Pete Wenman

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

1 year of the war is passed. From the start of the invasion and to the huge count of air and missile strikes. One of my friends has been killed by wagner artillery in Bohorodichne village near Bakhumt. My father-in-law has been killed by storming the defensive enemy positions in the Kherson region 1st of October. I gave 3 of my salaries (all what I have)on the first day of the war on the military budget. Thanks to all of you, thanks for your help. Taking carry of our refugees, helping our soldiers to destroy enemy forces with AT weapons, artillery, APS, AFV, and Tanks, peoples who served in foreign legions. Thank you for giving billions of money to support our economy. Special thanks to battlefront for small support for me, when I asked about a discount, they gave me 2 games with all DLCs for free - I didn't expect this. Some of my relatives were in Kherson in occupation, and all high-value electronic and expensive things were looted from them by Russian forces. And now we don't fear rocket strikes (10 times they exploded 700-1000m from my house) we don't fear nuclear threat, we don't fear the second army in the world and you shouldnt. Sorry for we English would that what I want to say for all of you, I can tell you many things about the war but first i will try to improve my language knowlages.

Shame about the arrests - lets hope its stern telling off for these arch criminals

Shame about the arrests - lets hope its stern telling off for these arch criminals

The one bit of kit that would have given us a chance to beat the Soviets - tea anyone ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_vessel

The one bit of kit that would have given us a chance to beat the Soviets - tea anyone ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_vessel

Shame about the arrests - lets hope its stern telling off for these arch criminals

That's pretty much all the Royals I've met 😉
P

“reports indicating something like ‘general counteroffensive’ of the ZSU in the Bakhmut area”
Tom Cooper has thoughts
https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-19-february-2023-bakhmut-c282d043b148
 

I’ve got that tee shirt, made the gpmg seem no weight at all. Have to say though that live firing the 84 both sub and full calibre was a lot of fun.

Well, he's wrong then.  The British Army's Staff Officer's Handbook for 1978 has the same allocation of Charlie G in both Mech and  Type A and B light role battalions - 36 in the battalion, 9 in the company, and 3 in the platoon.   Moving forward in time, I was a reservist in a light role infantry battalion in 1984 and every rifle section had a Charlie G which I may or may not have had to cart around 😉.

Canadians had the M2 since the 60s. This was not a new weapon.  Lugging a “big empty tube” on training was always fun.

Tom Cooper summarising events - not sure too many here will disagree with the premise.
Bottom line: the ‘biiiiig’ Russian offensive appears to be petering out amid massive casualties and at least two big failures. Yes, this conclusion might be premature (and yes: even I’m surprised for coming to the idea to write this)....
Unless much more details become available, I guess the reasons are what I’ve explained again and again:
a) the VSRF cannot support one ‘biiiiiiiiiig’ operation in a single sector, thus was forced to distribute less troops on three ‘primary’ sectors, and these proved insufficient to overcome the combination of Ukrainian fire-power and will;
b) because of incompatibility with the winter weather, it’s Orlan-10 UAVs are not working, and thus the Russian generals are ‘commanding blind’ (they do not know where are what of Ukrainian positions), while their artillery lacks the effectiveness necessary to breach Ukrainian frontlines and enable a serious advance;
c) the mass of mobiks is simply not trained well-enough to conduct offensive operations (especially no mechanised operations); and
d) the VSRF is lacking officers to organise, train, and lead 100,000, 150,000, 200,000 (or more) of mobiks into combat.
Atop of this, due to the lack of UAVs and other modern means of reconnaissance, and bad weather, even the GRU and FSB are experiencing growing problems with collecting intelligence. Between others, it turned out they’ve requested their moles in the German BND to obtain intel on activity of Ukrainian M142 and M270-units…
Finally, by now it’s obvious that even Gerasimov and his aides found no solution for the general degeneration of the VSRF — for which there is nobody else but Putin and the Keystone Cops in Moscow (foremost including Shoygu and Gerasimov) to blame.
https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-18-february-2023-dc29786a91df
P

Tom Cooper summarising events - not sure too many here will disagree with the premise.
Bottom line: the ‘biiiiig’ Russian offensive appears to be petering out amid massive casualties and at least two big failures. Yes, this conclusion might be premature (and yes: even I’m surprised for coming to the idea to write this)....
Unless much more details become available, I guess the reasons are what I’ve explained again and again:
a) the VSRF cannot support one ‘biiiiiiiiiig’ operation in a single sector, thus was forced to distribute less troops on three ‘primary’ sectors, and these proved insufficient to overcome the combination of Ukrainian fire-power and will;
b) because of incompatibility with the winter weather, it’s Orlan-10 UAVs are not working, and thus the Russian generals are ‘commanding blind’ (they do not know where are what of Ukrainian positions), while their artillery lacks the effectiveness necessary to breach Ukrainian frontlines and enable a serious advance;
c) the mass of mobiks is simply not trained well-enough to conduct offensive operations (especially no mechanised operations); and
d) the VSRF is lacking officers to organise, train, and lead 100,000, 150,000, 200,000 (or more) of mobiks into combat.
Atop of this, due to the lack of UAVs and other modern means of reconnaissance, and bad weather, even the GRU and FSB are experiencing growing problems with collecting intelligence. Between others, it turned out they’ve requested their moles in the German BND to obtain intel on activity of Ukrainian M142 and M270-units…
Finally, by now it’s obvious that even Gerasimov and his aides found no solution for the general degeneration of the VSRF — for which there is nobody else but Putin and the Keystone Cops in Moscow (foremost including Shoygu and Gerasimov) to blame.
https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-18-february-2023-dc29786a91df
P

Tom Cooper summarising events - not sure too many here will disagree with the premise.
Bottom line: the ‘biiiiig’ Russian offensive appears to be petering out amid massive casualties and at least two big failures. Yes, this conclusion might be premature (and yes: even I’m surprised for coming to the idea to write this)....
Unless much more details become available, I guess the reasons are what I’ve explained again and again:
a) the VSRF cannot support one ‘biiiiiiiiiig’ operation in a single sector, thus was forced to distribute less troops on three ‘primary’ sectors, and these proved insufficient to overcome the combination of Ukrainian fire-power and will;
b) because of incompatibility with the winter weather, it’s Orlan-10 UAVs are not working, and thus the Russian generals are ‘commanding blind’ (they do not know where are what of Ukrainian positions), while their artillery lacks the effectiveness necessary to breach Ukrainian frontlines and enable a serious advance;
c) the mass of mobiks is simply not trained well-enough to conduct offensive operations (especially no mechanised operations); and
d) the VSRF is lacking officers to organise, train, and lead 100,000, 150,000, 200,000 (or more) of mobiks into combat.
Atop of this, due to the lack of UAVs and other modern means of reconnaissance, and bad weather, even the GRU and FSB are experiencing growing problems with collecting intelligence. Between others, it turned out they’ve requested their moles in the German BND to obtain intel on activity of Ukrainian M142 and M270-units…
Finally, by now it’s obvious that even Gerasimov and his aides found no solution for the general degeneration of the VSRF — for which there is nobody else but Putin and the Keystone Cops in Moscow (foremost including Shoygu and Gerasimov) to blame.
https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-18-february-2023-dc29786a91df
P

Actions speak louder than words. Zero abrams = the entirety of the US is completely feckless. All of it. Every single person and organisation. Feck. Less.

BTW, a small footnote to this:
My early design inspirations were George Mc's scenarios. I always considered any scenario from him to be a master class work. Challenging but fair. Perhaps it's a Scottish thing? :D
For map design, Pete Wenman was a major inspiration and pointed me in the right direction. His map work is fantastic and I drew some considerable inspiration from his early CMSF maps.
There are others that I admire very much but I wouldn't say they inspired or influenced my work. They have developed their own distinct style and so it's theirs.

They can't do that. I look at Tom Cooper map of this battle, but he is again wrong. This battle has more wide scala, than fighting for dachas SE from the town. 
Look first of all on satellite map from your post. Do you see except heavy bombed dachas the same heavy bombed pass in right edge of the map? This is maybe more important part of the battle, which Cooper didn't spot. 
 
Here is my rough map - other directin of Russian attack was north from Mykilske. They tried to seiz UKR strongpoints at mine #1 workshops and air-feeding shaft of mine #!. And fight for latter was also fierce. There was a video of dozens bodies near treeplant - this is from this place. UKR had also main strongpoint on Pivdenno-Donbaska (Southern-Donbasian) coal mine #1, which keeps road Vuhledar-Maryinka. In firsr two days Russians could came almost to the road in the mine area, but soon vere thrown back. So, until they breakthrough line of strongholds NE from Vuhledar, they can't bypass the town. 
Thus, minimal dimension of battlefield from Pavlivka to air-feed shaft is approx 10 x 5 km. This is about proper CM map sizes for even not large-scale modern operations. And this is I don't take into account possible Russian attempts west from the town on the line Prechystivka-Vuhledar. But its took place, though initially were unsuccessful for Russians
PS. Mashovets wrote today, that UKR artillery destroyed Russian ammo supply convoy near Vuhledar, destroying dozen trucks and several armored vehicles. Looking for photos/videos.
 

The fire just died out, we urgently need to throw firewood🤣

This was unconfirmed rumors. Since weekend Russians multiplied own efforts to cut off Bakhmut from main supply routes Sloviansk - Bakhmut on the north and Kostintynivka - Bakhmut on the south. Except Wagners convicts, they also attacked with Wagner "core" and with VDV troops, so they could advance significanly along canal from Klishchiivka to Ivanivske and now are heavyly assault approaches to the Kostainntynivka - Bakhmut road. 
Today's twitters are reporting about endless heavy arty and MLRS barraages from both sides in that area. Unlike in previous days, reportedly UKR arty is working continuosly and hard. Either ammunition was delivered in time, or now they use "emergency strore" due to lack of ammo. Mass usage of bomblet-copters in Bakhmut is not of good life - but because of critical lack of artillery. One guy wrote in twitter - their battery has a long queue from units, which requested Excalibur strike or even "several shots at mother...ckers".
93rd mech.brigade was returned to Bakhmut week ago or some more - their time of R&R was shortened, because situation became worse. Their drone recon unit "Seneca" returned there so far through a 7-10 days, after the brigade was moved out - troops critically needed eyes in the sky. Many eyes. Despite on Bakhmut direction there are many drone teams are operating (except drones inside frontline units), their number anyway insufficient to cover all enemy movements on so wide front.   

There is a translation of the clip further down the thread. 
 
 

New message from Mashovets. This time he paid attention to the Russian special forces on the territory of Ukraine, as well as the aviation group on the territory of Belarus.
🔺 The 2nd separate brigade of special forces - a separate consolidated tactical detachment is fixed, deployed in the area of the village of Valuyki, and its reconnaissance and sabotage groups (RSG) regularly roam along the border of Ukraine and the line of contact in the Kharkiv and Kupyansk directions.
🔺 3rd separate Special Forces Brigade - at least twice recorded southwest of Kremennaya, another RSG operated in the area of the village of Bogdanovskoye
🔺10th separate Special Forces Brigade - seen in the area of the village of Razdolnoye east of the city of Novaya Kakhovka (probably, in the area of village of Zeleny Pod, the base of the combined tactical detachment of the brigade is deployed)
🔺14th separate Special Forces Brigade - its units are deployed in Donetsk, at least everyone sees it there regularly, most likely they "work on short notice" to the west of the city, and their base is in the city itself
🔺16th separate Special Forces Brigade - probably its units use the area of the village of Troitskoye to base their forward base, it is quite possible that the main base is deployed in the city of Gorlovka.
🔺22nd separate Special Forces Brigade - based on Tokmak (forward group), but the main base, apparently, is located in Berdyansk.
🔺24th separate Special Forces Brigade - most likely aimed at Seversk - Liman, Kramatorsk, at least it was seen in the area of Lysichansk. It probably operates with at least one consolidated tactical detachment, precisely in this direction.
🔺45th separate Special Forces Brigade - its RSGs began to be regularly fixed in the direction of Orekhovo and to the east. Apparently, at least one combined detachment of the brigade was deployed in the Zaporozhye direction quite recently, now it is they who are very actively wandering around the "gray zone" in the Orekhovo region.
🔺 All 4 naval reconnaissance points of the naval forces of the Russian Federation are deployed in those directions where the main forces and means of the brigades of the marines (coastal defense) of the respective fleets operate (for example, the naval reconnaissance point of the Black Sea Fleet near the city of Volnovakha, pretends to be a "unit" 155 th arr MP of the same Black Sea Fleet).
A more interesting position of the forces and means of the special operations forces of the armed forces of the Russian Federation in particular:
🔺 part of the forces and means of the special operations forces (most likely a separate detachment / special training center "Senezh") and some command group of special operations forces deployed in the Belgorod-Valuyki area, not far from the subsection of the 2nd separate special forces brigade)
🔺special training center "Kubinka-2" and another forward group, starting from January 8, appeared in the Brest region (Belarus), while "studying the combat area".
It is quite likely that in the near future we should expect an intensification of reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the enemy in these directions.
To date, the activity of units and subunits of the Special Forces of the RF Armed Forces as part of an enemy force grouping is recorded only in certain directions and sectors, which is quite possibly due to several reasons:
 
🔺 losses
 
🔺the desire to hide the main areas of "interest" of the command of the Russian troops
🔺 the need to re-equip the relevant units and units of special forces, respectively, bringing their combat abilities to some more or less acceptable level.
Among the main tasks for which the Russian military command uses SPP units are the following:
🔺Guidance and adjustment of "high-precision" means of destruction of Russian troops, including UAVs, AOS. Yes, very often, the Russian command uses groups of "special forces" as banal spotters of artillery fire at the tactical level.
🔺Moreover, it is not uncommon for the Russian command to throw units of its "special forces" into assault attacks or "put them on the defensive for reinforcement." In fact, he uses his special forces as "elite" infantry.
🔺 Conducting search and reconnaissance operations in tactical and very rarely the nearest operational zones. This is recorded from time to time (Russian special forces have slipped into banal military intelligence, there have been cases when they purposefully "worked" on individual platoon strongholds, company strongholds), etc.
In fact, the current state of units and subunits of the Special Forces of the RF Armed Forces does not allow the Russian military command to use them for something more serious and "deep" than tactical (military) intelligence. And in some cases, it tritely uses its "special forces" as an elite assault infantry (for example, such cases were recorded in the 22nd and 24th special forces brigades).

There is a translation of the clip further down the thread. 
 
 

There is a translation of the clip further down the thread. 
 
 

Actually my research in regimental journals turned up photos of the wedding of one of my former bosses, you don't get that stuff from the National Archives at Kew.  I also found a whole load of stuff about @Pete Wenman's former regiment in the same time period.   Now I get that wedding photos are not what we're after for research but there was a whole lot of good stuff that filled in the gaps from the more general sources. If I had the time then for sure I would dig deeper and have done so when researching battlefield tours but I found enough to make the campaign for which the basic map schematic that @The_Capt posted earlier in this thread.