Tero

Originally posted by Scarhead: For Germans, the plt sergeant with the MP should have a bonus, too. But not for the other nations. Based on what ? For CMx2 replacing HQs with lower HQs, including squad leaders acting as Plt HQs for Germans. EG by just allowing 1st squad to take over from HQ if HQ is disabled or too far away. What if the unit structure does not conform with the universal model ? Or there is historical evidence of the unit structure being set aside on the fly to rearrange the forces on the spot ? The problem with this issue is lack of comparable data on small unit training and tactics and how they played out in actual combat in the different armies.

Originally posted by Andreas: The point about *cough* 'recruitment' *cough* in newly liberated areas is very important. Training these new soldiers in what often was an incredibly short amount of time (I think it was just six weeks or so that were effectively available between the end of the spring offensive and the beginning of the L'vov Sandomierz offensive operation in 1944, in 1st Ukrainian sector) requested a massive effort of Soviet rear organisation, who not only had to outfit these chaps, but also train them. Hmmmmmm.... a quick note: given the amount of civilian casualties the USSR sustained during WWII I just wonder how many of them died while pressed into service by the Red Army after they had been liberated but were subsequently listed in the civilan ledger. Not wanting to be revisionist or anything like that but the new recruits had to come from somewhere and the civilian death toll in the USSR is known........

A few days a ago there was in Finnish TV a documentary about a man who was hooked on drugs for over 60 years after having been "exposed" to them during in the service during WWII. He was able to shake the habit at the age of 71. The use of Pervitin and other drugs to enhance endurance and stamina was apparently quite widespread in the Finnish army, especially during times of extreme activity. And it was organized and controlled by the Army itself. Not unsurprisingly the documentation of it has not been widely publicized. The Finnish LRRP troops for example used drugs on their long hikes behind enemy lines. [ September 25, 2003, 03:22 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

http://www.johnston.ca/tacair/index.html

Originally posted by Holien: Andreas and others tried in a clumsy fashion to explain that it was a poor attempt at humour. At least here in Europe the German sense of humour is a joke in its own right and does not need explaining.

Originally posted by Lars: Can we at least agree Canadian Snow is crap compared to good ol' Made in the USA Snow? As the penultimate überFinn I can not accept any other proposition than: Canuck and US snow are both crap compared to the überFinnish snow. [ September 19, 2003, 03:15 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Now I know what White Death feels like. [ September 19, 2003, 03:02 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

They didn't. They lost, both times. They held out a while and made it expensive, and so were able to get terms - better ones the first time, largely because of how inexperienced the Russians were. But their army was defeated on both occasions, and had they not made peace on terms they would have been conquered outright. Not surprising given the odds, which yes do matter. Ah yes, if only those poor idiot tactically benighted Germans had gone to school with the uberFinns, they might have held off the Russian hordes. The Germans inflicted more damage on a vastly superior enemy with vastly better strategies and operational direction than any great power in world history. Their tactics were not the problem. Their tactics, anybody can profitably learn from. (The Finns lost too). While gathering data for rebuttal this occurred to me. These remarks of yours present an intellectual and a scholarly problem. You seem to think the Soviet tactics and doctrine sucked against the Germans while their were effective against the Finns. In other words: the Germans were better than the Finns at defending against the new style Red Army assault. On one hand you commend and vehemently defend the excellence of the German tactics and doctrine while you trash their operational skills and strategies. On the other hand you cathegorically berate and downright ridicule the Finnish tactics, doctrine, operational skills and strategy. On top of that you commend the Soviet strategies and operational art while you belittle their tactics and doctrine. You seem to think that the German tactics and doctrine was par excellence and there can be no-one who can come even close to their level of proficiency (well, perhaps the Western Allies ?). You commend the Soviet strategies and operational art while you cast doubt on their tactics and doctrine. You speak of the Finnish tactics, doctrine, operational skills and strategies as if you had the same amount of in debth knowledge on them as you have on the Germans and the Soviets. Riddle me this, oh great one: if the Finnish tactics, doctrine, operational art and stratgies sucked so much and they were so much more inferior to the German ones how was it possible for the events to unfold the way they did ? The first peace feelers had been sent out already in late 1943. The Soviet attack started June 10th. The Isthmus part of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation reached its goal (capture of Viipuri) in 10 days in June 20th as per their (post facto ?) stated final agenda. After that they pounded their heads against the Finnish defences for a month (from June 20th until July 18th) before this part of the operation was called off. The Petrozavodsk part of the operation started June 21st while the Finnish troops had started disengageing from the sector June 16th. The Finnish forces fought a delaying action, manned the U-line and beat back the attacking forces in fighting that went on until August 4th. The last enemy attempt was beaten back by encircling and routing two Red Army divisions in an engagement (operation ?) between August 1st and August 9th. Cease fire started September 5th, the peace treaty was signed September 19th. After all this the Finnish army was in far better shape it had been in 1940. AFAIK the only German AG in the East which could hold out in the same positions for more than a month under constant attack (tactical and operational pressure) was AG North. This leads me to believe that for all your 20-year detailed studies of the Eastern Front tactics, doctrine and strategies your knowledge of the field is rather narrowminded and incomplete in places. It can be said it is biased even. Your grasp of the strategic level is excellent (when it comes to the main contestants at least). Your attempts to apply that knowledge to the operational/tactical level are a bit wobbly. [ August 28, 2003, 04:00 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by JasonC: They had the resources to keep an entire army group in reserve for Kursk, and then launch major army group sized attacks after the defensive period of that fight, on not one but *both* flanks of the salient itself. And to push the resulting offensive clear to the Dnepr, take Kiev, and pocket German forces in the Dnepr bend. The Russians won the decisive battles of the war in 1943. So what makes the year 1943 stand apart from 1944 ? The Soviets did have ample resources during both periods. But they did not have the resources in 1943 to win the war in their 1943 style and manner. They had to change their tactics and strategies to get the mix right. Their resources in 1943 and 1944 were not that much different. What changed was how they used them. They had the resources to conduct attacks with high local odds, CB fire on main German gun positions, and infantry infiltrating between their strongpoints. Nothing in the example given says you need 100 IS-2s or 300 T-34/85s to overrun a lone German infantry regiment. Indeed. Nor does say having them hurts. The strongpoint defense is supposed to be stupid and easily destroyed by IDing the gun positions and hitting them with enough tube arty prep, and then hitting the gunless German infantry with high local odds. When was the last time you actually studied the tactics in detail ? The Soviet histories (as per Glantz) note some of the attacks were NOT preceded by heavy barrages. There is nothing inherently wrong in the strongpoint defence. IF the opponent plays ball and does not take full advantage of its inherent shortcomings. In the Leontina example the defenders lost all their arty (which was concentrated in one location) to CB, in the Valkeasaari example the defenders lost their arty (which was dispersed) due to lack of transports to haul them out of the way of the advancing enemy. The brunt of the arty preparation was directed to pulverize the forward infantry positions. NOTE: the Finnish defences were not based on the strongpoint principle. Nevertheless the original Red Army plan seems to have assumed the Finnish defender would follow the established German doctrine and consequently the outcome was not quite what they expected. I bring it up to show the pre-assault preparations were similar but adaptable to local condisions. The Red Army spend a considerable time perfecting their entire concept, timing etc. You are hung up on what you consider important (the strategic level stuff). The preparation fire was directed so it would have the maximum effect on the defenders. It hit both the gun positions and infantry positions as needed. Yes, by mid 1944 the Russians had odds ratios and equippage high enough that an uninstructed 7 year old child should have been able to finish the job. Wrong. They had the ratios already in 1941. And an instructed 40 year old general could not make it work. It was the deployment of them that was changed dramatically in 1944. In 1943, maybe they needed the operational skills of a 14 year old pimply faced amateur wargamer. There is no question they outplayed the Germans operationally in either year, and in the transitional period from November 1942 to Kursk, for that matter. But what they didn't manage to do in 1943 was blow the Germans off the map, to annihilate their whole army. How would you rate the German proficiency in 1941 ? Scarfaced war veterans ? They could not blow the Red Army off the map then. What changed with the Germans between 1941 and 1944, in your opinion ? And if all it took to kill a German ID was a little prep fire and decent local infantry odds, they would have been able to, easily. It simply wasn't that easy, much of the time. Nobody's trying to short change the Germans. But you seem to be totally incapable to grasp the notion that the idea that you collect your resources in one location and the enemy knows their disposition and strenght fairly accurately and they even know how you will react is an invitation to military disaster. The strongpoint may well be able to repell the attacks. But even so the overall tactical situation may develop so that the strongpoint may be cut off and isolated if it does so. Either way the forces are neutralized. By any other standard, the post Kursk offensives were a huge success. The Germans did not exactly come out of the fall and early winter battles unscathed, either, though the front did stabilize a bit west of Kiev. The Russians tried in other places too, though on smaller scales sometimes. True. But how much would you say the fact the Eastern Front lost a considerable number of its armoured (ie mobile) formations to the Italian front during that period affected the situation ? You say, "not left to chance". Some Russian offensives that they thought were fully prepared with massive odds failed with high losses - particularly early in the war of course. You really should not try to mix and mingle the tactical and operational/strategic level with no regard to the developments in tactics and strategies. It was not all about numbers. How could the Finns survive the Winter War and the French could not survive Fall Gelb, if it was all about the numbers ? Later, they tried many smaller ones, some of which worked and some of which did not, or made only limited gains. Their biggest ones, late, did tend to work. But they were not the only things they were trying. And the scale of the success varied. The post Kursk one retook Ukraine but the German forces - depleted certainly - basically survived. In Bagration they did not. How would you say the German tactical freedom changed during that period ? Right after Kursk they were not restricted by CHQ strategies to the extent they were during Bagration. In Courland they did not wipe them all out despite trying. In Crimea they basically did. The results of operations vary, that is in the nature of war. That is all my "roll low" and "roll high" comment means. And your rolls are still flawed. The Crimea was lost because the Germans could not support the defenders by sea. In the Baltic the Russians were only beginning to get their naval operations into gear after having them being non-existent when the Baltic Fleet had been bottled up from 1941 until late 1944 (free movement from the base of the Gulf of Finland starting only in September). Because that is when the war was actually won. In the strategic level, maybe. It was only in 1944 when the Red Army was able to put its strategic upper hand to work. And even then they had to be careful. 1942 the Russians evened the strategic score, and there is indeed some interest in that, too. In 1943, the Russians beat the Germans. Obviously the decisive year is more instructive and more interesting than the aftermath. It matters what either side tries to do, which is not true e.g. in 1945. What is your take on Winter War ? By strategic definitions and pure numbers it should have been a cake walk for the Red Army and yet they managed to botch it up. As for "how should they have conducted the operations", it misses the point. No, it does not. It is precisely the point. The Germans had the strategic and tactical upper hand and yet they could not defeat the Red Army. Why would Stalin have ignored the apparent German proficiency if he had the strategic take on them and could just wait for the numbers to creep up on the Germans ? It is a statement that they didn't for a reason - that the job was hard, because the Germans were not as weak as Andreas is portraying them. Andreas says nothing of the sort. It is just that you seem to be blind to the tactical level vs the strategic level aspects. I think what Andreas and I mean to say is the strongpoint defence hastened the German defeat by several factors. With the right tactics and CHQ attitude they could have fought off the Red Army for a much longer time they actually did. It kept the German army alive despite huge operational defeats for a year, against opponents who definitely were "there yet". Here is where we part ways. My POV is from the Finnish army and how it developed as opposed to the Germans. The 6 battalion division was weak, weaker than its Finnish counter part. The main diffences however was their tactical use. The Germans wanted/needed to keep the number of divisions in the level it was. Which was dictated by their chosen defensive doctrine. The Finnish doctrine and the German doctrines were different when it came to giving up ground. Had the German commanders been given total freedom I am sure they would have been able to use what they had, no matter what the organization, much more efficiently. If you hit a regiment with 300 T-34/85s after a 1000 gun prep fire, then yes you will get through it. That is not the same as saying "just put your guns on his gun strongpoints and lap your infantry around his forward positions, ta da, you will always break through in 1-2 days tops". The latter is simply not what happened. It makes nonsense of the length of the war and the scale of Russian casualties. It paints far too easy a picture, and renders the Russian accomplishment trivial. Poppycock. You fail to appreciate the importance of the restrictions imposed by the OKW/OKH on the front line commanders. Take a look at the Finnish casualty rates, kill/loss ratios and POW exhange rates. For example, during the Continuation War the Soviets captured only ~2 000 Finns, most of them during the summer of 1944. During the same time we took 64 000 POW's. The Finnish nation could not afford the kind of man power losses the Red Army was metering out to the Germans. To conserve the man power the Finnish CHQ had to do things differently than the Germans. They had to plan the defences so that the local superiority of the Red Army could be evened out. Of course the local odds ratios are far above the global ones. When you have 2:1 overall the way you make it pay is to pick select portions of the front and get 5 or 10 to 1 there. To work this however would require exact knowlegde of the disposition of the enemy troops and exact knowledge of their MO and propable responces. As for the idea that AG South was not subject to major operations in 1943, um, huh? Of course they were. The Russian main effort in 1943 was in the south, from Kursk defensive and Kursk offensive to the Dnepr battles. Yes. So why did they leave AG Center alone ? If they had the capability to do their pleasing ? As for Grisha's comments, on German tactical skill and C&C ability, that is exactly what I am talking about. It existed. Yes, it existed, And no. You are NOT talking about that at all. You are spouting strategies and operational figures and trying to make them fit your thesis by trying to apply them by jumping between tactical and strategic scale as you see fit. So far you have not given a plausible explanation (beyond the strategic dodging and mumbo jumbo) why the Germans survived in 1943 but failed in 1944 and beyond. The depletion of the German forces was serious but not severe in 1943 so how was it possible for the same forces to endure at one time and fail the next ? Andreas is effectively denying it as a factor. He is not. He is just trying to explain away why the Red Army doctrine was so effective. Everybody can see looking at the map that German strategic "play" was stupid in 1943 and 1944. They blow their reserves attacking at Kursk, and so don't have them to respond in 1943 late summer and fall. Actually the widrawal of the mobile forces to counter the invasion of Italy hurt them far more in the long run than the actual losses at Kursk. Dumb orders about pockets prevent saving numbers men. Dumb orders to form WWI style strong points was the reason these pockets developed. Manstein is sacked for trying to be rational about the Dnepr bend. He and many others for trying to be rational about so many other situations. Then all the armor of AG center is sent to North Ukraine just in time to leave it naked to Bagration. Not all armour, I'm sure. If there were places the 44 operations were clearly superior it was not in concentration (adequate to excessive in both cases), but in smarter use of their exploitation phase opportunities, less (not no) exposure of the spearheads to counterattack deep in the German operational rear, etc. Except their objectives were much more limited (more realistic) per individual operation in 1944 than they had been in 1943. This is not a sign that 6 battalion divisions and strongpoint defenses and the rest of the items in the German *tactical* defender's toolkit were stupid. It shows however that all of them were wearing thin. The patches were only making the work easier for the enemy.

Originally posted by JasonC: What you haven't explained is why they couldn't manage to do it earlier, pretty much at will, any time from mid 1943 on. If the defense is so weak and the attack method so simple, such back breaking 10 day periods should have been there for the asking, much sooner. You are disregarding the fact the Red Army did not have the necessary resources to conduct these operations before 1944. And even then they could do one major operation at a time. They had to husband the resource well. IIRC the task for 1943 was to hold the line and break the Leningrad siege. If you look at the pattern they conducted the offensives in 1944 the instances they had two of them going simultaneously are few and far between. I've explained why I don't think they could have them whenever they wanted - because they were outlier successes. It wasn't that they got them whenever they tried, it was that they got them occasionally (trying for a year or more), and when they did it was enough. That theory of yours does not stand up to scrutiny. The different stages of the operation Bagration was run in sequence from North to South. If the Leontina attack was an outlier then you'd have to say it was both unique and and a fluke. I think it was neither. Between Andreas and me we have two similar gambits to a Soviet strategic operation: Leontina and Valkeasaari. The diffeneces in the defenders level of preparation and their reactions to the developing situation high light the almost identical, dare I say text book execution of the attack in both cases. This despite the 1000-odd km distance between the locations. The temporal proximity of the two is of significance. I've also explained that those outlier successes were enough to create the strategic ratchet that the Germans could not stop. When the Russians "rolled low", they took some losses but the situation was basically stable. When they "rolled high" (enough), half the German army disappeared. Roll enough times, win the war - while taking some losses to get there. Only it was not left to chance. The Red Army preparations were very thorough and their operational goals limited. But that is different from a claim that the German defense was so weak that if the Russians looked at it, it'd fall apart. That no roll was involved. That any time they tried, they succeeded, smashing through and annihilating the defenders in their path. That is the claim I am arguing against (you are free to disown it if you like, that is your affair). Your "roll" theory is lacking. The initial attacks on the strongpoints left the entire enemy front weak. What determined the outcome of the operation was the way the enemy could and would respond. If the German defense scheme is simply stupid and all you have to do is put arty on their gun positions and mass a bit locally, then the Russians should have demolished them in the fall of 1943. They had the numbers by then. They had the artillery. The line had been static long enough to bring shells forward for it. They also knew their way was too rigid and the Germans too resourceful for it to sustain any reverses. They had to plan carefully or else they would face even longer war. Kharkov anyone ? But for some unnamed reason, the Germans didn't evaporate and the Russians lost rather a lot of people in the second half of 1943. How? Why are you fixated on 1943 ? What is a mystery is how the attackers can have numbers, local concentration, better operational plans, sound doctrine, winning campaigns on the map going their way, all against a supposedly stupid defense that is progressively depleted and ridiculously undermanned in force to space terms, and still lose as many or more as they inflict and not blow the outnumbered defenders off the map. When was the last time you took a look at the said map ? How should they have conducted the operations ? They were driving the Germans off their soil systematically. By doing that they were shortening the front line allowing the Germans to concentrate their forces. The road and rail net got better the further West they got. They would lose the partisan disruption effects. They were in effect making things easier for the Germans and they simply had to bleed them dry before going for the jugular. They were trading time for space. What the heck were the Germans doing from mid July 1943 to say March 1944? They were losing the war. That is indeed the decisive period, there is no question about it. But they did not collapse the way they did in the summer of 1944, and the wonder of it is why not? Because Stalin was taking no chances. They had 2-3:1 by the time of Kursk, and it went up after that. The thing is you need at least 3:1 locally for any offensive to succeed. "The Russians did not mass operationally". Sure they did. The staff studies show high concentrations for each of the post Kursk blows. Hmmmmmm..... if you have 2-3:1 and you mass operationally then you'd either have 1:1 in places and 4-5:1 in the blows ? Or you have 2-3:1 all around ? Which is it ? "The Germans were in prepared positions". Only in AG Center, not in the south, where they lost the war. Leontina was where ? How did AG South survive the year in 1943? Because there were not subject to major operations then ?

Originally posted by JasonC: Why wasn't the whole thing over in 3 months, then? The Germans tried it in 1941 and failed. Stalin was quite adamant not to replicate that. The terrain was not always so wooded that detachments from the Russian lead elements could get through the forward lines without serious battle, lapping around a limited number of hold outs and overwhelming any reaction reserves before they could do any good. I trust you are aware they used smoke, dug assault trenches up to the first line of obstacles. They also claim they owned the night. The Finnish experience was the counter attack had to come before the Russians dug in, the breach in the line had to be local and the reaction had to catch the Russians on the move. In more than a couple occasions successful counter attacks were conducted and the attacking force then had to pull back to new blocking positions. The morale of the story is the Russian forces kept on a constant pressure that made the defending force actions much more critical. One wrong move would render the defenders situation unbearable. See, sometimes an attack with 5 to 1 odds could fail with significant losses, and little harm to the Germans. How? Suppose the German gun positions are not all fully IDed. Maybe some have moved recently. Maybe roving guns fooled Russian sound ranging. Maybe the partisan info they got came from German double agents. Maybe air recon spotted phoneys and missed real well camoued pits. The thing is they had them going along a 20-40 km front so any local reversed could be accepted if the plan as a whole was working. If you take a look at last stages of the the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation you see the picture. After taking Viipuri the Russians conducted three consecutive attacks in sequence to breach the Finnish defences. All of them were made along a 20-40 km axis with the first attempt being in the center, the second in their left flank and the last one in their right flank. So maybe they are bogged down a lot of places and the Germans have time to react. True. But by the same token the reaction might be directed at a decoy breakthrough and shortly after the reaction was staged a crisis would errupt just far enough for the reaction force to burn a lot of fuel and time getting there. Maybe the Russians get through only here and there, That was the plan. But of course you knew that. but a full 2 battalion reserve regiment with a company of StuGs counterattacks several of these in sequence before they know where they are, where their friends are, have dug in, or can raise division commanders or the Russian artillery. By the time they finished with the last one they would be exhausted, low on ammo and low on fuel. And kilometers from the next hot spot. How long do you think they could sustain that before being worn down ? Not, however, because you have an irrestible monotonic steamroller smashing too weak German positions every time. That didn't happen. It took way too long, and the Russians lost way too much in the course of their offensive period, for that to be an accurate picture. Perhaps. But by the time AG Center collapsed the cumulative effects were in evidence. And that was what the Russians were after. Not the spectacular one time victories but the slow errosion of the German defences. But you can't extrapolate from them to get a sense of the usual case, or aggregate them straightforwardly to the operational or strategic level. They are too rare for that. Then again you can not jump in and out of scales as you see fit to make the figures fit your thesis.

Originally posted by redwolf: I've always regarded Soviet divisions and up as really more comparable to one level lower in other armies. The regimental support is low in all armies, but other armies pack something substancial into the division. I think it is quite the opposite. The Red Army regiments carried a bigger stick than they did in most armies. And that gave them the edge in tactical situations. For one their logistics were decentralized. Having the heavier assets assigned into independent formations allowed them to be distributed more freely according to the situation than would have been possible in a more conventional set up. If the heavy support was moved away the regiment would then simply switch to defensive, dig in and be reasonably well off given the heavier organic support they had available to them.

Originally posted by Denwad: Well, the Crusader MKI had 2 MG turrets and a main turret. Theres some other I can't remember, I think an AC with 2 turrets. The Cruiser A9 had two MG turrets.

Originally posted by laxx: BTW, anyone know whether smokescreen was used extensively by the russians ? I was led to believe it wasn't at all common. The Red Army use of artillery deployed smoke was not that common. Smoke screens deployed by ground means were very common.

Originally posted by jrcar: G'day Tero, comments below Down under ? I'm not talking about doctrine, but reality. The principle firepower potential of infantry is the machine gun. No other army had a belt fed MG as a platoon SAW except the Germans. I recognise the Finns situation was different, but at normal combat ranges 100-500m the MG rules (as long as you have them). The situation was the same for the Soviets, the Italians, the Rumanians and the Hungarians. Just to name the Eastern Front. Well the MG is an excellent suppression tool, And I'm not trying to downplay it. But the fact is the Germans were pretty much the last ones in the Eastern Front to start officially equipping their platoons with more automatics to supplement the platoon FP. but yes if you can bear hug the enemy then it makes calling for indirect fires difficult. Indeed. This is where having sensors does count, and good weather! Fighting in good weather only went out of style a century or so ago. I would certainly prefer more infantry in a Div, but its important to get the mix right, and given limited manpower, and enough weapons, arty provides the main killing power. The late war Red Army infantry division complement was 5000 - 9000 men. Its the mix thats important, you need both. But the latter requires less manpower, but you still need enough of the former, and I think 6 Bn is just enough (if kept upto strength). It depends on the tactical situation. "He who defends everything defends nothing". He who puts all eggs in one basket will lose all of them at the same time. Yes strong points are easy to target, but they make the most efficient use of the manpower and heavy weapons. The alternative of spreading them out into smaller penny packets is even worse. True. The strongpoint approach called for mobile response to local crisis. And the Red Army took that into account in its planning. By wearing the mobile forces down and tying them up in several places at the same time rendered the entire concept impotent. Had there been a flexible frontline the concept would have been, well more flexible. Yes fundamentally Hitler was stupid to attack, but how does that impact on this discussion? The same way you people claim the narrowness of the of the frontline the Finns had has an impact on this discussion. Well this discussion has gone a bit off the original topic, but we are talking about the German change from 9-6 Bn divs and if that was a smart idea or not. And the underlying principles DO apply more broadly. Yes. Anybody know how the Hungarians for example developed their infantry formations ? We in the Australian Defence Force face these issues all the time, how much infantry and how much heavy weapons do you have in your mix. In the past we were infantry heavy and lacked a lot of heavy weapons, our demographics (along with many other western nations) means that we have a smaller pool of manpower to draw from in the future, while needing to increase our combat power. Having increased heavy weapon allocations will help us to do this, along with improved command and control. The thing is the modern wars just are not the same they used to be. The Finnish defence are built now on the brigade formation and the main aim is to disrupt the attacker by being mobile enough to disperse and mass up where the enemy is the most vulnerable, guerilla style. That also entails the enemy forces are engaged and blocked at the points of our choosing. But there is a point where you do not have enough bayonets, my contention is that 6 Bn’s in a German div is just enough (provided they are kept upto strength). The Finnish army faced the same problems as the Germans did, including battlefield attrition. The diffences in the German and the Finnish way of dealing with the crisis culminate in the way in which the CHQ dealt with them, including the man power losses. The Finnish army as a whole could not have sustained the kind of losses the Germans did. In case you are not aware of it the Finnish army did not lose any formations from platoon size up in enemy encirclements. AFAIK no full companies were lost in that manner, I know for a fact no Bn's or regiments were lost). Also, the Finnish platoon small arms mix was different, giving them inherently more FP over the German one in standard text book configuration. Thus I think it is fair to say that a depleated German platoon was further up the creek than a similarly depleated Finnish platoon, in terms of organic fire power. Yes it did! They were able to keep the mobile divs (and some inf divs) off the front line to provide counter-attack forces or launch new offensives. In the Eastern Front the last great German offensive was the Kursk offensive. And for all their counter attacks AG Center and AG South could not hold their ground. Some even say both were routed. I agree with Jason on the fact that these were frequently wasted by the overly offensive minded General Staff, but the concept worked very well. The concept was sound, but only in paper. The fact of the matter is the Red Army studied the German tactics very closely and deviced means to pulverise the main points of defence and neutralize the mobile counter attacks. This was possible because of the German CHQ would not acknowledge defeat until all was lost and there was nothing left to do but to but assemble the fleeing survivors and establish a new MLD some times hundreds of kilometers from the original one. The Germans did not have enough combat power to hold everywhere in enough strength to guarantee stopping a breakthrough.... hardly anyone ever does The had enough combat power. The thing is their defensive zone should have been at least 100 km deep. They were denied the tactical flexibility which their chosen tactics called for. (although the Finnish circumstances with a defence on a narrow front may be an exception...). Please check the average width of the Red Army offensive operation zone. Compared to that the "Finnish special circumstances" claim and argument does not really hold water. Even against the odds the Germans were able to continue to create forces capable of offensive action by holding the line with less, while forming a strong reserve. So why did AG Center collapse so spectacularly ? [ August 10, 2003, 01:50 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Denizen: Sparked by the suprising vulnerabilty of the IS-2 turret front in CMBB, IRL the vulnerable area was under the gun. The reports I have read about tank-vs-tank engagements with IS-2's almost invariably say the disabling/KO'ing hit was made under the gun or above/through the drivers vision port. That would suggest the turret ring was the weakest point in the behemoths armour. Furthermore, if memory serves, the turret front forms a shot trap which directs ricochets through the drivers compartments roof when the turret is turned forward. [ August 07, 2003, 03:34 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by jrcar: The secondary firepower is the machine guns in the units. The rest of the infantry are really just there to protect the machine guns, That applies only to the Germans. and then the arty, from enemy close attack and to fix the enemy so the arty can target the area. The problem is the infantry has to have enough FP to pin the enemy down so the arty can blast them. IMO the Germans reliance on the MG was detrimental, given the Red Army docrine of seeking hand to hand combat. Loosing a regiment is a small loss of firepower, for a large release of manpower. I disagree. If, as you say, the arty is the main force and the infantry is the blocking force then losing that blocking force renders the mainforce that much more impotent. I agree with Jasons points of the regiments. He makes some valid points. However, the German tendency of forming strongpoints both make and break his arguments. The distribution of regimental/divisional support assets was important. But the logic of massing both the infantry and the support assets into strongpoints made them easy targets for preplanned attacks. Just as the text book reaction to breakthroughs made them liable to fail because there was a way to device a counter plan well before the breakthrough was made. Having a third element (whether its in a platoon, company, battalion, regiment or division) gives a commander tactical maneuver options. Which in turn, in the case of the Germans, are limited by the high command grand strategies. And as Jason notes the inf divisions weren’t assigned maneuver tasks, that’s the role of the mobile divisions. Lets not get fixated on the Germans too much. Perhaps this kind of thinking was one of the failings of the Germans. The Red Army used their mobile and infantry divisions in a very different manner (and the überFinns had only one truly mobile formation ). Compared to the Germans the Soviets designed their operations (after 1942-43) as a series of smaller, controlled steps which they could manage better. The German early operations were charaterized by sweeping, spectacular grand scale moves which left huge gaps between the mobile and the infantry formations. At the operational level of command more maneuver elements is also important, so by taking out tactical flexibility the Germans were able to maintain operational flexibility, and in large conflicts that is far more important´ That did not really actually work now, did it ? I'm sure that was the plan but the Ruskie buggers figured out and used it against the Germans.

Originally posted by JasonC: Has uber Finn chit chat killed this thread? Or was it me? Does anyone still care about German division organizations and their whys and wherefores? Should I move my giant post to a new thread to get comments? Does anybody read this stuff? lol. Well, I THINK the original topic does not mean only German divisions and their deployment are relevant in this context.

Originally posted by Andreas: I was talking of the chaps that did the work, not of the equipment here. Without the proper equipment they would have been out of a job anyway. Captured kit, maybe a bit in these areas. A bit ? The entire inventory of the French and the Polish armies available to them. And more. Can't really envision only the trucks and Chenilettes and arms being utilized. Cannibalised kit, very little, since most of the disbanded units tended to be disbanded behind Soviet lines, making access to their equipment a tad difficult. That is true. BTW -I would not rate AG North's performance as a success. Tactically I think it was at least noteworthy. They just got lucky, and then that luck was wasted because Dönitz wanted to have a training area for his submarines... Gotta love the inter-arms rivalry of the Reich That has not ceased to amaze me.

Originally posted by Keke: I think you exaggerating a bit, although it has said that the best supplier for the Finnish Army was the Red Army. The percentage is off the cuff, yes. But some (most ?) of the pre-war arty was war booty taken from the Russians during the civil war. Edit: After rereading your post, I see you meant the actual AG North. I haven't ever heard such a comparison, and it doesn't sound valid to me. I think such a comparison has not been made. However, if you read for example Ehrfurt or other English language histories and compare remarks of the Finnish defensive efforts and compare that to accounts about the AG North/KG Kourland defensive efforts I think it is fair to say AG North has been rated better than the Finnish army.

Originally posted by Andreas: How many varieties of guns/HMGs? 60-odd types of field guns (67 IIRC). 1 basic variant of HMG in the field army (Maxim), IIRC 3-4 subvariants, all with interchangeable ammo. More LMG models, domestic, captured or bought though, only LS-26 and DT in frontline service, both used the same ammo. How many varieties of vehicles? Mostly horses. Motorvehicles were of all makes, mostly civilian vehicles pressed to service. Airforce flew machines from every major warring nation except Japan. How many of these in total? That I have to look up. Relying on captured or self-manufactured ammunition stock? Both. On how many fronts? Two-three, depends on the time period. Over what distance did the logistical system have to support it? Considerable, when you take into account there were not too many motorized vehicles. Also, most of the positions were not along the road net. It does not reflect directly on the fighting capabilities of these formations whether they are equipped with the German lFH18 or the Soviet 122mm howitzer (indeed, the 122mm is probably the better gun), but it creates a logistical nightmare, one exacerbated by many factors that did not apply to the Finnish army at all. That is the text book answer. But I have to say the Finnish forces had problems which were solved by using captured weapons and munitions. Also, domestic arms production and selection of weapons for service was geared so that for example the ammunition calibers down to the cartridge casing was identical to the projected major adversary, ie. the Red Army. EDIT: there were plans to take up the MG-42 by changing the caliber to suit the Finnish supply system. It came to nothing when the Germans could not supply the parts needed. Another thing I feel has not quite been looked at enough is the shortage of specialists (e.g. radio operators, pioneers, etc.) that also is exacerbated by the creation of additional units. That is true. I am still unconvinced about the firepower benefit outweighing the drawbacks of creating the additional overhead within the system. If there was a firepower benefit ? Every new division needed a signals battalion to be able to function, plus signals equipment in the sub-formations. The same (although not as critical) for pioneer and transport assets. How much were they able to cannibalize from the captured equipment or from disbanded units ? [ August 02, 2003, 05:35 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Andreas: BTW - what do these numbers of foreign guns tell you about the industrial capacity of Germany to equip all these new divisions with heavy weapons? How does that reflect the fighting capabilities of of the formations ? The Finnish army arty was alomost 90% captured and they did not fare too bad, all things considered. I think there are probably interesting parallels between the failure of the Red Army to deal AG North the deathblow they meted out to all other Army Groups, and the Red Army's failure to make short work of the Finns. True. It is funny in a way that the Finnish effort has been regarded as a failure while the AG North effort has been regarded as a success (of sorts). I would have thought the Arctic theatre is quite different from the rest of Finland though - maybe you can tell me if that assumption is correct. It is different. But not all of it.

Originally posted by Keke: The arrangement of 2 three Bn regiments plus an extra Bn was not satisfactory solution (according to Finnish commanders), and the army had started major reorganization, were divisions would have been eventually replaced by 4 Bn Brigades (like the army today). True. But the idea was to compare the German division with the Finnish division. (not jaeger Bn, but Erillinen Pataljoona = Separate Bn) And so it is. Got entangeled in the company/battalion TOE. Btw, when it comes to "rather specific circumstances of fighting in Finland", I here this every time when it's pointed out that Soviet operations had more difficulties there than against Germans. I just wonder how "normal" the conditions then were in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation... Most of the time people forget about AG North and how it performed in the latter stages of the war...

Originally posted by Andreas: That is an interesting point tero, and I had not really thought of it that way. I understand from discussing this with Grisha that a sort of continued preparation for defense was built into Soviet attack plans, which would probably be based on this contingency. Indeed. It is common knowledge in Finland any and all counter attacks against the Red Army HAD TO come before they had time to dig in. Otherwise the task became very, VERY much more difficult. Also, Finnish analysis right after the war (even during it I suspect) identified two types of breakthrough attacks: decoy breakthroughs which was inteded to draw in, disperse and expend enemy reserves in the area and the real thing. In both types the artillery support was designed to have preplanned fire zones at the shoulders of the breakthrough. This because they projected counter attacks were directed from the flanks at the base of the breakthrough. Incidentaly, to expand light on Kekes views on the organizational issues: There was an organizational change in the Finnish army in 1942 to free up 250 000 men to work in the home front. The difference between the new German and new the Finnish TOE seems to have been the fact the new model Finnish infantry division comprised of two regiments of three battalions plus an extra (jaeger) battalion (and an engineer battalion plus assorted support asssets). In addition to that separate brigades were formed. As to the firepower differences between the German and the Finnish divisions: the Finnish army did not have MG-42 so they had compensate by having more organic FP at platoon level (SMG's, LMG's automatic rifles) to beef up the FP as the Maxims, which were organizationally in a separate HMG company. [ July 30, 2003, 03:54 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Something that is not evident so far is the effects of the German doctine vs the organizational changes. IIUIC the organizational change pretty much coincided with the cathegorical order to hold ground at all costs. IMO this lead (naturally) to the formation of static strongpoints beacuse of the sheer lenght of the frontline to cover. And in turn this lead to the formation of the mobile firebrigades when the front line started leaking seriously. It seems the Red Army took this into account when they were designing their attacks. They would crush a strongpoint (in Yassy-Girgisiev for example) and then they deployed to take out the mobile firebrigade thus ripping the entire frontline to pieces forcing the less mobile German infantry formations to start manouvering and be cut down on the move as it were.