TheVulture

And simultaneously cutting down on their reliance on Chinese imports to bring critical manufacturing capability back to domestic/ allied locations.

One thing that needs reinforcing, the west does not have nearly enough equipment to match it's financial potentials. Takes time to rebuild but the production lines need to cut their teeth via supplying Ukraine.

Don't waste the weight on the seababy and draw the extra attention.  Instead have separate support surface drones with MGs or AGLs and a good supply of ammo that put down the suppressive fire while the seababies head in

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungary-president-signs-swedens-nato-membership-ratification-2024-03-05/

Seriously and @squatter can look here too.  For anyone advocating Ukraine pursuing peace negotiations or suing for peace - easy to say but no one in this camp has provided a coherent theory of what that would look like right now.
Let’s say “Ok, you guys are right. Ukraine is out of options here. There are no viable way for Ukraine to continue to prosecute this war.”  Ok, so what?  What would peace negotiations look like?  How exactly do you guys see these “peace negotiations” happening.  Every time I ask this question I get some hand waving but no one has yet to unpack just how any peace negotiations could end up in anything but weakened western influence and a more vulnerable Ukraine that Russia is going to exploit.  What peace negotiation, that Russia is going to accept - while, as we are continually reminded, Russia is still capable of waging offensives to take ground?  What possible leverage does the west or Ukraine have in guaranteeing Ukrainian independence and security.  Is Russia going to offer reparations?  How about war crimes prosecution?  Is Russia going to give up an inch of ground it has taken?  Are they going to push for recognition of Crimea and Donbas as Russian provinces.
This is what is so disingenuous about this line of advocacy - at best it is delusional liberal left “let’s give peace a chance”.  At worst is it far right BS designed to program failure into this entire war so that their presidential candidate can be “right all along”.  In both cases the idea of peace negotiations right now is an empty coffin where actual ideas on this war go to die.  We may very well need a negotiated end-state in this war, but suing for peace now, while on the back foot is going to embolden Putin and his regime…and is exactly what they are looking for in order to promote themselves “Look we brought them all to their knees”.
But let’s open the floor.  Please walk us through what a peace process would look like right now.  Let’s stop sideline heckling on won’t work and tell us what you think will work.

Oh good, you are back.  So I posted links to two estimates of RA force lay down south of Kherson.  From OS we have at least a decent idea that there is roughly a division down there.  I then did a force to space analysis that would show roughly 100 RA troops per km.  That is roughly 1/3 of the average troops density elsewhere and much less than RA offensive concentrations.  But, again, you simply ignore it.
I am not sure what a discussion in Kherson sector has to do with the larger strategic force comparison; however the argument was never that the “RUS are outnumbered and outgunned in Ukraine”, it was: the RA is thin at Kherson and Ukraine has on opportunity to exploit that.
Well at the CFC we also do not assume the enemy is “superior in every way so every option is too hard…so let’s just quit” either.  I have no doubt the RA has hard points along that obstacle but they do not have enough forces to create an effective “wall”, they have likely no depth and they definitely do not have air superiority.  I mean, seriously, how much more do you need?
So first off “difficult” does not automatically translate into “impossible” - that is not a good military rule of thumb.  So how “beleaguered” is that force at Krynky?  How much has it cost the UA to hold that bridgehead.  How hard have been the RA c-attacks.  You basically “have seen pictures of tired Ukrainian Marines” and translate that into “impossible mission”.  So who is demonstrating bias here, in order to fit a foregone conclusion?  Krynky shows that a small light force one the other side of the Dnipro can be sustained and resist RA attempts to push them out.  It demonstrates that the RA do not have decisive force at Krynky and I suspect the bridgehead is acting as a patrolling base.  The fact that they have held on for months reinforces this deduction.
Now the real question is, can the UA do 6-10 Krynkys?  Upscaling is a completely different issue.  It depends on availability of trained troops, water crossing equipment, stores and intelligence.  It is a complete complex operation.  Is it guaranteed?  Absolutely not - war is not a menu with items you can simply return to the kitchen because you don’t like them - this will be a very hard and dangerous operation.  However, it is 1) possible and plausible and  2) likely one of the better operational offensive options on the table.  You appear to write off any offensive operation for your own reasons, however, here is one professional military analysts who is telling you that there is an option space here given the proper resources.  The risks are high, however, the payoff may be high enough to warrant the risk.  Further the other options are all pretty much worse unless the UA has solved for minefields in this war.
(This is your queue to get huffy again and argue with the kitchen btw)
Your state position has been, and is (unless you wish to retract) - “Ukraine is out of options and as such we should be pursuing peace negotiations.”  If you can provide a single post where you do not reinforce this central premise then I think we can re-assess your position.  You have worked incredibly hard to remove the southern light operational option - to the point that Steve also called you out for ignoring evidence being presented in favour of your underlying position.  You have also dismissed any and all other options - again to reinforce your position.  You have side-stepped historical references as “out of date”, you have side-stepped force-space analysis and you have downplayed Ukrainian successes.  
Now, you are correct.  This could all be quite innocent and you do not have a conscious ulterior motive.  But now you might want to take a look at your own biases because you are definitely projecting a sub-conscious motive here.  You can get all huffy and demand to see the manager, but I still smell and suspect you of political motivations that align with other posters who have come through here who employ pretty much the exact same MO on the discussion of future Ukrainian military success - ignore or downplay any analysis or assessment that would give Ukraine any chance of success; over subscribe Russian capabilities and capacity: land back at “Ukraine is done…we must sue for peace”.
No argument on the transformative impact ISR has had on the battlefield.  And no one is saying a water crossing operation is going to be easy.  Like minefields, it will require pre-conditions which include a level of c-ISR.  However, we have a proof of concept that it can be done, which is a helluva lot more than we have with respect to minefields and RA forces elsewhere.  That is one large obstacle to try and cover in detail - 85-100kms.  And the UA has freedom of movement along most of that obstacle (I.e. unlike a minefield they can cross at multiple locations).  So what?  Well if one can keep the logistical demand low, one could sustain light operations through over the water and air resupply (see: heavy drones)…you know, like in other times in history.
A light force water crossing is damned hard and comes with significant risk, no getting past that.  However, compared to other options it may be the best of the bunch.  And it may very well work…and by “work” I mean draw RA forces away from other sectors to deal with it, which may open up other opportunities.
As to “Russian stooge” and “f#cking idiot”…you realize you are the only one to make these statements in this debate?  I still suspect you of ulterior motives but of course that will need proof otherwise.  No, I suspect you are a guy who is entirely enamoured in your own opinion and is always pushing to be the smartest guy in the room.  Now which rooms?  In the end, I really do not care.
Now who is throwing around “you are all f#cking idiots and Pro-Ukrainian bots”?  So if your purpose was to highlight how challenging future offensive operations will be for the UA…well, ok, got it. Contribution noted.  But it really appears you are working very hard to convince everyone that Ukraine has no offensive options left, and its defensive ones are nearly as hopeless…and therefore Ukraine should “sue for peace”.  
This will have been at least the 2nd, possible 3rd time someone has come out of the woodwork after Adiivka to push this perspective.  Your approach of 1) being entirely in love with your own opinion and 2) ignoring any and all evidence or counter analysis, and 3) becoming very offended when called out, matches those previous poster profiles.  Could all be innocent coincidence and you honestly believe this is the situation despite also hoping for a better outcome, but I remain suspicious.
Why?  Because like those other posters, you are not promoting actual discourse.  You are pushing a single position without room for anything else.  I am more than willing to admit a water crossing operation south of Kherson may very well fail, it is no guaranteed success.  I am also very willing to publicly admit that Ukraine is definitely facing some tough decisions this year.  I do not believe we are at the “beg Russia for peace” stage though and see still possible opportunities but windows may be closing.  You on the other hand dismiss any and all ideas that run counter to your position.  You are preaching, not discussing.  Could be just who you are, but you picked a really crappy time to come out and self-actualize.

This is the other major flaw in the thinking within the “sue for peace” crowd…what peace?
All war is negotiation.  However, that negotiation is framed by realities on the ground.  So while this war may very well end in some sort of Korean Peninsula solution on lines yet to be determined.  Like the Korean War both sides had to be forced to the table by military facts.
So the narrative coming out of the MAGA/Macgregor crowd is that 1) Ukraine has no hope.  No military solution exists for Ukraine and they build everything else around that central “fact”.  2) seeing as point #1 is a universal truth (and no room for counter-factuals exists within that universe), the Ukraine must sue for peace.  And of course their own Glorious Leader will somehow make an equitable and enduring peace happen.
This is utter bullsh#t.  Even if one accepts point #1 - and there is a growing pile of evidence the Ukraine is not “done”, as planes keep getting blown out of the sky - this theory completely fails to define just how their version of “peace” will happen.  Russian “peace negotiations” in the past have been self-serving and onion skin thin.  If Ukraine begs for peace right now, it will be from a position of weakness.  If the West begs for peace right now, it will be from a position of weakness.  Does anyone think that Putin is not going to exploit this fact? Russian peace terms will be their terms.  They will be designed to ensure: future Ukrainian vulnerability, a clear demonstration of Western weakness and failure, and promote Russian superiority.  
If Ukraine sued for peace right now I have zero doubts Russia would be asking for war reparations…from a country they invaded.  Russia would also likely demand legitimacy and recognition for the territories it captured.  And would make sure they set conditions for successful future actions - they will call it “Ukrainian neutrality”.
There is no easy tap out in this war.  It is a real war where endstate will emerge directly from military outcomes.  As a minimum Ukraine must freeze this war on its terms, not Russia’s and the West needs to support that.  The “fantasy” in all this is not the prospect of future Ukrainian military success, it is the entire belief that there is another option when dealing with Russia.  I suspect there will be an end line in all this and I am less and less convinced it will be the pre-2014 border; at this point pre-2022 will be a stretch.  But it is definitely not where we are today.  Ignoring the lines on the ground, Russian sacrifice is not high enough to force them towards anything remotely looking like an equitable peace negotiation that we could trust.

It is my biggest gripe in this forum. Closely followed by the idea russia is hanging on by mere threads, collapsing any day now.

Today's Perun has a good high-level overview of the Chinese military that is worth a listen for anyone interested in the China  / Taiwan / US situation.
Also has the wry observation that China is modernising its navy partly to be able to protect its international trade, which it is very dependent on economically. Particularly with the US, Japan and Korea. But the main geopolitcal threats it sees  to its international trade are from the US, Japan and Korea. So it is trying to build a navy to compete with those countries in order to be able to protect its trade with the same countries....
 

Ukraine seem to be getting very good at this "asymmetrical conventional war" approach.
The Black Sea Fleet, which vastly overmatched the Ukrainian navy, has been pretty much neutralised. In the early says they were launching cruise missile strikes from near Odessa. Now they won't even go as far as Sevastopol, and operationally seem to be limited to ferrying supplies with their decreasing supply of landing ships.
The Russian air force also has massive superiority in numbers and modern equipment, and yet are losing aircraft at an impressive rate and have lost two of their A-50 planes (and no-one seems to know really how many airworthy ones they actually have now). Of course the air force is still a problem and not neutralised (hello, glide bombs and cruise missile salvos), but it's obvious that Ukraine are forcing the Russians to be more cautious and conservative with their air power than they'd ideally like.

Ukraine seem to be getting very good at this "asymmetrical conventional war" approach.
The Black Sea Fleet, which vastly overmatched the Ukrainian navy, has been pretty much neutralised. In the early says they were launching cruise missile strikes from near Odessa. Now they won't even go as far as Sevastopol, and operationally seem to be limited to ferrying supplies with their decreasing supply of landing ships.
The Russian air force also has massive superiority in numbers and modern equipment, and yet are losing aircraft at an impressive rate and have lost two of their A-50 planes (and no-one seems to know really how many airworthy ones they actually have now). Of course the air force is still a problem and not neutralised (hello, glide bombs and cruise missile salvos), but it's obvious that Ukraine are forcing the Russians to be more cautious and conservative with their air power than they'd ideally like.

Ukraine seem to be getting very good at this "asymmetrical conventional war" approach.
The Black Sea Fleet, which vastly overmatched the Ukrainian navy, has been pretty much neutralised. In the early says they were launching cruise missile strikes from near Odessa. Now they won't even go as far as Sevastopol, and operationally seem to be limited to ferrying supplies with their decreasing supply of landing ships.
The Russian air force also has massive superiority in numbers and modern equipment, and yet are losing aircraft at an impressive rate and have lost two of their A-50 planes (and no-one seems to know really how many airworthy ones they actually have now). Of course the air force is still a problem and not neutralised (hello, glide bombs and cruise missile salvos), but it's obvious that Ukraine are forcing the Russians to be more cautious and conservative with their air power than they'd ideally like.

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/26/europe/sweden-nato-accession-hungary-intl/index.html
Sweden is finally in NATO 

Mostly off-topic mini-documentary on the prototype soviet Su-47 that never entered production (courtesy of Growling Sidewinder, who is a combat flight sim guy (DCS)).  It's only 9 minutes long, so not a big time investment. I mention it though because there is a short bit at the end about the Russians having restarted some testing with it as part of research in to forward-swept wings on drones to give much better manoeuvrability with a view to drone vs drone combat.
More of a curious titbit than anything substantial.
 

I don’t think anyone of serious power in the West wants a full Russian collapse.  The overall Western grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has been “stable status quo”.  We have spent the last 33 years pretty much working on all fronts to sustain “the system”.  We toss scarfs and hats on it but at its core is a central unchanging stability.  Why?  Because stability is good business.  The West, with the US at the centre built the scheme that “won” the Cold War and want that party to keep going because we get very rich off it.  The rest of the world makes our stuff for cheap, while also buying our other stuff.  
But pretty much from Day 1 “the others” pushed back.  First was the intra-war years, interventions and then terrorism.  Now this has upscaled to “revisionist states” and “power competition”.  Russia invaded Ukraine for several reasons but one of them definitely was to demonstrate that they are not going to be bound by western rules (Hell, Putin said exactly this in that speech back in Sep ‘22).  This puts the West in a dilemma, they can either do too little and Russia threatens the system, or they crush Russia…and it threatens the system.  So they appear to have chosen the middle path, which of course is getting hijacked by the internal movements who want to…wait for it…change the system.  MAGA, alt-right, nationalists, whatever, all disagree with “the system” even though it has made everyone richer.  The reality is that it did not make everyone equally rich so discontent is natural.  Worse, power spheres exploit this so they can get more powerful (and richer).  So Rust-Belt yokels eat this stuff up and start to dismantle “the system”, which includes democracy apparently.  The reality is Trump is a symptom, not a cause and I am not sure even they realize how dangerous this game they are playing is.
So Ukraine happens and becomes a symbol of a “war for, and against, the system.”  It isn’t about the fact that killing innocent Ukrainians is wrong - hell if morales like human life mattered we wouldn’t have Gaza.  No, Ukraine is all about “the system” and both sides appear to be waging it viewed through that lens.  Russia needs to show that they are going to play by their own rules, but not completely break themselves.  One could ask “why is Russia fighting this war by half measures?”  Do they enjoy a quagmire?  No, Putin understands what he has gotten himself into and is adopting a slow burn strategy, hoping we will get distracted and caught up in our own nonsense…and he might be right.
The rest of the West is trying to step up, but frankly we have grown awfully fat, dumb and happy on the back of the US - who now is having a bipolar fit.  In the end, we can live with a fallen Ukraine.  We can shore up the borders and lock Russia out.  We can live with a partial victory in Ukraine, do we really care about Crimea, LNR and DNR?  No, we did not in ‘14 and we don’t now.  We can’t live with a completely imploded Russia.  Those are where the real risks lie.  Too many unknowns that could really break the system.  So we wind up with a half hearted war designed to punish Russia for challenging the system but not destroy them.  Ukraine is, and I am being brutally honest here, is almost secondary to the entire conversation.  It was simply a very unfortunate country where both sides could try and prove a point.  We love Ukraine all of a sudden because they are an opportunity to show that 1) Russia was wrong to challenge the system, and 2) the system still works.  
I strongly suspect this is why this war is also so muddled in military circles.  We are watching a war to defend the system..that is demonstrating the weaknesses of our own military system at the same time.  So we put blinders on and try to pretend it isn’t happening.  Our military power has to still be relevant…otherwise how can we defend the system?
So to answer your question, “yes, the US and the West know exactly how important Ukraine really is and are fighting this war based on that calculus.”  The answer however is “somewhat important”.  We care and feel bad, but care much more about our own issues.  Putin read the short game about as wrong as one can.  He may have read the long game extremely well.  The way to beat the West is not outright confrontation, it is apathy.  2 years is forever for a culture addicted to clicks and flashing lights.  Putin’s off ramp is being able to draw a victory line somewhere of his choosing and he is shooting for that.  And we might just let him get there.
Now I would not start freaking out and worry about a second attack on Kyiv.  Something that dramatic might actually get our attention again.  No, this needs to become a boring war - I am starting to think Putin’s Tucker Carlson interview was smarter than we thought.  What better way to get Western audiences to yawn and start to change the channel than a history lesson?

The flares have been used for some time before that launch,  and the launch is from the other side of the aircraft line of flight to the video that shows the hit. 
So in one video we have A-50 moving right to left, and an explosion behind the aircraft where presumably an IR seeker hit a flare. Then the plane explodes.
In the other video from the Russian base we have the A-50 moving left to right (on approach to land at the base), and after a fair bit of flaring, a SAM launch which appears to be about the right timing to be the missile that hit the A-50
Possible scenario: UKR SF got to a few miles from the base where they could hit the A-50 coming to land. Man portable IR seeking SAM launched (e.g. Starstreak) but hits flare. Base air defence launches and hits A-50. Either they were trying to intercept the UKR missile, confused about the situation  (fog of war) or just panic. A-50 trying to avoid IR missile behind is hit by radar guided missile from the front. 
EDIT: Not starstreak - I don't think that is IR guided from what I've read. 

Dude, take your meds or something.  You have come out swinging on a number of issues even when it was clear you were way off base.  You were going after folks on that A-50 when it was clear that you were looking at an older incident - and not the one with the posted video from the last 24-48 hours.  Now you are coming at someone else for whatever the hell this is about…gee you think Russian troops could not get their hands on Ukrainian coveralls?  Kinophile commented on how the Russian Army has brutal practices and you object…so your position is that the Russian Army does not have brutal practices?  Based what?  The sign translation?
You seem to be in a fighting mood for the sake of simply fighting.  Seriously go to a bar and get smacked around, get it out of your system and then come back.

Thanks for the clarification, but you might consider thumbing down the ad hominem attacks a bit.

By order of Russian MoD, we are tired of not being believed when we say friendly fire downed our planes. Therefore, if you launch AA rockets at target you must video it and upload it to internet so we can prove to decadent and ineffectual west we shot ours down.

True, but I suspect this is where things are at.  Any ISR on the breach will mean PGM artillery and long range loitering munitions.  A lone ATGM team with a modern system can take out lead vehicles.  And standoff tac aviation has demonstrated what it can do.
To be perfectly honest our entire mechanical/explosive breaching tactic has only ever been done in one war that I can think of, Gulf War.  And we essentially did all the pre-conditions I am talking about with air power…and Blind Pew and his dog rolled right through them.  We never actually did live opposed minefield breaching operations.  We exercised them for decades and always “won” but never under real battlefield conditions, let alone modern ones.
The very uncomfortable truth of this war is that there is a whole lotta stuff we have only ever exercised going back into the Cold War.  ATGMs, air parity, denied environments, firepower parity, EW.  All things we practiced but never had our assumptions tested.  Gulf War looked like a validation but that war had specific context.  We assumed every war would be like that one and ‘03 reinforced that idea, even though the hints were starting to show up.
Then this war comes along and presents some major counter evidence that our tactics work at all.  So we say “Russia Sux”, “Ukraine Sux” “but we are good” like a benediction.  Worse we are tying the narrative to all of this.  If Ukraine can’t “win like we would”, well then it is on them.  The reality is that we had (have) a bunch of assumptions that have never really been tested and I suspect they are being tested in this war.  Some are enduring, like training quality, infantry and precision.  Others are not holding up too well at all, and it is making us very uncomfortable.  “Well we would roll over those minefields just like we did back in ‘91”.  Well this is not ‘91, and it is not that war.  This one has the look and feel of Korea, with 21st century technology.  

Our tactics underpin our operational constructs (manoeuvre and Mission Command), which all support our military strategy (short sharp wars of massive overmatch), which all feed into funding and spending in the trillions.  So when a war comes along that suggests we might be in the wrong movie, you can easily see people start getting their backs up. “Aw unmanned is a flash in the pan.  Someone will invent counters and things will go back to the way they were.”  But the evidence is piling up.  It is not just unmanned.  Precision weapons like the Javelin or artillery fires.  C4ISR that pretty much anyone can cobble together, including the Russians.  Denial, which will impact us as well.  It is all adding up to something shifting but most do not want it to shift too much.
Basically we are at the situation where if the enemy Blind Pew and his dog can see that minefield while we are breaching it, and they have a few precision smart weapons in range…the breach will likely fail because that breach is reliant on maybe 6-10 critical systems that can be hit very accurately by a number of systems we cannot fully deny.  We put APS on the breaching teams and PGM artillery drops on them.  We push back the artillery and UAS come in with more mines and reseed the breach.  We do everything right and the enemy has c-moves ready to bottle up the breach.  And this is before the real stuff that can defeat our defensive systems has even shown up (stand off EFP, ATGM sub munitions and mines with legs).
We need to start coming up with new ideas, not stuff to bolt on our old ones to try and keep them alive.
 

Recently, I noticed that my UKR listening skills have improved noticeably. With the aid of translators and some effort, I can watch and translate UKR videos. So, let check the following interview with UKR AFV expert (former AFU tank officer)
 
 

I'm not sure about that. Two days ago I want to hear some more information about Nord Stream and after a few questions I become a lying pro-Ru hypocrite.
Understand better?

If you draw a line after the big Ukrainian gains of Kherson and Karkhiv, and look at what has changed purely in terms of territory since then,  Russia gained Bakhmut last winter, then there was the Ukraininan summer offensive which didn't achieve strategic objectives in terms reaching Tokmak, and now we've had Avdiivka. I think if you add all that up, Ukraine comes out comfortably ahead, although neither side has changed the size of the Russian controlled territory by even 1%. If someone is seeing this as Russia having the upper hand, they're seeing what they want to see.

If you draw a line after the big Ukrainian gains of Kherson and Karkhiv, and look at what has changed purely in terms of territory since then,  Russia gained Bakhmut last winter, then there was the Ukraininan summer offensive which didn't achieve strategic objectives in terms reaching Tokmak, and now we've had Avdiivka. I think if you add all that up, Ukraine comes out comfortably ahead, although neither side has changed the size of the Russian controlled territory by even 1%. If someone is seeing this as Russia having the upper hand, they're seeing what they want to see.

UKR Air Command issued the data of Cospas - SarSat - international satellite system for search&resque, where can be seen four radiobeacons in the allegedle palces of pilots ejecting in that day. The more western mark obviously belonged to Su-35 - Russians recognized it was lost near Shakhtarsk. Pilot was resqued. 
Other two marks are in Diakove (UKR) and south from Millerovo (RUS). Looks like damaged Su-34 tried to make emergence landing on Millerovo airfield, but fell down and only one pilot could eject. 

Second Su-34 with mark near Diakove was allegedly filmed falling down in flame by the settlers of Diakove. Interesting - women, who are filming, speak Ukrainian or mixed RUS-UKR (so-called "surzhyk"). They say the jet feel down directly on the village street.