Tero

Originally posted by Michael Emrys: That's certainly true. But my impression, and somebody correct me if I'm mistaken, is that the parallel sheaf was by far the most commonly used, not least because it was quick to arrange and get the shells on target. I was going to say "by far most commonly used" is an overstatement but then I realized that it applies to all other armies in the game except the Finnish army. The others require a little more calculation, don't they? Yes. But if you do the math beforehand or you have aids (aid's, aids'? ) the others will not take much more time to set up.

Originally posted by JonS: Yes, really. You'll note that Nigels site explains that the maps were available, even though it was sometimes a challenge to produce them. Quality of maps is always variable, but I fail to see what the problem is with either creating a new grid - as long is everyoine uses the same one it doesn't atter where the origin is. The "problem" is you claimed the WA had better maps than the Germans. I also fail to see the heartache is using gridded aerial photos. In fact, I'd say that properly produced gridded photos would make superb maps. Yes. For orienteering. For fire direction they are less than perfect but perfectly workable. The problem is you need to have adjoining frames taken at the same altitude and attitude. AFAIK only the Finnish army had a purpose built camera which took pictured simultaneously from the horizon making it possible to aling the maps better for corrections. Your 'fact' isn't, and your conclusion is no surprise to anyone. Feel free to trash the "fact" in detail. If you can be bothered to actually produce sources that indictate the WA training was better than the German training ? Yes. On land and not on ships ? Without an effective way of including them in the game, toys by themselves are meaningless. The "one-size-fit-all" approach taken now in less than perfect when dealing with multiple armies with different procedures. Just to re-iterate: in my post above I said "doctrine, procedures, and equipment" which should generally be taken to mean more than "doctrine" alone. More is by no means necessarily better. If you subsribe to the catch phrase "all things being equal" you focus by definition on the quantity more than quality. People habitually trash the Red Army doctrine and procedures eventhough they had more than enough in the equipment department. The WA get exhalted for their doctrine, procedures and equipment as a matter of course. Thus the Soviets get longer delays while the weight of fire they can churn out has no bearing on the proceedings. [ December 09, 2004, 03:58 AM: Message edited by: Tero ]

Originally posted by junk2drive: November 1940, Wilkie wins the US presidential election after Roosevelt continues to refuse to get involved in another European war. Calls for more support of the hopeless British in their attempt to drive the Nazis off the Isles have resulted in little more than boatloads of supplies. Wilkie quickly gets Congress to declare war on the Axis. How could he have overcome any quicker the Congress isolationists who were forestalling any and all involvement in European wars if FDR (supposedly) had such great difficulties in coersing the country to war ?

Originally posted by Dandelion: ...as primarily an expression of intense dislike of the the enemy,.... Intense dislike ? How much more PC can you get ?

Originally posted by JonS: * Quality and availability of maps. Really ? http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/maindoc.htm#Organisation%20and%20Equipment%20-%20Observers The Germans had the same problems. * Quantity of radios and organisation of radio networks. Concur. * Availability of guns and ammunition. No contest. Especially after 1942. * Number of guns. Look above. * Highly trained and readily available Air OPs. The value of which is debatable. * Ability for a single FOO to order anything from a single gun to every gun in range. At short notice. It seems many (most) armies mastered this to some degree this by 1942-43. * Quality of training of all ranks. Given the fact the British system did not establish a wide base for expansion during war time I'd have to say the Germans had the edge on this one. * CB organisation In what respect ? * Radar spotting and direction They had ground radars back then ? Most of the points presented in favour of WA are in the realm of production and assets, not the doctrine itself.

Originally posted by JonS: Can't comment on the Soviets, but I'm doubtful, except in some fairly restrictive cases. AFAIK the Soviet armour was strictly DF. Technically their SPA was capable of doing indirect fire but doctrinally and organizationally that was a no-no. Not sure about the Germans, but am very doubtful. Apart from Hummel/Wespe and other pure SPA I would say the armour was very unlikely to do any indirect fire. Their Stug crews were artillery so they would have been able to perfrom the fire missions but I have never heard they did it. By 44/45 the Germans were well behind the WAs in terms of artillery doctrine, procedures, and equipment (meaning more far than just the guns themselves). Please ellaborate. At face value at least the British and the German doctrines were fairly similar. Artillery, and especially field artillery which was by far the commonest sort found at the pointy bit, was - and still is - an area weapon of low lethality measured over individual rounds and fire missions. Concur. The lethality is incidental. It is the suppression which is the more effective measure of success. The size, shape, and location of the area to be hit can all be specified with considerable accuracy, but where the rounds fall within that area is largely a random process. A single gun mission (for example the one Blackburn does late in the Normandy campaign) is a very special, very slow mission type, but it can be used to direct individual rounds onto a very small target. Yes. But the point is you CAN use stitch fire from a single gun to take down a bridge or a bunker. FOs did not, could not, and still do not specify a required % casualty figure when ordering a mission. If they did many a mission would have been cancelled.

Originally posted by Michael Emrys: Sorry, but I can't figure out what you mean by this. You are not the first one. For reference http://www.poeland.com/tanks/artillery/sheafs.html I'm not a redleg, but my understanding is that with battery fire, the guns aren't aimed at the same spot, but are usually aimed in parallel trajectories so as to give a natural dispersal. This depends totally on the SOP of the army in guestion. And "natural dispersal" means you have less shells on target. Naturally, the nature of the target is also a part of the equation. To me the TRP is of little value if the firing method is not appropriate. You assing a point target and then fire by the hectare. Of course it would be possible to aim them so as to provide a converging sheaf focussed on a relatively small point. Such fire would be devastating...if it hit the target. Moreover, such strikes should be limited in terms of number of shells and duration. And TOT is essential in this respect. Again, things largely dependent on the SOP and fire plan.

Originally posted by YankeeDog: Also, remember that you can't just slap the carriage of even a 75mm IG down on the ground and start popping off indirect fire. Given the higher projectile velocity and recoil (relative to mortars, that is) even light howizters would generally take far longer to set up well enough to get any reasonable level of accuracy with indirect fire. Players are deluding themselves, though, if they think this should be a common, easy-to-use tactic in a battalion-level game like CM. Generally speaking, yes. But that does not take into account different battle types. If we are told in defensive type battles both sides have had enough time to set up things like TRP's and other "time consuming" measures then one would imagine the on-map assets would be included in the fire plan. Some things are much more visible from the air than they are from the ground (and vice versa). For example, any kind of fresh digging (such as a foxhole) tends to be easily spotted from the air due to the different color of the fresh earth, even if there are trees or other overhead cover. On the other side of the coin, terrain elements that offer very little concealment from ground observation, such as the shadow on the side of a building, make units virtually invisible from the air. Having the air assets ALWAYS make a pass on a legit target instead of a, say, haystack is less than realistic. Oh, and as for the tighter fall of shot pattern of on-board mortars: Yes, try firing an on-map mortar at a range similar to what the off-map mortar batteries would presumably be firing. That is, a good 1.5km or more. You will find that the longer the range gets, the more spread out the shell pattern gets, especially in range. At about 2km+, it gets pretty close to the spread of an off-board battery, especially if there's a bit of a breeze about. Funny thing, that. . . OK. Now do the same with 4 or six tubes and what kind of results do you get if you use the same spot as aiming point ? On my last refresher training I specifically asked this from the mortar pukes and they told us they have to manipulate the piece to make the shells scatter from the aiming point, no matter what the range. Otherwise the shells would hit the same spot pratically all the time. But they are just überFinnish mortar pukes using WWII era 82mm Red Army mortars so what do they know about these things.

Originally posted by Redwolf: If Tero would learn to quote right so that he wouldn't let Moon's part appear as his in the quote, I would tell him that with direct control like in the CM HQ situation the spotter can adjust each individual tube. In the remote FO situation there is additional overhead and/or only adjustment of the battery as a whole. True. But that then leads to the guestion about the aiming poing. Howcome the aim point for individual tubes in a battery is the same but the fall pattern would have them sitting on top of each other ? For on-map assets you can simulate the 50% hit zone being in the same spot and have the fall patter not being the same for all. The pattern for the indirect fire is far too wide in CMBB and CMAK, though. Agreed.

Originally posted by Pzman: Maybe due range? The on map arty has a lot less ground to cover and thus is less impacted by wind, and other aspects of traviling through the air, I would guess. That does not really account for the discrepency. If the weather is the same for both on-map and off-map assets then the fall of shells should be the same for both IF proper measures are taken to compensate for range and shell flight time.

Originally posted by Moon: The issue got muddied a bit after CMBO, of course. Still, in 90% of the case, the ability to direct indirect fire from on-map artillery for anything but mortars is realistic. This leaves only one guestion: why can the on-map mortars group their shots far tighter than their off-map brethren ?

Originally posted by poppys: Sanitation was like most other controllable conditions in any war, it depended upon the positive or negative control exerted by the officers of any given unit of any given country. Just like whether or not prisoners were treated according to the Geneva Convention. In many instances, Im sure, there was no way to control wheather or not someone took a dump in some certain location, and a house with a little cover would be better than out in the outhouse as most of the WW2 era European country homes or for that matter US country homes did not have indoor plumbing. Of course I have the advantage of being born on an Arkansas farm in 1938, so I remember that out houses are cold and isolated. poppys Indeed. The officers are only part of the equation. The troops themselves have to have a basic knowledge of the matter. Ie, city dwellers will have less civilian experience in sanitation in field condition than people from the farms and logging camps. If you have officers quoting manuals to a bunch of city people accustomed to pulling a cord to dispose of the waste you will have different results compared to if you have farmers and loggers being told by their officer they need to build a "facility" (a ****ter for the less squemish members of the community).

Originally posted by General Colt: Like my mother always said: When the conversation turns to **** its time to QUIT. Quite a poet that lady... Moon, please lock this thread... Why ? If you can discuss killing in graphic detail then you should be able to stomack discussion about bodily functions without resorting to kiddie stuff like "number one" and "number two".

Originally posted by Sergei: Well, sick troops are probably more prone to flee in reality too. The guestion is are they able to flee ? You hardly can be described as a spirited fighter when all you can think of is the functioning of your stomach and bowels. I would imagine the Japanese had the same problems as the ANZAC's, the British and the USMC and I have never seen it mentioned they were not spirited fighters. And as mentioned the troops deviced ways to poop while staying alert (or the other way around ) so I think this particular aspect of the general condition of the troops did not affect the morale as much as it did their actual fighting capabilities. What would be the difference between the reload time be for a squatting man vs a prone/kneeling man ?

Originally posted by Sergei: Sick troops can be modelled with the weakened or unfit attributes. We'll just have to hope that CMX2 will model "smell contacts"... Yes. But which is more effective, a depleated squad or a full squad in CM ? I would imagine there were IRL squads with full complement with every member having dysentry. The use of unfit status now in CM is a bit dodgy since it affects morale. And since soiled pants are (I imagine) commonplace in combat I doubt seeing your mates dashing for a dump, especially when you know they are dashing for a dump, does not have the same effect in morale as seeing them dashing for safety in panic. Mind you, I have seen very few pictures of the fallen who have been killed with their pants down. Even the one(s) I have seen stated in the caption they were not killed in action.

Originally posted by Macphail: very interesting thread guys, but the real question above, was what relation this has to the game, and should there be some sort of performance penalty. no. Actually it should. Dysentry (just like malaria) will affect your performance every bit as much as extreme heat or cold. That does not mean a man is excused duty because of them. Bad or insufficient gear to shelter a man from the elements is every bit as debilitating as frozen mud in the tracks. The game simulates machinery stalling because of frozen tracks etc. Just because the phenomenon does not effect mechanical stuff does not mean there should be no penalties for theses kinds of things for the infantry. BFC will call for qualititive and quantitative data on these things of course. Trenchfoot etc causes are easier to qualify and quantify, dysentry and other related things are not. Mainly because of the "delicacy" of the issue which has left it undcumented from the annals of war.

The Germans were sloppy in every front. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=57851

Originally posted by Other Means: I thought I'd try and invoke some debate on what universal tactical rules we can think of that may be of use in CMx2. Simple, atomic things that can used as parameters for the fuzzy logic of the AI. The "universal soldier" approach. (NOTE: My take is rooted in WWII) MG's placement Only the Germans have a easily portable, belt fed GPMG, the rest have other arrangements (BAR, DT, Bren etc LMG's and Maxim etc HMG's) Need to be in cover The Germans dug in in front of the forest tree line, the Red Army and the Finns inside the forest tree line. The Western Allies ? Need to be as far back as possible Depends on the terrain. And the cover SOP. Need to be able to see at least 20% of the horizon Does not work in places like Hürtgen, Karelia, the Pripet marches etc Attack should go through covered ground Leading to lucrative predeterminable choke points ripe for preplanned arty hot spots. Infantry should not get closer than 25m between squads That would automatically push leading elements too far beyond the covering base of fire in certain situations (cresting a ridge line etc). If attacking through no cover a call to arty for smoke should be made (arty will be handled according to need) Finns did not use arty deployed smoke. Squads should advance in formation See the "no closer than 25m" rule. Also, there were differences between the use of walking fire and squad/half squad/smaller element rushes. Formation should change according to threat level etc Dependant on the small arms demographics of the squads.

Originally posted by Sergei: VIB is both faster and better armed (with .50 and .303 cal MG's), I think... doesn't seem like there is anything similar in CMAK. Agreed. Except I think the heavier mg is a 14mm one. The French Hotckiss for example would be ideal but since it is not included in CMAK (at least on the Allied side) IMO VIB is the only viable stand in. With zero ammo on either gun it can pass off as either male or female version. The main trouble is the performance (ROF, penetration etc) of the heavy MG is far better than the actual single shot 37mm gun in the FT.

Mk-VIB ?

The report suggests that the Ferdinand went into combat with the circular hatch wide open, as does the drawing. This suggests a major vulnerability if Russian infantry got to close quarters. </font>

Originally posted by poppy: But---In CM the artillary available to either side is not enough [hopefully] to be the dominating factor as to which side wins. IIRC the arty in CM is watered down so that it does not degenerate the battles into arty slugfests (which would be historically predominant). This pertains to the intensity of the barrages rather than the tech-spec. So-- I still believe that the M1 is under rated in the 100m and 250m and 500m ranges. Military rifles in WW1 were all bolt action and in WW2 Great Britian and Germany still depended on the bolt action rifle. The US on the other hand developed a semi-automatic rifle of the same ballistics +- for a very good reason. It can be aimed and fired without taking your finger off the trigger for eight rounds and this is a great advantage when you are trying to hit something, especially if that something is moving. Except the practical aimed fire ROF is for all intents and purposes the same for the M1 as it is for the bolt action rifles. And for suppression purposes the MG/LMG/SMG work better. Ceterum cenceo the SMG is getting a bum rap in CM.

Originally posted by JasonC: I would appreciate the reverse sort of link, to whatever study John is referring to, because I still find the figure highly implausible. http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/boccage10.html As for turnover in infantry, in most US divisions in WW II it ran between 1 time and 2 times. And that reflected non-battle losses (disease, trench foot&frostbite, accidents, etc) about equal to battle losses. While single units might have reached 5 times, that was not the norm by any means. Not exactly. The total turnover with non-combat losses is for the entire complement whereas the KIA/WIA/DOW is mainly to the the combat element of the division. Loss rates specifically in the infantry per day after a division entered the fighting are typically on the order of 1%, with whole division figures of 25 to 50 per day. In the heaviest offensive fighting that reaches a few hundred per day - US in Normandy, Germans at Kursk. Meaning the 25-50 loss formation becomes the battalion. Sounds plausible. Except, what about the non-combat losses which are figured in in the total casualty rate ? Constant 1% per day divisional loss rate in non-combat days to non-combat causes seems a bit excessive. Especially when trenchfoot for example does not figure in until winter time. And it is well know what kind of a bane it was for the US combat units during the winter of 1944. And as already shown above from the overall medical statistics, most of those already quite low losses came from shell fragments. Most probably from indirect arty and mortars - since tanks were often rare on the other side. I hope you noticed that artillery caused a constant ~50% of all types of casualties (lethal and non-lethal) where as small arms cause close to 50% more fatal (~30% of the fatal subtotal) than non-fatal (~20% of the non-fatal subtotal) wounds. The link I gave has stats for offensive posture, as well as overall. That is where most of the losses occur and importantly where most of them are actually categorized. Losses on defense have a high "unknown causes" component - wounded are often captured as well, aid stations displace, etc. How big is that unknown factor ? In the link you provided it says below the table 40: The portion lost to bullets does not soar 2-3 times on offense. On the contrary, the average is itself largely set by experience on offense, particularly for the WW II figures. What makes you think this is the case ? Small arms are more lethal, relatively speaking, than artillery since the number of lethal wounds inflicted is greater than the number of non-lethal wounds inflicted. Most tactical combat is about getting an enemy off a particular piece of ground. It is not a matter of destroying his force, but of putting modest portions of it in danger, sufficent to persuade them to leave a given spot. Artillery bleds the enemy over longer time scales than these tactical combats, and over weeks and months burns out entire formations. This relative indecisiveness of directly inflicted tactical maneuver arms casualties is one reason breakthrough and encirclement matter. Units don't just die when hit frontally at modest odds - they instead bled slightly and displace. Fully encircled units fail to displace. The two sources of significant, campaign scale casualties are (1) artillery attrition and (2) maneuver arm encirclement. Except encirclement induced casualties are totally irrelevant in this context since irrevocable casualties due to attrition caused be surrender are not included in these figures. When talking about the relative effectivness of weapons systems it is irrelevant if the enemy is neutralized because he was captured since that does not reflect the effectiness of the weapons system. It reflects the effectivness of tactics and doctrine. "The enemy can not push the button if you disable his hand!"

Originally posted by Snarker: Maybe Tero will revisit us and post them again. Ranked right up there with the 'I pissed him off on purpose so he would growl and show his teeth' thread. Sorry, too tired at the moment. One of the twins had stomach troubles last night. And besides, the pictures were not by me anyway.

Originally posted by Redwolf: You also need to take into account that the 4 pdr and 6 pdr AT guns were excellent for their caliber. 4 pdr ? The round modeled in CMAK and CMBB for the Pak36 has a large HE charge which weakens the round considerably (limiting maximum penetration no matter how fast it hits) and also makes it a lot lighter. Why the values in CMAK are lower than in CMBB I don't know. How does the PAK36 compare with other 37mm guns ? IIRC at least the US 37 gun (both AT and tank gun variant) was a derivative of the Bofors design.