cyrano01

The T-14s make for a great show!

Farewell the plumed troop, and the big wars,
That make ambition virtue! O, farewell!

@The_Capt mentioned it earlier, and I'm also really curious about the UKR state of things.
We talk a bumpteen pages about Russia, Putin et al but we have little discussion on UKR mil-pol relationships. The screaming tantrum baby of Russia has gotten lots of attention, but we need to do some due diligence on the real player in this war, the one who actually matters (because without them this entire situation would not exist) - the Ukrainian Ground Forces.
How does the UA actually function within the political framework?
Do they develop and set their military goals in isolation?
Is Zelensky involved much or more just informed?
EDIT - Just saw this on NYT. Political related but still relevant. It set the bar for the military - No Surrender. Stand and Fight. At a moment like that, those words need to be said. This probably gave Zel a lot of credit with the UA.
What is the operational decision making process? Is there a Stavka/Joint Staffs?
How well do the UGF and UAF communicate & coordinate?
 
 

I probably should have been more clear, my bad.   All militaries have to negotiate with their political level to a greater or lesser extent.  We shine it up and call it “military advice to policy” but it is really negotiating their political needs with military strategic ones.
What is weird in the Russian dynamic is the risk to that “ability to negotiate”.  Especially to the point that is becomes a CoG consideration.  Most militaries have it built into a national legal framework but in autocracies the reality of a political amateur essentially “taking over” and making the military negotiation position null and void is somewhat unique -and even then it is not often done, see Stalin.  
In this case the Russian military is being forced to fight-for-success or that bargaining position may simply be take away.  And if Putin as CinC means that, then it has already happened.

I did not want to let this one slip by because once again it leads back to Russian Centers of Gravity.  I have proposed the political ones previously but we have not really discussed the Military Strategic and Operational:
Military Strategic:
- Ability to generate and project conventional military mass into Ukraine.  The entire threat of the Russian military is based on this key factor.
- Ability to control the strategic military narrative in Russia.  This overlaps the political CoGs, but is also has to do with sustaining the Will of the Russian people and support for military action.
- Ability to negotiate with their own political level.  A weird one as most militaries do not find themselves in this position but...Russia.  The Russian military has likely been negotiating with Putin throughout this thing and will continue to, the only way they can do that is if they remain in control of the Russian military. Speed of Success is key here as faster is better because time is not on their hands.
Operational
- Ability to project coordinated mass into Ukraine to deliberate effects that lead to decisions.
- Secure and open LOCs back to Russian SLOCs.
-Ability to secure terrain objectives and demonstrate success.
This is my best guess with what we have so far and these are odd in comparison to normal western thinking.  But you can see how both the Strategic and Operational CoG center around military mass.  This is all that Russia really has to bring to this fight.  It has not been superior manoeuvre (exact opposite) or integration, it has been a lot of mass to grind down Ukrainian defence; this is a war of attrition if there ever was one.  
So What?  Well to answer your question above, reset and refit take time, and for really mauled organizations they take a lot of time.  So all of these units in refit subtract from Russian mass, which is at the heart of their strategy.  Based on the overall strategy, Russia's war has become "mass at all costs".  Doesn't matter if it is bent or broken mass, brittle mass or even dumb mass...troops and equipment all pushing at something...all the time.  Rest and re-fit do nothing for this in the short term.
So why the rush?  Isn't time on Russia's side?  Can't Russia simply drag this out in a long war?  I don't know but based on their actions I am guess the Russians do not think they have a lot of time left.  That is probably why this thing in the Donbas looks more like a land-grab than a deliberate attack.

Staffed with people like me and you naturally ... milk with that brew sir?

Writing bollox or making UAVs?

Yes, that is my sense as well.  The Russian operational trend appears consistently to try and do too much with too little.  Given the "typical" BTG construct:

(Seen these pictures everywhere)
According to the old frontage rules, this outfit could likely cover a 3 km frontage in the old 2 up, one back formation.  The MLRS and I assume UAV support allows it to strike really deeply, it has some flank security and AD so is somewhat self contained (except recon but I will get to that).
So with 16 BTGs, assuming they hold 1/3 in reserve means about 11 BTG up front, which translates to about 33, say 35 kms frontage. A rough eyeball of the Russian start line up there:

Is roughly twice that frontage...at the start line.  That frontage will expand in the advance, not even taking into account attrition.  So either the Russians are using a very different force-to-frontage metric and giving that BTG a 7-10km front which is a lot to ask of 800-1000 pers unless you have got some next-gen ISR and precision lethality.
Which leads me to the next big question?  Where is the Russian recon?  I have been looking around and in all this discussion I have not seen anything on how or where the Russian recon screens are laid down.  There are no dedicated recon units in the BTG (unless I am missing them), I have to assume that the recon is held at formation.  Given the environment that is not a small ask, to screen a 70+km frontage out to 10-20 kms.  This is made worse as the UA method has put eyes with teeth everywhere so you would need detailed/close recon at least out to 4-5km in front of lead BTG elements (the range of the Javelin being 4+km) to even stand a chance.
For historical reference:

So that is a 10-25km frontage for an old MRD, with a recon screen out 50km in front.  That MRD has 9 MRBs and 3 TBs with an entire TR in reserve (so 3 more TBs), for a total of 15 Bn-sized units...for 10-25km.  And there would be another MRD behind it.  To do what the Russians are proposing, in old Soviet terms would require 3-5 full up MRDs, an entire CAA at full strength.
I get frontages have expanded with modern ISR and weaponry (or maybe they haven't on the advance) but this is asking a lot of fresh troops, let alone already mauled ones.  Am I missing something?

Some frontline news:
Mariupol. After a time of next ultimatum has gone Russians hammered Azovstal with FAB-3000 from Tu-22M3 and heavy artillery (maybe 2S4 240 mm siege mortars too). Azov command made a statement the plant territory almost all ruined, they try to take out survived people, dead and wounded from ruins. Russians at this moment don't advance forward. About 1000 civilaians hide in plant undergrounds   
Zaporizhzhia axix: Russians throughout the day desparately attacked our troops in Huliaypole area to establish better conditions to the entering in the battle rest of forces, but hadn't sucess.
Velyka Novosilka axis (JTO south): Russians decided outflank our troops west from this settlement and to breakthrough between Huliaypole and Velyka Novosilka. They advanced from Liubymivka to the line of ponds and the dam near Temyrivka village
JTO: Russians could take Maryinka under own control, but our forces after regrouping counter-atatcked and retaken the settlement. In Rubizhne all attempts of enemy to move further where repelled. Now Russians and separs control about half of the city. Calshes around Kreminna.
Kherson oblast: Russians launched attack on the north of Kherson oblast to take back positions, lost in previuous weeks, but hadn't success
Kharkiv oblast: multiple attempts of small armored battlegroups to infiltrate through our positions and find the hole in our defense - no success.     

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

I'll see your Flight Simulator and raise you map army ...
MilitaryMap - Plan your Mission
I've been noodling around this one as well and am miles off finishing but I've done enough to work out in terms of ground alone that a Russian attack is going to be a big ask.

The images above are different map/imagery sets of the same area with the red line being the approximate FEBA as of a few days ago.  The area shown is basically Izyum-Slovyansk-Kramatorsk.
The broad COAs for Russian are basically:
COA1 - Deep Envelopment. COA2 - Medium Envelopment. COA3 - Shallow Envelopment.
Of the three COAs - COA1 offers the best opportunity for manoeuvre and is the preferred COA.  COAs 2 and 3 both involve moving through severely restricted terrain and a battle for Slovyansk.  As a guesstimate, moving through the woods to Slovyansk will swallow up a minimum of three BTGs if the Ukrainians choose to disrupt the advance on the approaches to Slovyansk.  Slovyansk cannot be bypassed which means that if it is going to be defended, it will require a minimum of 4-5 BTGs to subdue.  A number of 22 x BTGs has been banded around for the force assembling in Izyum meaning that COAs 2 and 3 will expend nearly a third of the available combat power in Izyum covering the first 35km.  That is assuming that Russia can knock Slovyansk over easily for which there is little evidence to suggest that it is capable of doing so should it be defended.  It will also probably take at least a week to clear out the defenders which means that COAs 2 and 3 stand little chance of achieving a face saving "victory" by 09 May.  In fact COA 2 will definitely fail to deliver on that timeline.
Map Army Files are below if anybody wants to rummage around the detail bearing in mind this is WIP.
BAE.milxlyzRussian FLOT 10 Apr.milxlyz
 

Which leaves an interesting question. In this brave new world where the UGV/UAV combo can deliver the effects a tank might have done; and where UAV+Artillery can batter anything that stands still for more than a few minutes into oblivion where does this leave the PBI?
 
Do we still need them to 'close with a defeat the enemy?' Or could our unmanned and ranged combinations above do that?
Do we need them to occupy terrain, or m ore generally to operate in any area where the ground is too steep/rough/boggy/wooded or otherwise UGV unfriendly. Oh, yes, built up areas! Interesting question, just how mobile are UGVs in poor terrain.
 
How do we protect the infantry? In ICVs or APCs they have some protection against small arms and artillery but in a world full of highly lethal AT weapons is that a good trade off? Alternatively do they have to dismount way before getting anywhere near the sharp end,  and operate on foot and realtively dispersed? The Ukrainians have shown a pattern for this but it does mean your infantry are limited to the speed they can march and have no protection beyond their body armour. Does this mean we are heading down the Starship Troopers route for the infantry?
I can see the casualty sensitive, mainly Western, states, getting squeamish about being seen to send their human beings in to fight robots.
All of this, of course, ignores the need for dismounted troops in situations short of high intensity warfare. UGVs might not be too good at talking to the locals and gathering information.
 
No idea of any of the answers of course, but loads of interesting questions.
 

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

Which leaves an interesting question. In this brave new world where the UGV/UAV combo can deliver the effects a tank might have done; and where UAV+Artillery can batter anything that stands still for more than a few minutes into oblivion where does this leave the PBI?
 
Do we still need them to 'close with a defeat the enemy?' Or could our unmanned and ranged combinations above do that?
Do we need them to occupy terrain, or m ore generally to operate in any area where the ground is too steep/rough/boggy/wooded or otherwise UGV unfriendly. Oh, yes, built up areas! Interesting question, just how mobile are UGVs in poor terrain.
 
How do we protect the infantry? In ICVs or APCs they have some protection against small arms and artillery but in a world full of highly lethal AT weapons is that a good trade off? Alternatively do they have to dismount way before getting anywhere near the sharp end,  and operate on foot and realtively dispersed? The Ukrainians have shown a pattern for this but it does mean your infantry are limited to the speed they can march and have no protection beyond their body armour. Does this mean we are heading down the Starship Troopers route for the infantry?
I can see the casualty sensitive, mainly Western, states, getting squeamish about being seen to send their human beings in to fight robots.
All of this, of course, ignores the need for dismounted troops in situations short of high intensity warfare. UGVs might not be too good at talking to the locals and gathering information.
 
No idea of any of the answers of course, but loads of interesting questions.
 

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

Massed Infantry -=Defeated=- by the Machine Gun
Machine Gun -=Defeated=- by the Tank
Tank -=Defeated=- by Heavy Tank
Heavy Tank -=Defeated=- by the ATGM
ATGM -=Defeated=- by the Drone???
Drone??? -=Defeated=- by the ???EW AAA Light UGV Tank
???EW AAA Light UGV Tank -=Defeated=- by the  Infantry (in trucks )
And on and on...  But all those weapon systems, including the Infantry are still relevant on the battlefield.
SOURCES:
 

Yup, all absolutely relevant questions.
If I'm Poor Bloody Infantry, no matter where, I will love the Machine -- robot or not -- for carrying my ammo, better chow and some less shell shocked guy to medevac my arse out if I get shot.
But I also make sure I've personally taken out of its loadout anything I absolutely need to have to eat and kill Ivan for the next 10 days. Because at the end of the day, 'dismounts' will be the ones who get to decide Who Won. That 'Facts on the Ground' thing.
While if I'm UGV 'crew', I don't sleep too close to my beloved vehicle.

Which leaves an interesting question. In this brave new world where the UGV/UAV combo can deliver the effects a tank might have done; and where UAV+Artillery can batter anything that stands still for more than a few minutes into oblivion where does this leave the PBI?
 
Do we still need them to 'close with a defeat the enemy?' Or could our unmanned and ranged combinations above do that?
Do we need them to occupy terrain, or m ore generally to operate in any area where the ground is too steep/rough/boggy/wooded or otherwise UGV unfriendly. Oh, yes, built up areas! Interesting question, just how mobile are UGVs in poor terrain.
 
How do we protect the infantry? In ICVs or APCs they have some protection against small arms and artillery but in a world full of highly lethal AT weapons is that a good trade off? Alternatively do they have to dismount way before getting anywhere near the sharp end,  and operate on foot and realtively dispersed? The Ukrainians have shown a pattern for this but it does mean your infantry are limited to the speed they can march and have no protection beyond their body armour. Does this mean we are heading down the Starship Troopers route for the infantry?
I can see the casualty sensitive, mainly Western, states, getting squeamish about being seen to send their human beings in to fight robots.
All of this, of course, ignores the need for dismounted troops in situations short of high intensity warfare. UGVs might not be too good at talking to the locals and gathering information.
 
No idea of any of the answers of course, but loads of interesting questions.
 

I had no idea that Finns have a sense of humour o_O
 

So I am very interested in UA information management.  First of all they have demonstrated information superiority over the Russians almost at every level, which I suspect has been a decisive factor in the war so far and leads to more questions than answers:
- How did they do it?  Based on the level of open source information out there Ukrainian defence looks like it has adopted a "whole of nation" approach to the collection and dissemination of information along with total mobilization of military effort.  From what I can tell this democratization of intelligence has worked and allowed the UA and defenders get ahead (and around) Russian advances before they could gain momentum.  How is that collection happening?  Is it entirely over the internet?  Hotspots?  Are they employing those Startlinks?
- How did they manage information overload?  In the west data overload is a big issue.  As @Hapless notes it can paralyze an OODA loop by over saturation leading to longer orientation times. The UA, on the surface, looks like it has gotten around this...how?  My guess (and it is a guess) is that by adopting a hybrid C2 approach they are relying a lot on self synchronization at a micro level.  Info sharing is not being collected into a giant cloud but is instead in a whole host of little clouds all over the battlefield.  Peer to peer tactical units and groups are sharing to synchronize themselves...a lot of the anecdotal stories shared by @Haiduk seem to point to this.  In western experience this akin to the action of the airborne forces in Normandy, they did not wait for centralized orders, they simply ad hoc re-grouped and "went out to make trouble".  So this is not new, but what is new is the level and resolution of that information.
- What does central information management look like in this war?  The Russian model in this is as important as the UA one because it failed gloriously.  I suspect the Russians have been relying on BTG level centralization of C4ISR and it has not worked.  First this is the Soviet legacy model.  Second, we saw it in 2014.  Problem with this centralized model is that it can either starve or overload, in the Russian case I suspect it starved.  In the UA case how are they handling information flow to the center?  It must be happening but who or how are they deciding what stays at the tactical level and what gets elevated to paint a clear operational level picture.  I can't help wonder if the UA is not getting "big data" support from the US and others, which is very interesting as a lot of those systems have not been tested in conventional warfare. The connection between self-synchronized tactical level and centralized operational level is another dimension of hybrid in this war and it hinges on what appears to be an emergent information management system.  I have no doubt it might look like chaos to the outside observer but it is working.
 
 

Good to see the media focusing on the core issues.  Jesus wept etc ...

The live strategic map this group has been waiting for. Unit identifications. Locations. BTG quantities. Yet to be seen if this is timely or sustainable info:
https://www.uawardata.com/
Zoom in or click on a stack of counters and it breaks down into sub unit IDs.