SeinfeldRules

I have always viewed the published Ukrainian losses as absolutely ridiculous. If Russians truly have 90,000 casualties then there would be virtually no fighting forces left (not counting support units like artillery or logistics), and you then have to wonder how Ukraine is still struggling to gain momentum in places like Kherson or Kharkiv. Besides, since when has a nation EVER been able to accurately estimate an opposing nation’s casualties? It’s pretty much accepted as historical fact that governments and militaries always overestimate enemy casualty numbers. Plenty of evidence out there that one burned out vehicle doesn’t automatically equal 3+ dead soldiers and humans are hardier then is commonly believed by the public. I can buy 32,000 total casualties but certainly not 32,000 KIA. 

Well his second thread isn't exactly accurate, as we absolutely have and account for manufacturing deviations between howitzers, and have several processes to identify these differences. We also have differences between the efficiencies of our propellants and the weight of our shells, which is why we segregate them into similar lots and track the differences between the various lots... that's probably the main difference between western and Soviet equipment, not necessarily purely a quality thing (though it plays a factor) but the fact that we more accurately account for those differences... looking at the Tabular Firing Tables of a Soviet D-30 and comparing it to ours, the amount of data they used was noticeably less. We have extremely detailed firing tables that account for many different variables, and I'm not sure if more recent Russian howitzers have improved, but I would argue that's a bigger factor then it being purely a manufacturing issue. Not every Russian howitzer is from the 1980s with completely shot out tubes, but if you have incomplete firing tables you will not be as accurate.

Well his second thread isn't exactly accurate, as we absolutely have and account for manufacturing deviations between howitzers, and have several processes to identify these differences. We also have differences between the efficiencies of our propellants and the weight of our shells, which is why we segregate them into similar lots and track the differences between the various lots... that's probably the main difference between western and Soviet equipment, not necessarily purely a quality thing (though it plays a factor) but the fact that we more accurately account for those differences... looking at the Tabular Firing Tables of a Soviet D-30 and comparing it to ours, the amount of data they used was noticeably less. We have extremely detailed firing tables that account for many different variables, and I'm not sure if more recent Russian howitzers have improved, but I would argue that's a bigger factor then it being purely a manufacturing issue. Not every Russian howitzer is from the 1980s with completely shot out tubes, but if you have incomplete firing tables you will not be as accurate.

Well his second thread isn't exactly accurate, as we absolutely have and account for manufacturing deviations between howitzers, and have several processes to identify these differences. We also have differences between the efficiencies of our propellants and the weight of our shells, which is why we segregate them into similar lots and track the differences between the various lots... that's probably the main difference between western and Soviet equipment, not necessarily purely a quality thing (though it plays a factor) but the fact that we more accurately account for those differences... looking at the Tabular Firing Tables of a Soviet D-30 and comparing it to ours, the amount of data they used was noticeably less. We have extremely detailed firing tables that account for many different variables, and I'm not sure if more recent Russian howitzers have improved, but I would argue that's a bigger factor then it being purely a manufacturing issue. Not every Russian howitzer is from the 1980s with completely shot out tubes, but if you have incomplete firing tables you will not be as accurate.

Well his second thread isn't exactly accurate, as we absolutely have and account for manufacturing deviations between howitzers, and have several processes to identify these differences. We also have differences between the efficiencies of our propellants and the weight of our shells, which is why we segregate them into similar lots and track the differences between the various lots... that's probably the main difference between western and Soviet equipment, not necessarily purely a quality thing (though it plays a factor) but the fact that we more accurately account for those differences... looking at the Tabular Firing Tables of a Soviet D-30 and comparing it to ours, the amount of data they used was noticeably less. We have extremely detailed firing tables that account for many different variables, and I'm not sure if more recent Russian howitzers have improved, but I would argue that's a bigger factor then it being purely a manufacturing issue. Not every Russian howitzer is from the 1980s with completely shot out tubes, but if you have incomplete firing tables you will not be as accurate.

Well his second thread isn't exactly accurate, as we absolutely have and account for manufacturing deviations between howitzers, and have several processes to identify these differences. We also have differences between the efficiencies of our propellants and the weight of our shells, which is why we segregate them into similar lots and track the differences between the various lots... that's probably the main difference between western and Soviet equipment, not necessarily purely a quality thing (though it plays a factor) but the fact that we more accurately account for those differences... looking at the Tabular Firing Tables of a Soviet D-30 and comparing it to ours, the amount of data they used was noticeably less. We have extremely detailed firing tables that account for many different variables, and I'm not sure if more recent Russian howitzers have improved, but I would argue that's a bigger factor then it being purely a manufacturing issue. Not every Russian howitzer is from the 1980s with completely shot out tubes, but if you have incomplete firing tables you will not be as accurate.

Well his second thread isn't exactly accurate, as we absolutely have and account for manufacturing deviations between howitzers, and have several processes to identify these differences. We also have differences between the efficiencies of our propellants and the weight of our shells, which is why we segregate them into similar lots and track the differences between the various lots... that's probably the main difference between western and Soviet equipment, not necessarily purely a quality thing (though it plays a factor) but the fact that we more accurately account for those differences... looking at the Tabular Firing Tables of a Soviet D-30 and comparing it to ours, the amount of data they used was noticeably less. We have extremely detailed firing tables that account for many different variables, and I'm not sure if more recent Russian howitzers have improved, but I would argue that's a bigger factor then it being purely a manufacturing issue. Not every Russian howitzer is from the 1980s with completely shot out tubes, but if you have incomplete firing tables you will not be as accurate.

While I can’t speak for Bear I can tell you my problems with the MATV: too small for everyone will full kit; no real covered storage on the outside of the vehicle which meant all your personnel gear got wet and snowy, or you looked like a hobo wagon with tarps and plywood strapped everywhere; impossible to conduct any sort of command or control functions inside of it (a must for survivability, as you need to avoid setting up tents); radios stored OUTSIDE the crew compartment, meaning you have to go outside to troubleshoot or change nets; small windows that are impossible to see out of; too high of a center of gravity which made it hard to maneuver on tough terrain; complex and hard to acquire repair parts; and an over reliance on civilians specialist to provide support for the various systems. 

It was universally hated by everyone in our battalion. It stayed in our motorpool and we used HMMWVs unless there was no other choice due to maintenance. 
 
 

While I can’t speak for Bear I can tell you my problems with the MATV: too small for everyone will full kit; no real covered storage on the outside of the vehicle which meant all your personnel gear got wet and snowy, or you looked like a hobo wagon with tarps and plywood strapped everywhere; impossible to conduct any sort of command or control functions inside of it (a must for survivability, as you need to avoid setting up tents); radios stored OUTSIDE the crew compartment, meaning you have to go outside to troubleshoot or change nets; small windows that are impossible to see out of; too high of a center of gravity which made it hard to maneuver on tough terrain; complex and hard to acquire repair parts; and an over reliance on civilians specialist to provide support for the various systems. 

It was universally hated by everyone in our battalion. It stayed in our motorpool and we used HMMWVs unless there was no other choice due to maintenance. 
 
 

While I can’t speak for Bear I can tell you my problems with the MATV: too small for everyone will full kit; no real covered storage on the outside of the vehicle which meant all your personnel gear got wet and snowy, or you looked like a hobo wagon with tarps and plywood strapped everywhere; impossible to conduct any sort of command or control functions inside of it (a must for survivability, as you need to avoid setting up tents); radios stored OUTSIDE the crew compartment, meaning you have to go outside to troubleshoot or change nets; small windows that are impossible to see out of; too high of a center of gravity which made it hard to maneuver on tough terrain; complex and hard to acquire repair parts; and an over reliance on civilians specialist to provide support for the various systems. 

It was universally hated by everyone in our battalion. It stayed in our motorpool and we used HMMWVs unless there was no other choice due to maintenance. 
 
 

While I can’t speak for Bear I can tell you my problems with the MATV: too small for everyone will full kit; no real covered storage on the outside of the vehicle which meant all your personnel gear got wet and snowy, or you looked like a hobo wagon with tarps and plywood strapped everywhere; impossible to conduct any sort of command or control functions inside of it (a must for survivability, as you need to avoid setting up tents); radios stored OUTSIDE the crew compartment, meaning you have to go outside to troubleshoot or change nets; small windows that are impossible to see out of; too high of a center of gravity which made it hard to maneuver on tough terrain; complex and hard to acquire repair parts; and an over reliance on civilians specialist to provide support for the various systems. 

It was universally hated by everyone in our battalion. It stayed in our motorpool and we used HMMWVs unless there was no other choice due to maintenance. 
 
 

While I can’t speak for Bear I can tell you my problems with the MATV: too small for everyone will full kit; no real covered storage on the outside of the vehicle which meant all your personnel gear got wet and snowy, or you looked like a hobo wagon with tarps and plywood strapped everywhere; impossible to conduct any sort of command or control functions inside of it (a must for survivability, as you need to avoid setting up tents); radios stored OUTSIDE the crew compartment, meaning you have to go outside to troubleshoot or change nets; small windows that are impossible to see out of; too high of a center of gravity which made it hard to maneuver on tough terrain; complex and hard to acquire repair parts; and an over reliance on civilians specialist to provide support for the various systems. 

It was universally hated by everyone in our battalion. It stayed in our motorpool and we used HMMWVs unless there was no other choice due to maintenance. 
 
 

This is a great piece, an absolute treasure trove of artillery and fire support related TTPs.

It’s not that simple to switch a weapon system, as now you have to also swap out the entire supply chain - the M270 is a tracked vehicle chassis and the HIMARS is a light wheeled vehicle. That includes parts and all the associated mechanics and such, and all the support equipment. That is not easy or cheap to do. You start running into second or third order effects if you start striping units like that.  These National Guard rocket units are routinely deployed overseas. 
 
 

It's an interesting article but I would like to see if it is supported by more then that one tweet, because that is all I've been able to find on howitzers having to go back for refit. I'm intensely curiously myself because I personally believe the M777 is a FOB Queen, well suited to supporting remote outposts in a static position but too mechanically fragile for continuous operations such as in Ukraine without extensive maintenance support. Expensive and fragile parts and an over reliance on the finicky hydraulic system (which operates everything from the closing of the breech, the tube elevation mechanism, and ability for the howitzer to displace out of position, as well as other functions) may render it out of combat more then is acceptable. These versions don't even have the digital systems, which can be their own level of burden. I am also interested in the performance of systems like the Caesar (thank you so much @Taranis for all your information on the system!) because the lack of manual or digitally degraded backups concerns me for very similar reasons, considering it may be a system adopted by the US Army. But I seriously doubt we will hear any information on that for a long time, at least from any sort of government sources.
I'm not sure what issue you have with the article? In 2018 I worked on the Joint Staff for Operation Inherent Resolve and attended plenty of staff meetings where we pondered the intentions and plans of the Iraqi Army. They didn't keep us in the loop on everything they did, sometimes for valid reasons and sometimes not. They had no obligation to do so and neither do the Ukrainians. I can absolutely see Ukraine playing the same game, for exactly the reasons outlined in the article. I've read Pentagon briefing transcripts earlier in the war where the spokesman alluded to the very same thing. Another thing I learned being on such a high level staff is that it is extremely rare for the government (or at least the military) to outright lie on the record - there are many other ways to word things and "protect the truth" by bouncing around it, without risking it coming back around on you for lying to the public. So if people in the administration are coming out saying we don't have an accurate picture of Ukrainian forces, I believe it. Because beyond our space based capabilities (which can collect equally well on every system out there, Russian, Ukrainian, or otherwise), I highly doubt we are focusing assets on collecting within Ukraine itself. The risk of an American ISR asset going down in Ukraine and causing an escalation in the conflict is probably far too high for too little gain.

It's an interesting article but I would like to see if it is supported by more then that one tweet, because that is all I've been able to find on howitzers having to go back for refit. I'm intensely curiously myself because I personally believe the M777 is a FOB Queen, well suited to supporting remote outposts in a static position but too mechanically fragile for continuous operations such as in Ukraine without extensive maintenance support. Expensive and fragile parts and an over reliance on the finicky hydraulic system (which operates everything from the closing of the breech, the tube elevation mechanism, and ability for the howitzer to displace out of position, as well as other functions) may render it out of combat more then is acceptable. These versions don't even have the digital systems, which can be their own level of burden. I am also interested in the performance of systems like the Caesar (thank you so much @Taranis for all your information on the system!) because the lack of manual or digitally degraded backups concerns me for very similar reasons, considering it may be a system adopted by the US Army. But I seriously doubt we will hear any information on that for a long time, at least from any sort of government sources.
I'm not sure what issue you have with the article? In 2018 I worked on the Joint Staff for Operation Inherent Resolve and attended plenty of staff meetings where we pondered the intentions and plans of the Iraqi Army. They didn't keep us in the loop on everything they did, sometimes for valid reasons and sometimes not. They had no obligation to do so and neither do the Ukrainians. I can absolutely see Ukraine playing the same game, for exactly the reasons outlined in the article. I've read Pentagon briefing transcripts earlier in the war where the spokesman alluded to the very same thing. Another thing I learned being on such a high level staff is that it is extremely rare for the government (or at least the military) to outright lie on the record - there are many other ways to word things and "protect the truth" by bouncing around it, without risking it coming back around on you for lying to the public. So if people in the administration are coming out saying we don't have an accurate picture of Ukrainian forces, I believe it. Because beyond our space based capabilities (which can collect equally well on every system out there, Russian, Ukrainian, or otherwise), I highly doubt we are focusing assets on collecting within Ukraine itself. The risk of an American ISR asset going down in Ukraine and causing an escalation in the conflict is probably far too high for too little gain.

It's an interesting article but I would like to see if it is supported by more then that one tweet, because that is all I've been able to find on howitzers having to go back for refit. I'm intensely curiously myself because I personally believe the M777 is a FOB Queen, well suited to supporting remote outposts in a static position but too mechanically fragile for continuous operations such as in Ukraine without extensive maintenance support. Expensive and fragile parts and an over reliance on the finicky hydraulic system (which operates everything from the closing of the breech, the tube elevation mechanism, and ability for the howitzer to displace out of position, as well as other functions) may render it out of combat more then is acceptable. These versions don't even have the digital systems, which can be their own level of burden. I am also interested in the performance of systems like the Caesar (thank you so much @Taranis for all your information on the system!) because the lack of manual or digitally degraded backups concerns me for very similar reasons, considering it may be a system adopted by the US Army. But I seriously doubt we will hear any information on that for a long time, at least from any sort of government sources.
I'm not sure what issue you have with the article? In 2018 I worked on the Joint Staff for Operation Inherent Resolve and attended plenty of staff meetings where we pondered the intentions and plans of the Iraqi Army. They didn't keep us in the loop on everything they did, sometimes for valid reasons and sometimes not. They had no obligation to do so and neither do the Ukrainians. I can absolutely see Ukraine playing the same game, for exactly the reasons outlined in the article. I've read Pentagon briefing transcripts earlier in the war where the spokesman alluded to the very same thing. Another thing I learned being on such a high level staff is that it is extremely rare for the government (or at least the military) to outright lie on the record - there are many other ways to word things and "protect the truth" by bouncing around it, without risking it coming back around on you for lying to the public. So if people in the administration are coming out saying we don't have an accurate picture of Ukrainian forces, I believe it. Because beyond our space based capabilities (which can collect equally well on every system out there, Russian, Ukrainian, or otherwise), I highly doubt we are focusing assets on collecting within Ukraine itself. The risk of an American ISR asset going down in Ukraine and causing an escalation in the conflict is probably far too high for too little gain.

It's an interesting article but I would like to see if it is supported by more then that one tweet, because that is all I've been able to find on howitzers having to go back for refit. I'm intensely curiously myself because I personally believe the M777 is a FOB Queen, well suited to supporting remote outposts in a static position but too mechanically fragile for continuous operations such as in Ukraine without extensive maintenance support. Expensive and fragile parts and an over reliance on the finicky hydraulic system (which operates everything from the closing of the breech, the tube elevation mechanism, and ability for the howitzer to displace out of position, as well as other functions) may render it out of combat more then is acceptable. These versions don't even have the digital systems, which can be their own level of burden. I am also interested in the performance of systems like the Caesar (thank you so much @Taranis for all your information on the system!) because the lack of manual or digitally degraded backups concerns me for very similar reasons, considering it may be a system adopted by the US Army. But I seriously doubt we will hear any information on that for a long time, at least from any sort of government sources.
I'm not sure what issue you have with the article? In 2018 I worked on the Joint Staff for Operation Inherent Resolve and attended plenty of staff meetings where we pondered the intentions and plans of the Iraqi Army. They didn't keep us in the loop on everything they did, sometimes for valid reasons and sometimes not. They had no obligation to do so and neither do the Ukrainians. I can absolutely see Ukraine playing the same game, for exactly the reasons outlined in the article. I've read Pentagon briefing transcripts earlier in the war where the spokesman alluded to the very same thing. Another thing I learned being on such a high level staff is that it is extremely rare for the government (or at least the military) to outright lie on the record - there are many other ways to word things and "protect the truth" by bouncing around it, without risking it coming back around on you for lying to the public. So if people in the administration are coming out saying we don't have an accurate picture of Ukrainian forces, I believe it. Because beyond our space based capabilities (which can collect equally well on every system out there, Russian, Ukrainian, or otherwise), I highly doubt we are focusing assets on collecting within Ukraine itself. The risk of an American ISR asset going down in Ukraine and causing an escalation in the conflict is probably far too high for too little gain.

Essentially, that is the benefit of the full digital system that the Caesar has onboard.
 
Yes that is one of the rockets out of the pod.

I don’t think Russia intends to turn Severodonetsk into Mariupol, they have a much better way to take the city by threatening the roads and forcing the units to withdraw. The fact that we’re seeing such dramatic swings in control in a matter of days leads me to believe both sides only have a limited “crust” of forces fighting for the city, trying to gain and maintain contact but not necessarily committing to digging in and holding. Yesterday the Russians were pushed back to their original defensive lines and now today the Ukrainians seem to have retreated back to the industrial area. Both sides need to contest the city in some way to prevent the reinforcement of other areas but I don’t think we’ll be seeing Mariupol levels of urban combat.

I’m going to play Devil’s Advocate here, as a user of proprietary DOD hardware and software, there is absolutely something to be said for the simplicity and usability of using COTS systems. A lot of soldiers I’ve talked to would agree. It certainly seems to work for Ukrainians.

It's definitely based off his Twitter thread but it seems like they at least reached out to the developers for comment. Nothing system wise in the article is outlandish or outside the realm of possibility. I only take issue with the characterization that such a system only takes seconds to deliver fires. Even by American doctrinal standards we have several minutes to process fire missions with fully digital observers and howitzers, and it's very rare to meet that standard due to a wide range of circumstances. Knowing the realities of how these systems operate I am hard pressed to believe the hype, especially in a military without a preponderance of fully digital howitzers. I would love to see actual proof that it's being done this fast on a regular basis. One of the very few things I've seen in OSINT describing the process of target identification to execution - the engineer's Twitter thread discussing the pontoon bridge fiasco - stated it took 20 minutes to deliver artillery fires, which is about on par with my own experience.
Another line in the article I will bring up is the claim that this is contrary to what the Russians are capable of, despite them supposedly having very similar software. Whether it's functioning or wide spread across their formations is unknown to me, but we have seen very little in OSINT that can accurately characterize how Russians control fires on a technical or tactical level, for better or worse. Howitzers lined up close in a field or treeline has very little to do with their ability to send fire mission across a network, and everything to do with the lack of Digital Fire Control systems - a boat that Ukraine occupies equally.
While it's certainly a excellent capability to have and its impressive that the Ukrainian military can utilize something like Starlink to leverage that, digital distribution of fires is nothing revolutionary or unique; articles like this just give the public the opposite impression.

Yes and no. Digital Fire Control allows several things. One is the ability to self locate and self lay. This greatly simplifies operation or the howitzer and speeds up emplacement. This part of DFC simply tells you where the howitzer is located (grid) and the direction and elevation the tube is currently pointed at (firing data), and is unique for each howitzer and independent of any command network. You still need someone to tell you what data to fire. 
 
The second part of DFC is the ability to link into the digital network to receive firing data. The computer system calculating the data sends it over a digital network to the howitzer and it auto populates into the system, meaning all the crew has to do is lay the howitzer, instead of receiving it over the radio and the crew entering it into their gunner sights and then laying the howitzer. 
 
Theoretically this allows an observer to enter a target into the system and have it automatically route to a howitzer without any intervention. The American AFATDS system is designed to operate this way, as all our howitzers are fully digital.  In reality we rarely operate this way, as combat is never as simple as putting some guidances and control measures into a computer system, you need some sort of human oversight at certain points. Which is why Trent’s thread the other day is almost certainly bunk: Ukraine seems to have very little howitzers with Digital Fire Control systems to enable such a system, and are operating in such a high tempo and target rich environment that some level of decision making has to go into the allocation of fires. I’m sure they have a similar system to AFATDS for passing a digital fire mission from node to node, but that’s not that ground breaking. 

This is an incredibly common trend you see in training. UAVs can have very much a soda straw effect when it comes to processing and analyzing the feed. Even when you find something it can be hard to place it in context as you often don’t get the full picture of what formation that unit represents. From what I’ve seen, often one of the best ways to use a UAV is to have another intelligence asset cue them on and have the UAV complete the kill chain with accurate targeting data. 
 
Another under appreciated aspect of UAVs is the support required to operate, analyze and integrate their collection into a a coherent intelligence picture for units - command posts are already bloated with personnel and have survivability issues, I can only imagine the number of people you would need to view, assess and analyze dozens of UAV feeds. AI can help but that’s probably farther off then a drone rich environment. Plus the air space control plan you would need, the possibility of target duplication and overestimation (multiple UAVs collecting on the same target, turning what is only 3 vehicles into an entire company). Where are all these UAVs going to take off? All of the more capable UAVs need room and personnel to operate. UAV integration is a non trivial problem set. 

I am always skeptical of people claiming certain equipment or contributions will be war changing, I've heard that since February 24th and yet to see any of it pan out. There's also a lot of best-case-scenario type situations being bandied about with MLRS, and it may be strictly factual but often doesn't take into account reality. I think HIMARS or the M270 will be a good asset for Ukraine and give them a useful capability, but I doubt it will be war changing and there is still a lot that is contingent on what they actually will receive, and how much.