Holien

It's certainly valuable to know how to "listen to what they're not saying" when trying to analyze the mood in Beijing, but I don't think Chinese ambitions to the north are a big secret. Poesel made an excellent post a couple pages ago which pointed out what the Chinese government has made clear for over a decade: they aim to become a great power in the polar regions.
There is a CSIS multimedia presentation about this with several links to government statements on the topic: https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-research-facility/ 
Here is a Brookings report for a longer read: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic-activities-and-ambitions/
Although the internal politics of the higher echelons of the CCP can be pretty opaque, they are generally pretty good at sharing their broader geopolitical goals, because that's the only way to get 98 million party members aligned. I suspect analysts spend a lot more time wading through the avalanche of buzzword-laden content that the government makes freely available than schmoozing at bars trying to coax out what is being kept secret.
 

Really? From my experience, nobody is as full of **** as a room full of drunk Chinese businessmen...or really any room of businessmen.  

let it go, just not worth it.  Clearly he doesn't comprehend what climate change really means.  You can't argue with someone that takes pride in their ignorance.... and it is just going waaaaaayyyyy off topic

This was in Amsterdam and referencing Israel and Gaza. What has it got to do with Ukraine? Given your wording, it sounds like you are just trying to shoehorn a personal bugbear.

It is very interesting how a former intelligence officer, while in prison, managed to organize and carry out one of the most complex operations of our time. Despite the fact that he had only a few childishly naive failed operations.

GUR updated information about yeterday strike on harbor in Chornomorske. Previously was claimed two pr.11700 small landing crafts were sunk, now after study of received video GUR made a statement these were small landing crafts pr.1176 and pr.11700. The first one allegedly has sunk very quiclky, the latter one some time left on surface, but also lay down on ground. On one of landing crafts BTR-82A was deployed, which cought fire and its ammo exploded inside. 
On the photo - comparison of superstructure details from the video and from the photo of pr. 1176

Russian divers conduct works of investigation of vessels conditions to lift them up. The harbor of Chornomorske is very shallow, so it will be easy, but all question is the level of damage, which can make repair works senseless, especially for old pr.1176
Here is satellite image aftermath of attack, not quite detailed
 
Location of Chornomorske. This is northern part of Tarkhankut cape. Chornomoprske never hadn't special naval base, but in it harbor light vessels can be deployed if needed. Here is suitable short route for some elements of supplying of garrisons of sea shore of Kherson oblast from Zaliznyi Port to Skadovsk - delivering of repaired vehicles, limited replacing of personnel, food/ammo supply etc. 
 
Before the war BSF had two pr.1170 Serna-class (D-144, D-199) and one pr.1176 Akula-class/ NATO Ondatra-class (D-106) small landing crafts. All they based in Novorossiysk and were attached to 170th minesweeping divizion of 184th Novorossiysk coastal defense brigade. Likely for operational purpose they were moved to western shore of Crimea.
First pr.1170 D-199 was sunk near Zmiinyi in May 2022, so now Russia lost last landing boats from BSF composition, if they din't send here the same vessels from Kaspian flotilia - they deployed some pr.1170 crafts before the war, but still unknown either they still in Black or Azov sea or moved back to Kaspian sea. 
Last known photo of D-106 pr.1176 for June 2023. This small landing craft has 24 m of length and can carry up to 50 tons of cargo (or 1 tank/two light trucks, or 20 men in full equipment)

And here presumably last remained before 9th of November D-144 of pr.1170. She has 25.6 m of length, can carry the same 50 tons of cargo or one tank/two light armor/two light trucks, but unlike pr.1176 can take onboard up to 90 infantry.
Last known photo of D-144, 22nd of September 2022

 

As you know, during a week UKR forces have been striking some important targets in Russian rear:
1. UAV operators school of DNR forces in Donetsk. Russian milbloggers tell valuable equipment was lost, also losses among personnel (unknown how much, likely about dozen). One of most painful losses for DNRs - old very experienced sapper, veteran of Afganistan, who fought since 2014, separs called him "sapper genuius"
2. Strike on Russian HQ in Strilkove on Arabatska spit in Kherson oblast. By contraversal information VDV general Teplinskiy  either was wounded or still intact.
Now appeared first news about losses - UKR really hit HQ of "Dnepr" groupmemt, when lilely their operative planning department had a meeting
From left to right:
Colonel Vadim Dobriakov, operative duty - deputy of the chief of VDV Command control center
Colonel Aleksei Kiblov - chief of department of fire missions planning of VDV HQ
Colonel Aleksandr Galkin - operative duty - deputy of the chief of VDV Command control center   
 
Obviously killing of high-ranked palnning department officers and wounding of unknown number will affect control capabilities of Russian troops in Dnipro area.
3. Strike of 9th of November on Skadovsk, sea-town of Kherson oblast. A building was hit, where 126th military investigation department of Investigation Committee of Russian Federation and Rosgvardiya station was deployed. Russian TGs claimed 8-10-11 servicemen were killed (different sources), 10 wounded. In present time five bodies are recognized, three of five more still on recognizing.
Among killed - acting chief of 126th miliatry investigation department Dmitriy Katsuba, two officers-interrogators, forwarder and driver. Among wounded also Dagestanian servicemen of Rosgvardiya and Miliatry Police 
 

4. Except today's maritime drone attack on Chornomorske in Crimea, reportedly barracks of border guards and naval forces in this town were hit with missiles. No information about losses yet.

Sure, and I knew someone would jump on me, but if I'm that second guy facing death and dismemberment I'd much sooner have a single shotgun shot to try to save myself, or maybe at least detonate it further away, rather than trying to plink it with my AKS.
...Maybe give every grunt leaving his trench an underbarrel GL in which he locks and loads a special round that combines pellets with a little smoke, to give just enough concealment to flee?
I'm sure the Culin hedgerow device was half-assed too, but it was better than nothing.

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.
Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:
- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”
- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).
- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

The Type 076 looks a bit like a traditional aircraft carrier, just smaller, and (as mentioned in the German article) has been planned for several years. Here is an English-language article: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/whispers-of-076-chinas-drone-carrying-assault-carrier/ There are several prototypes and models floating around in this direction, but I'm not sure how many are realistic attempts and how many are just the usual janky mock-ups from entrepreneurs trying to land those lucrative government research deals.
One thing has already hit the waves is the "civilian" drone mothership 珠海云. Haven't had much luck finding an English language source that isn't paywalled, so you might have to make do with notorious state media Global Times: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202301/1283744.shtml What's cool about it is that the ship itself is also autonomous, a bit like those drone-carrying-drone flying mothership prototypes that have also popped up in recent years.
It's definitely a pretty exciting industry, insofar as robots-that-kill-people can be considered exciting. I wish there were some English language Perun-like chaps talking about developments in the space, but perhaps the fact we don't appear to have that is evidence that although there are lots of rumors and prototypes, none of it is quite ready for prime time yet.

This is a variation of the mass vs precision thing.
In the paper-scissors-rock of modern warfare, precision artillery beats mass artillery, as we have already repeatedly seen proven over the past 20+ months.
Tl;dr: I'd much rather have/be supported by a Western artillery system with fewer shells than a Russian system with more shells.

That does have some option space but keep in mind that is a LOT of infrastructure.  In order to create strategic corrosion at a level that could move the needle we are talking a sustained campaign of systematic strikes along entire sectors.  So volume is the first problem.  Second is pace.  If you strike too slowly Russia will simply repair rebuild and you never really achieve corrosion.  Too fast (assuming one has the resources) and you could trip the “driving support into Putin’s arms” thing.
The realty is that Ukraine is the weaker power here in many ways and will likely benefit from weaker power strategies rather than adopting greater power ones.  Stalemate is actually a key step on the strategy map of Mao’s “People’s War”.  Smaller powers normally play for time and erode a stronger opponents will.  The tricky part is sustaining western will.  The best way to do this is through demonstrations and signalling if one cannot pull off major drama.  Ukraine will likely only get itself into serious trouble if it tries to pretend that it is a great power and over-extends.  Further, small powers can also gain by controlling the narrative - we are seeing this contest in Gaza right now.  By triggering an overreaction (or a perceived overreaction) from the greater power the narrative can be manipulated to pull in wider support.
More simply put Ukraine will likely have to start thinking about a long game as a benefit as opposed to a risk, while Russia needs to fear it.

Hi,
Just to add to your thought process those who get adjusted scores because the game did not get completed I think should get the same scores as those who had a no show.
They do the same in FOG2 unless the game is nearly completed, but as they can track points more easily in FOG2 that makes sense.
For CM it is all about the end position and I think it is fairer to folk that they get the same as the no shows...
Just my 2p....
Not that it will help me as after I guess a 10 year layoff of playing any CM game I am getting my arse handed to me in Barkmans corner...
My oppo has been excellent at sending turns and we have around 12 mins left....
Soo much to re learn....
🙄

Well to outfit a broad frontage assault based on rollers alone would likely take the entire NATO inventory.  A modern tank Bn might have 8 of these systems, so even outfitting 100 UA tanks with rollers is going to deplete an entire Corp.  Then there is the problem of endurance.  The mine roller can maybe take 5 good hits, give or take depending on the mine types.  So on a single minefield the lead tank is likely going to burn out its roller.  This means you will have to go in echelons and I am not sure on a broad front breach that you would not run out of rollers before you ran out of minefield.
And all that is before the punishment for mass kicks in.  Every PGM, UAS, gun and tac aviation is going to be positioned to counter as they are going to see the 100 tanks coming from space kms before they hit the minefields.  So I don’t think massed rollers (or ploughs for that matter) are a viable tactic.
Flanks- four operational options…none of them good:
Short Right - assault water xing down by Kherson.  Been waiting for that one all summer but I think it may be off the table.  Too hard to sustain in this environment is the likely issue.  But damn I was hoping.
Long Right - amphib assault deep on the western coastline.  Very cool idea but capability to do that at an operational level is held by only one nation right now.  Maybe a couple others could cobble something together but Ukraine is nowhere near able to pull it off.  Raids and SOF maybe but some sort of deep amphib manoeuvre is not going to happen.
Short Left.  Cut up through Russian territory east of Kharkiv and do a short left hook down into Luhansk.  Starobilsk would be a likely operational objective.  One would need to synch this with a push coming out of the west in the Devorichna area.  We will come back to “invading Russia” strategic risk but even operationally this one is risky.  First you would need to establish an Air Denial corridor to sustain that offensive and RUAF would likely throw the kitchen sink at it.  If you could do that you are still looking at a long LOC to keep a deep offensive alive in gas and bullets.  You would also be facing the ISR/PGM/Guns problem.  Good news is you might surprise the Russians and crack that whole flank.  Bad news is that they will likely stop it along that Severodonetsk - Stanytsia marsh/river line..and that is your best case.  You can expect all sorts of hell coming in from the East out of Russia as they would likely throw any reserves they have left at the problem.  This entire plan is very high risk and likely not enough gain to justify it.
Long Left Flank (damn him, had to say it) - a Reverse Priggy.  Go really deep to the M4 and then south all the way to Rostov-on Don.  This would likely knock Russia out of the war as it would cut the entire logistical spine of the SMO.  Problem is obvious, the forces needed to pull off a 500km (+) advance through deep Russkie country far exceeds what the UA have.  The Air problem would be immense and you would likely wind up like the RA did back at Kyiv - way over extended and vulnerable.  In fact this manoeuvre could just as likely knock Ukraine out of the war.
Strategic Risks - poo poo the nukes all you want but if the UA invades directly into Russia two things are likely going to happen..both bad.  1) Putin will likely green light tactical WMDs.  No one in the West is going to start WW3 because Russia decides to use tac WMDs on their own soil.  You could risk some major operational level losses in the UA with almost zero chance of western back up.  2) It would drive all the support into Putin’s arms. The Russian IO would make sure that a Russian Bucha happened and then Putin’s war footing latitude would widen dramatically.  Political narratives would go sideways and the western coalition of support may very well crack.
So basically they are all bad operational choices with really terrible strategic risks.  It is not fair that Russia gets to invade and Ukraine cannot pay back the favour but the world is not fair.  Russia is a nuclear power and would get just the acceptable excuse to use them in this scenario and Putin would get all the support to drag this war into the next century.  And even if they did not do all that only one operational scenario has any hope..and frankly it might not be worth it.  A major re-taking of land would shore up support but if the UA over extends…well you get it.
So we are kinda stuck with up the middle, lots of smoke and HE.

Who ever took that video knew exactly when and where "something" was about to happen. Not a coincidence.

Video of "Askold" is being hit with three missiles
 
 

Recent huge flash in the Sun caused Aurora Borealis in southern latitudes, so it can be seen in Ukriane too even in Odesa oblast.
Red evening sky caused many jokes about Russians used nuke %) 
Soldiers pose on background of such rare phenomena  (though this is second Northern Light in this year in Ukraine - first was in spring)

In 2022 Kherson operation also was widely announced - this was most expected by Ukrainians. I think, Zaporizhzhia front operation was also mostly expected both by Ukrainians and Russians, so it's wasn't any secret about direction of our strike. All questions to our General Staff why they choose more expected way through Tokmak and Melitopol, where Russians prepared most heavy defense. 
Maybe after the war we will know more about foiled winter offensive, unill Russians dug up own "Surovikin line", when we expected weapon and personnel training, but received lot of discussions instead. And why allies adviced "to delay with offensive", but in May, when Russians already bult own fiortifications they became to advice "to hurry up with offensive"
Also I hope, after the war we will receive an answer, why in Autumn of 2022 we conducted offensive on Kherson instead to strike on Tokmak - Melitopol, which automatically could put Russians on right bank  of Dnipro and in Kherson on the edge of cutting of supply. 

Many Ukrainians criticize our generals. However, our military leadership is only capable of conducting operations at the level at which it is possible for them
1. Training of their subordinate officers and soldiers.
2 Possibilities for the exchange and processing of information by headquarters
3. And of course, the level of supply with everything necessary
Criticizing leadership is the favorite pastime of the Ukrainian people. There is a funny opinion that fate is unfair to Ukrainians and constantly appoints cunning and self-interested leaders to govern them. But my opinion is that every nation has exactly the leaders it deserves. Ukrainian commanders have exactly the level of competence, material support and communications that they were able to provide during 8 years of preparation for a big war. We have had enough time to carry out reforms...

I have always considered Tatarigami one of the most valuable sources of information about this war. Until I read his statement that Bakhmut did not need to be held, but instead had to retreat to more “advantageous positions.” If it were not for the retention of Bakhmut, then who knows where our positions would be now. Near Slovyansk or to the west of it?
Now the opposition to Zelensky media is promoting the assertion that the reason for the failure of the Zaporozhye offensive lies in the retention of Bakhmut. They say the reserves necessary for the summer offensive were spent there. Based on this logic, in March 2022 we needed to leave Kharkov, Kiev, Chernigov and Sumi. After all, the defense of these cities was also very bloody.

Damned Soviet army sh....t still to kill personnel. 
In honor of Artillery and missile troops Day command of 128th mountain-assault and 65th mech.brigade gathered personnel of these brigades - about 100 men for solemnly awarding reportedly in Zarichne village of Zaporizhzhia oblast. This is about 25 km from frontline. Reportedly Russian Kh-59 missile hit gathering of many people. It's unknown - either they were spotted by UAV or ELINT asset by multiple cell phones signal in one place, or some traitor from locals gave information. 
As result of strike 18KIA, 20 WIA (including three civilians) 
High-rank and mid-rank officers still roughly violate an order of General Staff about debarment of personnel gathering in one place more than platoon size. In their heads Soviet-style rules and "traditions" of "service" with endless alignments, cheking of "journal of journals accounting" still more important than reality of war, good sense and effectiveness. 
More worse, according to the General Staff order, soldiers and officers if they understand that higher command orders about non-combat purpose mass meeteings, which can threat their lives, these orders can and have to be contested. But this is only on paper. In real Soviet tradition "I'm chief - you are foul" still alive. And lower officers and soldiers often afraid to contradict such orders. Beacuse they are in full power of higher officer and can be punished. All "hot lines" of MoD, which should to prevent this rarely work indeed. Because after such call higher command gave an order to make investigation.. by officers of the same brigade from where they got a complaint. Guess who will be fu..d after "investigation"?
By current laws officer can punish own subordinates, who reject to execute his orders. But no any responsibility for officers, whoes stupid decisions lead to death of dozen soldiers. This is maybe highest problem of UKR army, inherited from Soviet army system - absence of repect to subordinaties, considering them as supplies. And really many people in Ukraine now scare to be mobilized in first order because of such Soviet attitude from commanders. 
 

 

Seems U.S. sent at least one M1150 ABV along with the other Abrams tanks:
 

You are no doubt correct…but he is contained.   Pragmatically the West political calculus is that this is a problem that cannot be solved.  If we destroy Putin/Russia we have a whole other set of more dangerous possibilities.  If we let him get away with murder (literally) we set ourselves up for worse.  Russia just took “the 2nd most powerful land army” on the planet and smashed it to a pulp in Ukraine. Putin might not care about convicts and country rubes, but he does care very much about nearly 3000 tanks and a submarine.  It will take the RA decades to come back from this mess.  However, they still need to be enough of a threat to justify NATO spending targets and positioning.  Conveniently a stalemate outcome supports this.
A lot of you in Ukraine/Eastern Europe think we in the West “don’t get it”.  We actually do, very well.  What you do not understand is that our level of investment has a different end-state.  We never wanted to see the complete and utter defeat of Russia as a state.  The hazards of a nuclear power in complete free fall are simply too high.  Putin can lie to himself and his people all he wants, but he knows that any hopes of Russian imperial expansion died North of Kyiv…he did that and everyone knows it.  Will Russia be back?  Sure.  Or maybe we will get lucky and when Putin dies we get a more moderate jerk we can do business with.  But for now, the US and Canada sell more oil and gas to Europe.  We sell more weapons to Europe. And we contain Russia, just enough.  Act 2: China.  
Would it have been nice to drive home the “point” a little further?  Sure.  But now Ukraine can support an insurgency in the occupied territories for a decade instead of Russia doing other way around.  We know Putin doesn’t care and will continue to play his game.  But the outcome of this war, even if it stops today, made want Putin “wants” irrelevant.  He shattered is military means to achieve it.  He also broke his Diplomatic and Economic means in the bargain.
So we fall back on Plan Korea.  We can live with that.  Optimal?  Definitely not.  But when I said back last May that if the UA offensive goes nowhere over the summer and fall that “there would be difficult conversations”…well this is that conversation.
I personally don’t actually think we are done yet to be honest.  Let’s see where winter takes us.  But the UA CHOD basically admitting we are at “positional warfare” - which is just code for slow grinding attritional warfare - then it is clear we can see those hard conversations coming.  Next will be to see if there is any political movement on either side.

Well add to the list that infantry by side of hedge didn't see a sherman pass by in the open 20 meters away...
Or a Shreck team set back from the bocage where a Sherman drove up the other side and saw the team 1st and blew it away...
Or a Squad of German infantry had a Sherman drive 10 meters away and decide that grenades would be pointless and then they got spotted and blown away by the same Sherman that then rocked up to the bocage. It stayed at bocage a few seconds blasting at my squad before it noticed the shreck team the other side of the bocage, all the while the shreck team was smoking dope...
Such is CM and I had forgotten all the $hit happens stuff after 10 years it is all flooding back...
The joys of CM

Well add to the list that infantry by side of hedge didn't see a sherman pass by in the open 20 meters away...
Or a Shreck team set back from the bocage where a Sherman drove up the other side and saw the team 1st and blew it away...
Or a Squad of German infantry had a Sherman drive 10 meters away and decide that grenades would be pointless and then they got spotted and blown away by the same Sherman that then rocked up to the bocage. It stayed at bocage a few seconds blasting at my squad before it noticed the shreck team the other side of the bocage, all the while the shreck team was smoking dope...
Such is CM and I had forgotten all the $hit happens stuff after 10 years it is all flooding back...
The joys of CM