Tero

Have you tried using MIME instead of 8-bit when you are sending your messages ? And you could always zip the game files.

There is a another thread on this at http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=23;t=002152

To infinity.... and beyond !!!

Originally posted by Cameroon: Yes, vehicles can and will move off-map due to morale problems. Under human control, yes. However they seem to be MUCH less likely to do so than infantry. I was in dire staights with that pesky KV-1 against the AI and when it started reversing towards the edge of the map I thought I had driven it off. Infantry was running off the map like grazy so I thought I would not have to use any more resources to kill that heavy sucker. No such luck. Once it hit the map edge it turned and kept on reversing at the very edge of the map. Most annoying. I think someone (aka_tom?) posted about how the AI replotted a vehicle of his in a traffic jam off-map (morale of the story, unless fixed stay away from the edge ). But what about troops totally under AI control ? Are they immune to the "drive off the map because I am too scared" routine ?

Originally posted by Foxbat: Komsomolets Oh, man ! When you can't get it right you can't get it right. But I seriously doubt a dinky little Komso could pull a several tonne AA gun, so that wouldn't solve the untowed AA gun issue. True. It would solve the überFinnish untowed any-gun issue.

Originally posted by Sardaukar: ...like Molotov's Coctail. Not to mention Molotovs Bread Basket.

Originally posted by Engel: Sounds suspiciously like something that was made up after the fact to boost troop morale. I think it was not concoted for propaganda purposes. There are several similar remarks of that kind we Finns cherish, both from RL and fiction written after the war. Väinö Linnas "The Unknown Soldier" (about the CMBB period ) is especially well known and quoted. Some of the Finnish remarks heard in the game are directly from that book. More Winter War remarks that spring to mind off hand: In Trotters "A Frozen Hell" there is a story about a British/American correspondent who went on tour to inspect the carnage after the Raate road battles were over and he wrote down how a Finnish soldier tallying the Russian KIA remarked "The wolves will eat well this year." And a Russian general, forget who, is supposedly on record for saying "We gained just enough ground to bury our dead." [ November 11, 2002, 07:21 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Spook: The US Army shortfall in dealing with trenchfoot in late 1944 is undeniable, tero. However, it must be taken in perspective. Not making the US Army look bad is not the proper perspective. We should be looking at this issue dispasionately. The Finnish politicians directly caused needless casualties when they opted for a shoestring budget all through the 30's. This meant that when the feces hit the ventilation there was a basic shortage of every kind of arms and type of munition except for the basic infantry small arms. Had there been enough artillery and AT assets and munitions the Winter War tale could be even more lobsided than it is today. Sound tactics and doctrine developed to match the prevailing conditions by the Finnish military prevented the lack of proper amounts of supplies, weapons systems and munitions from becoming the downfall of the Finnish army. One of the pilars of the Finnish army was the high regard for the wellfare of each and every individual soldier. This sprung from the fact that with only 3,5 million inhabitants the Army could not afford ANY casualties due to sloppy management of the basic needs of the individual soldiers. A soldier down due to frostbite or trenchfoot was everybid as serious, actually even more so, than a soldier down due to enemy action. Even when they could not supply him with the latest weaponry they made sure he could at least get a hot meal and take care of his personal gear when not in combat. From their point of view it did not matter if the soldier had only 10 rounds instead of 100 in his pockets if he was in the condition to actually fire those 10 shots and not down due to trenchfoot and unable to fire the 100 shots. Incidentaly, as late as the mid-80's it was formally forbidden to wear socks when on a march. You were supposed to use the "rag" (similar to the one which was used during the war) because when used properly it could absorb more sweat without irritating the foot and it was easier to maintain during breaks than a sock. The US Army on the other hand had an abundance of resources, including human resources, but it seems the US Army as an institution did not believe the wellfare of the individual soldier was in the interest of the common good of the institution. Under extreme conditions that is. First off, the US Army experience of extended wartime campaigning in combined cold and wet weather was very limited. The only prior experience was for soldiers who served in Italy in the 1943-44 winter, and these were in the extreme minority (the US 3rd, 36th, & 45th Divisions) of divisions deployed on the NW European front. Yet, from what I have read, the decision to ship munitions instead of proper gear for the troops was a deliberate one made quite high up in the chain of command. That would indicate they were prepared to sustain further casualties to the elements. 90 000 equals what, 9 divisons at 10 000 men a pop. With casualties like that some 60% of the entire Finnish army OOB would have been out of comission. It might seem straightforward in hindsight that the US Army planners should have paid attention to the East Front experience, or more to the Italian front. But in hindsight, "should" and "did" don't seem to match here. Further consider that even in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy, German Tiger I tanks (and Panthers in Italy) had been encountered in battle by US forces. In theory, such prior engagements should have accelerated US armor development and "doctrines" to counter, but again, the lessons were learned the hard way. Tech-spec developments as such are not inside the scope of this debate. As to the presumed abundance of supply, here again, one must remember that the sudden expansion of theater operations from Normandy to the West Wall, and with limited availability of high-capacity ports in France and Belgium until after October, challenged the delivery of supplies more than what otherwise might be assumed. And in the early fall of 1944, within 12th Army Group, it was the "judgement call" of Gen. Bradley that winter clothing & shoes take lower priority in delivery than the standards of "bullets, beans, and gas." Because at that pre-winter timeframe, hope still remained with Bradley and other higher Allied commanders that the German army on the West Front was only a few weeks from total collapse. This brings up the basic gear as a part of the OOB of the respective infantry platoons. What did they carry with them to shelter them from the elements ? IIRC the Germans carried ponchos that could be attached into (leaky, flimsy) two man (larger ?) tents. There was no way to heat that edifice except with the body heat. The Finnish army platoon carried a tent (or a plywood equivalent) which housed a half platoon. It came with a stove for heating (good also for cooking). What kind of arrangement did the US Army use ? Being motorized I would expect the US Army was not burdened with issues pertaining hauling the men and their stuff around. The Finnish infantry was horse powered so they had to carry most necessities with them when in the field. As to the Finnish example, why should one be surprised about the development of methods to combat trenchfoot being more extensive and in place by wartime? The winters are typically longer in Finland, with heavier snows and colder temperatures. Even in the preceding prewar years, how could this had been missed by the Finnish high command? Indeed. But when looking at the tech-spec development of the respective armies the Finnish army was (supposedly) at the lower end of the food chain. Keeping the men (pool of which was VERY limited) fit for duty under all conditions was of prime importance when they could not get the latest high-tech gizmos. Lets look at it this way: the FP of an American squad was impressive on paper. Each man carried a semi-auto rifle. The Finnish squad had bolt action rifles, LMG's and SMG's (the ratio between semi/full auto and bolt action weapons would go semi/full auto heavy in front line units quickly during combat when captured arms were taken up to give more firepower). Throw in prolonged trenchfoot conditions (in the Finnish front even summer time because of the boggy/marshy conditions in several sectors) and an equal number of combat casualties, say 3 men. Both squads start out with 10 men. Subtracting the 3 combat casualties we are left with 7 men in each squad. Now take out the casualties due to the elements (frostbite and trenchfoot). Say, Finns nil, Americans 2. That leaves the Finns with 7 men in the squad and the Americans with 5 men in the squad. The Americans still have 1 SMG, 1 LMG and 3 M1 semi-autos but the Finns have taken a few extra LMG's and semiauto's during the engagement so they now have 2 SMG's, 3 LMG's and 1 semiauto and 1 bolt action rifle. Now, lets reinforce the squads to full strength. Finns 3, Americans 5 men. After a few days lull in the fighting but similar weather conditions the Finns are still at full strenght but the Amis have lost yet another 2 men (the old hands) to frostbite and trenchfoot. The ammo resupply is on the blink. The Amis have what they carry (say, 150 rounds each). The Finns have what they carry but they get resupply when they rummage through the enemy fallen and they retreive a Maxim in the process. The squads are thrown into combat again.The Finns have 7 veterans and 3 regular troops (all fit) and sport 1 HMG, 2 SMG's, 3 LMG's, 1 semiauto and 2 (actually 4) bolt action rifles while the Amis have 3 veterans and 5 regulars, (all of whom suffer different degree of exposure) and sport 1 SMG, 1 LMG and 6 M1 semi-autos. Which of the squads do you think can keep up the FP and act effectively in the upcoming engagement ? In effect, for a nation like Finland, cold-weather wartime preparations were far more "institutional" than for a nation like the USA. Certainly, parts of the USA (the 48 states) get cold too in winter, but in northern army stations, I rather doubt that troops were put through exercises that kept them out in the field in severe cold for any more than a few days. That doesn't equate to what was going to be experienced with soldiers put on the line for weeks on end in the West Front in 1944-45. True. But that does not mean it can not be foreseen and dealt with accordingly beforehand. Unless of course you calculate you can afford a certain number of inevitable casualties to the elements. Which would cripple a smaller army. So in sum, tero, while the Finns could outperform most others in checking the ill effects of cold weather to its soldiers, this was in response to geographic and climatic conditions that would almost always ensure severely cold winters within Finland. Were the USA in sum total subjected to the same kinds of prewar climates on a consistent basis, without regional "gradation" of the winter weather, the prewar US response would have probably been comparable. Agreed. But when engaged in combat for years such needless casualties to elements seems to show a certain degree of disrespect the professionals had towards the "citizen soldiers". [ November 11, 2002, 03:46 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

On a related note: Will AFV's under AI control reverse off the map unintentionally ? I did a QB and in it I was about to drive a KV-1 under AI control off the map and once it hit the map edge it started reversing along the edge of the map apparently until it rallied enough to come forward some distance from it.

Originally posted by redwolf: Actually high rarity for a captured tractor would be OK in my opinion. The überFinns did not have any gun tractors but the captured Komosomolets's (Komosomolets', Komosomoletses ? ), all 184 of them, so that would rather cancel out the rarity on them. If they ever make it into the game that is.

Originally posted by Spook: Comradeship is certainly a factor, but it isn't a blank check, and any attempts to assess nationality to inherent "resistance to combat exhaustion" is going to gain the same ground with BF as it has before --- zero. I do not think nationality inherently predisposes anybody to be superior to everybody else. However, if we look at for example trenchfoot and frostbite occurrances in various armies there is a marked tendency. The Germans suffered from them in the East during the first winter. The Americans suffered (IIRC) over 90 000 casualties to trenchfoot alone as late during the winter of 1944-45 eventhough they must have been avare of the dangers by simply observing the other combatants and their experiences. I have not seen any firm figures on the cases of trenchfoot and frostbite in the Finnish army but I think can be counted with a 3 or low 4 digit number from 1939-45. Given the superior supply system of the Americans I am forced to conclude there is something in the fact the Finns being Finns could avoid trenchfoot and frostbite better than the Americans. This is because the Finnish society as a whole was much more rural back then than it is now and practically everybody knew the importance of keeping your body warm and your feet dry at all times. The Finnish army had half squad tents and mini-stows to keep them warm. No matter what the situation was the availability of proper accomodation was one of the first things the Finnish troops built up when they settled down for any longer period of time. Well, actually the first thing to be built when entrenching was almost always a sauna. I think this kind of nationality based aptitude does exist. But even a Finnish foot fells wictim to trenchfoot if not properly prevented or treated. But would the Finns had shown the very same level of tenacity if deployed to fight out in the North African desert or in the jungles of Burma, without knowing why they were being sent to such places priorhand? One can only speculate, but never presume with certainty. Well, I can say for certain that when the Finnish troops went over the 1939 border there was a marked drop in the zeal of the troops. There were even occurances where troops refused to go over the old border. Then again in 1944 (after the influx of proper infantry AT weapons) the zeal returned when the fate of the entire country was at stake again. But isn't comradeship enhanced by fighting alongside familiar faces in a unit? What if the unit takes severe losses in a short period of time, on a repeat basis, such that within a platoon, there's no more than one or two familiar faces not only amongst the original unit members, but even amongst the first round of replacements? Could an "old hand" veteran who's still around truly maintain the same level of "comradeship" as before? That can't be assumed as absolute. I would not dismiss that off hand. It is not absolute but given the differences in the initial formation of the units and replacement procedures in different armies I'd say there might be something to this. The Finnish army brought its fallen home whenever possible. If at all possille the Finnish troops were even willing to risk further casualties to recover a fallen comrades body so it dould be transferred home for burial. On the other hand the entire Finnish doctrine was to geared so the use of costly frontal assaults would be the last resort. In a reservist unit where the CO is his messangers neighbour (and has been for the last 30 years) and where he knows everybody else on a first name basis from civvy street this kind of behaviour is understandable. What is more in a system like this mounting losses tend to make the men more resolute and this is one of the reasons why the Finnish army was so tenacious during Winter War. I know the WWI buddy regiments were detrimental to morale in the eyes of the Western military leaders but I think they were detrimental only because of the way they were used (up), not because of the inherent fallacies of seeing your mates get killed by a single, long burts of MG fire. ADDENDUM: The age of the combatants as a factor. I think a 19 year old can be more of a zelot than a 35 year old father of 4. But given his experience in life that 35 year old will propably be more resilient to mental stress than the 19 year old. [ November 08, 2002, 03:46 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Spook: Just to note, tero, that my "Finns being wimps" lead-off note in my previous post was tongue-in-cheek. There are no sources, of course, because I wasn't serious about it. I know. Furthermore, it's a completely valid question if the "60 days" makes enough consideration for "background factors" that may drive soldiers on, especially on the East Front where hardship was an extremely common currency. True.

Lets bump this baby up with some pictures I found while doing other research.

Originally posted by Foxbat: Before we get on the BUG trail, it seems to me that these guns would not be pulled in a CM scale enviroment. These are intended for static airdefence stuff and would in a CM battle be used in preplaced positions. Looks like a design decision to me The Soviets did not apparently know this when they hauled along their 76mm AA guns as a part of their divisional OOB with them to be captured in the great excirclement battles during Winter War (and which BTW were still used as training guns in the Finnish coastal arty in mid 80's).

Originally posted by Wol: Komsomolets tractors are not towing vehicles for medium AA guns! Nor are Komintern, Voroshilovets or STZ 3/5 as far as I know (Though all but the Komsomolets tractor probably could). The komsomolets I have never seen tow anything bigger than a 76 field gun, and usually 76 regimental guns or 45mm ATG. A YAG 10 Heavy truck would be a suitable prime mover. As far as I can tell its just a BUG. ANd a rather large one! You are missing the point. With no Komsomolets tractor (and/or horsies) in the game we überFinns are left with nothing to tow our guns with. The Soviets at least have their M5 HT's. BFC please fix or somefink..... BTW: the Komsomolets could tow a PAK40. But only just. [ November 07, 2002, 07:30 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Spook: Well, I'm compelled to monkey-wrench your monkey wrench, tero, and say that "105 days of front line action" is not sufficiently compelling. What are your sources on this ? In fact, as will be related further below, one could even speculate that the Finns were actually wimps. How so? Please bear with me later on below. But first, I must return to one of John's original quotes: Lay on, McSpook !!! It is a bit unclear if the 60 days of combat is continuous or scattered over a period of up to a year. The Finnish troops were engaged in continous front line conditions for over 105 days (the troops had been mobilized and positioned well before the war actually broke out) all of which must be considred to have been intense combat. When talking about averages. You see, there is the key, which has been little broached in prior discussion: what do we all mean by "60 days of combat" or even of "intense combat"? I don't even think as that "front line action" can be equated to this term, because, as tero noted in his above post, being in the lines doesn't necessarily mean being directly in battle all the time. It does however imply there is little or no slackening in the mental and physical stress excerted on the troops. The "60 days" figure seems rather small, when compared against the length of WWII overall. To combat veterans, however, it would of course seem an eternity if they were keeping track. Agreed. In my own opinion (subject to correction), intense combat would represent any combat situation in which a soldier came under fire that impressed upon him that he had a chance of becoming a casualty from that engagement. He walks away from the battle unhurt, but it's added on along with the memories of other earlier battles and making him ponder more on his odds of coming through by war's end or being taken off the line. That would mean even a chance encounter with a sniper while on patrol on a relatively slow day counts as intense combat. And it does not take into account if the soldier knows he is up for a rotation to the rear or not. As I said earlier the fear of dying during the last minute of the engagement (or what can considered to be a needless sacrifice) was a very real factor when assessing troop performance. During Winter War the Finnish troops were more resolute in this respect when compared to the performance of the Finnish troops during Continuation War. Consider, by added example, the typical tour of US and British bomber aircrews flying over western Europe. The USAAF tour was 25 missions (increased to 35 by 1944), and 30 for the RAF. In the timeframe of 1942-43, loss percentages per mission were projected in Allied planning to "average" at about 5% or so. This might even had been conveyed to the bomber crews at one time or another. So, assuming the early USAAF case of 25 missions (with no more than one mission a day), a bomber crewman might not cringe at a 95% survival chance for any one mission. But thinking on 95% taken over 25 missions --- that means a survival chance for the whole tour of just under 28%. Jon's original proposed set does not distinquish between actual combat action and front line conditions. I think the analogy is fitting. The mental stress excerted on the bomber crews equals that of the ground troops. On average one lousy mission every two weeks. No biggie, right. I think there is nobody who could say the crews were not veterans after a few runs (if they survived them) and by the time they hit the 20 mark they could be rattled. But the timeframe would be either well below 60 days (actual combat) or over 365 days (front line conditions). Now getting back to the soldier on the line, assume that for each battle he was in, casualties in killed & wounded were also only 5%. (EXTREMELY unlikely for combat units!!) Further assuming no more than one engagement in a day, then after 60 days (engagements), his survival chance goes down to less than 5% overall. So, it's probably little surprise about combat exhaustion setting in after about 60 engagements of "intense combat." Not that the combat soldiers were all busy calculating odds between engagements, but most could intuitively sense that after 60 days of close battle, the odds were so heavily stacked against them. And this is just of the surviving soldiers who made it through those many days of close fighting, without further considering the effect of seeing everyone else who started out with them already being killed or maimed. On a related note: I find it fascinating how the different replacement systems affected the troops and their performance in different armies. The German system made the units coherent internally by having them remain in the (relatively) same level of combat experience. The old units were patched up with similarly old units and the new units were pathed up with experienced NCO's and officers. The Americans filled the units piecemeal thus saturating them with different level of experience across the board. The Finnish system was much like the American system. The difference was the "new guy" syndrome in the American units seems to have been far worse than it was in the Finnish units. AFAICSI the reason for this was the fact during Winter War the new replacements (fresh off the boot camp or volunteers) were usually from the same region the parent unit was formed in and usually the old hands knew the newcomers from civvy street. During Continuation War the replacement system got more varied because during Winter War one time losses during combat concentrated too much to certain regions at a time. Losing 40 men from a single municipality in one hour during one failed counter attack was what happened and that affected the demographics of that region too much to be ignored when the system was overhauled. By Continuation War most of the replacements could have Winter War under their belt and from past experience they knew the really new guys needed coatching more than scorn. Everybody knew the new guy, being inexperienced, was liable to get hurt far more easily than an old hand. But they also knew the limits of the pool of available replacements so every man counted. The new guy did have to prove his worth in combat before he became one of the lads. The old hands gave them tips and somebody was usually assigned to pair up with the replacement until he got battlewise. But the central intangible is how those "60 days" play out. Here again, how of the days of front line action add to the "intense combat" toll? And how are they distributed? I vaguely recall one postwar study of British WWII soldiers being able to "stay on the line" about 300 or 400 days average, but don't recall the source. That's quite a larger figure than the "60 days," but here again, the issue is of how many of those days (again averaged) featured intense combat. I've seen the similar figure on American divisions. And a figure of 90 days of continuous combat before total breakdown for American troops in the Hürtgen forest IIRC. The Finnish divisions remained on the line from 1941 until 1944. Be that as it may all these figures must pale in comparison with the similar German figures. This is what I was teasing about on the "105 days of front line action" for the Finns, tero. That seems low as compared to UK or Commonwealth soldiers. The entire war lasted for only 105 days. During Continuation War the Finnish divisions remained on the line from 1941 until 1944 during Winter War. That means the Finnish soldiers stayed on the line for roughly 1400 days. With a couple of weeks for R&R leave at home a year that still leaves well over 1300 days on the line. Of course, the whole issue is what exactly is being compared here in terms of "front line action." True. It is also a matter of actual intensity of actions during a given timeframe, available resources, losses sustained and tactics and doctrine used. For all intents and purposes that 105 days of Winter War can be said to have been intense combat for the front line troops. On averages. There was no possibility for being rotated to the rear for proper R&R. The only way you got off the line was if you got wounded. The front line units were rotated to the rear for R&R but they had to remain ready for action, they were subject to harrassing bombardment and they had to perform counter attacks because the Finnish doctrine dictated the positions must be in control of friendly troops by the time the engagement was over. That meant any breakthrough had to be handled with forces on the spot. When losses mounted that meant the reserves got depleated at the same rate as the actual front line units. By the end the Finnish army was essentially a force comprised of men who fell asleep standing up (because they had not slept properly for weeks) but who still performed very unlike the "60-day wonders" as described in Jon's example. Things like sense of purpose (motivation), trust in the guys next to you and your immediate superiors and even trust in the arms and assets at your disposal are not factors that can be overlooked when assessing the performance of the troops over prolonged periods of time. During Contination War the Finnish troops remained cohesive even when sustaining cripling casualties. The (small) number of Finnish POW's the Red Army was able to take during the entire war (1939-44) is one indication of the morale of the Finnish troops. Also, one major reason for the initial collapse of the defending units morale during the 1944 Soviet assault was the lack of effective infantry AT assets. They could handle (emotionally) the heavy artillery barrages, the aerial bombardment and the infantry but when they could not deal with the new armour they lost faith. Once the new AT assets became available the troops gained back their fighting spirit rather quickly. In sum, it's immensely variable from unit to unit as to how many soldiers in that unit have seen 40-60 days of intense combat, and thus are becoming "old lags" on a significant scale, even within just one squad. Chances are nonetheless VERY low that a WWII squad is going to have a majority of its soldiers, as having come through enough days of combat as survivors, as to make "combat exhaustion" something to easily scale for. IMO the determining factor should be the time frame, ie if the combat was continuous or not. The fact that can handle the fear of death (you acknowledge you are basically dead in the combat zone) is a universal key which all combat veterans who survived never fail to mention when they tell about how they managed to survive while others died. [ November 07, 2002, 03:50 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by John D Salt: Instead of the conscript/Green/Regular/Veteran/Crack/Elite levels of CM, then, I would imagine experience levels matched roughly to the phases of the Swank & Marchand graph: Green (0-5 days of combat): Fresh: (6-10 days of combat): Experienced (11 to 40 days of combat): Sticky (40 to 50 days of combat): Fought out (50 to 60 days of combat): The überFinns throw in a monkey wrench. Again. The Finnish army endured 105 days of continuous front line action under extreme weather conditions during Winter War. There were basically three types of fronts. - Static with 2 stints of combat with a reatively quiet period in between. Practically no rotation to the rear for R&R. Rotation from front line to reserve and back only. Being in reserves meant fixing the entrencments at night and counter attacks by day. - Static with continuous, increasing pressure by the enemy. Practically no rotation to the rear for R&R. Rotation from front line to reserve and back only. Being in reserves meant fixing the entrencments at night and counter attacks by day. - volatile (mobile actions against an encirceled enemy) with continuous action. Barely adequate rotation to the rear for R&R. Some units in blocking positions were under similar conditions as in the two other examples. Your proposed list leaves out at least one factor: - Fear of death (or the acknowledgement of the possibility of your own demise). "Fear of dying at the last minute of the engagement" - syndrome is a factor related to the experience meter you gave though. One factor perculiar to the Finns during WWII was not the fear of death itself but the possibility of your body not being salvaged to be buried in your home cemetary. I would imagine that the actions described as “fanatic” in CM would be those performed by soldiers in this last category who had somehow been goaded into action and, having lost all hope, demonstrate the “courage of despair”. That explains only a part of the "fanatic" behaviour. IMO there is behaviour that is "fanatic" and what can be called to be "berserker". Fanatic troops act as a group while berserkers are individuals. Can't really see a whole decimated platoon turn "fanatic" but I can see individuals of that unit turn berserk. [ November 06, 2002, 09:12 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by JimF: English should be the initial language as it is the most spoken in the world, but other language mods would quickly follow. Actually, if going by the "most spoken in the world" rule all of the texts and voices should be in Chinese. [ November 06, 2002, 06:57 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Colonel_Deadmarsh: Could a tank driver be killed by one of these methods, thus rendering the tank useless, causing abandonment? Alas, mobility kills due to driver getting whacked is not possible because of the musical chairs the game engine performs for the crews. The first one to go is always the TC.

Any chance getting user defined folders for PBEM play ? Would make life a bit easier. Pretty please.

What about ATR in AA role ? Haven't witnessed any occurances yet so I assume it is not possible. At least the PTRD/PTRS and the Lahti were used to shoot at (and occasionally they actually brought down) ground attack planes.

Originally posted by JonS: The ‘tactical innovation’ was the habitual linking of the same battery with the same battalion. The doctrine of having guns centralised under higher command, and controlled by FO parties forward with the infantry had been established during WW1. Despite what Evans says about the innovation being discovered at Tobruk, it was in fact a bit older. It first appeared in India in the 1930s, and was known as ‘the Indian Method”, or ‘The Indian System’, or some such. So what was the big broobahah about the system Monty came up with (reinstituted) ? In terms of its affect on CM? Yes it is irrelevant. You are correct. When we take into consideration the way armour is modelled in the game. It is very different with the artillery modelling. ..... snipping and coming back later because the bloody browser ate my replies the first time around. Really? I thought in CM the Finnish artillery was exactly the same as the Germans (aside from the radios)? Who’s getting the shaft again? That IS a slur. Eino Tirronen, Tykit Jyrisevät pp 276-277

Originally posted by Paul Jungnitsch: [/qb]That is maybe the result of Naval gunfire support from the Baltic? German heavy ships were used quite effectively to break up Soviet tank attacks, same as the Allies broke up Panzer attacks in Normandy. What is shown are the effects of a combination of Finnish field artillery and aerial bombardment. The only non-field arty assets in play were the Finnish medium bombers and the only German assets were the planes (Ju-87 and FW-190) of detachment Kuhlmey. [ November 01, 2002, 01:24 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Here you can see how heavy barrage affected Soviet armour in the summer of 1944.

The practice of affiliation did not prevent concentration of fire, and the battery was not under command of its affiliated battalion. It was a way of getting people used to working with each other. If the same BC is always working with the same CO, and the same FO is always talking to the same OC, then communication between them is likely to be faster and more effective. Again, it has nothing to do with who commands and controls the artillery. So why was the change (if there was one) called a "tactical innovation" then ? The Finnish army had made this innocation already in the 20's. Incidentally, CMBO is set in 1944-45 and CMBB from 1941-45. What happened in the ‘20’s isn’t relevant. Really ? Are you ready to claim the work in the '20's the Germans did on the concepts of Blitzkrieg is equally irrelvant ? Unfortunately for the RA they didn’t have überFOs who always knew where the right place was They just had to muddle along as best they could, which seems to have been good enough. Who ordered where the FO's should be ? The Finnish arty was a regimental/divisional and not battalion level asset but its was still closely knit to the defensive/offensive operation of the unit it was supporting. And so was the RA. Again, why was there a significant tactical innovation made in 1941 that affected the entire system ? The Finnish arty went through the entire war with unchanged tactics and doctrines. The only significant improvements were the number of radios being increased and the invention of the korjausmuunnin. This indicates some very basic differences in the organizational problems and how they were solved at different level. No it doesn’t, it indicates that you are seeing only what you expect to see. Nope. The Finnish arty tactics and doctrine were based on different axioms from that of the RA. The system was geared around the respective tactics and doctrine. The Finnish set remained basically unchanged while the RA had a series of changes made on the run. Dunno about that – by 1944 the British Army was effectively a conscript army too, yet they still trusted the FOs enough to allow them to command the guns. But from what I read not direct them. Incidentaly, in the Finnish arty the junior (reservist) officers ran also the gun positions. So did the RA through the use of Survey Regiments. The quote referred to WWI. That happened a bit before 1944, and things had changed. Should I interpret it then so that common grid replaced/substituted appropriate/proper survey procedures ? Yes, quite. Still, not really practical when your AO encompasses more or less the whole world, rather than just a little bit of NW Russia Ah, the universal soldier gambit. No matter how hard and vigorously BFC beat that drum I still find it hard to believe the tactics and doctrine are the same all over and once the big picture is set (and it complies with the data which is most readily avialable - which is *gasp* the Anglo-American data) the forces using anomalous procedures just have to sit in the middle and suck on it. Why should the Finnish arty suffer from the afflictions of the big armies or suffer undue penalties when it had been developed to use advanced procedures and it had taken all the precautions so when the **** did hit the fan all the ground work and procedures were so good they lasted the rigours of combat all the way from 1939 to 1945. The only thing amiss were the resources. Once that was rectified things could only get better. Well what? I take it you think leaving infantry unsupported under fire is better than wasting a few rounds of HE? I disagree. There were times, especially during Winter War when there really was no HE to waste. Since the FO was the Johnny on the spot, don’t you think it would be a good idea to listen to him? Remember that in connection with this RA FOs were senior pers. Indeed. How often did standard conditions apply ? I think the Finnish system did not leave things like this to the FO's discretion. He was responsible for supplying the target coordinates and corrections. The rest was down to the system. Oh, I don’t know … how about 30-60 seconds being the general average? I think that is a bit too vague for a basis of a scientific model. Since targets engaged by an AGRA etc would tend to be fairly significant targets, this spread was usually seen as a good thing. After all, the 600 – 800 men of a targeted battalion don’t all fit in the 10m x 10m square identified by an 8-figure grid reference … True. But for maximum effect (density, kg/sqm, what have you) that is also a waste of resources. Huh? Where did you get that from? The quote has nothing to do with TRPs. TRPs are used to re-engage a target quickly some time in the future, not to determine the location of a target. Lets see: Next were those associated with target location, interesting because they show height as a bigger problem than location. The reason for this was that predicted targets tended to be acquired from locating systems such as sound ranging and flash spotting or gridded air photos that were reasonable accurate. However, the locations then had to be plotted on a map to find the target height. The problem then was the inaccuracy of the maps, particularly in France where a well marked feature such as a road junction could be mis-positioned by up to 100 metres. This meant that height was often wrong because it had been taken from the wrong place on the ground. Obviously these problems with maps meant that predicted targets selected by ground observers were also inaccurate,.... Seems to me predicted targets (TRP's in CM) were a bit of a problem for the RA. If the CM model was correct the quote above should have the RA fire on a TRP arrive quickly but over 100m out of place. [qb]The British Army fought in France twice – once in 1940, and again in 1944. Maybe the quality of the maps improved between Round 1 and Round 2. Terrain features 100 meters off ? Does not seem to me they did. Depends on the base PE. Doubling 20m isn’t that significant. Doubling 100m probably is. You are forgetting the placement of the guns on the map. What do überMaps have to do with variable quality fuzes? I would assume with accurate topographical data you set the timed fuses that much more accurately. Sure, why not? With observed fire once you have a round on the ground you can crack straight into adjusting, and can effectively forget about met and all other non-standard conditions. With a predicted engagement all those variables have to be taken into account and calculated for. The question is: if you have all the data already in place and it is accurate how much longer does it take to execute a predicted fire mission as opposed to observed fire mission ? Ammo is cheap. Soldiers aren’t. When both are in short supply it pays to be accurate AND economical. Naturally. Nothing can compare with überFinnish überOR. You are missing the point. According to RA 93% of predicted engagements were ineffective. Why ? I'll have to dig up the data on Finnish firemissions but fro Continuation War I'd have to questimate the efficiency rate for Finnish arty firing predicted engagements was way better than that 7% No, you’ve got the wrong end of the stick again. As soon as you start adjusting the surprise is gone. It doesn’t matter how fast you can complete the registration, it will still be longer than the time it takes the target to get into cover. Registering in the morning, then shooting FFE on it in the afternoon – which is basically what the quote was on about – means that the target may have relaxed in the meantime, and exposed itself again. What happened to silent registration ? Tero, you keep looking for differences and überness. Differences, yes. Überness, no. And sure enough you’ll find it. But what does it mean in game terms? IMO, giving the current model, the differences are less than the resolution of that model. In game terms the Germans and the Soviets get the benefits while the little guys get the shaft. No provisions are made for example for organizational stuff which deviates from the big picture norm. The übermapping is incidental but it did count for us Finns. We had accurate maps and ability to produce them quickly while the Germans complained about the lack of maps. For example. [ October 31, 2002, 02:29 AM: Message edited by: tero ]