Tero

Originally posted by Sergei: But but... Hietanen destroyed one with a mine. Is it known for a fact it was a KV ? In the book (IIRC) it was not specified as one. In the old movie it was a PzKw-IV and in the new movie it was a T-55 with fiberclass superstructure. 20 kg? How did they deliver that, or was it buried into a road? IIRC it was command detonated when the beast drove over it.

IIRC the Germans took out either a T-34 or a KV with an empty champagne bottle at least on one occasion.

Maxim/Vickers HMG's could habitually fire something like 10 000 rounds without stoppages during WWI. Why do they jam so often in CMXX ?

Originally posted by Moon: Temperatures affect hit probabilities immensly in CM, not only since we introduced heat-haze in CMAK, but even in CMBB in, e.g. extremely cold weather. The artillery services rate their gunpowder for different ambient temperatures. What about the gunpowder on the AFV's ?

Originally posted by Soddball: 2km is a relatively long range but the Nashorns were dead meat in that battle - partly, perhaps, through borg spotting, with 3 or 4 IS-2s targetting the Nashorn, but their precision in combat really was diabolical. I wonder if the vehicle platoon to-hit chances are cumulative. And if it is realistic if they are. After all, the vehicles are separate entities even when they are a part of a platoon. [ January 02, 2004, 05:40 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Moon: But good gun accuracy is MUCH more than only good optics. Agreed. I am not entirely sure what you mean to be honest, but seeing the facial features is only relevant for identification, not for hitting your face If I am a 60kg lightweigt and you take me for a 150kg heavy weight and you aim at the supposed center of my supposed mass while I make a positive ID and aim accordingly which one of us would you assume makes the first shot hit more reliably ? And what if I am trained to shoot at your face while you have been trained to hit the center of the mass ? The shorter the range, the less the effect of optics. They still do count (e.g. field of view and adjustable magnification, which would make *finding* close-by targets easier), but less and less, as e.g. mechanical features of a gun or tank or mount take over. How were the mechanical features of the respective mounts taken into account when the game was being designed ? The stabilizer was partially modelled, but not when it came to its weaknesses (malfunctions for example would lock the gun at a certain elevation at all times). Short-range acquisition is in fact simulated in CM, and I am sure that it is partly responsible for some of the odd "why won't my unit fire" incidents sometimes reported on the board. I think "why won't my units hit" are more common. From what I recall (it's been a while, so don't quote me please ), the optics system in CM really only makes a difference around the last 10% of the given max. LOS distance for a battle, provided it's more than 1000m or so. Actually it's probably even more "fuzzy" than that, Charles hates hard "breaks" like that. That is interesting. This would explain the relative impotency of the AT guns in the game, given the average engagement ranges in the game. Adjustable magnification isn't automatically better than non-adjustable. It simply depends on the range(s) involved. True. Though I would not say it depends simply on the range. The engagement ranges during the summer of 1944 in the Karelian Isthmus were between 10 and 1000 meters and still the Finnish tankers said they Stug optics (including visibility out of the buttoned up vehicle mind you) gave then the edge over the opposition. But to comment on what you said specifcially, first-hit probability certainly depends on optics. As does 2nd or 3rd hit. But think about it - to what extent does 1st hit prob. depend on the quality/experience of the crew? 50/50? 40/60? I've seen in the game a veteran or better Axis crew miss their first shot more often than their similarly experienced Allied crews to be able to pass judgement on that. Mind you, with the Long Range Optics the 88 seems to have gotten a bit closer to what it was supposed to have been IRL than it was in the original game. From my experience, optics make a difference at extreme ranges or under extreme lighting/atmospheric conditions only. For 95% of situations, other elements are at least just as much or way more important. That does not really happen in the game though. A concealed asset (AT gun or what not) is more often than not dead meat when it fires the first shot, regarless of the fact it has the (supposed) edge. This is the stance (you can call it conservative if you like ) we followed with CM. Conservative is not perhaps my first choice for the term but I'll let it ride.

Originally posted by Moon: partly because information/research is often sketchy about battlefield optics so that we have to guestimate some data, and last but not least because the effects of optics ARE hard to treat objectivly. Reminds me of the debate over the "partially on" stabilizers on Ami armour. IRL the Finnish tankers who had a go on both Stugs and Soviet armour said the optics on the Stug counted for more in their mind than the superior armour of the T-34/KV-1 in Finnish service. The Stugs were retained in service as static emplacements well into the '90s because of their accurate guns whereas the Soviet WWII armour was phased out of service in the early '60s. Do a test. Take two binoculars, one a high end model and the other not, give one to a friend and walk away from each other. Stop every few meters and see if you can see him, and ask if he can see you. You will find out that most likely the range in which this is true is minimal and/or non-existant. This is even more true for larger objects, such as tanks for example. That is not really a valid comparison. The real way to do it would be to distinquish for example facial features. That would simulate the effects of non-athmospheric phenomenon. Optics quality makes a real different in extreme situations only - darkness, or juust below maximum visibility range. What if there maximum visual range is not affected by athmospherics but things like vegetation and terrain features ? It seems the consensus is the optics do not count in a knive fight at close quarters. But what is the range (or rather the set of condition) which render the better optics inconsequential ? In the open desert (much like in the Russian steppes) the tradition has it the Germans could outfight their adversaries because of the quality of their optics was superior (along with their tactics and experience). Optics also influence other issues, like identification, to a higher degree, but to be able to shoot at something you don't need to see each and every detail of it. One would imagine the first shot hit ability is affected by the quality of optics though. If you have a binocular sight with adjustable maginification with a fine cross hair I'd say you are more likely to make the first shot hit than with a monocular non-adjustable sight with a (relatively) thick cross hair.

IMO the problem is not in the actual modelling of the phenomenon, the problem is the rate of occurance in the game. Luck is a factor but when that luck (or misfortune) occurs consistently then there is something wrong. My pet beef is the consistency with which the hand held AT weapons miss with their first shots. Nobody is THAT unlucky THAT consistently.

Originally posted by aco4bn187inf: More training should be given in hip shooting and in the use of the BAR asd a close-in weapon."- That is curious. I was under the impression the US Army was big on walking fire to begin with.

Originally posted by flamingknives: In Korea, it was found that the bulk of the squads effective fire came from the BAR. It was considered superior to the M1919 as it was more mobile and therefore used in the front line. Any info on the semi-auto rifles and how they fared ?

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles: The US had more of a distributed firepower at the squad level. Other nations with bolt action rifles and heavier squad automatics or LMGs should not be compared to the US 'slots'. The thing is other nations used more SMG's than the Amis. The LMG's (which BAR also is) were comparable to each other. AFAIK only the Germans fielded a belt fed SAW while the others used BAR-like SAW's and SMG's. The perceived advantage of the American semi-auto prolification drops out with the decrease of the range. At longer ranges the semi-auto is not that superior to the bolt action rifle since the accuracy of the semi-auto rifle suffers if fired rapidly. And the SMG's superior rate of fire over the semi-auto more than makes up for the suppression/kill efficiency at shorter ranges.

One note on the impact angle. At 1600 meters, what is the the impact angle of the round ? I assume it is not what it is at 1000 meters. If it is more of a plunging hit which would make the hit on the clasis plate more of a flat hit than a "regular" hit.

Tero, this is an interesting statement. Are you saying the Finnish government had little say in the determination of the political objectives upon which Finland's military strategy was based upon? Or, that once the Finnish government determined the political objectives for their conflict with the USSR from 1941-1944, the strategic planning of Finnish military operations was out of Finnish politicians' hands? </font>

Originally posted by Bone_Vulture: Isn't that what I just said? :confused: Not the way I read it. Anyway, if the tank in that pic would be modelled in CM, it'd be immobilized due to bogging already. Not exactly. The real difference is in the "experience" level. The Germans were apprehensive about driving their vehicles in the kind of terrain in which the Finns would (be forced to) drive theirs. Perhaps the Finnish Stugs should be modelled differently? Perhaps a special "Finn bonus" that'd cause the Stug to maneuver like it had a ground pressure of like 0.5 kg per cm^2? More like the entire vehicle performance in wooded terrain modelling should be overhauled. [ November 19, 2003, 12:45 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Grisha: So, for purposes of wargaming it would not be unreasonable to assume limitations with the advancement of Finnish units into the Soviet Union due to reasons outside the scope of military concerns. Not exactly IMO. In the case of Finland and her "reasons outside the scope of military concerns" vis-a-vis wargaming it is often forgotten that the political and military considerations were much more closely and much more obviously linked together that is the case with the case of the "big players". The cause and effect between the political and the military in Finland was much more intricate and subtle than it was for example in Germany. During both the peak moments and the darkest hours of the FDF it was always the politicians who had the last say in the matters pertaining strategy. And the politicians had the good sense to leave the running of the strictly military matters (tactics and doctrine) to the soldiers. The sole exception was the town of Viipuri. IIRC that was the only prestige location which Mannerheim had singled out as a "not a step back" location. And even he was sensible enough to let it drop when it was lost.

Originally posted by Keke: Now could you tell me who considered it in 1941? IIRC racially the Finns had been classed at the time as a slavic race but had been exempted from the "lower class" status, partly as a matter of politics and because of the Winter War. One should not forget that many Finnish officers served in the Russian Army before and during WW1, including Mannerheim who commanded the [Russian] 6th Cavalry Corps on the southern front during the late phases of the war. Not to mention gen. Nenonen.

Originally posted by Bone_Vulture: All I can think of is the Stug's already horrible ground pressure combined with an additional couple of tons of body mass... In a forest terrain. I don't think that could be modelled in CM, except as an ad hoc AT bunker. Interestingly enough the Finns drove around their Stugs in terrain which the Germans would have deemed unsuitable for armoured activity. If you look at the pic in the first post you will see what i mean.

I think the documentary was aired here in Finland not so long ago. Most impressive and effective. Highly recommend.

They are skiing in grass? Seriously, why are they doing that? </font>

Originally posted by Kaiser Soze 71: They probably were Lehto, Rahikainen and Määttä. They had to stand at attention as a punishment, because they were stealing food from the Army's supply depot. They did not steal it ! They got them from some boys from the same village. !

Surely you mean the half-platoon tent? </font>

Originally posted by Michael Emrys: This is an interesting point. I have read that among American troops in Viet Nam, the country boys oriented and adapted better out on patrol in the jungle, but then the city boys took over in city fighting in places like Hue. I have found no comparable discussion about the troops during WW II, but it wouldn't surprise me if a similar situation applied. I would expect so, too. And since most countries have both towns and villages one would expect the universality is there. Which brings us to the fringes of the military establishment of the respective countries and how they planned ahead. Including such things as battlefield bivouacks. The Germans for example had their light weight tents made from separate cloths carried by the men themselves. The Finnish army went for the half squad tent with a stove (the model is still in use today). I do not recall having seen any data on the British and the US bivouacks. From what I have read the Germans for example relied on finding bivouacks in the indiginous constructions more than their tents, which they apparently thought would be temporary ones. The Finnish army tent fits better for extended bivouacking in field conditions. I theorize that since the Finland could not afford "unnecessary" losses the need was to limit the "mobility" and other such "kills" with appropriate preventive measures. The big armies could afford them so they were taken for granted, (if unfortunate). But as far as whole units were concerned, these effects might tend to even out as soldiers shared their particular knowledge in their squads and platoons. In armies that tended to recruit units in particular regions, these kinds of differences might emerge, but as time went on, most armies became at least somewhat homogenized, at least as far as the urban/rural split is concerned. The interesting thing is the value of the "buddy battalions" have been cast in doubt by the British experience during WWI. The Finnish WWII mobilization organization was regional and during heavy engagements the casualties concentrated. But it also meant that the units were composed of men who knew each other intimitely (including their commanding officers up to battalion level)and unit cohesion tended to remain good even when the losses ran heavy. On the other hand the units were susceptible to all kinds of rumor mongering (which resulted in the fall of Viipuri in 1944). One noteworthy thing is that even in full retreat the Finnish units would not surrender. The Red Army could capture only ~2400 Finns during the Continuation War. By the same token the number of Soviets captured during Winter War was ~5000 while the number for the Continuation War was ~60 000.

Originally posted by Michael Emrys: Well, stamina and general physical toughness count. Ability to function on little sleep, ability to withstand continual stress, All common denominators. resistance to illness are all important in combat. What about city boys vs country lads in adverse conditions ? The knowledge on such things as what wood you can and can not burn in the combat zone counts in. So does the overall level of preparedness of the respective armies to combat the sanitary and other related hazards. I think the only army to suffer from trenchfoot on a large scale during during the later stages of the war was the US Army. Then again to get it in the Finnish army was far less likely to happen and if you did get it was more often than not the soldiers own fault for not taking care of his gear when he was supposed to. NOTE: during Winter War the civilian footwear used by the troops worked both ways, country boys using their own boots were pretty much OK while city lads using their lofers were not so well off. But it isn't obvious to me that any nationality had a measurable advantage over the others in this regard. For one thing, once again individual differences would tend to blur whatever national differences might have existed. I agree in principle. But, generally speaking, somehow it is always the home team which gets all the bonuses. IF they have got their act together. [ October 07, 2003, 08:53 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Andreas: This finding could well have been skewed by a possible failure to correctly compare who does what in various armies. Also, what constitutes fighting in this context ? In the British army, the platoon leader was almost invariably a Lieutenant (officer), although there have been exceptions, of course. In the Wehrmacht (and at least until the late 80s in the Bundeswehr), you find a lot of NCOs in platoon leader positions. Therefore, if the 'last few NCOs standing' happen to be the platoon HQ, it would be no surprise to anyone aware of this organisational difference that the unit stays organised. And it does not even have to be the HQ NCO's left standing. I think such things as distribution of battle field intel and your own battle plans to the lower ranks are in the focal point of this issue every bit as much as the training and application tactical principles. I'm sure you have read the book on British infantry training during WWII (the name of which escapes me at the moment). It would appear the British infantry did not encourage the crossing of the boundaries between officers and other ranks for one.

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges: Because we know, from how the Cold War came out, that central planning is not a good way to run an economy, generally, we forget that it is a good way to run a war. It's also worth noting that the USSR was very good at running a centrally planned economy. Indeed. The West did not win the Cold War because the Soviets were lousy in running their economy. They won because the Soviets could not switch off the munitions production and they could not increase the commodities production to match the Western production of consumer items. The Western economies were not harnessed to the munitions production after 1945 while the Soviet economy stayed essentially the same in nature from 1941 until 1989. Central planning won't work in the civilian economy, of course, because the ability to produce 1 M trucks is worthless (literally) if no one wants to buy them, and next to worthless if you can only sell 10,000 of them. It is even worse if you pay for the production of 1 million trucks and then give them away to your allies at a fraction of their cost. There was a market for the Soviet military produce. They just did not get the market value for it. They ended up paying for other peoples wars.