Combatintman

Dariivsky bridge pontoon replacement and nearby warehouse were hit.
 

As a smoker that guy is sure to get a posting to an ammunition depot.

As a smoker that guy is sure to get a posting to an ammunition depot.

Not many to choose from is one of the big factors and many of those are in the middle of town and have a fair amount of security in and around them.  The Russian Embassy by comparison is accessible as it is outside the city centre.  The attack was clearly planned and IS-K had almost certainly gone there on days that the consular section was open to see what went on there.  That recce identified that there was a crowd to hide in and that Russian officials would come outside the embassy security perimeter to call people forward to get their visas which was the scenario in which the attack was made yesterday.  In security risk management terms a straight out case of an exploitable vulnerability.
The Pakistani Embassy, which used to be the British Embassy until 1994, is also pretty accessible for the same reason and that embassy also has lots of people outside it gathering for visas.  Of the two, and if I was in IS-K's shoes, I'd go for Russia because IS-K still relies on facilitation and recruitment via Pakistan.  This shouldn't be taken to mean that Pakistan is providing this - it is just where some recruitment happens and Pakistan's geography puts it adjacent to IS-K's stronghold in Kunar Province from which onward facilitation routes run.  It is of course no friend of the Pakistani government but far less hassle right now to target Russia because Russia isn't in a position to turn the screws on IS-K recruitment and facilitation. 
It is worth pointing out that IS-K is not the force it was in 2019 and now that it can't collaborate with the Haqqani Network in the way that it used to, it needs to pick and choose its targets carefully as well as implied above, ensure that its recruitment and logistics aren't disrupted.  Quite a few of the attacks this year have shown that IS-K is almost relearning its trade.  The August 31 attack on a Taliban military convoy in Kotal Khair Khana in Kabul's Police District 17 was a good example.  This was a VBIED and the intent was to target a bus full of Taliban military but the device was triggered too soon and a minibus with civilians aboard travelling in front of the military bus got the brunt of the blast.  That sort of botched execution was rare before August last year.
This attack was more about embarrassing the Taliban than attacking Russia although the suicide bomber made sure he got two of them.  The message was very much that the Taliban cannot keep foreign diplomats secure like they promised rather than Russia is a hated infidel country.
Other than that Steve ... I have no idea

As a smoker that guy is sure to get a posting to an ammunition depot.

Not many to choose from is one of the big factors and many of those are in the middle of town and have a fair amount of security in and around them.  The Russian Embassy by comparison is accessible as it is outside the city centre.  The attack was clearly planned and IS-K had almost certainly gone there on days that the consular section was open to see what went on there.  That recce identified that there was a crowd to hide in and that Russian officials would come outside the embassy security perimeter to call people forward to get their visas which was the scenario in which the attack was made yesterday.  In security risk management terms a straight out case of an exploitable vulnerability.
The Pakistani Embassy, which used to be the British Embassy until 1994, is also pretty accessible for the same reason and that embassy also has lots of people outside it gathering for visas.  Of the two, and if I was in IS-K's shoes, I'd go for Russia because IS-K still relies on facilitation and recruitment via Pakistan.  This shouldn't be taken to mean that Pakistan is providing this - it is just where some recruitment happens and Pakistan's geography puts it adjacent to IS-K's stronghold in Kunar Province from which onward facilitation routes run.  It is of course no friend of the Pakistani government but far less hassle right now to target Russia because Russia isn't in a position to turn the screws on IS-K recruitment and facilitation. 
It is worth pointing out that IS-K is not the force it was in 2019 and now that it can't collaborate with the Haqqani Network in the way that it used to, it needs to pick and choose its targets carefully as well as implied above, ensure that its recruitment and logistics aren't disrupted.  Quite a few of the attacks this year have shown that IS-K is almost relearning its trade.  The August 31 attack on a Taliban military convoy in Kotal Khair Khana in Kabul's Police District 17 was a good example.  This was a VBIED and the intent was to target a bus full of Taliban military but the device was triggered too soon and a minibus with civilians aboard travelling in front of the military bus got the brunt of the blast.  That sort of botched execution was rare before August last year.
This attack was more about embarrassing the Taliban than attacking Russia although the suicide bomber made sure he got two of them.  The message was very much that the Taliban cannot keep foreign diplomats secure like they promised rather than Russia is a hated infidel country.
Other than that Steve ... I have no idea

As a smoker that guy is sure to get a posting to an ammunition depot.

Not many to choose from is one of the big factors and many of those are in the middle of town and have a fair amount of security in and around them.  The Russian Embassy by comparison is accessible as it is outside the city centre.  The attack was clearly planned and IS-K had almost certainly gone there on days that the consular section was open to see what went on there.  That recce identified that there was a crowd to hide in and that Russian officials would come outside the embassy security perimeter to call people forward to get their visas which was the scenario in which the attack was made yesterday.  In security risk management terms a straight out case of an exploitable vulnerability.
The Pakistani Embassy, which used to be the British Embassy until 1994, is also pretty accessible for the same reason and that embassy also has lots of people outside it gathering for visas.  Of the two, and if I was in IS-K's shoes, I'd go for Russia because IS-K still relies on facilitation and recruitment via Pakistan.  This shouldn't be taken to mean that Pakistan is providing this - it is just where some recruitment happens and Pakistan's geography puts it adjacent to IS-K's stronghold in Kunar Province from which onward facilitation routes run.  It is of course no friend of the Pakistani government but far less hassle right now to target Russia because Russia isn't in a position to turn the screws on IS-K recruitment and facilitation. 
It is worth pointing out that IS-K is not the force it was in 2019 and now that it can't collaborate with the Haqqani Network in the way that it used to, it needs to pick and choose its targets carefully as well as implied above, ensure that its recruitment and logistics aren't disrupted.  Quite a few of the attacks this year have shown that IS-K is almost relearning its trade.  The August 31 attack on a Taliban military convoy in Kotal Khair Khana in Kabul's Police District 17 was a good example.  This was a VBIED and the intent was to target a bus full of Taliban military but the device was triggered too soon and a minibus with civilians aboard travelling in front of the military bus got the brunt of the blast.  That sort of botched execution was rare before August last year.
This attack was more about embarrassing the Taliban than attacking Russia although the suicide bomber made sure he got two of them.  The message was very much that the Taliban cannot keep foreign diplomats secure like they promised rather than Russia is a hated infidel country.
Other than that Steve ... I have no idea

As a smoker that guy is sure to get a posting to an ammunition depot.

Not many to choose from is one of the big factors and many of those are in the middle of town and have a fair amount of security in and around them.  The Russian Embassy by comparison is accessible as it is outside the city centre.  The attack was clearly planned and IS-K had almost certainly gone there on days that the consular section was open to see what went on there.  That recce identified that there was a crowd to hide in and that Russian officials would come outside the embassy security perimeter to call people forward to get their visas which was the scenario in which the attack was made yesterday.  In security risk management terms a straight out case of an exploitable vulnerability.
The Pakistani Embassy, which used to be the British Embassy until 1994, is also pretty accessible for the same reason and that embassy also has lots of people outside it gathering for visas.  Of the two, and if I was in IS-K's shoes, I'd go for Russia because IS-K still relies on facilitation and recruitment via Pakistan.  This shouldn't be taken to mean that Pakistan is providing this - it is just where some recruitment happens and Pakistan's geography puts it adjacent to IS-K's stronghold in Kunar Province from which onward facilitation routes run.  It is of course no friend of the Pakistani government but far less hassle right now to target Russia because Russia isn't in a position to turn the screws on IS-K recruitment and facilitation. 
It is worth pointing out that IS-K is not the force it was in 2019 and now that it can't collaborate with the Haqqani Network in the way that it used to, it needs to pick and choose its targets carefully as well as implied above, ensure that its recruitment and logistics aren't disrupted.  Quite a few of the attacks this year have shown that IS-K is almost relearning its trade.  The August 31 attack on a Taliban military convoy in Kotal Khair Khana in Kabul's Police District 17 was a good example.  This was a VBIED and the intent was to target a bus full of Taliban military but the device was triggered too soon and a minibus with civilians aboard travelling in front of the military bus got the brunt of the blast.  That sort of botched execution was rare before August last year.
This attack was more about embarrassing the Taliban than attacking Russia although the suicide bomber made sure he got two of them.  The message was very much that the Taliban cannot keep foreign diplomats secure like they promised rather than Russia is a hated infidel country.
Other than that Steve ... I have no idea

Not many to choose from is one of the big factors and many of those are in the middle of town and have a fair amount of security in and around them.  The Russian Embassy by comparison is accessible as it is outside the city centre.  The attack was clearly planned and IS-K had almost certainly gone there on days that the consular section was open to see what went on there.  That recce identified that there was a crowd to hide in and that Russian officials would come outside the embassy security perimeter to call people forward to get their visas which was the scenario in which the attack was made yesterday.  In security risk management terms a straight out case of an exploitable vulnerability.
The Pakistani Embassy, which used to be the British Embassy until 1994, is also pretty accessible for the same reason and that embassy also has lots of people outside it gathering for visas.  Of the two, and if I was in IS-K's shoes, I'd go for Russia because IS-K still relies on facilitation and recruitment via Pakistan.  This shouldn't be taken to mean that Pakistan is providing this - it is just where some recruitment happens and Pakistan's geography puts it adjacent to IS-K's stronghold in Kunar Province from which onward facilitation routes run.  It is of course no friend of the Pakistani government but far less hassle right now to target Russia because Russia isn't in a position to turn the screws on IS-K recruitment and facilitation. 
It is worth pointing out that IS-K is not the force it was in 2019 and now that it can't collaborate with the Haqqani Network in the way that it used to, it needs to pick and choose its targets carefully as well as implied above, ensure that its recruitment and logistics aren't disrupted.  Quite a few of the attacks this year have shown that IS-K is almost relearning its trade.  The August 31 attack on a Taliban military convoy in Kotal Khair Khana in Kabul's Police District 17 was a good example.  This was a VBIED and the intent was to target a bus full of Taliban military but the device was triggered too soon and a minibus with civilians aboard travelling in front of the military bus got the brunt of the blast.  That sort of botched execution was rare before August last year.
This attack was more about embarrassing the Taliban than attacking Russia although the suicide bomber made sure he got two of them.  The message was very much that the Taliban cannot keep foreign diplomats secure like they promised rather than Russia is a hated infidel country.
Other than that Steve ... I have no idea

Well they're getting it in spades now ... wonder why the United Kingdom supplied shedloads of NLAWs etc to Ukraine?

Yeah ... this.  Russia is concerned about Islamic terrorism on both its own soil and in the CSTO 'Stans bordering Afghanistan.  Using an Islamic militant for an attack would also not go down well with China.  A definite non-starter.

Well they're getting it in spades now ... wonder why the United Kingdom supplied shedloads of NLAWs etc to Ukraine?

https://datastudio.google.com/reporting/dfbcec47-7b01-400e-ab21-de8eb98c8f3a/page/IzToC?s=lZrHK_PhUC0
 
someone has done some real work graphing Russian losses.
 

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.

I'd look at the enemy in a bit more detail before you leap into a plan.  You say it is platoon strength - so go and 'place' a German platoon on that map and think about it from the German defender's point of view.

I'd look at the enemy in a bit more detail before you leap into a plan.  You say it is platoon strength - so go and 'place' a German platoon on that map and think about it from the German defender's point of view.

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.

From this forum's Kabul correspondent ... let's well and truly bury the Afghan thing.  As is generally the case, the most obvious explanation is usually the right one.  The timelines were simply those dictated by the February 2020 US-Taliban Agreement.  Biden arrived in office with a short timeline in which to take the decision to follow through with the withdrawal commitment in the US-Taliban Agreement.  The decision was announced on April 14, 2021.  According to the Washington Post article:
"Just weeks before the essay appeared, Biden and Putin had held a June 16 summit that both declared was “constructive.” At that point, Ukraine was a concern, but one that White House officials felt could be dealt with. As the White House delegation left the meeting, held in Geneva, a senior Biden aide would later recall, “we didn’t get on the plane and come home and think the world was on the cusp of a major war in Europe.”
The article states that it wasn't until October that the US was confident enough in its assessment that Russia would attack to take it to the President or put another way, sometime after the last US service member walked up the ramp of a C-17 in Kabul.