Tero

It could be useful when setting up historical force set ups involving for example Finnish forces when you need to have more artillery support or defensive positions than the usual point allocation would allow for. Unfortunately unrestricted forces do not extend to arty support or fortifications.

Originally posted by Andreas: Ah okay - that is beginning to make sense to me now (doesn't mean much ) - the breakthrough area was separated by a lake, it would make sense to keep a strong force back, instead of committing them early, and risking them ending up on the wrong side of the lake. Here's some maps to get you oriented: http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Jatkosota/Kartat/cwdata/4406-07Tali-IhantalanTaistelu.html http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Jatkosota/Kartat/cwdata/4406-07Tali-IhantalanTaistelunAlku25-26.6.html http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Jatkosota/Kartat/cwdata/4406-07KannasIhantalanTykist%F6keskitys.html from http://karjala.dyndns.org/metsapirtti/artikkelit/penttiahtiainen/jankajaak/janka05.htm This last two places JR12 (jaeger/infantry regiment 12) AT assets on the map and the tanks KO'd in JR12 sector. RK means 76,2mm regiment cannon, the 45 and 75 are selfexplanatory, PS kauhu means pzschreck and psnyrkkimiehiä means men armed with pzfausts. [ July 22, 2003, 04:43 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by JasonC: The Russians' main problems are to direct their preplanned barrage sensibly despite limited intel, IRL the intel the Red Army gathered on the opposing defensive positions before this kind of prepared, deliberate offensive was very, VERY extensive, exhaustive and above all extremely accurate. At times they even built mock ups of the positions and rehearsed attack against them to get the timing etc right. They also dug assault trenched towards the enemy positions (as close as 70m from the first barbed wire obstacles) so the line of departure would be closer to the enemy defensive installations and the defenders could be surprised while still keeping their heads down after the barrage.

Originally posted by Keke: One big difference is that whereas Finnish High Command was ready to withdraw and delay as soon as it was necessary, German Army had to deal with idiotic "stand fast" -orders, against which the Soviet Army had perfected itself. True. It does seem like the Red Army 1944-style attacks were less effective when the defenders were willing/able to move around.

Originally posted by Keke: That's not exactly true. Finns were about to mass their reserves at Ihantala area, but only weakened 18th Division and 3rd Brigade dealt with Soviet 21st Army until 25 June at this focal point. Sorry about the inaccuracy. Anyway, the reserves were being massed in the bay of Viipuri/Tali-Ihantala/Vuosalmi area as per original battle plan set down already when the the defences collapsed at Valkeasaari. According to the wardiary of Soviet 21st Army, Stalin ordered 21 June the commander of the Leningrad Front, Marshal Govorov, to continue with the offensive, and reach Imatra, Lappenranta and Virojoki by 26th-28th June. Then towns of Kotka and Kouvola should be captured (hence the name Kotka-Kouvola operation). After that and with the help of the 59th Army, Helsinki should be "liberated". That bit of info was not present in Soviet histography.

Originally posted by Keke: The main difference between Iasi-Kischinjow and Kotka-Kouvola operations is that Soviets managed to eventually advance only 8kms in two weeks with the latter... I think the comparison to the break through at Valkeasaari is more appropriate. After all, by Tali-Ihantala the offensive had been on for 10+ days, the Finnish army had fought a 100km rear guard action and lost Viipuri. The only real difference is the brunt of the Iasi-Kischinjow was directed at two AK and the first day saw the near destruction of two divisions while the Viipuri Offensive was directed at the Western half of the Isthmus (IIRC one AK) and the Valkeasaari cambit shattered but not annihilated only elements one Finnish division. By the end the Iasi-Kischinjow operation was the end of AG South Ukraine while the Finnish army survived the Viborg-Petrozavodsk operation relatively intact. The Finnish army had massed its reserves at Tali-Ihantala during the 10 day rear guard action. And after Tali-Ihantala the Red Army tried to push through across the bay of Viipuri to the West of Tali-Ihantala and across river Vuoksi at Vuosalmi to the East of Tali-Ihantala in an effort to splinter and consume the Finnish defensive forces. The front line during the summer of 1944 EDIT: added the pictures links. Damn it. http://personal.inet.fi/private/hovi.pages/sa-int/karttajatkosota.html The front line during Winter War http://personal.inet.fi/private/hovi.pages/sa-int/talvisotakannas.html Glanz's book on the siege of Leningrad brushed past the subject of the summer offensive against the Finns in a couple of paragraphs and Tali-Ihantala is referred to in a single sentence. Unfortunately. I hope that Mr. Glantz will present the operation in his "Forgotten Battles" -series soon. Me too. EDIT 2: According to Soviet sources there never was a Kotka-Kouvola operation. in his siege of Leningrad book Glanz however indicates the Red Army intention was to "push inland" but the attack was "rebuffed". [ July 21, 2003, 02:40 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by tools4fools: Goes both way - A HMG, inf gun or tank on a small elevation got much better LOS into that forest and can shoot at defenders in there It is a bit more complicated than that. The question is if they can see the defenders positions so they can shoot at them. And being on a small elevation some distance away from said patch of forests puts them on a pedestal in the open for any and all weapon in range to take pot shots at. Which would put them in a position which is not unlike standing up. - which it could not do if the forest would still be there. That depends on the amount of undergrowth. And all that cover gives you the possibility to sneak in there without being seen by the defender Which do you see better, a moving object or a stationary object ? In a tangeled mass like than you can sneak over a position and get shot from behind. - albeit you are better ready for some handgrenades as if you sneak in there sooner or later you will be heard by the defenders... You are forgetting the felled trunks and branches muffle the effects of hand grenades. They can even deflect them back at you. if I go into a real forest with infantry, I cannot call in direct fire support. If you go into a real forest you will not be able to hump heavy direct fire support at all so you will end up relying on indirect fire support, mainly mortars. Or your SAW's and other automatics your troops carry. if I go in that blown up forest, I can call in direct fire support The thing is your direct fire support may end up blowing and shooting YOUR people up by mistake. - if there is still someone alive in there, that is. Looks devestating. That kind of devastation takes several days, even weeks to adcheive. For the defender best would be if he hides in a kind of mess as seen on these pictures but in a intact forest. It is not as simple as that. For example in an intact forest the trees block you LOS so the attacker can get much closer without being zapped after having crawled to get to the jump off point. And (depending on the undergrowth) the attacker does not have to fight the obstacles of felled trunks and branhces in addition to dodging bullets and firing their weapons. Attacker should be ambushed in a realivly open aera - small path or clearing - with realtive little cover. And no direct fire support possible due to the forest blocking LOS. That assumes the attacker prefers to break cover and go into the open when they are in a forest. The best alternative for the defender is close combat so the (relative) open LOS and the effects of heavy fire support is negated. BTW, the reverse slope doctrine works in this kind of terrain too. http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Jatkosota/Rintama/cwdata/4408KannasIhantalanTienMets%E4%E4.html http://www.sodatkuvina.cjb.net/images/Talvisota/Rintama/cwdata/400301TaipaleMaaliskuussa.html [ July 18, 2003, 02:47 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by tools4fools: Don't know about cover, but LOS is sure better than before!!! Depends. For the defender that is a clear bonus. For the attacker...... to be able to see INTO that kind of scenery properly you need to stand up (and even that will not necessarily give you a better view). As you know standing up in in the open in the combat zone can be hazardous to your health.

Originally posted by Andreas: One thing though is that modern wheat/rye is a lot shorter than even varieties from 20-30 years ago. Selective breeding has done a lot for this. Shorter crops are less likely to be damaged in a storm, and obviously waste less input on straw. At school we were taught the shorter straw/larger grain is due to better irrigation/more rain. During dry summers the crop tends to grow the straw rather than the grain. Something to do with the fact the grain is only a by-product as far as the plant is concerned. During dry season fewer/smaller grains ensure the plant itself survives on the available water/nutriates and at the same times produces as few "offspring" as is necessary for the survival of the species. I'm not sure about the selective breeding but AFAIK they grow the same varieties nowadays they grew 50 years ago. AFAIK the recent introduction of genetic manipulation has been the main source of new varities. Edit - it would still be shorter though, I am sure. Anyone knows the height of 1940s wheat/rye? I think they have always been about waist high. At least pictorial evidence would suggest that. Then again people were shorter back then so that is not conclusive.

Originally posted by Andreas: Is there more or less cover in this forest? If you are standing up, less. If you are in a dug out, trench or simply lying prone on the ground, more. In addition to less debris flying around adding to the damage of bursting arty shells (far less tree bursts overhead) any fallen tree truncks provide cover from flying bullets and fragments in addition to providing cover and concealment from spotting. Even if you are firing your weapon. The tangled mass is also a very formidable obstacle for attacking forces. [ July 17, 2003, 05:52 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

while running CMBB in IBM A31p, 256Mb RAM ATI Mobility Fire GL 7800, Mobility Radeon 7500AGP (LX) chipset with 64Mb memory at 1600x1200 16bit high colour the lower tool bar black borders, "AI thinking" box, the "resolving action" ruler and clock counter white out occasionally. The problem occurs mainly when there is a unit selected but it also pumps out while scrolling the map and (apparently) when a unit is under the lower menu bar. Sometimes effects like rain screw the screen up and can not be resolved without a reboot. The craphics card settings are all in the default. The screen getting screwed can be avoided but the colour problem is a nuisance even if it does not affect gameplay as such.

Originally posted by redwolf: While the plate can the thinner you usually need more plate to fit all the stuff you need inside the tank. Ie. the vehicle is either extremely cramped or has a high silhouette. Or both. It also makes the design harder to uparmour than a design made out of vertical plate "boxes". The quantity needed for the beef up armour is greater and so is the weight.

Originally posted by panzerwerfer42: Seeing as their modeled as canvas and wood frame assault boats not row boats then your argument doesn't hold water. I think Barleymans premise is very few Eastern Front armies used the US model boat.

From Lysters paper: Assesment based on one time fluke barrage or general perception of the weapons system and its capabilities ?

Originally posted by Sergei: II/KTR 15 1.1. 1944 8/76K36, 4/114H18 1.10. 1944 8/114H18, 4/105H37 Rask.Psto 14 1.1. 1944 and 1.10. 1944 12/150H40 From Paulaharju.

Originally posted by PondScum: Trust? TRUST? Finns don't rely on trust! They would CALCULATE the trajectories of the flying pieces of destroyed tank, and choose the correct place to hit it so that the pieces would take out the other tanks. You mean like this : In case it does not show up see http://uk.geocities.com/lepte2000/WWII_photos.html the picture at the bottom. NOTE: these are not BT's but I think the picture is graphic enough. [ June 07, 2003, 06:28 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by CombinedArms: There's a least one factual error here... I stand corrected. However, being less than 30 days off my previous statement I do not feel it totally demolishes my premise since my original time limit was set at the winter of 1943. As I've said, I tend to see November 1942 as the turning point in combat terms. The Allies succeeded with a number of potentially risky offensives. Make that Western Allies and I concur. If they had failed, who knows what might have happened. Since every one of them succeeded, the Axis war effort was on the strategic defensive from then on. On the whole, I agree. In the case of the Eastern Front the situation was a stalemate until after Kursk. The Axis extremities were suddenly being successfully attacked. The Axis was never able to regain the strategic initiative. I'd say they lost the strategic initiative soon after Barbarossa started. The Germans had no resources to spare to respond in a STRATEGIC level after Barbarossa drained them and the Japanese lost their ability to respond in strategic level by Guadalcanal.

Originally posted by Gaylord Focker: I disagree, only because Stalin was making such a huge fuss about the West opening another front in 1943 to help relieve the beleagured Soviets, wich ended up happening in Sicily, Italy, and later Normandy. By early 1943 the Soviets had the Germans pretty much contained. IMO the real reason why Stalin made the fuss was the fear of bleeding the Red Army white leaving it too weak to repell any attack by the Western Armies after the Germans had been beaten. Or worse yet for him, the Germans would have been pushed back to their own borders and then they sue for peace and the Western Powers accept their surrender. That would have left the Germans as nominal losers but intact and in a position to form an alliance with the West against the USSR. There never would have been extra fronts tying down and diverting German Divisions and resources from the East, Extra fronts ? The only entirely new front was formed in France. And in case the US did not commit troops the US production would have been available to the British and the Soviets giving them the necessary logistical superiority. also no mass Allied Strategic bombing of the German war machine. The thing is there was no mass destruction of German war machine by this strategic effort. The US involvement (8th AF) was in no condition to fight effectively before they got the LR fighter escorts. Which happened in 1944. So in that respect the US involvement in the air offensive prior to 1944 was more of a moral booster than a real military hindrance for the Germans. FDR was sending aid, and that played a big part in Germany declaring war in my opinion since the U-Boats were very successful at that time, and was assumed the U.S would be too busy with the Empire of Japan, they were wrong. When you are debating what-if's you can not induce this kind of data as reasoning. The premise is the US did not enter the war. That leaves the fact FDR was already supplying aid to both the UK and the USSR before Dec. 7th 1941. Had Hitler not deglared war on the US FDR would still have suplied both the UK and the USSR with aid. So you do you count elite Waffen SS divisions as stationing occupation forces as well? THe amount of men and materiel tied down in France and Italy, combined with the massive strategic bombings to come played an enormous role in later Soviet success. Which came first, the egg or the hen ? Men and materiel tied down in France and Italy did not increase dramatically prior to Kursk. This puts the time in mid 1943. And IIRC the Germans had to call off troops massed for the Kursk offensive because of the invasion in Italy. By which time the Kursk offensive had ground to a halt anyway. The same applies to the effects of the air war over the Reich. The number of men and materiel tied down remained constant. So North Africa does'nt count? If we go by the German priorization: no, it did not count. Besides, there were no US troops in NA prior to 1943. Only US built machines manned by British/CW troops. Realy? So all of those aerial flotillas of ME-109's and FW-190's were of no value in 1943 in combating American and British strategic bombing? Again, those Luftwaffe assets in the west were greatly needed and would have been put to good use in the east. The damage inflicted to the industries was not really effective. The effects of tying down resources was real. But prior to 1943 the Red AF was still in the process of being rebuilt so I doubt there would have been much to do for the figters but strafing. Which would have put them at risk of being shot down by AAA. Interesting, but how do you come to that unfounded conclusion? They are unfounded only if you think I'm belittling the actual US war effort. Which I am not. I'm just working a what-if based on historical facts as of 1941 prior to Hitlers deglaration of war and extrapolation from them. And in that set of facts the US does not commit troops. Well your wrong, because up until Pear Harbor, they were tieing up around one million siberian troops, that later headed to the eastern front. Please, remind me: which came first, the attack on Pearl Harbour or the parade of the Siberian troops on Red Square followed by immediate deployment to the front to repell the attack on Moscow ? The way I see it the Siberians were reserves held back until absolutely needed. The Japanese were not tying them down because the Japanese had gotten to run for their money against the Red Army and were not going to risk defeat in an area which was not beneficial to their strategic goals. Stalin secured the Japanese standing before releasing the troops from Siberia. I disagree, had the Finns invaded Leningrad with the Axis, with nothing else changed, it only would have resulted in more deaths, and not a victory. Really ? How many Germans were there in AG North ? Had the city fallen in (say) September 1941, would they have been deployed elswhere, like to support the attack on Moscow ?

Originally posted by Sergei: I wonder how it was later, though. The failed counter-attack on the Soviet bridgehead at Vuosalmi in 1944 was preceded by smoke missions by "sections from II/KTR 15 and Rask.Psto 14 and smoke mortars" (tämä siis Käkelän Laguksen miehistä, suomeksi "Savuammuntaan osallistuivat jaos sekä II/KTR 15:stä että Rask.Psto 14:stä ja savunheittimet (JPr:n savutusjoukkue ml).") We'll have to dig up the OOB of said arty formations to determine the guns they were using at the time. My hunch is they were using German 105's and 150 guns. The way I read it the smoke projectors and mortars were apparently under infantry rule. That leaves only sections of II/KRT15 and RP14 to fire proper artillery smoke mission. Which by my reconing is not very much given the number of artillery formations at hand at the time.

Originally posted by John D Salt: FWIW, I suspect that the Red Army relied more on visual signalling than Western armies, and widespread use of smoke might have had bigger penalties for them. Concur. The forward infantry elements carried high visibility flags and panels to indicate their progress so the FO's could lift the barrages as needed. This of course meant that while the Red Army artillery fire plans were on the rigid side they did have a degree of flexibility built in into the system. I suspect that the Soviet attitude to artillery as "The God of War" would have encouraged them to keep the atmosphere clear for observation purposes on many occasions. Not for observation only. There was also the airsupport element woven into their assault plans that called for clear skies. Litterally. [ June 05, 2003, 07:37 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Sergei: It seems that Soviets also relied on night attacks in many occasions. Concur. And IIRC they did use smoke even during the night. Btw. Tero, do you know what types of Finnish artillery had smoke rounds available to them, at useable levels (that is, more than a prototype in Nenonen's closet)? None spring to mind off hand. IIRC according to pre-war doctrine engineers were responsible for the battlefield smoke in the first place.

Originally posted by JonS: Fair enough - the western allies made extensive use of smudge pots too. But hopefully you can see that being able to project smoke forward of your foremeost postitions has its own advantages? Of course. It is a matter of allocating resources. Much like in the CB debate , it is the projected benefit and effectiveness of any given type of ordnance and how you prioritice its deployment as a part of your tactics that dictates your use of said ordnance/method. The Red Army artillery was tasked more with a hammer-like missions rather than a veil type missions. I think it is quite telling their "arty tunnel" method did not entail use of smoke as a primary means of concealing the avenues of advance. Instead they lifted the barrage and continued the shelling with direct fire weapons in an effort to keep the defenders heads down and mask the lifting of the barrage in the intended break through point. At least later in the war their tactics as a whole were centered in the task of getting as close to the enemy as possible to deny the enemy its superior long-distance tactical firepower and capability. They also sought to draw in the enemy reserves to the focal point of the battle to drain them at the same time as the front line forces were drained. This is why their use of smoke was highly localized and concentrated to the very forward edge of the schwehrpunkt of the attack. The artillery was tasked with engaging the enemy defensive positions and projected counter attack routes. From your post it seems like you think that smudge pots are better in all circumstances. Not in ALL circumstances. The Finnish army did not use tube deployed smoke screens, mainly because in the prevailing terrain type the dissipation of smoke deployed with tube arty was/is far more difficult to determine than that deployed by the infantry itself (with a degree of precision that is down to the infantry itself) on the ground. In case you did not know the officer charged with the development of the Finnish artillery arm was an artillery officer in the Imperial Russian army before Finland became independent.

Originally posted by Kanonier Reichmann: I've been wondering for some time now why the Soviets did not equip their AFV's and mortars (on board at least as depicted in CMBB) with a supply of smoke shells? Surely they could see the benefit in being able to mask advances made by infantry with locally provided smoke screens. The only reason I can think of why there is this general dearth of smoke shells when it comes to the Soviet side is that they may have considered it not "manly" enough or too "wussy" to advance against entrenched defenders with the benefit of smoke cover. I'm sure that's not the real reason but does anyone know for sure why they didn't rely on smoke alot more on the tactical level? Thanks in advance. They did rely on smoke screens. A lot. But they deployed it using ground methods. (Much like the überFinns who BTW in CMBB do not have ANY smoke available to them ) That way the smoke screen was more controlable and not subject to deployment errors inherent to tube fired ordnance. As for using them on AFV's: their tactics relied on overwhelming numbers and you can not overwhelm something you can not see yourself now can you.

Originally posted by Gaylord Focker: i think the Axis would have defeated the Soviet Union had it not been for American, British, and Commonwealth forces, I think the forces were not as instrumental (as such) as was the aid they sent. In a what-if scenario where the USA is not going to war against the Germans it would not have ensured the fall of USSR by default. And this because the fact FDR was already giving (or selling) aid to the British and the Soviets as it was. It was after all Hitler who deglared war on the US, not the other way around. The Western Allies did tie up significant numbers of German forces but since the Germans were already stationing occupation forces in the west and engaged in pastisan warfare in Yugoslavia the mere presence of hostile forces in the UK was enough. The DAK expedition was a sideshow for the Germans. IMO the crusial period was the period between the start of Barbarossa and the winter of 1943. And during that period the Western Allies were not engaged in land warfare against the Germans in a manner that was either (really) helping the Soviets or hurting the Germans. And the aerial effort against the German industrial effort the Western Allies were putting up was (in retrospect) of doubtful value before 1944. The British Western Desert forces were already on top of the DAK, thanks to the US military aid. In a sense the Germans were already being contained with the help of the US industrial might. Without US ground forces against the Germans the war would propably have lasted longer but the outcome would have been the same. and aid, as well as unintentional Japanese aid. IMO the Japanese were not a major factor due to their defeat in the hands of the "old" Red Army at Nomonhan and Lake Hasan. AFAIK the deal the Soviets struck with the Japanese coincided with the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbour. I would not even put it beyond Stalin to having endorsed the attack on Pearl Harbour as a means of getting the US actively involved in the war. In a sense the intentional, deliberate and deglared aid the Finns gave by not taking part in the siege of Leningrad was far more effective as a contributing factor to the failure of operation Barbarossa than the Japanese unintentional help ever was.

Originally posted by JasonC: But large scale CB attempts by massive numbers of shells were regularly tried and the results were disappointing. Arguably, the same shells fired at the forward areas instead would have had a greater impact. True. This why the Red Army used considerable portions of its CAS in an effort to suppress the enemy artillery. At least in the Finnish sector that is. The max range of 67% of the Finnish arty was at most 12km's and the Red Army CAS was almost never employed in deep interdiction but was limited quite close to the front line the firing positions were in constant danger of being attacked from the air as well being subject to CB missions. The Finnish army lost a total of 267 guns during the 1944 campaign. Of these 151 guns were lost in the Isthmus and of these 151 guns 92 (28% of the inventory in the sector at the time) were lost during the first few hours of the offensive as they were overrun, mostly due to lack of transports. Also, losses were heavy with the IG's used in direct support of the infantry. The reported number of damaged guns widrawn for repair was 182. Of these only 26 were damaged by enemy fire (the source does not specify if the enemy fire was aerial or CB). Most of the rest of the damages were due to worn barrels. The main reason for the disruption of fire missions were due to gun crew casualties. (source: Field guns in Finland 1918-1995 by J. Paulaharju, ISBN 951-25-0811-7) The target density in the rear areas where the guns live is quite low. The guns don't have to be that concentrated. Some promixity is necessary for fire coordination, to make use of scarce communication, command, and supply assets. But all of these targets can be "hardened", all are only located roughly, there is no real time adjustment of fire (or it is from the air and imprecise, obscured by smoke and dust once rounds fall, etc). Since annihilation is not the main objective of CB in most cases all you need to do is get a fix on the battery and let it rip to make the opponent gunners duck even for a minute or two. The type of fire mission and how accurate it is is down to the respective arty branch and its firing methods and pre-made preparations. It just bled the defenders every day, and their numbers did not hold out while the numbers of shells being thrown at them did. The fact the German tactics, both in the West and in the East, was the same (ie not an inch back) did play a considerable part in this equation. [ May 28, 2003, 05:29 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]