Holien

Russian milbloggers write two UKR HIMARS hit the ceremony of awarding of 155th naval infantry brigade personnel in Olenivka (near Volnovakha). 
Reportedly 19 KIA, 12 WIA. Among killed three high-ranked officers, including deputy commander of brigade. The commander of brigade was wounded.

Interesting thread from UKR serviceman from engineer-position building unit of engineer brigade (these units subordinated to Support Troops Command, not to Ground Forces Command) about why unlike Russians UKR forces have so poor fortifications (if they were built after the big war started), which often dig hastily with shovels and limided engineer means of brigades instead to be prepared beforehand by engineer troops of Support Command.
1. Why we have so small number of useful fortifications. According to General Staff directive of Marh 11 2016 the infantry unit, seizing area of defense is a disposer of defense lines, and the performer of works of building and equipping of this defense line is Support Forces, which have to do it according to requests of infantry brigades engineer service chiefs.
2. Many of chiefs of infantry brigade engineer services do not know how to plan ahead and send requests to Support Command untimely. When I arrive on the place, I have neither a map nor enginner justification of positions. As a rule I hear some sort: "Dig here from the stump to tree-plant". But this is not work in this way. The defense must be continous. Ше must have a depth and the enemy hadn't to bypass it. But infantry engineers in stupid way don't know how to plan this and we have to do it themselves or even to shut up and to gig there, where they to tell, because your business is to shut up and execute.
3. Why is thete no concrete? According to the order of Engineer Troops Chief and a resolution of Chief-in -Command of July 4 2017, the character of defensive positions determinates by Operative Tactical Groupment Commands - OTU (wood cladding) and Operative Strategical Troops Groupment Commands - OSUV (pouring with a concrete) after appropriate request of the infantry unit, seizing defense area.  Wood is provided by Engineer seervice of OTU, and concrete and technic are provided by OSUV. The second defense line have to be cladded with a wood and the thired defense line with a concrete. Why there is no this, because, again, brigade's engineer services have no will to denand this and OTU have no money, because deals (author used a word more corresponding to "frauds") with a wood is a separate theme. 
4.Concerning a concrete - I report. There is no one engineer unit doesn't supply with corrwsponding technic (like and NATO too). These works performs civilian technic, but this is contracts with business. Moscovites just rob technic for works, but we can't do in such way. And again - where is third defense line should be? No one infantry brigade on East didn't provide a project.
5. Where are the tractors? According to numerous directives, orders, normative documents to maintain the defense line have to a units of Support Forces with a supply of infantry units. Alas, an excavator doesn't work on the water - it needs a diesel, and soldier, who works in it have to rest somewhere and to eat something, 
6. As result - with all my respects to engineer services of 110th, 47th, 53rd brigades, you guys are guilty themselves, that your troops hadn't proper trenches. And to all other collegues in Twitetr I recommend to study documents and contact the proper address.    
7. Concering to our work. We work from 6:00 to 17:00 and build continuosly, having more poor funding and more vulnerable technic. Pay attantion, there are many fundrising requestes, but no one engineer unit doesn't ask about a tractor or excavator. Because we undcerstand - the needs of infantry is more important. But instead the infantry for some reasons considers us as useless appendage 
    

Hmmm
Any scale of operation?
Would you like to take a crack at explaining how Ukraine has managed to maintain such a bridgehead which has been in existence for months?
 

Hmmm
Any scale of operation?
Would you like to take a crack at explaining how Ukraine has managed to maintain such a bridgehead which has been in existence for months?
 

Ok, well let’s start there then.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington's_crossing_of_the_Delaware_River
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plunder
And of course the big one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord
And let’s pull some doctrine in: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90-12/fm3-90-12.pdf
So adding this all up, essentially it has and can be done but there are a lot of caveats.  Ultimately it is a question of weight.  How much weight is being projected across the river as combat power?  How much weight is needed under combat conditions to sustain the weight of the combat power on the other side?  There are multiple ways to get that weight across a river other than a fixed bridge.  Fixed ferry, unfixed ferry, tac aviation and now, UAS.  Forward foraging and cannibalization etc.  
Now doctrine agrees with you, the best is solid fixed LOC bridging but any crossing operations, even conventional ones come in phases.  The opening phase is very often lighter more mobile resupply methods until the bridgehead force can push the enemy back far enough that it is safe to build a series of fixed bridges.  Essentially almost every opposed military river crossing in history began with what we are describing south of Kherson - light forces establishing a bridgehead, sustained and then heavy force link up once conditions are established.  D Day being an exception as were other amphib operations which all had to be sustained by air and sea.
So “sustaining a scale of operation” without a bridge is not only possible, it is really the only way to get many water crossing started in the first place.  Now as to “how long and how far?”  Well that depends on a lot of factors.  If the UA stays light it keeps the logistics bill low.  They might not need a fixed pontoon bridge if they can advance - as you say - “10-30kms”.  Pontoon ferry’s might be able to sustain them as they did for the RA for quite some time before the RA withdrew.
So basically as an engineering and logistics problem what we are looking at south of Kherson is not new or novel.  In the current environment it is going to be challenging and dangerous but it is not the thing being invented from zero in all this. 
 
Ok, so this one opens up the question of how well prepared are the RA forces on the other side?  Light forces have proven pretty important in this war.  They were critical in the first month pretty much everywhere and at Kharkiv constituted the breakout force.  If the RA has built a heavy line of defence as you seem to indicate then you may be correct.  But have they?  We really do not know, but the fact that a small bridgehead at Krynky for months - no massive RA armoured c-attack, and a few maps of force lay down estimates may help:
https://features.csis.org/ukraine-war-map/
https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/
These seem to suggest that the RA have accepted risk in this sector exactly because there is a river there.  So how dense are those RA fortifications?  That map appears to show roughly a single Division covering off 100 kms of frontage.  That is - and let’s be really generous and say that RA division is at full strength - approx 10,000 troops, or 100 troops per km..which is extremely thin.  Estimates of the rest of the RA line are around 300 troops per km.  100 RA troops per km means that there are massive holes in that defensive line.  Light troops can not only cross, they can infiltrate between forces and get into rear areas, which will force the RA to react.  So we are not talking the Atlantic Wall here, we likely have RA hard points on obvious crossing sights, small c-moves forces and a bunch of RA ISR.
So indications are that RA force density is quite low, which makes the light dispersed option a good fit.  Now the UA has much better intel and will have to plan according to that but based on what we can see, the employment of light forces over that river in strength is not only possible, it is viable.
An and now we get to the crux…but you kinda answer your own question here.  “What can these light forces actually do?”  Well at Kyiv they stopped the RA cold.  Elsewhere they have been instrumental in causing the RA to collapse - please find me one major tank battle in this war?  Hell it is hard enough to find a decent mech battle.  This is a war dominated by fires, not manoeuvres.
So the answer to your question is right in your post:
”RUS regroup, reassign reserves to the zone, pile on the drone/artillery/aviation support”.  
That is exactly the objective of a bunch of light forces running rampant in the backfield.  Why?  Because the RA will have to pull these (shrinking) assets from somewhere else.  This is the minimum objective by the way.  If the RA cannot or does not have “reserves” then an opportunity to redraw the lines south of Kherson presents itself.  If those light forces can actually establish a bridge head then options open up for heavier forces and other crossing options.  By that point the entire left end of the RA line is in trouble. But let’s leave that all as a branch plan and stretch goal.
So the real question is not in your response or reasoning.  They are not “can it be done” or “will it do anything?”  The real question is: does the UA have the forces and capabilities to do it at scale?  This we do not know and will have to simply wait and see.

Hmmm
Any scale of operation?
Would you like to take a crack at explaining how Ukraine has managed to maintain such a bridgehead which has been in existence for months?
 

Ukraine needs to keep lobbing every drone they have at the refineries. If they hurt Russias refining capacity badly enough that Putin has to start IMPORTING refined products, or telling parts of the country to relearn how to drive a donkey cart we are in whole different war.

Fixed it for you...
It would be like me saying that about America at the moment..
😉

Fixed it for you...
It would be like me saying that about America at the moment..
😉

Fixed it for you...
It would be like me saying that about America at the moment..
😉

Fixed it for you...
It would be like me saying that about America at the moment..
😉

In Putin's Russia, everyone puts in 110%.
What's so hard to understand?

I think a trip to parts of India would dispel your disbelief. 

Disappointing does not even begin to describe that the AFU has to plan for this. it is good that they are letting the world know they will have a plan to continue fighting, regardless what happens in D.C. 
 
 

Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
But consider the following:
1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....

Alexe Kopytko, collegue of UKR Mashovets wrote several posts about losses. I am not going to translate them as they are aimed at the general public. However, I am going to translate relevant information.
UKR is a significantly more open society and country. So, it is much easier to find and count deaths using open sources. The oldest community in Ukraine that monitors War deaths is "The Book of Memory of those who fell for Ukraine".
Quote from the UKR news article [I recommend but I am not going to translate for now due to lack of time] about UKR losses up to November 2023
Second article [for the same period]
From Kopytko posts
Zelensky numbers are close to actual numbers. UKR is nowhere near the defeat.

We have GrigB Intelligent Translation Services. During next week, the Russian Statistical Service will release a fresh report. Over the weekend, Russian opposition economist Milov will assess the campaign's strategic impact. If nothing bad happens on my end, we'll have a summary by Sunday night.

Not only S-400. Russians have super-long-range AA missiles R-37, carring by MiG-31BM with 200 km of range and R-37M with 300 km of range for Su-35 and Su-57. There were several episodes, that these missiles have been shooting down UKR planes and helicopters far from frontline. 

Fellow forum readers, you only have one life (probably). Do not waste any of it reading this absolute bollocks.. I will summarise:
Premises:
A minister went to HMS Clyde on a super secret mission, taking a reporter with him! The UK has a submarine called HMS Ambush that the minister visited The submarine had a tarp on it The UK has trained underwater bomb disposal divers Liz Truss said something     Conclusion: The UK blew up Nord Stream.

Let's look at detection and early warning ranges.
New sketch based on UKR Mashovets post

Here are detection ranges from A-50 Old Patrolling Route.
Some info
 

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1761453249180168647.html
Ukraine faces a difficult period as Russia regains military momentum and Ukraine grapples with internal challenges.
Key Points:
Ukrainian Manpower Shortage: Political and military misalignments have delayed vital mobilization efforts. New troops likely won't be sufficiently trained and ready until late summer. Springtime Vulnerability: Russia is exploiting Ukraine's weakened state with multi-front offensives. Although Russian gains have been modest, they are prepared for high casualties and have more forces in reserve. External Aid Factors: Ukraine is reliant on external support, which has its own limitations and could be affected by future political events, such as the US elections. Worst-Case Scenario Focus: Urges a focus on worst-case scenarios for aid planning. He calls for a sense of urgency similar to that seen in early 2022.

Some details of shot down A-50
 

Again one UKR soldier of 8th mountain assault battalion of 10th mountain assault brigade against 10 orcs. 
Russian comamnder advices to the squad that one of them to throw in UKR soldier, sitting in the drain a grenade with tear gas (that he calls in radio chat "Cheryomukha" - "bird charry" - known name for series of different tear gases) and the second to shoot him from other side of the drain. But UKR soldier keeps Russians with a fire and Russian commander starts to moke up over own personnel "You have to throw him with grenades! Then you can hide in this positions and a "bird" (drone) can't reach you. You have 10!  Can you at last to finish with a one, who keeps your all! Outflank him!  
But Russians likely see the drone and don't risk to attack decisevely. In last moment Mavic dropped the grenade and teared off one Russian. One more body nearby has seen. Also during the skirmish one Russian soldier was hit with a rifle fire. 
 

Today's post of Kostiantyn Mashovets and some opinions in comments (some simplified by me) - he also hints this can be S-200. Mashovets is retired AD officer and practices on S-200 in early years of own military studying. 
As a variant. 5V28 missile - far limit of engagement zone for loitering AWACS plane is 255 km. Upgraded variant - 5V28M - all 300 km. And there is a strory among AD servicemen that on maneuvers this missile flew away on 340-350 km [like in similar way Russian Tu-154 was accidentally shot down by UKR S-200 in times of Kuchma much further of declared engagement zone - my comment]. Yes this old-school system, bulky, but according on number of features it still unique system. And AWACS planes are its "firm", highly specialized targets. Despite S-200 has semi-active homing, it can homes in passive mode, but the target have to be very bright source of radio-emmiting, and AWACS radar for S-200 seeker is a like firework. 
There was information S-200 misisles were recieved from Poland or Bulgaria. Also some of our missiles can be repaired. In Ukriane S-200 system was decomessioned long time ago and all launnchers were scrapped. But since S-200 was upgraded as erzats-ballistic missiles and some of them were used in this role I can assume we have some mobile launcher for them, not a stationery like in Soviet Union. And I think, we could upgrade some equipmemt in this missile. Some people in comments under post of Mashovets pointed out in USSR S-200 could by deployed on railway carts. One problem with S-200 is its toxic liquid fuel, demanding special chargng procedures, so even mobile launcher is not simply drove here - shot - ran away.
 
On background of video with Russian S-400 launches here is my version:
1. Two UKR S-200 launched in A-50
2. Operators in the plane see imcoming missiles and in desperation launched all what they can do - chaffs, flares, turned on EW equipment and gives targeting to incoming missiiles for S-400 to shot them down. PS. Flight time for S-200 is about 2 minutes.
3. S-400 crews launches missile(s) on incoming S-200 and:
a) they failed to intercept them - one missile is distracted by EW equipment of A-50 (but on video it looks like a flare repelled the missile), The second hit the plane
b) missile, launched at approaching S-200 mistakingly has locked on A-50. BOOM.
c) S-400 intercepted one missile (visible as if a flare did it), but the second S-200 hit A-50    
 

On the footage, the first missile strikes the flare. So, unless chaffs and flares were launched and stayed close together, it was a short-range missile. Looks like UKR SF raid.