Tero

So it is OK to describe in graphic detail how you kill people but we all go blind when some body says something dirty ?

Interesting. Now, when can we see these test results put to practise using a BB-gun on 1/35 scale models ?

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: No, this is the closing of the assembly period - the attack goes at X Hour, to be determined but supposedly at first light the next day. And so it is. I need to get glasses.

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: As for Tero's comment re: training rather than improvisation - yes, but that also encompasses experience, if that's not what you meant. That is what I meant.

Originally posted by Runyan99: No, that's not how I read it at all. Breakthrough battle STARTS at X+5, after the barrage has lifted. Assault guns jump off. That isn't the schedule to capture the objective Hell, the artillery shifts to the rear at X+4. You think the Germans are going to breakthrough in one minute after their own artillery lifts? The first obstacles are to be taken down at X+1-1½. I would not put it past the commander on the spot to start moving his troops out at that time or soon after that. After all only the start off of the Stugs is specified, not the start off of the infantry apart from the Brakebusch platoon. I presume they are hugging the barrage since once the barrage lifts the defenders will swarm the defensive position so if the plan is to succeed they need to overcome the defenders before they man the positions and cut down the attackers when they are going over the top. BTW: the end of the battle IS specified in the orders. It is a bit vague but still: "after closing by 2300hrs".

Originally posted by Runyan99: I notice that the written plan covers everything that can be anticipated BEFORE the battle, but gives no guidelines as to how the battle will actually be fought. Everything after the jump off is left open to improvisation. That would be training, not improvisation, actually. Specifically, there is no guideline as to how long it is going to take to reach the objectives. The reason, I think, is that they just don't know, and they realize it is folly to guess. Breakthrough is projected at X+5 when the objective 1 (crossroads has been reached and the bunker taken out) is complete. The fate if objective 2 is not clear from the orders but IMO it is the purpose of these types of orders to leave the time table for the second objective unspecified so that the developing situation does not hamper the carrying out of the orders. The bit about the ammunition carriers is interesting. Apparently ammo is going to be available, and mobile, in trucks and motorcycles. Not sure exactly how or when they plan to distribute it. As needed propably. I'd expect runners would be used to fetch ammo from the supply train if and when the need arises.

Originally posted by Sergei: Since it is about communications and supposed to be given to battalions, I doubt. As I said I did not find it in the text. Maybe Gustav just stands for letter G and so it is something beginning with that. A radio of some kind, most probably. Here is one I found off hand: http://www.radiomuseum.org/dsp_modell.cfm?model_id=15817

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: If anyone can enlighten me on what a "Gustav" device is, I'd be obliged. Could not find it in the text but off-hand I would hazard a guess: the only Gustav Gerät I know is the 800mm railway gun.

Originally posted by Sergei: About the automobiles... it must feel really dumb having to control traffic consisting of a single truck: You don't happen to have on you data about the use of GAZ trucks in the Finnish army ? I have accumulated 1/35 GAZ-AA, GAZ-AAA, GAZ-MM and ZIL(?)-5 truck models and I have drawn blank in my attempts to find out any data about them in Finnish service. The only pictures of them I have seen are from Raate road and the one flattened by a tank in Eastern Karelia.

Originally posted by Sergei: Anyway, if the grenade explosion had been anything like what they in Hollywood often are, his body would have been in thousands of pieces scattered over a square kilometre area. Did the grenade which he survived detonate so that his helmet was facing it, I forget ? Being next to the grenade might be a benefit more than a hazard. Of sorts. The burst pattern of the grenade detonating on the ground does leave a blind zone right next to the grenade where there are less fragments than higher and further away. Also, any substantialish obstacle directs the blast effect away so if the grenade detonated in a teeny-weeny depression or behind a piece of turf (or even your helmet) you might survive the blast even if you were right next to the grenade. Luck is a definitive factor here. And yes, I do think the grenades are a bit on the weak side in CM. But not weak enough to really annoy me. [ July 21, 2004, 01:27 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

IIRC the Germans used a number of captured French halftracks (Kegresse ?). From that I deduct at least the French had some in the inventory prior to 1940.

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles: A big factor is barrel vibration. For precise longer range shooting (ie antitank AP fire), the barrel would have to settle out since it acts like a tuning fork. This applys to most long barrel weapons. I have seen footage of 88mm firing indirect (not AA) and the crewmen are just pounding away. The barrel is elevated beyond 10-15 degrees. In that mode the 88 is like any other field arty piece. On the vibration, I suspect the mount was designed and built to absorb some of the oscillation of the barrel in the deliberately designed dual AA/AT role. The AT role called for aimed shots at slow moving mobile point targets at relatively close range. When the gun controls have been designed to handle optimum ROF and to follow fast moving targets at extreme range I would imagine the overengineering would be more than adequate to compensate for the effects of the inherently slower ROF in AT role. IMO the anecdotal evidence from the recieving end of the 88 would support this premise. On a related note: I hear the 81mm mortar is so stable and accurate you have to deliberately shift it to make the shells scatter. Also, the recoil mechanism and its fluid type (or gas types) would reach a travel limit. The working fluids/gases would heat up from the repeated pressure/cycle. Yet the most frequent failure stories relate to ambient temperatures the gun designers did not envision the piece would be used in. And most of them are from the Eastern Front and not the African front. That would suggest the problem was not heat but cold. Another concern (long term) is barrel wear. Fast firing with smokeless powder leads to rapid barrel wear. I understand that the 88mm was designed so that part of the barrel could be changed because this wear was such a problem. In Death Traps, the author describes how US troops would fire the 105mm howitzer so fast that the rifling would just erode. The crewmen would just line up and heave cased 105mm ammo in as fast as they could. I think all arty services regularly monitored the barrel wear and it was calculated into the firing tables negating some of the adverse affects of it. In direct fire where you monitor the fall of the shot I suspect even a regular crew would be able to compensate for the barrel wear as long as the effect was not erratic. And long before it became erratic the barrel would be scheduled for a change as a matter of procedure.

Originally posted by flamingknives: RoF would be limited by having to observe fall of shot and adjust for range in the ground role, Or by switching targets when you make a kill with the first shot. while AA use is firing into a predicted area as fast as possible with no adjustment of each shot The 88 reloading was semi auto and it had a power rammer auto feeder.

Originally posted by David I: Sergi, The Soviets didn't want our bomber pilots to land in Soviet territory! How much less would Stalin want a Corps or more of Capitalistic, Canuks on his soil?! DavidI Well, Stalin had already killed off most mature male immigrant Communists from Canada and USA by 1938. Mind you, he did let the British pilots to operate in Soviet soil early on. Manpower was not in his to-worry list. It was specialist skills and advanced hardware.

The idea of the attacks during the 9th of June was to make the defending force commit its reserves prematurely and in the 10th of June they launched the offensive proper. This is also the reasons the Soviet histories list the date of the commencement of the attack differently from the Finnish histories.

Originally posted by Andreas: Some aspects of the Italian campaign, e.g. the initial withdrawal after the Salerno landings, were clearly a holding action, designed only to give time to prepare the Winter, and then Gustav lines. As I said. Or do you mean delaying action ? The moving pockets in AG Centre are not holding actions on the other hand. They are just a desperate bid for survival by encircled forces, mostly operating without a connection to each other, or higher HQ. Most of these pockets were destroyed very quickly. True. I used them as an example of a mobile defensive action by the Germans. Apart from the ones already mentioned and the 1st and the 2nd Kharkov and the latter part of the African campaings there were not too many deliberate even semi-voluntary, let alone voluntary defensive widrawals made by the German forces.

Originally posted by Sergei: Definately Germans were capable of working delay operations when they had the forces and favourable terrain. Indeed. Just look at Italy, Lapland or the bocage area. IMO Italy and bocage area are not relevant as they were not delaying actions but holding actions from the start. On the other hand Lapland is a good example, so is AG North actions in the Baltics. I am also inclined to include the moving pockets of the AG Center in this list. While the retreat from VT to VKT gave a lot of terrain to Russians in a week's time, no battalions were lost and the army remained capable of fighting. I doubt this could have been pulled off in Belorus, though. Based on the Finnish "ability" in avoiding massive losses due to capture I have always guestioned the inclusion of POW's in any force tactical effectivness comparisons and studies in general. What I've always wondered is why the old Mannerheim line wasn't used. The old fortifications had been destroyed, but I think it would have been easier to improve and the lakes and swamps would have restricted tanks better in summer. VT line was shorter because of the Viipuri Bay, of course, but then defending Viipuri was going to be impossible. The Winter War experience may have been a factor in it. Or the number of available forces was not enough to conduct the defence, form a reserve AND prepare for what comes next. That is no excuse for the overall lack of preparation though.

Originally posted by Mikko H.: Wasn't Finnish Army supposed to act like Germans in this respect? At least the GHQ's initial reaction in the first week or so after the start of the offensive was to order immediate counter-attacks to recapture the lost positions (which in hindsight can be seen to have little or no chanches of success). It seems to me the Finnish tactics were flexible not by design but by force of circumstances. The force of circumstance brought on the flexibility by design. If you look at the Winter War tactics they were essentially the same. Hold the line at all costs and widraw to another position when it is time to do so. The widrawal bit is what threw the monkey wrench into the Red engine. They had to fight all the way to Viipuri whereas if they had been fighting a standard German defensive play they would have been free to roam among the fleeing defenders once the breach in the defences had been made and the defending force utterly gutted. Success (the seeming lack thereof) of the initial counter attacs does not lie in the "success" but in the way they bought time to move the reinforcements on site. The attacker also wears down so any further developments do not depend only on the defensive forces and how they fare but also how fit the attackers are and how often they have to rotate back. The widrawal has been called the "run across the isthmus" when in fact it was a decently conducted rear guard action. The way I see it the summer of 1944 campaign was a "directors cut" remake of the Winter War, only in a much grander scale.

Originally posted by Sardaukar: Some mistakes made by Finnish GHQ was to have too many units in Eastern Karelia area. I wonder if it was a mistake. IMO it was by design. If Soviet AF interdiction would have been in place, those units would have never arrived to crucial parts of Isthmus battles in time. In occasions, they were thrown into battle almost straight from railroad cars as it was. One of the most serious mistakes the Soviets made was they did not use their overwhelming aerial superiority to interdiction. Then again they may have thought they could take out the reinforcements as they were fed in after they had annihilated the original forces in place. This would have been a sound strategy if the Finnish army had commited itself to a more rigid defensive tactic and had been ground up at or near the MLD. It is fair to assume the Soviet planners thought the Finnish army would have acted like the German army in a similar situation.

Originally posted by Andreas: Accuracy would be less, but it could be brought into action more quickly, and move more quickly to escape counter-barrages. I think ROF would be more affected than accuracy. IIRC the cross section bars - thingies could be lowered so they touched ground keeping the mount relatively steady.

Originally posted by Andreas: they did not have decent infantry training. They may have had decent weapons training, but that is a different matter. True. But when you know how to operate your piece you have one less thing to worry about. And from what I know about the HJ as an organization the members were familiar with the basic drills when they entered the army. In case of the essential workers being pressed into service, the training issue is indeed valid. As for the tactical proficiency of the raw recruits, I'd say the German army had it better than most armies as they incorporated the vets with the new comers in a different manner. Their leaders were not getting better. Also true. But they did have combat experience. For many of the late 44 recruits, the 18 years old guy that I introduced may not have been representative, they had been previously 'UK' status, because of their occupation, so they were factory workers, and a bit older. I was wondering about that. The Marshall observation is of course for a different army, but in the German case, an alternative to individual fire was always there, on squad level. It was the MG42. Much more readily available and better to aim then the US indirect assets. That does not really correlate with the US Army reports of the performance of the German squads, especially on attack. I come back to Jary - when the MG42 went out, the German squad tended to fold. Why is that, if individually they had so much firepower? My suggestion is any or all of bad training, bad leadership, no interest to die for the cause, resulting in a lack of individual drive. Coupled with the will to live and the terror of being captured by the Russians it is understandable the lines crumbeled so spectacularly. Still, the Red Army losses remained high so even when the squads folded when they lost the MG they must have been able to inflict casualties beyond the capabilities of the Kar98. Clearly anecdotal, but to me more convincing then a view based on the doctrine. But that is just where my taste lies. I am also not sure if I would give the squad MG to a rookie. Compared to a vet, he will waste ammo, be less observant, be more likely to jam it, be less effective in bringing fire on target, and be more likely to make any number of mistakes that can get me (never mind him) killed. Rookies make good ammo carriers. Would the vet MG gunner rely on the rookie to spot for him ? He could not do everything himself. I just realized I have seen very few (if any) photos of German MG gun crews dead beside their gun. There are quite a few photos of dead Red Army MG crews beside their gun.

Originally posted by SgtDuke6216: good point, I would have to agree with that. My question is, how many "vets" did the Germans have left towards the end? It couldn't be many due to the Volks units and children concripts.... The point is valid. However, the MG team relied on the rookies to spot and cover it and not just haul ammo for the gun. I very much doubt a vet in any army would leave this kind of a vital task to an untrained, unfit, demoralized rookie who could not asses the development of the tactical situation and identify key terrain features. Besides, the weaponry of the US squad in VN was pretty much what the Germans were aiming for by the end of WWII. Every man in the US squad had a semi/full auto rifle and the SAW was a proper GPMG. [ May 23, 2004, 01:40 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: I agree with Andreas. Worthy of note that 16 weeks of basic training for German soldiers in 1939 was shortened to something like 7 by 1944. I would include physical conditioning to the list of deficiencies of German soldiers by that time - recruits were getting younger, and were probably under-developed, which would also tend to effect the way they shot, or their ability to schlep an MG42. How many of the younger recruits had NOT been involved in the Hitler Jugent movement ? Their physique may have been less satisfactory but AFAIK they had had rather extensive weapons training from early on.

Originally posted by Andreas: I think I'd like to see some evidence based on action, not on numbers of weapons issued or doctrine, before I accept that premise. That bit is ellusive. Do you have any access to numbers of captured semi/full auto small arms taken into use by the German army ? 'can a barely trained, badly led 18-year old with a Stug 44 bring the same firepower on target as a well-trained, well-led, experienced man with a K98? I think the guestion should be "would the Stug 44 (StG ? ) be given to that 18-year old or a more seasoned trooper in the platoon in the first place ?" I would think the MG-42 would be manned by the rookie more likely than a vet, given the way it would attract more attention than a vet would be willing to risk when there are more expendable assets around. Plus hosing down an area with the MG does not require as much skill as rapid aimed fire at point targets with a StG44. We know how the German replacement system worked. How common was it to carry different types small arms within the platoon beyond the Kar98/MP40 combo ? PPsH and other semi/full auto weapons found their way into the inventory. My premise is based on the fact the German front line units tended to increase their FP by what means necessary, including taking up weapons from the enemy, even it was on an ad hoc basis. There is anecdotal evidence (Jary being the most prominent) against it, and I have a hard time believing that the German squad could rely more on its individual members when these were becoming less and less well trained. Not individual members. Individual fire power. Training is indeed an issue but lets not forget how the Soviets solved the equation. They did not have the MG-42 so they handed out the PPsH and other full auto weapons to the raw recruits. Both the Germans and the Soviets were starting to seriously run out of man power by 1944-45. As per your Yassy example way back when the Soviet doctrine was to KO the opposing arty whenever possible. Singling out and dealing with the MG-42 was a natural tactical development. Human wave attacks were a thing of the past. So, with the arty KO'd or relocating, no human wave to hose down with the MG-42 and the MG becomming a prime target everytime it opened up who was killing the Red Army soldiers ? My guess would be that you probably could have observed a similar phenomenon as Marshall observed in the US infantry, i.e. that few men really contributed meaningfully. The presence of the MG42 may well exacerbate this, because it is so powerful just on its own that it could provide a good excuse to the aforementioned 18-year old to just keep his head down and pray that the nightmare ends soon. The Marshall observation is based on a force with abundant indirect firepower at its disposal. Does that correlate well with the German situation most of the time ? The US Army chose to relegate most of the SMG's to cooks, bakers and drivers instead of front line units for crying out loud.

Originally posted by Andreas: Like the photo op during the Ardennes offensive, where on two pictures in a book I am reading it looks as if the German soldiers are carrying M1 Garands? Are you sure they are not the M43 (?) semi-autos ? Both, but it is just something I picked up, so it is at best anecdotal evidence, and weak one at that. Stories like 'the Stug 44 was always in short supply, but I was an officer, so I had one', or a whole formation kitted out with Italian SMGs with no ammo late in 45. Somehow "formation kitted out with PPsh's" would sound better as an example. S.L.A. Marshall rearing his head again. One of these days I'll get around to actually reading one of his works. According to him you could also have given the US soldiers Megadeathblastersofdoom™, or toothpicks, since they were not inclined to use them in any case. IIRC that tendency was written down even in contemporary "Lessons learned" series. But quite apart from that, your line of reasoning is at variance with the late-war Soviet doctrine of emphasising firepower from support weapons incl. tanks and assault guns. One would assume that the intense Red Army love affair with large-calibre direct fire HE guns would actually reduce the need for high personal firepower, since those 122mm guns are busy shooting you on your objective. Doctrinally speaking. Doctrinally speaking the Soviet infantry was predominantly full-auto fitted from 1942 on until 1945. The use of big arsed direct support would indicate IMO the Red Army was low on manpower and used to conserve living force in break through and exploitation phase. Since the German platoon was becoming (with the doctrinal shift towards semi/fullauto individual weapons) less reliant on the platoon/section MG in its firepower the Red Army needed to counter that development as well as the actual MG42 firepower.