Tero

Originally posted by John Kettler: That's odd, since Communicator 4.8 does support frames, as did its predecessor, 4.71. I use NS4.7 primarily at the office and it did not work whereas IE6 works fine. I've had problems with NS with sites which have .css and this type of file in the front page. I've always chalked it up as a MS/IE frame technology which I have thought NS7 can/could handle.

Originally posted by John Kettler: When I try to connect with "For Valor" I get NOT FOUND. Have tried twice. Mac OS 8.6 running Netscape Communicator 4.8. It is down to the Netscape version. You need to get a version that supports frames. [ May 22, 2003, 08:06 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by JonS: I've given a link to the source doc in another thread. Which is where ? It was written by half-a-dozen former DAK guys, so I assume they can be trusted to know what they are talking about. No guestion about that. The red tape you trumpet probably wasn't that big-a-deal. I think that is a matter of interpretation. One keeps reading about the inter-service squabbles they had at all levels so it is up to each and everyone of us to interpret how widespread it was. Remember the size of the forces involved. (DAK = 3-4 divs. Geologic section = approx 10 guys. Etc.) And they were all in NA from what I can tell. True. The red tape is not in the distance, it is in the organization of the entire endevour. 4 (four) different, distinctly separate organizations needed to organize the relatively simple task of mapping. I assume the Artillery Points where simply reference points used to align the maps/photos, etc. Rather like trig points. But since it was artillery surveyors doing the work, they called them ... Artillery Points. Stands to reason. But what were the AP's used for, actually ? It would help if there was some infusion of data about their artillery practises. I thought you said the uberFinnish maps took 48 hours to produce? And that they were suitable, but not that great. Doesn't sound like there is all that much difference to me. You GUESTIMATED 2-3 days. How did you arrive in that figure ? The source says maps were produced in a short time that fully met the requirements of the forces. Yet it also states quite clearly states first, good German maps were available only on the scales of 1:1,000,000 and 1:500,000 and Later, they (British maps) were reprinted. The French maps, used for the first time in Tunisia, were serviceable but were later replaced by German maps Lots of use of lended/captured materiel and reprinting or large scale maps good only for basic high level operations. BTW, in a couple of your statements it is clear you are confusing the several types of maps the Germans used in NA, No confusion. You seem to have a blind spot when it comes to these different kinds of maps and their uses. You seem not to see anything perculiar about everybody having maps of their own for their own use. They had separate topo and road maps for example. Having different scales of maps I do understand but having separate maps for orienteering and for fire direction is not economical. Or end-user friendly during times of crisis. If you think about it, you will see that there is no need for these to go down to platoon level. Indeed. So what did they have at that level ? Maps hand drawn on napkins based on briefings if all the good stuff was at regimental level ? [ May 17, 2003, 04:12 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Quintus: The toothpick, if dipped in a high enough quality ink, can be used to draw very good maps... If you are smart enough and you have all the wood you need you can process that tootpick and lots and lots of other toopicks into paper and use a proper press to apply the ink on the map. That way you get maps with very good print quality. Much better than your hand drawn ones. What matter is how accurate they are and how suitable to the task they are supposed to facilitate no matter how they they are produced.

Originally posted by JonS: I recently came across this highly relevant passage: Excellent. Can you please quote the exact source. A few cursory notes: In Libya, the German Army was initially solely dependent on the hastily reprinted Italian maps Seems they had to rely on these kinds of sources on a regular basis pretty much in every theater. (scale l:2OO,OOO), since at first, good German maps were available only on the scales of 1:1,000,000 and 1:500,000 (which were mainly destined for use by the Luftwaffe). Confirms some of my hunches. In 1941, the Luftwaffe received a special map on a scale of 1:400,000 and in conic projection, which fully met requirements. Requirements set down by and for the Luftwaffe ? The lack of good maps made itself felt, especially in defensive operations. See ? New photographs were accordingly taken of the area of the Marsa el Brega position and of the Buerat position in cooperation with the Luftwaffe, the cartographic detachment of the Africa observation battery, the cartographic section of the German Army High Command, and the Military Geologic Office. LW, DAK, OKH and the Military Geologic Office. Seems like a lot of red tape spanning across half the continent. The following method was used. Looks like the standard triangulation method requiring standard, extensive leg work on the ground. ... especially since only a simple stereoscope was available for the purpose. The Finnish camera was better. Correct evaluation of the form of the terrain and of the condition of the ground on the basis of the aerial photographs required a great deal of experience. The set of photos provided by the Nenon camera (horizon and directly below coupled with the altitude reading) facilitated this part of the job greatly. Errors occasioned by the angle at which the photograph was taken, Not a major problem with the horizon shot. the distortion at the edges of pictures, With a 30% overlap ? In this way, maps were produced in a short time that fully met the requirements of the forces. That is a bit vague as well research assesments and descriptions go. Typical. They gave an accurate picture of the tactical conditions of the terrain, permitted orientation, and contained correctly surveyed artillery points. I assume these artillery points were of prime importance to their artillery method. In respect to tactics, the road maps made by the Military Geologic Office constituted an important supplement. Hmmmmm..... I wonder how that worked. They made separate maps for roads and topographics ? The maps were always available in adequate quantities, with the exception of temporary scarcities brought about by the difficulties of supply. Come on ! When was this source written ? And by whome ? The maps and documentary material of the Military Geographic Branch were used by all headquarters down to the regiment. They were used for the initial basic orientation in the conduct of operations and as such were indispensable. AFAIK the Finnish maps were made available and used all the way down to platoon level. And there were no separate maps for roads. However, since only such documentation as was available at the beginning of the war could be used, there were gaps that only reconnaissance could fill in. That would mean the artillery method could not rely on maps until the artillery points had been surveyd. Unfortunately it doesn't specify any exact times to produce new maps, but based on the activities required I would estimate 2-3 days. Since the source so accuratly puts it: maps were produced in a short time that fully met the requirements of the forces. while they were also (according to the source) always available in adequate quantities, with the exception of temporary scarcities brought about by the difficulties of supply. I have to say your guess is as good as mine. Even if yours is within the ball park it boilds down to the fact the Finnish troops had much more accurate maps (and they were much more artillery friendly since they were made with the artillery usage in mind first and foremost) available down to platoon level in half that time, on average. [ May 16, 2003, 04:57 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

I saw this kind of thing happen with bunkers and pillboxes in CMBO. They were sound contacts but they were ID's as bunkers/pillboxes and the contacts were positioned accuratately in relation to the actual position of the bunker/pillbox.

Originally posted by Hannibal: It would be interesting to see soviet tank losses from d-day on . The russians did fight the german armoured forces when they were at their peak .I assume german armour from a numbers standpoint not qualiy of tanks was much diminished from 41-43 . IIRC in When Titans Clashed there is an appendix which gives the official Soviet loss figures per operation. The figures are most likely for write offs only. For example the tank losses for Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation are listed as heving been ~300. The Finnish claim is 600-1000 depending on the source so that would make 1 write off per 2-3 KO'd.

Originally posted by Marlow: Wasn't commenting on that, I was pointing out to Tero that he was mistaken regarding what the passage did say. And I stand corrected. I focused on the statisticians credited the tank destroyer battalions with the destruction of 306 enemy tanks bit while going through the data I have on the US armoured losses. Compared to the data I have the claim about the SP TD performance during the Ardennes campaign seemed a bit overstated.

Originally posted by Sergei: Well, it is a slight deficiency. With only one tank-vs-tank engagement fought during the three months I felt it needed to be mentioned. But surely the loss ratio speaks for itself and a serious-minded historian neglects everything else! The wonderful world of statistics. Yes, this is the statistics published in 1997 by Maksim Kolomiets (except that he says technical defects counted 1275, battle losses 1904). winterwar.com is offline so I had to go by memory. But it really only includes the losses in the Isthmus. There is another report by professor M. Semirjaga from 1990, according to which out of the 6541 Soviet tanks in the theater Finns destroyed 2268. This according to Käkelä's book. I'll have to dig that up. As an aside, Kolomiets' figures tell that 110 tanks were lost in the Isthmus by sinking to water. That would be consistent with the nature of the later operations when they were attacking over the ice in the Gulf of Finland.

Originally posted by Marlow: Nope. You are correct however, the passage does state that SP TDs had most of the kills. The passage credits the kills to the BATTALIONS, not SP TD's in particular. The SP vs towed gun losses were 1:6 in favour of the SP's. On the tank losses in ETO some average on-hand and loss figures (total): M4's, average monthly (June 6 44 - Jan 20th 45) on-hand figure 2900, reported lost 2855 (Nov 20 44 - Jan 20 45 on-hand 4318, reported lost 1080.) NOTE no figure for February available. M3, M5, M24's average monthly (June 6 44 - Feb 20th 45) on-hand figure 2050, reported lost 1069 (Nov 20 44 - Feb 20 45 on-hand 2885, reported lost 435) M10TD average monthly (June 6 44 - Feb 20th 45) on-hand figure 695, reported lost 439 (Nov 20 44 - Feb 20 45 on-hand 748, reported lost 237) M18TD average monthly (June 6 44 - Feb 20th 45) on hand figure 237, reported lost 120 (Nov 20 44 - Feb 20 45 on-hand 355, reported lost 87) EDIT: source: data kindly given by Mr Anderson at the Dupuy Institute. [ May 07, 2003, 03:56 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Sergei: In the Winter War, the loss ratio of Finnish to Soviet tanks was something like 1 to 550. Not all of those were destroyed in tank duels, however. IIRC the Finnish tanks did not manage to take out ANY of their counterparts during that ONE tank-vs-tank engagement. Of the total of 3000+ tanks the Red Army reported lost "only" ~1200 were combat casualties. And of those they reported ~300 being write offs. Those figures do not however include for example the ~200 - 300 AFV's captured by the Finnish troops as it seems only the Isthmus front casualties are on record.

Originally posted by Sergei: It is of course necessary that the engine keeps track of which targets within LOS of a unit have been spotted by that particular unit, and which targets within LOS haven't been spotted by that unit. (Ie. which targets the unit CAN acquire for direct fire, and which it CAN't - except by area fire.) Indeed. Things get tricky when the target is technically within the field of vision but IRL the firing unit should or would not be able to spot it instantly. There is, however, the caveat that should a tank column get ambushed in open by a gun, they probably wouldn't just stand still and keep their cool until someone figured out where the gun actually was, but they would start firing at most probable locations to keep the enemy heads down while they move to a safer location. Having this hindered by too great a delay wouldn't make sense to me, while I guess it'd take some time for the surprised TC's to react and give any sensible orders orders to the gunner. True. But by the same token there is the automated response factor that would make them fire wildly at anything that looks like a target, including a grassy knoll 500m to the left (or even 180º) of the actual position the fire is coming from. I would not deem it unrealistic that a command delay to break off such an automated response to reacquire a new target would be even greater than it would be if they have not started firing automatically. And of course there are also the numbnuts who misinterpret the delibetate commands and target the wrong spot by mistake making others follow their lead and making the fire direction even harder. And inevitably there is the issue of using tracers and/or other fire diretion tools and how they draw enemy fire suppressing the unit commanders or command units and making the fire direction even harder. [ April 24, 2003, 05:27 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by wwb_99: Could be that once broken by an external factor, the targeting always stays broken. Since the presence of drift of barrages is modelled in the game to be the norm (albeit a random one) I'd expect pretty much the only way to get rid of this particular bug would be to do away with the certainty of the occurance of the drift.

Originally posted by Scipio: Units always select their targets on their own if not ordered to hide or a covered arc. Ay, even if they are facing 180º away from it when it lits up.

Originally posted by Scipio: Don't be so sure that the flash is so easy to spot at daytime, especially in sunshine. I will not say that it is invisble, but is not so obvisious as you might think if you don't look into that direction. Lets look at the pertaining laws of physics of the matter: sound travels at ~300 meters per second while the shot travels at or near 1000 meters per second. If the circumstances are right and you do not see the shot being actually fired the shell will hit its target before you hear the report. And the sound of the hitting round may inundate the sound of the gun firing thus discuising the approximate direction the shot was fired from.

Originally posted by redwolf: I think the idea to give area targetting a command delay is an excellent one. (for unit targetting it isn't, the TacAI often needs to be overwritten in its bad choices, but for area fire it sounds cool) What if the target is or can be actually spotted by the firing unit legitimately ? No need to use area fire if the target is lit up and targetable as a point target.

Originally posted by Tripps: Some have been scenarios with pre-selected forces (as was the first example) but I would say both. I've found the command delays for the Russians are in effect, in regards to following orders, so the Russian tank could be sitting there for a whole turn waiting to fulfil it's orders, but in the meantime, its no micky when it spots an enemy AFV! I think there seems to be a correlation between a vehicle belonging to a platoon and the accuracy of the first shot. Especially if there are more than one tank from the platoon in LOS of the target.

Any idea if the Soviet armour is present as platoons or are they singly purchased vehicles ?

Originally posted by RSColonel_131st: wouldn't it in reality be possiple, once the shells start falling, to request the aiming point to be layed back a few meters? In other words, aim at the outskirts of the wood, establish that the Arty is on target, then lay the fire 50 meters back and have it REALLY cook up the woods? IRL you can request it be changed as far as you like, even if the target is beyond LOS. If you know for example there is a depression 200m which you can not see behind a barn you can see nothing prevents you from firing a few ranging/registering shots and the ordering the fire mission proper 200m from the location of the shots. If you have the barn already registered you can order the fire mission without the ranging/registering shots. If I'm not mistaken, changing Arty target during bombardment so far is only possiple for area in LOS. I think a good gunner could make small corrections to either side without the FO needing to recheck. Actually the gunner is not the key person. The key person is the guy doing the calculations.

One translation of the Finnish word penger is dike. It sounds a bit .... dubious if you would go around saying Are you really sure you want to be doing that ? [ March 13, 2003, 09:07 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by Keke: - Tero, dont you know that only American pov and nationalism are good, other povs and nationalism of other countries are bad, and can be described as terrorism if necessary... Well...... - When German 144th ID came to Viipurinlahti early July 1944 to help Finns, its artillery was given only preplanned targets, as its lesser flexibility compared to Finnish artillery was known to all. I hope Andreas would pick up on this and do some independent research from the German POV. - In all fairness it has to be pointed out that Finnish artillery got its act together not until early July 1944, when there was sufficient amount of guns, ammunition and efficiently trained personnel to carry out the doctrines drafted by Artillery General Nenonen. At Karelian Isthmus the arrival of 6th ID from Eastern Karelia with its excellent arty staff was the turning point. Well, the act was together far earlier than 1944 when talking about the battery/battalion level implementation. It was together in 1939, in theory since there were precious little to throw at the enemy. It was together in 1941, this time with sufficient assets. The only thing that was "new" in 1944 was the massing of multiple battalions on a single target under a single FO.

Originally posted by Sardaukar: Most if not all aspects of Finnish artillery can be modelled in CMBB already. Indeed. I'm not tying my panties in a knot because of what is missing as such. It is the implementation of what is present in the current model that gives me heartburn. Would it be fun for gameplay perspective. IMHO no. The scale of the battle is all important. Steve said in a low LOS (small/medium ? sized) battle the role of the artillery is insignificant. I wonder how that would have played out IRL in the hilly forest wilderness of the Eastern Karelia for example. Or the Hürtgen forest for that matter. (but not as much as to Finns, since we are speaking about effectiveness now, not numbers). I wonder how that would fit into the design philosophy of the model. I believe the artillery was toned down because of the weight of fire issues vs effectivness, not because of the accuracy of fire vs effectivness issues.

Originally posted by Battlefront.com: Ah, got it. What I meant by "automatic" is the adjustment phase. Player's won't have to issue seperate commands to judge range, correct for error, etc. Just tell the FO what you want to hit and how you want to hit it, and the code will do the rest. That part is REALLY simple to program from a conceptual standpoint. If there is one thing programmers love it is real world If/Then proceedures. Will there be an option to have FFE without ranging shots and/or corrections ? Also, will there be a possibility to choose from TOT and "regular" firemission. It would be nice to have multiple FO's target the same area and have a coordinated, massed TOT fire mission. We probably will, however, give FOs some sort of Cover Arc type thing so they can be set to trigger based on limited parameters (SOPs). Will this incorporate TRP's in LOS to FO's or HQ units capable of calling in artillery ?

Originally posted by Andreas: Just a note.... Thank you for the info. Can you direct me to a more specific source on the subject ? To say that the German troops used Michelin when abroad is only part of the truth. It is also one of the most widely spread truths I'm afraid. These would have been useless for firing based on the map. Indeed. More important were either surveys undertaken on the hoof by the Kartographiebatterien, Astro-Batterien, both a branch of the artillery as the name indicates (this was rare) or the use of captured military maps of the enemy, which were then reprinted and overprinted with German and additional indications. Cartograhical units were present down to division level in some cases. Do you have anything on the production and distribution of maps in the Eastern front ? to think that the Germans were worse at this then the Finns is just a ludicrous statement. For what reason: because it is totally inconciveable anybody, let alone the Finnish lice, would be better than the Germans in any field ? I would like to see the super-douper detailed all-singing all dancing minutely accurate Finnish map of the approaches to the Caucasus please, to have some proof of that statement. Who ever claimed this should answer. Steve ? A question - since the Finns were so great with their maps, did they actually share them with the German artillery units in Finnland? AFAIK no. Another question - how good were the Finns at counter-battery, AFAIK not too many counterbattery fire missions were fired because the hardware lacked the necessary range. When counter-battery was fired it was generally at least as effective as the German counter-battery fire. especially in northern Finland? That is easy: no Finnish artillery in Northern Finland before late 1944.

Originally posted by Battlefront.com: You wanted to compare apples to oranges in order to paint Finnish topographical abilities as superior. I simply turned it around. You don't like that? Fine, withdraw your comment. You did not turn anything around. You simply made a hyberbole that is not on the subject. You make a big deal about the universal applicability of the model you have created. Your claim is to be universally applicable the actual Finnish topographical survey would have had to have extended from Petsamo to the Black Sea. Or preferably around the globe. I contest that. The Finnish army did not map the entire Western USSR. So what ? Topographics was and is not a Finnish secret art. But unlike the forces you modelled the arty aspect in CM on the Finnish artillery used methods which relied heavily on the availability of accurate topographical data. I hope you are not trying to deny the importance of topographical survey to the artillery practises during WWII. This is not the right question. The question should be, which nation was satisfied to have a limited war goal. Finland had modest goals and therefore required only modest resources to obtain their goals (which were ultimately not obtained). Germany had completely unrealistic goals and therefore its system was completely unable to cope with it. Topography was the least of these problems. What is the relevance of strategic goals in a CM scale battle and how do they affect it ? What is the relevance of the availability (or unavailability as the case may be) of accurate topographical data in a CM scale battle and how would it affect it ? I think it is rather relevant that in the meager days of the 30's the Finnish army made a relatively huge effort to compensate the projected limited resources in fire power by being able to deliver what little would be available as accurately as humanly possible. Other armies took different approaches. I am sure the German's weren't all that much worse off either. So why did they complain when they came across a rail line not present in their maps ? Those kinds of things happened to the Finnish troops too, especially when they were retaking the ceded areas where the occupying Soviet forces had built for example rail lines. Their problem was one of scale. Their front moved KMs within hours. This was not the case on the Finnish front except for very small and geographically limited areas. True. But if you look at the universal applicability of the model you have created I would hesitate to say the problem was scale. The Germans did after all create their artillery doctrine which suited their operative needs. And which have been regarded as having been among the very best in the world at the time. I'd say that if there is a problem then it is one of priorization. The Finnish artillery had different priorities and concerns than the German artillery. You keep pointing out that the Finns did not have to map the entire western USSR. If they did or not is totally irrelevant and beside the point. You have built a model which you claim is universally applicable. That does not mean quantity will supercede quality when weighing the relative merits of the parts that make up the whole. Stuff like ballistics, meteorlogics and so on, including topography are universally applicable. The fact that the Finnish army fought in only one relatively narrow front and fired relatively few rounds is not worth jack even when compared to the delivered weight of fire and the number of fronts covered by the big armies . All are subject to the same basic, universally applicable facts of scientific life. If your main concern is the integrity of the model and taking into account the differences in the level of topographical preparedness will unbalance it then say so. Only then the model will no longer be universally applicable since all things are not equal. This is not to say the Finns were substandard or not better than the Germans, rather I simply made the statement because you presumed them to be superior. I presumed the Finnish method to have been superior because nobody, including you, has actually produced any real data on the subject of German topographical survey and its relevance to the German artillery doctrine. My understanding is the Germans (like the Americans and the British) developed their methods so that they would compensate the lack of accurate topographical data with other means. This way their methods would be workable in the Western Desert as well as they would be in the Arctic circle. Also, several Finnish period sources have stated to that effect. In the absence of contradicting facts I can only reach the conclusion I have. If anybody comes across relevant data I will wellcome it with open arms. And if that data will trash all the Finnish sources then I will openly admit I am wrong. As you do with anything Finnish. Everybody has a subjective POV on things. Even you. I do not presume any and all things Finnish are superior by default. Take the LS-26 vs Degtaryev for example. The LS was a fine weapon but not as good as the DT in field conditions. Correct. If the Finns suddenly found themselves advancing on Moscow they certainly would have had similar problems. Perhaps. Perhaps not. The way the Finnish army operated I would imagine they would have churned out instant maps they way they did IRL. Provided of course that the Finnish army would have used historical methods but had, say, the German resources. Or did they have maps of all of Russia from the Finnish border to the Black Sea and over to the Urals better than the Germans did? Nope. But I would say that the Finnish army would have made sure they had them available to them in case they were needed. This is true. Since the Soviets weren't exactly welcoming of German cartographers running around their HUGE country, where and when were the Germans supposed to get better maps? That guestion is in the very core of the subject. I hope you did not mean it as a rethorical guestion. To be able to answer the guestion for the Germans you'd have to gather data on the recce missions they flew, their cartography service practises and how their intelligence apparatus was tied to these. Furthermore, how did things develop between 1941 and 1944-45. The Finnish army made the recce flights and the instant maps were made from the recce photos, printed and made available to the front line units on average within 48hrs of the flight. During the static phase the maps were being improved where necessary. Then a hunch is that technically speaking, their mapping capabilities were on a par. I'd imagine so. Apart from the special camera which noted flight altitude took and two pictures simultaneously, (one from the terrain below and one from the horizon to get the terrain elevation differences) I can not see how the ground based triangulation process would have been very different. But the Germans had to do what the Finns never did, which was map all of the Soviet Union during active military operations. The Finnish army did it in its sector using the methods and equipment developed before the war. As you said it was a matter of resources. But it was also a matter of priorization. Incidentaly, I did come to blows with Andreas over the Normandy area mapping when I first refused to believe the Germans did no topographical survey in occupied France between 1940 and 1944. You asked because you wanted to imply bias/ignorance. Otherwise you would not have asked. If I had wanted to imply bias/ignorance I would not have asked. I would have stated it flat out. You take it for granted my frame of reference is a Finnish one and most of my statements are based on that. Is is SO incredible to believe an Amercian (in this case) giving expert opinion is basing his statement in his respective frame of reference ? I have no doubt the opinion was an informed one. But I do think any thoughts on alternative methods in existence during WWII were not considered because at the time it was not knows such existed. I am sure a Fininsh mortar man would have given a slighly different appraisal of the situation and its dynamics. You tried IIRC. No. I just asked what makes my POV bad and your POV good. The Finnish experience had NO bearing on the Western Front. At the time I was under the impression it would have a bearing on the universally applicable model you had created. Nationalism has nothing to do with it. Simple historical facts do. Agreed. Except I think there is no such thing as a simple historical fact. The problem is you regullarly point out differences with the aim of showing that the Finnish method is superior or uniquely clever compared to the others. And mostly people get hung up on the supposed attitude instead of tacling the subject with relevant counter facts. It is hard to discuss things from the Finnish POV if I do not type the word Finnish in every other sentence. You have openly stated your contempt for "Western" sources, for example. Contempt is not the correct adjective. It is one you have chosen yourself. I do admit I do not bow down in awe when people start throwing around the big names and their work and expect the work to speak for itself without any critisism. By the same token I am not revering any Finnish sources without critisism. It is just there are precious few reliable contradictory sources in existence. That is not contempt. You also do not think that anybody who is no Finnish could grasp anything Finnish in nature. No exactly. I do think a historian who has not accessed Finnish archives and primary sources can not render objective judgement on political decisions and actions taken by the Finns during the war. And I do abhor revering work of a historian has used solely German or Soviet sources and which is giving a "definitive" view on the events in the Finnish front. Even other Finns speak of it to me. I do hope I am not the main subject of the conversations. If you haven't noticed I have largely ignored/refuted all issues brought up that are not relevant. No matter where they originate. However, the US and Brit doctrine/abilities are a common frame of refference for nearly all Forum members, so it is idiotic to think that they should not be used for at least comparision's sake. The operative phrase being "comparions sake". That IMO should imply that there is some comparing to something different, not similar, is being made.