LongLeftFlank

I mean the trite answer is it's their combination that hurts most but I still think this is a useful question.
I would argue that defenders dug in to fortifications with artillery support has been solved and aren't causing many new problems in this war.  The unholy pair in this war is laaaarge minefields and plentiful drones.  Without the minefields today's drones could be partially defended against by moving fast and/or light.  The Capt's ink-blots would work to neutralise lines of defense.  Without the drones you might be able to leverage stealth and operational confusion to effect a breakthrough in at least one or two places.  As it is though the mines don't allow you to move fast and the drones let the enemy watch you do it.  That then multiplies the effectiveness of artillery and mobilising reserves and, well, here we are.
 
For this war I would warn against trying to come up with a solution that carries out the entire attack for you.  This hell-swarm idea may be a thing in a few years but it's more than is needed now.  The minimum solution that we need today is to undo the effect that attack drones and drone-assisted C4ISR have had, then let your legacy units attack as they were always meant to.  That means finding a way to neutralise the vast majority of enemy drones, at least over a localised area and for at least a day or two.
As OBJ points out (and as others have theorised over the previous 70,000+ posts) the solution could be technical or doctrinal.  Doctrinal might be more efficient (I like LLF's Army-of-Rangers thinking) but would require re-training and potentially re-organisation which would take months, if not years to properly carry out.  A technological solution could theoretically be fielded within weeks of design freeze.

It doesn't help much, sadly, since others just keep quoting and arguing with him.
Look, there are tough questions to discuss here around actions Ukraine may need to make urgently if it is to stay in this war, much less 'win'. And there's a lot of room for differences of view on those.
But I for one am not about to waste time chasing down Carlson/tankie talking points at the bidding of some rando who argues at the level of a bright 17 year old off his meds. He brings less than nothing to this conversation.

Just want to note, chaps, that I talk to a lot of folks and I have yet to hear a clearer take on our tactical and operational conundrum than I do here. 

And there is this, to the issue of clearing minefields to a depth of 20km, 02Nov23 article, UA CINC, Valerii Zaluzhnyway. As always apologies if this is a duplicate.
Apparently amount and capability of equipment UA had was insufficient given depths of mine fields and RU ability to quickly reseed cleared lanes/areas with FASCAM. He does offer ideas on what they do need, new kinds of technology, "We need radar-like sensors that use invisible pulses of light to detect mines in the ground and smoke-projection systems to conceal the activities of our de-mining units," "We can use jet engines from decommissioned aircraft, water cannons or cluster munitions to breach mine barriers without digging into the ground. New types of tunnel excavators, such as a robot which uses plasma torches to bore tunnels, can also help.'
I don't have the knowledge needed to know if these systems exist or are in development, or what stage if the latter.
https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-iron-general-west-mine-clearing-equipment-insufficient-russia-war-2023-11
Per the article, "In July, Ukrainian military officials told The Washington Post that Western-supplied de-mining equipment was slow, noisy, and could easily be destroyed by Russian forces."

I wonder whether another factor behind the UA's 'difficult summer' was a kind of doctrinal disorientation suffered by the military leadership?
Ukraine successfully defeated the initial invasion force through more-or-less ad hoc corrosive warfare tactics: distributed light infantry with modern ATGMs, shop-bought Mavics and a hotline to artillery backup.  The tactics used seem to have been largely improvised due to the fact the UA was caught off-balance and massively outnumbered by the invading force.  The forces which achieved such success included a relatively large proportion of TD units which, in theory at least, were not really supposed to be that effective but had done their jobs when the chips were down.
After the first phase was over the UA was still not properly on its feet and so it dug in and kind of leaned into the same tactics; trying to absorb Russian attacks with mostly light infantry and an increasing number of artillery PGMs allowing their gun park to perform effectively despite overall limited ammunition stocks.  In one major instance this undermined Russian operational systems to the point that they totally collapsed around Kharkiv.  Around Kherson, where Russian defence was perhaps a little more deliberate, it sorta kinda worked to the point that the UA reached the Dniepr but I think we all identified at the time that things hadn't gone quite as neatly as may have been expected, given what probably should have been the critically vulnerable nature of Russian logistics across the river.
During the Bakhmut phase it feels like the UA may have lost a little more faith in the 'corrosive warfare' operational method (perhaps the Kherson experience contributed to this?).  I may be misremembering but isn't this about the time we were reading accounts of Ukrainian TD units kicking off and maybe occasionally abandoning frontline positions in protest at their apparent newfound status as line infantry?  I wonder whether that, combined with a degree of horrified awe at the power of Russia's artillery ever since Severodonetsk, may have worked to persuade the UA's leadership that distributed mass had been a successful means to an end but that, given the choice and their own training, soviet-style world-ending application of force was the thing to aim for.
We should also remember that, throughout this period, a very hot topic was Ukraine's repeated and insistent requests for tanks.  Lots of tanks.  As many tanks as allies could spare and especially some of those shiny, modern, western MBTs, please.  Even at the time I remember wondering why.  I think I might even have posted on this thread that 'maybe it's misinformation to scare mobiks and really what they want is drones, shells, SAMs and access to more C4ISR'.  Is this more evidence that, at a senior level, the UA hadn't actually learned all the lessons we were crediting it with having taught us?
In addition to all that, Ukrainian servicemen were being carted across Europe to undergo NATO standard training.  We've heard various accounts of how such training was ignorant of the realities of the war as it was being fought, so this effectively ended up as a third doctrinal flavour (and a flawed one, in the minds of at least some UA soldiers who went through it), somehow operating in parallel with the UA's soviet institutional heritage and its recent, bleeding edge experience.
So then came the summer offensive.  Well before it started there seems to be evidence to suggest that there was overt disagreement between the UA and western advisers with regards to what that offensive should look like both in terms of scale/breadth and tactics used (although I haven't seen any suggestion that either side were advocating a continuation of corrosive warfare tactics - how curious).  In the end it seems like Ukraine implemented western tactics with western equipment and (very) freshly western-trained units until they got a bloody nose and not much longer.  Now, I'm not saying these tactics would have worked if they tried harder but they only tried for, what, a couple of weeks?  Then they reverted very quickly to what looked like an uneasy, almost incongruous marriage of drones/PGMs with regular, more traditionally soviet-style blunt attacks.  At this point they were trying to attack everywhere despite not really having the numbers to be able to do that and properly reinforce success wherever it may be close.  Our very own Haiduk was often telling us of complaints about various levels of UA leadership and their dogmatic adherence to wasteful frontal attacks.  All of the above suggests a horrible lack of unity within the UA in terms of how and where things were being done versus how and where they should be done.
So, the Ukrainian military leadership was caught organising a full-scale offensive while having to consider:
Should they lean hard into western tactics and doctrine, which none of them were trained in and only a few of their (admittedly near best-equipped) tactical units were partly trained in? Should they take advantage of the fact they have caught their balance after the first year, they have secured fresh supplies of ammunition and equipment and the Russians are on the defensive in order to implement a proper, full-blooded soviet-style assault in the way they were always trained to?  Even though such theory isn't really intended to carry the day against an enemy with numerical and potentially materiel superiority? Should they discard both doctrinal frameworks in favour of what has worked so far, even though absolutely no-one is trained in that; they only did it because they couldn't do much else; it might only have worked because the Russians were so over-stretched and disorganised; perhaps they should step away from using TD units and towards 'real' combat units, now; and who's in charge here anyway, comrade General or that mouthy wannabe-NCO who won't stop carping on about reconnaisance and toy planes? Is it any wonder they ended up kind of doing all three at various times and places?

tl;dr: is there a case to be made that, rather than the fact the tactics were imperfect (and who could blame them for that in the current environment?), it was the fundamental uncertainty and consequent indecision in the minds of UA leadership itself which shaved those critical percentage points of speed and effectiveness away such that the offensive appears to have stretched the RA but did not break it?
P.S. I promise I will work on structuring my thoughts more succinctly in future, when I have time.

Flemfire, the way you argue invites criticism. In fact, all you seem to do is argue and pat yourself on the back. I enjoy lurking this thread, maybe you should do the same. 

Welcome, and let me offer you cigars and brandy from the Skeptics lounge.
You're definitely not the only one getting WW1 vibes here.



 
Bonus (Canadian clickbait)
Somewhere between the 'Belarusian spetsnaz break bricks with head' division and the 'only a lumberjack stirs his coffee with his thumb' division.

Perun from last month has some very relevant discussion of EW, and how it is keeping the ''Drone Apocalypse" at bay for the moment; last 1/3 of the hour, although the rest is also worthwhile as usual. 
 
 

Avdiivka.  I think the vids were posted before but this presentation gives helpful operational context.

 
 

Perun from last month has some very relevant discussion of EW, and how it is keeping the ''Drone Apocalypse" at bay for the moment; last 1/3 of the hour, although the rest is also worthwhile as usual. 
 
 

https://www.axios.com/2023/12/05/humanoid-robot-factory-agility-bipedal-amazon

If not slaughterbots just yet, at least a source of quick and dirty mine tramplers and ammo bearers?
...Of course, since these startups need funding all their core IC is already out during the vapourware stage, which means China Inc. can and will beat them to 'market' with crappy but functional knockoffs.
Whatever happens we have got / the Maxim gun / and they have (Not!)

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/18k0reh/full_video_ukrainian_t64_destroys_disabled/?utm_source=embedv2&utm_medium=post_embed&utm_content=post_body&embed_host_url=https://community.battlefront.com/index.php
 

Hey, LLF, I was able to get to the threads through the link you sent, but not what I suppose are images.
Andrew Perpetua thoughts on infantry Co/Bn mortars interesting and seem pretty supportable given cost and ability to logistically support alternatives.
No idea if Musk is mucking around again.

Would that be standing looking down drain or up?

Welcome, and let me offer you cigars and brandy from the Skeptics lounge.
You're definitely not the only one getting WW1 vibes here.



 
Bonus (Canadian clickbait)
Somewhere between the 'Belarusian spetsnaz break bricks with head' division and the 'only a lumberjack stirs his coffee with his thumb' division.

Without saying too much, let's just say I have rather good info on this robot and the company.  This particular company has zero interest in anything military.  Others will and hopefully will be used as LLF said above.  
And to the folks that think the end is nigh.  No, they are not about to take over the world.  It's a heckuva lot of work & effort & smart coding  just to get them to move boxes properly.  This is the current prototype, shown above & called Digit, and it's being used in warehouses for jobs that people don't like.  

Really appreciate the thoughts on this by @chrisl and all others after.
I just started looking but haven't found anything that looks like force structure or doctrine for massed use of drones. Maybe not surprisingly there does not yet seem to be a 'FM 7-7X, the Drone Platoon in the Attack.'
The impression you get is field practice in Ukraine is way ahead of published military thought. Maybe someone here knows the Ukrainian or Russian drone equivalent of JFC Fuller or Immelmann/Boelcke.
I might differ with others on AI. I think the integration of autonomous AI into conventional war kill chains in recon/strike complexes is inevitable given the advantages in response/decision cycle time.
I did find this interesting, thoughts on drone 'swarm tactics.' Author is an Italian Air Force Lieutenant attending USMC U.
https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/A-New-Way-of-War/
 

Well interesting if one has an unhealthy tank lust.  This is what in the business we call a “heavily situated” estimate.  The author starts with the core conclusion that tanks are still viable on the modern battlefield and then goes about pulling anything and everything he can to try and prove it:
- reduction of combat power down to firepower, mobility and protection - which of course are also the core attributes of the tank.  When in fact modern military doctrine sees combat power in far broader terms.  Interestingly he does not apply his condensed framework (from circa 1993) to the main competitor to the tank, the modern UAS/ISR.  Unmanned systems have far higher mobility, at least equal firepower in disaggregated form, and higher protection through distributed mass.
- Oversubscription on tanks role in just about all operations other than war.  I know from first personal experience and follow on research that his deductions from both Bosnian ‘93 and Canadian Forces in Afghanistan that the employment of the tank was anything but “decisive”.  In fact their overall employments were problematic for many reasons on those sorts of operations.
- Assuming that the UAS/ISR game will be fought “how we fight it”.  EW offers the best possible defence right now; however, as we have discussed at length, full autonomy of these systems, even in the last 1000m largely negates EW counter-measures.  China is investing heavily in fully autonomous systems…this is where things are going.
- Biases analysis of ATGMs: “costly and heavy”….seriously…as compared to a tank?   He also fails to recognize the most dangerous part of modern ATGMs…range.  FFS he is making a Cold War argument that ATGMs need LOS “making operators vulnerable” - that argument 1) has not been proven in this war and 2) does not reflect where ATGM technology is going.  No mention of self-loitering munitions or NLOS systems, some with ranges nearing 100kms. [He cites a CBC interview as proof that tanks can still find and kill ATGMs - sure it can happen but as we have seen, not to the point as to reestablish conditions for offensive operations]
-Largely sidesteps the entire issue of logistics.  Reduces it down to recovery and maintenance.  The major problem with heavy logistics is that itself must be “heavy”.  Heavy formations consume obscene amounts of fuel and ammunition.  Spare parts and recovery are also issues but long LOCs of fuel and supply trucks are suicidal in this war.  Why…because the enemy can see them with operational ISR (no real mention of ISR realities either for that matter).  Once seen they can be interdicted and shot to pieces.  This is why “logistics” is a core combat function…none of the others work without it.
- I do like camo, decoy and deception discussion.  That has some solid ideas.
- UGV comparison is woefully tepid.  Appears to assume UGVs will simply be 1 for 1 tank replacements when they will likely take the cheap distributed path much like their air counterparts.  
Author really fails to see modern warfare as it is,  more for what he wants it to be.  The combination of UAS/ISR and PGM has been definitely “undeciding”.  It can translate into offensive warfare under the right conditions but it is largely about Denial.  These systems have denied heavy  of its major offensive attributes.  They have done so because they are able to see, fix and engage heavy systems well beyond the ranges that heavy can respond.  They do so through distributed mass.  Combined with Air Denial we have a condition where heavy is narrowly applicable to the modern battlefield.
He proposes a bunch of solutions pretty much as I expected - invest in the tank heavily to try and keep it viable.  What he fails to define is “what is the point of diminishing returns?”  When do we call it and go in another direction?  He makes glancing, and frankly disingenuous, attempts in a light/med analysis but never really asks the question: “Well what if heavy is dead?”  Hell I am not even sure traditional military mass is not dead, let alone heavy.
The unmanned/ISR/PGM complex are not enablers to traditional land battle, they have become deterministic.  The decisive force on the battlefield is  no longer heavy systems…it is the systems that undecided them.  I suspect our future lies in these spaces as “precision, distribution, unmanned” also become part of the combat power pantheon.  We will see counter-systems and “forward edge superiority” as concepts.  What happens to forces that can “take and hold ground” remains unclear.  Right now ATGM, UAS and PGM (artillery and self-loitering) along with dog-faced infantry appear to be the new combined arms.
But if I know the western military complex (and unfortunately I do), we will spend billions, maybe trillions trying to prove “it ain’t so”.  Finally, we need to pull our collective heads out of @sses and realize that this issue is so much larger than the freakin tank or heavy or even ground forces.  It applies across all domains.  We have billion dollar ships and air fleets that may be unable to control or create superiority.  I can see that from here.  They will be brought down by cheap and ubiquitous smart munitions of all types.  So while everyone is gawping and squawking about tanks, I am not even sure aircraft carriers will stand up in 20 years.  Cyber and nukes likely may be the only military forces that we can count on to keep doing what they were.  Start with a blank white board and go from there.
 

No matter how they dress it up, Putin wants half of Ukraine.  Basically everything east of the Dnipro.  Kharkiv?!  That is a major urban fight.  100k per year?  That is madness.
This kinda feels like the big sweeping red arrows from summer ‘22.  RA can lose 100k per year trying to take back single towns, let alone Kharkiv.
Whelp, not a lot of room to negotiate there.

OK, the longer you guys try to engage @kevinkin replacement and his Gish Gallop (look it up) blasts of overconfident yet entirely unsupported broad projectile vomits of 'alternative facts' the more unreadable this thread becomes.
If he really wants to be our good faith house contrarian, he needs to post credible third party information, then give his take, one or two points at a time and allow time for reubuttal.
Otherwise, this is just garden variety trolling.
...This is what happens when nobody posts information and just bloviates and emotes.

If I choose, I can get the tankie view over on NakedCapitalism, which is basically the same rubbish you're spouting here. You're done.

It doesn't help much, sadly, since others just keep quoting and arguing with him.
Look, there are tough questions to discuss here around actions Ukraine may need to make urgently if it is to stay in this war, much less 'win'. And there's a lot of room for differences of view on those.
But I for one am not about to waste time chasing down Carlson/tankie talking points at the bidding of some rando who argues at the level of a bright 17 year old off his meds. He brings less than nothing to this conversation.

OK, the longer you guys try to engage @kevinkin replacement and his Gish Gallop (look it up) blasts of overconfident yet entirely unsupported broad projectile vomits of 'alternative facts' the more unreadable this thread becomes.
If he really wants to be our good faith house contrarian, he needs to post credible third party information, then give his take, one or two points at a time and allow time for reubuttal.
Otherwise, this is just garden variety trolling.
...This is what happens when nobody posts information and just bloviates and emotes.

OK, the longer you guys try to engage @kevinkin replacement and his Gish Gallop (look it up) blasts of overconfident yet entirely unsupported broad projectile vomits of 'alternative facts' the more unreadable this thread becomes.
If he really wants to be our good faith house contrarian, he needs to post credible third party information, then give his take, one or two points at a time and allow time for reubuttal.
Otherwise, this is just garden variety trolling.
...This is what happens when nobody posts information and just bloviates and emotes.