not overwhelming, minority of the Russian forces in the field. They are apparently especially prevalent among Storm-Z (literal cannon fodder) units as well as those run by the L/DNR (de-facto cannon fodder), whose units are by all accounts more run like criminal gangs than military outfits. As of late, the latter also affect mobiks from Russia proper sent to L/DNR units as reparations for killing off most of the male Donbas population.
So let's say there are 10-15% of all Russian forces that are in a truly abysmal state like the one in the cited example. This number appears to be relatively stable though, or it does not grow quickly enough. The other issue seems to be the "silent majority" of all other Russian forces, who don't produce these goofy appeal videos and whose relatives do not complain online that their husbands and sons are left to rot in Ukrainian fields. This "other" Russian army seems to be moderately competent (at least on the defense) motivated and able to coordinate with supporting arms, we just don't really hear from them and this warps our perception of the actual state of the Russian army.
I don't really see how the "achievements" of the Russians could be otherwise explained, as underwhelming as they are. But if these incidents were affecting the majority of Russian forces, I can not see how they could still be holding on. I still remember being confused by this already in the Spring of 2022, when they were still advancing! Anybody else remember the reports by that RU volunteer who fought around Popasna for a couple of months, Viktor Shaiga or something? I distinctly remember having trouble to match his reports with the fact that the Russians were making any progress at all, even then.

I've been wondering this myself for a long time, but for me personally this seems to be the most likely explanation:
These cases of extreme disfunctionality within certain Russian units seem to be confined to a sizable, but ultimately not overwhelming, minority of the Russian forces in the field. They are apparently especially prevalent among Storm-Z (literal cannon fodder) units as well as those run by the L/DNR (de-facto cannon fodder), whose units are by all accounts more run like criminal gangs than military outfits. As of late, the latter also affect mobiks from Russia proper sent to L/DNR units as reparations for killing off most of the male Donbas population.
So let's say there are 10-15% of all Russian forces that are in a truly abysmal state like the one in the cited example. This number appears to be relatively stable though, or it does not grow quickly enough. The other issue seems to be the "silent majority" of all other Russian forces, who don't produce these goofy appeal videos and whose relatives do not complain online that their husbands and sons are left to rot in Ukrainian fields. This "other" Russian army seems to be moderately competent (at least on the defense) motivated and able to coordinate with supporting arms, we just don't really hear from them and this warps our perception of the actual state of the Russian army.
I don't really see how the "achievements" of the Russians could be otherwise explained, as underwhelming as they are. But if these incidents were affecting the majority of Russian forces, I can not see how they could still be holding on. I still remember being confused by this already in the Spring of 2022, when they were still advancing! Anybody else remember the reports by that RU volunteer who fought around Popasna for a couple of months, Viktor Shaiga or something? I distinctly remember having trouble to match his reports with the fact that the Russians were making any progress at all, even then.

I've been wondering this myself for a long time, but for me personally this seems to be the most likely explanation:
These cases of extreme disfunctionality within certain Russian units seem to be confined to a sizable, but ultimately not overwhelming, minority of the Russian forces in the field. They are apparently especially prevalent among Storm-Z (literal cannon fodder) units as well as those run by the L/DNR (de-facto cannon fodder), whose units are by all accounts more run like criminal gangs than military outfits. As of late, the latter also affect mobiks from Russia proper sent to L/DNR units as reparations for killing off most of the male Donbas population.
So let's say there are 10-15% of all Russian forces that are in a truly abysmal state like the one in the cited example. This number appears to be relatively stable though, or it does not grow quickly enough. The other issue seems to be the "silent majority" of all other Russian forces, who don't produce these goofy appeal videos and whose relatives do not complain online that their husbands and sons are left to rot in Ukrainian fields. This "other" Russian army seems to be moderately competent (at least on the defense) motivated and able to coordinate with supporting arms, we just don't really hear from them and this warps our perception of the actual state of the Russian army.
I don't really see how the "achievements" of the Russians could be otherwise explained, as underwhelming as they are. But if these incidents were affecting the majority of Russian forces, I can not see how they could still be holding on. I still remember being confused by this already in the Spring of 2022, when they were still advancing! Anybody else remember the reports by that RU volunteer who fought around Popasna for a couple of months, Viktor Shaiga or something? I distinctly remember having trouble to match his reports with the fact that the Russians were making any progress at all, even then.

I came across this interview with a Russian volunteer earlier today and found it interesting and worth sharing.
The video stood out to me because the guy is both unapologetic and also appears mostly honest, which is rare enough for Russians talking about this war. He also speaks fluent English and the interview is conducted in English as well.

I came across this interview with a Russian volunteer earlier today and found it interesting and worth sharing.
The video stood out to me because the guy is both unapologetic and also appears mostly honest, which is rare enough for Russians talking about this war. He also speaks fluent English and the interview is conducted in English as well.

I came across this interview with a Russian volunteer earlier today and found it interesting and worth sharing.
The video stood out to me because the guy is both unapologetic and also appears mostly honest, which is rare enough for Russians talking about this war. He also speaks fluent English and the interview is conducted in English as well.

I came across this interview with a Russian volunteer earlier today and found it interesting and worth sharing.
The video stood out to me because the guy is both unapologetic and also appears mostly honest, which is rare enough for Russians talking about this war. He also speaks fluent English and the interview is conducted in English as well.

I do wonder, with the Ukrainian slow, methodical and infantry-centric approach during this counter offensive, how much do classical notions of "campaign weather" actually matter? With advances measured only in a couple of kms every week, I somehow doubt mud is going to be a major issue for, e.g., supply. I believe @Haiduk has alluded to this previously in a report about UKR units training how to assault half-flodded, soggy trenches. Current tactics will still likely have to be adapted, like driving tanks cross-country to shoot up enemy dugouts from up close, and we have already seen how bad weather can negatively affect drone operation (Wagner storming Soledar at -20C this January comes to mind).
If the counter offensive is really as sustainable in terms of force exhaustion as some claim, I feel we might see neither a rapid breakout nor the counter offensive slowly petering out, but rather an extended slow slog through fall and winter. What *will* probably become impossible, is the kind of high speed breakout movement that everyone has been hoping for at the start of summer once the weather finally breaks.

When I see pictures like this I sometimes think that people who develop camouflage patterns professionally have to be gnashing their teeth whenever they see footage from this war. Both sides use the same intricately designed patterns, scientifically crafted based on decades worth of studies and research to fool the human eye ... just for both sides to slap bright colored airsoft tape on top as much as possible to avoid friendly fire ... because IFF is kinda hard if your main source of observation and fire control are cheap commercial drones.

When I see pictures like this I sometimes think that people who develop camouflage patterns professionally have to be gnashing their teeth whenever they see footage from this war. Both sides use the same intricately designed patterns, scientifically crafted based on decades worth of studies and research to fool the human eye ... just for both sides to slap bright colored airsoft tape on top as much as possible to avoid friendly fire ... because IFF is kinda hard if your main source of observation and fire control are cheap commercial drones.

Thanks for this, I always ignored this Youtube channel because of these goofy thumbnails, but the content is pretty good.
Interestingly, there is also footage from the Russian side. The drone/telegram channel operator was allegedly later killed in that cluster munitions strike video from yesterday.
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681979245126463491?s=20
Also: Not a good week for minor Russian e-celebs in general, it seems:
 

Thanks for this, I always ignored this Youtube channel because of these goofy thumbnails, but the content is pretty good.
Interestingly, there is also footage from the Russian side. The drone/telegram channel operator was allegedly later killed in that cluster munitions strike video from yesterday.
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681979245126463491?s=20
Also: Not a good week for minor Russian e-celebs in general, it seems:
 

Thanks for this, I always ignored this Youtube channel because of these goofy thumbnails, but the content is pretty good.
Interestingly, there is also footage from the Russian side. The drone/telegram channel operator was allegedly later killed in that cluster munitions strike video from yesterday.
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681979245126463491?s=20
Also: Not a good week for minor Russian e-celebs in general, it seems:
 

Thanks for this, I always ignored this Youtube channel because of these goofy thumbnails, but the content is pretty good.
Interestingly, there is also footage from the Russian side. The drone/telegram channel operator was allegedly later killed in that cluster munitions strike video from yesterday.
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681979245126463491?s=20
Also: Not a good week for minor Russian e-celebs in general, it seems: