chrisl

I've pissed off birds before.
They not only bear a grudge, but manage to communicate it to all other members of the same species.  
Don't piss off birds.

I've pissed off birds before.
They not only bear a grudge, but manage to communicate it to all other members of the same species.  
Don't piss off birds.

I've pissed off birds before.
They not only bear a grudge, but manage to communicate it to all other members of the same species.  
Don't piss off birds.

Every single time they succeed at something they also lose resources that they aren't  able to fully replace.

Right?!  Gawd help us if we in the west ever get into a real war.  After the first setback we will be ready to wave white flags if this proxy war is any indication.  I am losing count of how many times the Russians take a small berg somewhere after weeks of trying and people freak out - “aaah, see the Russians are winning!  Abandon ship!!”  
Meanwhile the Ukrainians are basically spelling on bridges with arty shells and crippling Russian logistics, after collapsing a Russian front in the north, pushing them off Kharkiv, stalling then Donbas assault, and now this thing in Kherson.  But those are just flukes as the “Russians bide their time” and wait for their moment…while bleeding all over everything.

I don't think it's a problem with computation capability, or even ability to quantify resources.  The problem is quantifying victory conditions in a way that you can say "Nation X is 20% of the way to victory", or "If Nation X gains 3 meters of ground tomorrow, they'll be 0.0001% closer to victory".  In CM it's relatively straightforward to define degrees of victory because there are concrete goals: low own casualties/high opponent casualties, terrain location gains, number of units moved across a goal to represent a breakthrough, capture of items, etc.  And the victory conditions are roughly symmetric, where if Player A has to capture location X, Player B has to deny them that location.
In a real war like the Ukraine conflict there are many things easy to quantify (and easy to measure if you know the right people).  How many vehicles of each type each army has; how many infantry each has; how many logistics resources are needed (and available) to keep them supplied; how soon will X unit run out of supply if cut off; what manufacturing (or external resupply) capability does each side have, and can it keep up with usage/losses.  All that stuff goes into people saying two days after Russia crosses the line "Oh, those guys look like they got far, but they're toast and going to collapse".  But at no point can we quantify how much closer or farther from victory that takes either side.  We can even estimate when Russia will run out of functioning tanks, or outrun their 152 mm shell manufacturing capability, or run out of planes because there's a part only available from the west that fails after N hours of flight, on average.  And more.  And we can use it to predict outcomes of movements.  But none of it provide a quantitative value for how close Russia is to losing, or Ukraine is to winning, or vice versa.  It comes down to non-quantifiable victory conditions and partial victory conditions.

It goes back to the business principle of "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it" (or the engineering version "if you can't measure it, you can't control it").  The problem that people too often run into without realizing it is grabbing something that they can measure and managing/controlling around that without regard for whether it's even a proxy for the thing you're trying to control, let alone the thing you're trying to control.  I see it happen plenty of times in engineering situations where people should know better.
Counting bodies is much more quantifiable than evaluating success in the implementation of political/social objectives and evaluators of progress (who aren't necessarily the military, they may be politicians or the press) often fall back on that at the expense of viewing strategic goals.  A big part of why this thread has been so interesting is that there's a lot of inspection into the quantitative strategic impact of low level tactical events.  Popular press might say "Russia is pasting region X of Ukraine with artillery for days", while the analysis here will look at whether Russia can continue that for long enough to meaningfully take objectives, and what objectives might be achievable with the estimated long term resources.
edit: And there are all sorts of tools sold in the engineering and business world for "quantitatively" evaluating customer goals or selection of systems when there are multiple stakeholders who all have different goals/metrics/things they care about.  As quantitative tools they're all 100% garbage because they're readily gameable by anybody who's ever played games.  But they aren't actually useless - the value comes in making people consciously game them to get the result they want so they have to think about what criteria they actually care about.  But they're ultimately qualitative, not quantitative.

It goes back to the business principle of "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it" (or the engineering version "if you can't measure it, you can't control it").  The problem that people too often run into without realizing it is grabbing something that they can measure and managing/controlling around that without regard for whether it's even a proxy for the thing you're trying to control, let alone the thing you're trying to control.  I see it happen plenty of times in engineering situations where people should know better.
Counting bodies is much more quantifiable than evaluating success in the implementation of political/social objectives and evaluators of progress (who aren't necessarily the military, they may be politicians or the press) often fall back on that at the expense of viewing strategic goals.  A big part of why this thread has been so interesting is that there's a lot of inspection into the quantitative strategic impact of low level tactical events.  Popular press might say "Russia is pasting region X of Ukraine with artillery for days", while the analysis here will look at whether Russia can continue that for long enough to meaningfully take objectives, and what objectives might be achievable with the estimated long term resources.
edit: And there are all sorts of tools sold in the engineering and business world for "quantitatively" evaluating customer goals or selection of systems when there are multiple stakeholders who all have different goals/metrics/things they care about.  As quantitative tools they're all 100% garbage because they're readily gameable by anybody who's ever played games.  But they aren't actually useless - the value comes in making people consciously game them to get the result they want so they have to think about what criteria they actually care about.  But they're ultimately qualitative, not quantitative.

It seems to me that it's probably akin to the Drake equation- a fairly simplistic equation with multiple independent terms. The difficulty with Drake is that we have little idea what value to assign each of the values. Reasonable assumptions lead to wildly different outcomes, from "we're alone and always will be" to "Alan the Alien should be here next week".
In the warfare equivalent we have some idea for the factors (recruitable population, GDP, access to trade, ...) there is no certainty about the weighting for each from war to war or even month to month. For example: Allied GDP was crucial in WWI and WWII, yet all but irrelevant in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russian manpower reserves was crucial in WWII, but having no impact so far in Ukraine. Technology was overwhelmingly important at Omdurman, but irrelevant in Vietnam. And so on. We know the factors, but the damn weightings keep changing.

Crimea: perhaps we are counting our chickens before they hatch, no?   First is Kherson, about which many of us are confident will fall due to lack of supply.  Then there's the landbridge, what I call Melitopol front.  Plus need to clear RU away from north of Kharkiv.  There's a lot to do before crimea, though Putin's fear of losing could be good fun to watch.  Maybe he'll do like Hitler and park a huge force there (17th army, I believe), able to do nothing but sit.  
Anyone read Forczyk's WW2 crimea book?  There's a bit where Stalin wants to clear crimea but RU general says something like "why attack them?  they are in a prison camp where they have to feed themselves".

😁

Well, since nobody else went there, I'm finding it impossible to avoid going and posting the first thing that came to mind when I read that:
 

Well, since nobody else went there, I'm finding it impossible to avoid going and posting the first thing that came to mind when I read that:
 

Putin's Pocket?  

Putin's Pocket?  

You can think that, but there's not much to support it.
Your second to last sentence shows a confusion that's also common in most press reports.  Delivery systems and warheads are distinct from each other.  If the warheads don't go "boom" the delivery systems don't matter. 
Russia hasn't done a nuclear test that went "boom" since 1990.  They talk a lot, but the impression I get is that it's all powerpoint.  The latest wunderweapon is this hypersonic missile.  Without a warhead it's just a kinetic energy weapon.  It's also a non-trivial thing to do.  Russia is good at rockets - they've managed to maintain a very reliable launch program for 30 years post-USSR and have some of the most reliable launch vehicles you can get.  I have no doubt that they can make something go hypersonic.  The hard part is controlling it as a maneuver vehicle in the atmosphere, and there's no evidence that they've been able to do that.  We've spent the last 5 months looking at their "precision" guidance capability, their "advances" in armor and APS, their AD radar systems, etc, and there's not much there.  
Given that they haven't done a test that went "boom" since 1990, it's a pretty good bet that they haven't developed anything new in the warhead department.  They could possibly have developed a new fission bomb in the ~10 kT range - that's not that hard to do and they have a lot of materials laying around, but that stuff is also tracked (and leaves tracks) and I can't find anything indicating that there's anything new.  This congressional report from 2022 notes a lot of delivery system development, but given the actual resources available to Russia to do that, it's probably a lot of powerpoint and staged demos.  And delivery systems don't mean much if the warheads don't go "boom".
Warheads take a lot of maintenance.  The US spends ~$20B/year on "stockpile stewardship", which translates in real terms into "how do we make sure the bombs will explode without actually exploding one".  That's about 1/3 of the total Russian military budget.  You can make the argument that US engineers cost proportionally more, but it's a weak one. The US doesn't have anywhere near the level of corruption in the political and military budgets that Russia has, and has a lot of controls to make sure they're actually getting what they're paying for.  And the bright Russian scientists and engineers can come to the US and make US engineer and scientist salaries.  And even with all that, the US nuclear weapons development program nearly died about 20 years ago due to lack of interest from scientists and engineers not being interested in working on it (there was an NYT article or series on it that I haven't been able to find). Russia faces much worse problems in getting the technical people necessary to maintain their weapons systems and keeping them trained and making sure they're actually doing the work.  
You're correct that "it is a deadly serious national security asset that demands strict monitoring", but I suspect most of the monitoring is coming from the outside through arms control agreements (and maybe a bit of espionage), which do nothing to make sure the bombs will work, just that there aren't more than there are supposed to be and that the material is accounted for.  The corruption within Russia is pervasive enough that unless you can show me something concrete, it's likely at least as bad in the nuke maintenance department as it is with the truck tires.  At least someone is going to see if the truck tires go flat in the lot.
And as has already been pointed out (more by other posters) - a nuclear arsenal only works if it's not going "boom" outside of tests.  Actually pushing a button to launch nukes in anger is an indication that your nuclear strategy failed, because you'll stop existing less than 60 minutes later, along with your country in any meaningful sense. If Putin wanted to make a real nuclear threat, he'd set one off on a test range.  But he'd also want to be really, really sure that it went off, because if it doesn't, the threat fizzles as fast as the bomb does.

They're currently functioning exactly as designed - not a single NATO member is coming across the border to help in Ukraine.  They're sending lots of stuff, but Ukraine is on their own for troops.  The way Russia's other neighbors have stepped up, there's a non-zero chance there would be more belligerents signed onto defending Ukraine if Russia didn't have a nuclear arsenal. And Russia is being very, very careful to no drop any shrapnel on NATO members, despite all the posturing.

They're currently functioning exactly as designed - not a single NATO member is coming across the border to help in Ukraine.  They're sending lots of stuff, but Ukraine is on their own for troops.  The way Russia's other neighbors have stepped up, there's a non-zero chance there would be more belligerents signed onto defending Ukraine if Russia didn't have a nuclear arsenal. And Russia is being very, very careful to no drop any shrapnel on NATO members, despite all the posturing.

Russia has a limited ability to escalate after they've used a nuke.  Could they use more of them?  Sure.  Would it be a good idea? Not at all - it would turn most Russia into radioactive glass.  We've already seen the asymmetry in the quality of equipment from Russia - do you think the nuclear situation is any different?  Nuclear weapons require maintenance, and there's orders of magnitude difference in the amount of money the US puts into making sure they'll work compared to what Russia spends.  And Russia has to deal with the corruption, lazyness, and brain drain factors on top of that.  Why would anybody responsible for going into a radiation environment to maintain Russian nukes bother, when they fully expect that they'll never be used?  Much easier to check the boxes and take the money.
And the US wouldn't necessarily have to respond with nukes - the response could be an overwhelming conventional strike on key Russian resources, including nuclear facilities and Putin's dacha.  Or eliminate the Russian air force?  There's a bunch of NATO stuff flying around on the Russian border - you can see the refueling tankers on ADSBExchange all the time, but you don't see the things that are being refueled.

I do agree with you that there will be a response. But for one tactical nuke, the better answer would be a no-fly zone over Ukraine. A 'tit-for-tat' nuke would not accomplish much and had mostly symbolic value. A no-fly zone would more or less end the war, and the shame would be on Russia.
It would be a huge win (in this context) if the narrative after the war is 'we dropped the bomb, but still didn't win the war'.
But I really doubt anything like that will happen.

You can think that, but there's not much to support it.
Your second to last sentence shows a confusion that's also common in most press reports.  Delivery systems and warheads are distinct from each other.  If the warheads don't go "boom" the delivery systems don't matter. 
Russia hasn't done a nuclear test that went "boom" since 1990.  They talk a lot, but the impression I get is that it's all powerpoint.  The latest wunderweapon is this hypersonic missile.  Without a warhead it's just a kinetic energy weapon.  It's also a non-trivial thing to do.  Russia is good at rockets - they've managed to maintain a very reliable launch program for 30 years post-USSR and have some of the most reliable launch vehicles you can get.  I have no doubt that they can make something go hypersonic.  The hard part is controlling it as a maneuver vehicle in the atmosphere, and there's no evidence that they've been able to do that.  We've spent the last 5 months looking at their "precision" guidance capability, their "advances" in armor and APS, their AD radar systems, etc, and there's not much there.  
Given that they haven't done a test that went "boom" since 1990, it's a pretty good bet that they haven't developed anything new in the warhead department.  They could possibly have developed a new fission bomb in the ~10 kT range - that's not that hard to do and they have a lot of materials laying around, but that stuff is also tracked (and leaves tracks) and I can't find anything indicating that there's anything new.  This congressional report from 2022 notes a lot of delivery system development, but given the actual resources available to Russia to do that, it's probably a lot of powerpoint and staged demos.  And delivery systems don't mean much if the warheads don't go "boom".
Warheads take a lot of maintenance.  The US spends ~$20B/year on "stockpile stewardship", which translates in real terms into "how do we make sure the bombs will explode without actually exploding one".  That's about 1/3 of the total Russian military budget.  You can make the argument that US engineers cost proportionally more, but it's a weak one. The US doesn't have anywhere near the level of corruption in the political and military budgets that Russia has, and has a lot of controls to make sure they're actually getting what they're paying for.  And the bright Russian scientists and engineers can come to the US and make US engineer and scientist salaries.  And even with all that, the US nuclear weapons development program nearly died about 20 years ago due to lack of interest from scientists and engineers not being interested in working on it (there was an NYT article or series on it that I haven't been able to find). Russia faces much worse problems in getting the technical people necessary to maintain their weapons systems and keeping them trained and making sure they're actually doing the work.  
You're correct that "it is a deadly serious national security asset that demands strict monitoring", but I suspect most of the monitoring is coming from the outside through arms control agreements (and maybe a bit of espionage), which do nothing to make sure the bombs will work, just that there aren't more than there are supposed to be and that the material is accounted for.  The corruption within Russia is pervasive enough that unless you can show me something concrete, it's likely at least as bad in the nuke maintenance department as it is with the truck tires.  At least someone is going to see if the truck tires go flat in the lot.
And as has already been pointed out (more by other posters) - a nuclear arsenal only works if it's not going "boom" outside of tests.  Actually pushing a button to launch nukes in anger is an indication that your nuclear strategy failed, because you'll stop existing less than 60 minutes later, along with your country in any meaningful sense. If Putin wanted to make a real nuclear threat, he'd set one off on a test range.  But he'd also want to be really, really sure that it went off, because if it doesn't, the threat fizzles as fast as the bomb does.

The US spends a LOT on testing, both computer modeling and non-nuclear physical testing, plus the money spent on maintenance, to ensure the nuclear arsenal is "ready."  This is because we also, while not ratifying the CTBT, abide by it and have not tested a nuclear weapons in a long time. I know that people who do that work will say the verification that they do assures the weapons will work. I don't know much about the Russians, unfortunately.
Someone a bit back (sorry I didn't quote it), mentioned observer verification. What was said is correct. They are verifying launch vehicles and warheads, but not anything about whether they will work or not. That's a very involved process (see above about spending a LOT 🙂 )
Part of the research work I did was to come up with better ways for inspectors to verify stored, disassembled warheads. Say you can't physically touch them, weigh them, take a sample, etc, but you CAN from a reasonably close distance read the gamma radiation they give off. Can you then verify that the entire warhead is there? You want to know that it hasn't been opened and the whole inside taken out and left only a shell so that it appears visually to be whole. Verifying non-diversion of nuclear material. Securing this material is something we (the US) spent quite a bit helping the Russians to improve. It's been a good investment. Turns out this is an extremely hard problem to solve and requires some sophisticated mathematical techniques to converge to a reasonable answer. One of my technical papers could be summarized as: "Here are 4 new ways we tried to solve this and none were completely satisfactory. One was sort of ok, but not great"  It actually went over pretty well, because no one had tried these before but several in the audience had wondered. Negative data is still good data, and people won't waste time!

Dave

This is publicly available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests_of_the_Soviet_Union
We also have substantially better remote sensing capability for detecting tests now than we did 30 years ago.

The US really has to respond to a nuclear attack.
Post-Soviet Ukraine was born with the world's third largest nuclear arsenal.  They didn't have control over the launch/arming systems, but could have in a year or so.  Instead they voluntarily gave up the entire arsenal in return for assurances of security.  Failure to support Ukraine as much as possible (even now with conventional weapons) would basically toss out 50 years of work on non-proliferation. Not only would no state willingly disarm, but it will ensure a bunch of small (and less stable) states develop nuclear programs or work to buy nuclear weapons from other countries.  Letting even a tactical nuke go unanswered would make all that happen even faster, putting everyone on Earth at much higher risk overnight.  The current situation is already putting non-proliferation at risk - if Ukraine had kept and taken firing control of the nuclear weapons they inherited, none of this would be happening now.