Tero

Originally posted by Battlefront.com: Ah... so the Finnish Army had great 1:20k maps covering all of Russia, not just Finnland and the areas taken from in in the Winter War? Gee... wonder why the German's didn't just borrow the übermaps from them? This is propably the most inane respond from you I have ever seen. It is totally irrelevant to what extent the Finnish topographical service was mapping the previously uncharted territories. Practically the entire national service was built up to service the Finnish army (artillery). I assume the German Army topographical service was built up to service the German army. Which fulfilled its task better ? The Finnish artillery was not too happy about the instant maps they got within 48 hours of the recce flight. But they were accurate enough for fire missions as per the procedures of the Finnish artillery. And they were most certainly accurate enough for the use of the infantry. The inaccuracy of the German maps is legendary, especially in the East. IIRC they used the Michelin maps during their campaign in the West when they lacked proper maps. There were no Michelin maps for the Western parts of USSR. I bet German topo maps of their own territory were on a par with anything the Finns had. Just a hunch. No contest. But was their national topographical service built to service the needs of the artillery or was the German artillery using methods which did not count on accurate topographical data being present ? P.S. Your question of who the mortar man was expected, as was your predictable response. I would have been equally unsurprised if the mortar man had been in the British or the German army. Had he been in the Finnish army I would have been surprised. Thankfully other Finns can get their viewpoint accross, from the Finnish perspective, without coming off like a blind nationalist. You once asked me what possible relevance did the Finnish war experience had when discussing the combat mechanics in the Western front. I did not label you a blind nationalist then. Now I'm trying to inject them to a debate concerning the Eastern front when the British and the American war experience are being thrown around as relevant. Am I a blind nationalist if I hint the validity of the British and the American war experience in an Eastern front debate is not as relevant as the Finnish war experience ? [ February 11, 2003, 01:36 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Andreas: Would be a bit too much [iF] [THEN]/[AND] in there for my liking, considering you are chucking TNT about in close proximity to your Kameraden. But maybe I am just not Finnish enough? Well, there are stories about the German front line soldiers wondering how the Finnish troops were not being ordered to take cover in their dug outs when the Finnish artillery was firing strikes a couple of hundred meters from their positions. Apparently the German SOP was to order their troops to take cover when friendly artillery was firing at targets at or near danger-close distance. Or that the German troops specifically requested Finnish artillery should fire the missions which would fall near their own positions. Or how the Germans wondered how on earth the Finnish FO's would order fire missions to targets 100 meters from friendly positions without ranging or registering shots. Let's not even start on the availability of accurate 1:20k maps in Russia, shall we? OK. But I hope you do agree that historical, proven availability of such maps should not be considered to be trivial, incidental or anomalous when speaking about the mechanics of the artillery procedures. BTW: do you have anything on the topographical service of the German army in your fathers notes ? I'd be most interested to read up on it. When 12.PD advanced towards Tikhvin in late 1941, they came across a railway line (!) that was not on their maps, which they no doubt found slightly disconcerting, and worth mentioning in the divisional history. What can I say, the Finnish Army topographical service seems to have been far better than the German one. It would be interesting to compare for example Fremde Heer Ost data they accumulated with the maps available to the troops. I can not believe they did not mount any recce flights and I'd like to know how long it did take for the data (including topographical data) to seep through down to the troops. [ February 10, 2003, 08:00 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Andreas: Can we just agree that it boils down to: a) having a phone line Which was of course very scarse in most armies. the 1943 handbook being correct What was being described was the bare essentials of the Finnish procedure. The real procedure was more versatile. c) the practice being implemented in all of the Wehrmacht, not just the funny bits hanging about in Finland? I believe these "funny bits" which made it all the way to the US Army manual were the guys who hung around the Hürtgen Forest. Also, at the moment you can make an HQ your observation team, and you do get the same effect, albeit not at the 200m distance (no idea what the maximum would be if you have a command range bonus - 50m?). What you describe has zero to do with topographical preparations, since it is observed fire, directed by Mk.I eyeball. Which is not what was being talked about. Completely different issue. You don't even need a map for this. My point is against the supposed need for the mortars to register once they move. Sorry, I was perhaps a bit unclear about that. The phoneline trick can be used. But IF it can not be used THEN it does boil down to the topographical data the force has at its disposal. If you have an accurate 1:20 000 map and you are certain where your mortars are set up you do not need to register. Incidentaly, in which army does/did the mortarman/playtester serve ?] US. Can't say I am surprised.

Originally posted by Andreas: Once the mortar moves, it has to register again. Which it does, just not within the CM battle. At least for the überFinnish mortars there was no need to register within the limits of the CM battle. And apparently the Germans too From Handbook on German Forces WAR DEPARTMENT TECHNICAL MANUAL TM-E 30-451 CHAPTER IV TACTICS 3. Combat in Woods It boils down to the level of topographical preparations. Incidentaly, in which army does/did the mortarman/playtester serve ?

Lets widen the "big boys" frame of reference a bit. This is beginning to be a bit too German/Soviet/US-centric to be holistic and universally true. Originally posted by Battlefront.com: Sure, but by that way of thinking you can say that strategic bombing of oil fields, which in turn reduced the operational and tactical effectiveness of Axis supply and frontline, You better make that German/central European. But the extreme uses of it were reserved for breakthrough operations. And they were wildly successfull at that. Depends what is your scope for wildly succesfull. b. Size: Too, small..... c. Rate of Fire/Density:..... That is generalizing and focusing on the big boys and their ways. For the Finnish arty practises the CM scope the sheaf is too big and the density way too low. Plus the method of firing is wrong. Instead of plain vanilla barrages the firing mode should be plain vanilla fire strike of X rounds. One can argue how much effect that has on a typical CMBB battle though. I would argue it is quite small. I would argue the effect is quite significant. Depending on whose artillery doctrine you are using as your frame of reference. For example, I am playing a battle right now where little artillery is available and LOS is highly restricted. Therefore, this has little to no impact on the battle I am playing. That is your subjective opinion. Not true. Because of the shortage of tubes, shortage of ammo, shortage of FOs, and generally overwhelming calls for artillery... penny packeting of artillery assets was the norm. Again, depends what is your frame of reference. I would agree penny packeting artillery assets was the norm if you are talking about the limitations in the allocated rounds per fire mission or some such. Or when there historically there simply was nothing else but a single battery available for support. When you are talking about detaching single batteries as dedicated fire support assets as a norm then you are adhering to the Anglo-American frame of reference. Are you assuming a battalion is more accurate than a battery ? This might come as a big surprise to you but at least the Finnish subalterns were hammered that a battery firing 24 rounds is more effective than a battalion firing 12 rounds. By the same token a battalion firing 24 rounds was more effective than a battery firing 12 rounds. The Finnish artillery could use a 100m x 100m converging sheaf for a single battery as easily as for a battalion. Note where this was "hammered" into him... the classroom. In the field things were often different. I am not saying that this means it was more effecient, but rather that it was more practical and therefore more common. Again, depends what you use as a frame of reference. It may have been more practical and therefore more common for the Anglo-American forces but that does not apply for example to the Finnish army. Plus, not all FOs in CM represent batteries in the Artillery Regiment. Some represent the 2 guns located in the Heavy Weapons Company for example. The two guns that would, I might add, be the most likely to fire on targets during a CM sized battle. And this disregards the Finnish practises and puts them in a disadvantage because the CM modelling assumes Battalion/Division assests were organizationally slower to respond in general in a CM scale battle. Mind you, I've had a Soviet 152mm FO get a 27min delay (on a target in LOS to boot !!!) in a 25min battle. I do not rightly know if that is realistic or not by judging by the effect it had on the game I'd say it was less than realistic. Soviet artillery is generally cheaper per tube/round than German stuff. However, this changes around 1943 (forget when exactly) when Soviet artillery flexibility increased rather dramatically. The ammo load out for the Soviets is ahistorically small. 20-25 rounds for a 152mm battery in an assault scenario is way too small compared to what they churned out in real life. However, since this is direct spotting you are talking about it was felt that the greater the delta the more the FO would have to rely upon calculations than eyeballing it. This however is not how the real life procedures were adversely affected. A 100m (or even a 500m for that matter) shift does not mean they have to use several minutes calculating the "new" firing solution. If you fire without LOS or TRP then your guns could be off by hundreds of meters and you wouldn't know it until you got into LOS. Depends on the topographical data available, the effectiveness of your procedures and the proficiency of your troops. Charles had some firing data somewhere (I don't have it) that showed something like the average mean error being close to 250m off target. This may have been relevant in CMBO but not in CMBB since the Anglo-American and German procedures are not the norm in the Eastern Front scale. This is really not at all bad from a gunnery standpoint, but if you are trying to hit a small target... well... it frankly sucks but is realistic. It sucks to be realistic but you are using the wrong frame of reference. If the Anglo-American (and even German) artillery was off by 250m on average when not having LOS on the target point it does not mean the the deviation was always 250m, any deviation occured by default or that it was even a norm for some artillery branches to be affected by it to this kind of deviation to a significant degree.

Originally posted by Soddball: However, if that English person tries to learn (for example) Finnish, they will struggle more because Finnish is descended from a language which grew up in central Russia. In linquistic terms: Finnish is totally diffrent from the Romanic languages. Nothing to do with the place of origin. For one the vocabulary is totally different. You can not even guestimate what a Finnish word is in English from its appearance. With French, English, Spanish and German you are in the ball park. You can even actually understand Russian based on the Romanic vocabulary. The conjugation is totally different. One full page of Finnish text can fill up three pages when translated into English. And so on.... [ February 07, 2003, 02:27 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by ZealotBurner: My forces were all individuals. The Allies were 1 KV-1, 2 Plt of T-34, 3 Plt of T-26 and a handful of single tankettes, and of course a little over 1000 inf. didn't bother to see exactly the OOB. Like I said I am not claiming this to be a bug or anything really out of the ordinary other then a pretty good string of bad luck. I've been entertaining an idea about incredible coincidensies of the hit propability of vehicles belonging to a platoon targeting the same target simultaneously. The Borg spotting is there, the accuracy enhancements given by platoon leader bonuses are there. Could it be that the individual vehicles in a platoon get undue advantages in the form of increased hit/kill propability when they are targeting the same target simultaneously ? Reminder to self, next time I get a string of good luck report it on this post also, then head straight to Las Vegas. Ditto.

Please give some details on the forces. Are your tanks single or did you purchase a platoon ? Are the enemy tanks single or are they a part of a platoon ? Also, are multiple tanks (from the same platoon) targeting the same target ?

Originally posted by Holien: Ahhhahhh I have forced Tero to break cover. I knew talking of snow within ear shot of a Finn would get his interest. What do you guys know about snow ? All the technicians I have met who have been forced to come over here marvel the damned thing. Perhaps I should start bolling it and selling it to you...... Tero what about a turn or two? Send me a set up. Please.

Originally posted by Holien: Now off to work in the snow blizzard here. The village has had it's Gas cut off two nights and I have to wade through two inches of deep snow... (Yeah, Yeah, I know what you are thinking, but this is the UK!!!) Which propably means light snow fall with a hint of wind.

And more Finnish links: from http://www.angelfire.com/falcon/sevain/ [ January 29, 2003, 05:10 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by John D Salt: ISTR that one of SPI's tactical boardgames -- it might have been the original "Sniper!" -- had an interesting scheme whereby, once a side had reached its "preservation level" of casualties, its victory conditions changed completely, and victory points were awarded only for getting your remaining people out OK. I would be interested to see if a similar scheme could be made to work in CM. That would be interesting. The "luck vs skill" debate indicated there is something to be done to the less than perfect scoring which uses only casualties and the flags as yardsticks.

Originally posted by Soddball: Ye gods, another Finn grog. Is there nothing to do in Finland but read books about WW2? With the weather we've been having lately what else CAN we do ? I think it's actually Tero using 400 different log id's Nah. On the subject of wrong BMP's he missed one: the Finnish 20mm AA gun has the 37mm AT gun small picture in the tool bar.

Originally posted by Tuomas: I think that the professor refers to the possible bombing of Pietari-Äänislinna railroad. I think not. The text at least separates between the fear of the bombing as a real military peril and the reasons for making peace mere hours before the collapse of the Finnish forces as a political decision. Besides, why would aspirations to join the Fenno-Ugrig tribes together be in par with a simple military operation of bombing a rail line in this context ? Why did he even link that up with the possibility of the Western powers joining in in the side of Finland at this early stage ? The way I read the remark it means the Finnish desire to get hold of the territory inhabited by Fenno-Ugric tribes coupled with the loss of terrain as a result of Winter War made it possible for Stalin to maintain a "legitimate" hostile attitude towards the Finns without being seen as a sore loser. And it also made sure the Finns would not remain neutral later on with that kinds of bones to pick. I know the Soviets (and to some extent the Russians) were (are) prone to make these kinds of cryptic statements and it may well be the original statement loses some in the translation. I think there was a great fear of bombing in the soviet leadership After the early debacle that could well be true. Thanks for the link BTW. Most interesting. Maybe they had been reading too much of Harris! You mean Douhet ? Harris did not pop up until during WWII as the penultimate bomber commander.

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa: When were your christmas present books published? Some time during the last Milennia ? One interesting passage in the URL caught my eye: They wanted to end the war so Finland could still harbour its dreams of occupying Eastern Karelia as well as have a grudge against themselves for taking the ground they took as a result of the war ? If this is true then they (Stalin) were in fact banking on Finland winding up in a conflict with them and they could (hope to) finish up the business (of occupying the entire country) at a later date. This is supported by the fact USSR continued to harrass and pressure the Finnish government in a very antagonistic fashion. And they did bug the Germans about the "Finnish issue" repeatedly. They could have been pushing us into the Germans lap and making sure the Germans knew they were doing that. [ January 07, 2003, 04:08 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Olle Petersson: The whole thing started with a demand from Stalin for Finland to give up a large part of Karelia (to move the border away from Leningrad) The portion was not that large. And it would have moved the border only from the shore of the Gulf of Finland in the mainland Isthmus (along with the islands). In the Eastern part of the Isthmus the border would have run as before. What would have happened had the Finns complied in the first place? The same thing that happened to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Increased political pressure until a coup would have been staged and the new government would have seeked to join the USSR. If this would have appeaced Stalin and prevented war, then the Soviet army would not have "gotten it's **** together" in 1940, and therefore probably done even worse in 1941. Only Hitler would not have dared attack in 1941. He would have focused on taking out Britain and only after subduing her would he have turned East. Germany might have managed to take Moscow as well as gone further on the other fronts. By late '42 Ural might have been the frontline... If Hitler had attacked in 1941. But I doubt he would have done that since the Red Army was still an unknown force to him.

Originally posted by Frunze: But from his actions during the Stalin-Hitler pact, it sometimes seems that he was such a moron he didn't see it. I'd rather say he refused to acknowledge the fact HIS projection about the flow of events of things to come was less than perfect. He had calculated war with Germany would not start that early and was, as you say, in denial when the attack came. He brought the borders of the USSR and the Reich in contact along a broad front In their view they bought space for time at bargain basement price. , pissed off every potential ally and neutral state, Sweden did not count, Turkey was not going to do anything. Finland was about the only potential ally or neutral country on USSR western border who was pissed off needlessly. The Baltic states had been gobbeled up in no time with little effort. Down south the Bessarabia incident had enraged people and most, if not all, governments had already been replaced with German puppets or were far more willing participants than Finland ever was. supplied the German military with raw materials, gave Germany the possibility of taking on one front at a time. Concur. He bought time, sure, but what did he do with it? He gained a little territory - which was lost very quickly anyway during Barbarossa. True. The way the Germans handled the local populace was a god sent gift for Stalin. With a little less ardent racial agenda on the table the Germans would have had a united Europe in their hands 60 years ahead of schedule. [ December 28, 2002, 01:47 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Anybody know if there are Finnish Front mods for the minefield signs and for the Russian surrender voice where they speak German and/or other such Germanantizations which do not affect gameplay but are an eyesore ?

Originally posted by Frunze: Does your last point imply that Stalin realized that Germany might turn on him at some point? I'm under the impression. Poland, the main anti-Russian (if not anti-Soviet) antagonist from the 20's was done away with and the Archangelsk expedition in the 20's during the civil war had shown how hard it is to operate from a distance so I doubt he took anybody else except Germany that seriously in his short/intermediate term plans.

Originally posted by Frunze: And it would've been difficult for Britain to spare forces for a really large-scale intervention in Finland at that point. And they might have been too late in arrival anyway. But if they had gotten the invitation they might have gotten as far as the Swedish iron ore deposits just in time to see the Finns get eliminated. But if the Winter War had continued - it ended in March 1940 - British involvement might have increased somewhat. The problem was Chamberlain and Dalladier had made promises to their own to make up for Poland and IF the Finns had actually asked for troops they would have had to do something concrete. Stalin on the other hand was not too keen on having to enter the war in earnest at that stage. He was busy rearranging his sphere of influence as per the agreement with the Germans and he was not prepared to shift his focus too far ahead of schedule. (IIRC they were already supplying some weapons.) Along with the rest of the world. Most of it came in too late though. Which might have interfered with Hitler's plans for the invasion of Norway, which took place in April 1940, one month after the end of the Winter War. That plan was a counter plan to pre-empt any and all attempts on his supply of iron ore. These plans depended heavily on surprise, and involved naval attacks that Britain probably coulda messed up with advance warning. So why did the Anglo-French forces get creamed then ? With the Home Fleet properly deployed they could have thrown a monkey wrench in the German plans. If Britain's attention - and the Royal Navy - was drawn to Scandinavia earlier by even a small intervention in Finland, they might have noticed the preparations for the German invasion. I doubt neither the Anglo-French or the German strategists had even considered the ore before it was being bypassed when routes for the relief force were being considered. One possibility: this may have been a factor in the USSR's decision to negotiate peace with Finland. The Winter War was going somewhat better for them by this point, and they were wearing down Finland by attrition. But if Hitler demanded that Stalin lay off Finland in order to not mess up his plans for Norway.... Highly unlikely. Hitler did not make any demands to lay off IRL. He was in no position to do so. Finland was in Stalins sphere of influence fair and square. Stalin ended the war because every passing hour increased the potential of the Finnish leaders making a formal request for help in form of troops. That would have meant Chamberlain and Dalladier would have been forces to give Stalin a final note (just like they had given Hitler one in Poland) and soon after that they would have been forced to deglare war on the USSR (or abdicate on the spot). While the deglaration of war would propably been a pro forma affair it would have placed Stalin in a very isolated position if and when Germany had beaten the Anglo-French forces silly. In short: a between USSR and the Anglo-French coalition did not suit anybody elses plans except Hitlers. Stalin had already made a deal with the devil so he could not afford to have more than one enemy at the time when his army was being proven to be less than adequate for the job in front of it in the near future.

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer: The Finns were doing quite well on their own, Until February when the Red Army got its **** together and started making progress. The lack of materiel was starting to hurt us then really bad. so the addition of British/French forces with modern tanks and aircraft would have meant a serious problem for the bumbling Russian forces. One major reason the Finns did not actually ask for the help was the fact they did not trust the foreign troops to be as good as the Finnish troops in combat. The Germans BTW got rated below the Finnish troops in most respects when the German troops fought side by side with Finnish troops. I'm sure a swarm of anti communist volunteers would have joined up from all over Europe. Well, the swarm that actually joined the cause was not that great.

Originally posted by Quintus: Given that Russia attacked Finland very early in the "Phoney War / Sitzkrieg" period. It makes me wonder whether or not the not-so-subtle German backchannel diplomacy might have born fruit : "Look Britain, we all know who the real enemy to Western Christian Society is here... it's those stinking Reds." Etc. etc. Chamberlain was in charge at the time and I think even he would not have allowed the Munich agreement and the broken promises of "peace in our time" slide. It was after all he who instigated and authoriced the failed Norway expedition which in direct relation to the relief mission to Finland. If Finns had asked for help his hands would have been bound. Brittain and France would have had to fight both the Germans and the Soviets. Given that Anti-communist feeling was quite high at the time (The General Strike was not that long past in many people's memory - Churchill for one) and Hitler had attacked Poland, rather than somewhere closer to home, it's not inconceivable that some sort of 'accomodation' could have been arrived at. I doubt that. Finland was peanuts to them. The Swedish iron ore was not. As a vital strategic materiel to the Germans they would have been in an advantage to get hold of it and having a choke hold on the Germans. What actually happened shows clearly that the Soviets did not wish to enter the war in opposide sides with Brittain and France, despite their rethorics. Stalin knew he had to secure allies for the future. He had to avoid winding up in a situation he could not back down from. Even allowing for a possibility the Germans and the Anglo-French coalition to have started negotiations would have left him in a severe disadvantage. Britain and France had been appeasing like nobodies business for years prior to this and if there had been any straw like hope of 'peace in our time' to cling to, they may well have leapt for it. Not at this stage. They had wound up their population for war against Germany with quite powerful propaganda. To back down from that would have been illogical. Then again, you never know what would have happened had the Maginot Line been finished and some of the hard lessons learned in France about tactics and the inadequacy of Allied equipment taken place on someone else's soil. That means the Anglo-French forces would have been beaten in Norway/Sweden not in France. Even so that would have meant emasculation and capitulation, propably for both the British and the French. I'm vehemently anti-Nazi in my personal views but I do appreciate that to someone in 1939 without first hand knowledge of Nazi oppression, Herr Hitler seemed like a 'Solid bloke who had put Germany back on her feet and didnt like the Bolshies as much as the rest of us'. Hell, the Abdicated King met him for tea... That nice, solid bloke had absconded Tshekoslovakia and carved up Poland. With strategic interests at stake the British and the French could not start negotiating with this character. Not after all that. The other 'What If?' that I wonder about is what would have happened if the re-occupation of the Rhineland had been opposed by Britain and France. Hitler is later said to have said that he'd've backed down and postponed his plans for a while... An interesting notion. By that time he would have had his army and more importantly the navy all built up. We are lucky he got greedy too soon.

Originally posted by Olle Petersson: Given that Hitler's main goal was to conquer the European Soviet union, I think he'd gone a long way to make peace and form an alliance with UK (and possibly also make peace/cease fire with France). One major snare in that scenario: the British and the French had already deglared war on Germany. They came within days of deglaring war on USSR, or at least coming to blows with the Soviet troops. What complicated things was the fact the Finnish government did not ask for help and the Swedes did not want any foreign troops on their soil. Had the Finns asked for help that would pre-empted the peace settlement which Stalin had to agree to to avoid from having to potentially fight the British and the French troops in Finnish soil. Chamberlain was at the end of his tether and after Poland he could not let promises and assuarances of help slide without committing a political suicide in the process. Then Germany, aided by Finland and UK and cheered on by Sweden, would have started the advance on USSR a bit sooner, and Fall Gelb would have been postponed (if not cancelled all together). By that time Finland would have been a Soviet republic, Sweden entangeled in fighting against the French, the Britts and possibly even the Germans and the Soviets. In any case Sweden would have been ravished. The fate of Fall Gelb would have been down to the actual result of the fighting. Judging by the fate of the Norwegian expedition I expect the Germans and the Soviets would have been victorious no matter how large the forces engaged would have been. What would happen from there on I can't tell. Perhaps Japan would use the turmoil to invade Asian USSR. After Lake Hasan and the other reverses they suffered ? I doubt they would have entered the scene before the Soviets had actually collapsed.

Originally posted by BulletRat: In November 1939 Russia attacked Finland (a then neutral country) without a declaration of war, which almost brought England to the point of declaring war on Russia. Once Germany attacked the low countries it brought the focus of attention off Russia and back to Germany - however I'm wondering IF England did declare war on the Soviet Union, what would have been the outcome and where would we stand today? Had England and France done that I think the following would have happened: The strategic focus would have been shifted North. As the main objective of the Anglo-French expedition would have been to secure Swedish iron ore and the Russo-German effort to prevent that a major campaing would have devastated Denmark, Norway Sweden and Finland and most propably left Western Europe basically defenseless (BEF and major French forces devastated up North) against the German attack which would have surely followed. If the Anglo-French alliance had not fallen apart before the attack I'd expect France would have been rolled up as per what really happened and England would have been forced to seek peace because of lack of manpower after costly campaing up North and in Western Europe. The only wild card is Roosevelt. He may have been forced to accelerate his efforts to bring USA to war prematurely which would either have ended up in the anti-war fraction getting the upper hand and USA sitting it out entirely. Or the USA would have been forced to commit its forces in Europe and suffer the fate of France and England in the battlefield forcing the US forced to be widrawn and Roosevelt deposed. That would have left the entire Europe in the hands of Stalin and Hitler to divide up as they pleased. They would have fallen out eventually and I think Stalin would have come out on top and in control of entire Europe. This because of with his better resource management and experiences from the Winter War under the Red Army belt the Red Army would have been properly revised without Barbarossa fouling Stalins plans. Where would we stand today ? In Europe we would propably be dead or red.

Originally posted by Battlefront.com: If this was an issue of paramount importance, we would know about it. Move to Contact, Assault, and Advance were all born from user feedback. We saw no such push to have a "Fallback" order, and I for one think that is more than a little relevant. Microsoft is on record for stating that the reason for the lack of security in MS operating systems is the fact the customers did not demand it in the past. The Withdraw command is the commnad designed for such situations, and it of course is not to be used lightly. With one very distinct disadvantage: you can only use it to move in one general direction. I still do not undertand the reasoning why it is allowed to be directed only at the friendly base line egde of the map. Lets assume you are conducting an envelopment and all of a sudden you need to pull the force back to the side in a hurry. In a totally FUBAR situation your attacking force is basically dead meat as they will only Widraw towards the defenders positions you have been enveloping and any other mode of movement is ineffective, too slow or otherwise plain suicidal. For other situations, combos of existing orders works quite well. What combos? Totally depends on the situation. No one combo fits all. Perhaps. I still do not like the idea I have to order my men to cease laying a suppressive fire, turn their back at the enemy and move away from them. Having them use bounding overwatch when attacking is easy. Having them use bounding overwatch when pulling back is almost suicidal, what with all the command delays. Would it be nice to have a Reverse Advance type order, with a bit of hasty, fractional covering fire? Sure. But is it necessary? If it was there would be dozens of threads with hundreds of posts on this Forum specifying and documenting the need for this command. The feedback isn't there, so either it isn't really necessary OR the bulk of the 11,000 registered users on this Forum have missed something major. I think there would be howls of discontent if the the tanks could not reverse and they would have to resort to using the advance command in the appropriate direction. Or more to the point: why is there now a shoot'n scoot order for armour but no equivalent for infantry ? I don't know what else to say, other than to advise planning withdrawals better. Have positions that allow quick disengagement from potential enemy LOS, keep HQs nearby, don't put units in positions of isolation, and above all do NOT wait until the last minute to pull back. Getting in a jam is not anybodys bussiness but the players. But the issue is not that. The issue is the lack of proper tools to conduct a widrawal.